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MILNET Analysis
Changes to the U.S. Intelligence Community, Updated July 10, 2008

"...the Intelligence Community (IC) has been largely, and perhaps inevitably, shaped by the Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union.  This struggle gave shape to a specific set of "intelligence norms," i.e., organizations, products, practices, relationships and ways of doing business that extend throughout the IC. Some of these intelligence norms are likely to be fairly stable, regardless of U.S. national security policy or the international political environment. Others may be outdated and no longer responsive to U.S. national security requirements as we enter the 21st century. IC21 seeks to determine which of these intelligence norms are still relevant, which need to be either revised or replaced, and what alternatives there are to be added."
- IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century,  Staff Study, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, 104th Congress, June 1996.

Clearly the U.S. Government has been concerned with the growing threat of International Terrorism to the American citizen.  Ironically, Ambassador Paul Bremer's National Commission on Terrorism predicted a mass casualty attack on the U.S. in its report earlier in 2000, as did the Hart Rudman final report in December of 2000.  While the reports did not go unheeded, any response to the warning was slow or ineffective -- as made obvious by the 9/11 terrorists.  Clearly Intelligence and Terrorism are inextricably linked today and will continue to be linked for decades to come.

This report summarizes proposals for changes that have been made for the U.S. Intelligence Community.  Obviously some of the details of changes are extremely sensitive.  Our anonymous sources have been very careful to not reveal any information not already in the public view, even going as far as pointing our research at public documents or statements.  The public documents, some of which were highly classified at one time, are depressing, as many of the things we believe contributed to 9/11 have been cited time and time again by those focusing their intellect on the U.S Intelligence Community.

This analysis will look back at recommendations made as far back as 1949, through the eyes of 1996 Congressional Study that looked at ways to improve the U.S. Intelligence Community.  The study went back to the Truman days to see what recommendations had been made in relation to the current Intelligence Community, as well as recommended a future direction based upon the beliefs at the time (circa 1996). 

We will provide links to the Staff Statements from the Joint Inquiry on 9/11 (Hill Staff Reports), to get, perhaps, an insight to how Congress will be approaching future changes to the Intelligence Community.  When Commission's interim and final reports are released, we will add them to this "work in progress" briefing.  Will will offer analysis and quotes from the current debates as the Joint Inquiry and 9/11 Commissions delve into Intelligence Community failures circa 2004.  Links are available to many of the modern documents so that the reader can read them for themselves.

The following list summarizes the sections in our analysis, with links to allow the reader to immediately navigate to the section of interest.  However, we recommend reading this entire analysis, beginning to end, as we build upon early data to make several key points throughout.  The reader should also note, for further reading, the bibliography at the end of the briefing.


Note: The following Executive Summary and a footnote in the sources section at the end of this document constitute the changes made on July 19, 2002.  Other updates are prefaced with a bolded date for the reader's convenience.

Executive Summary of Most Recent Recommendations

The most recommendations for changes to the Intelligence Community come from both the most recent legislative effort, the 9/11 Commission, and the earlier analysis by Ambassador Paul Bremer's 2000 National Commission on Terrorism.  Also we add the thoughts of the acting CIA Director John McLaughlin on one of the key recommendations.

Bremer's National Commission on Terrorism (2000) recommended:

[Emphasis by MILNET]

The Joint Inquiry on the Intelligence Community Response (June 2002) to the Terrorist Attacks on the United States staff made the following recommendations:

CIA
 FBI
 NSA
 Congress
9/11 Commission Staff Reports , prior to July 22, 2004.

 The 9/11 Commission's early staff statements made the followoing recommendations:
Another key issue is a holdover from an earlier analysis which recommends a separate cabinet post for intelligence reporting directly the U.S. President.  [Emhasis by MILNET]

This may or may not be a recommendation by the 9/11 Commission's preliminary set ofrecommendations, however, acting CIA chief John McLaughlin stated on July 19, 2004, "a good argument can be made" for a Cabinet-level position to oversee the nation's 15 intelligence agencies and control their budgets. e3

But, he added, "It doesn't relate particularly to the world I live in. I see the director of Central Intelligence as someone who is able to do that and is empowered to do so under the National Security Act of 1947."

A.P. also reports that McLaughlin said, "the CIA's acting director said Sunday a new national intelligence chief is unnecessary and that intelligence agencies have made changes since the 2001 attacks to better protect the country". e3

The other idea receiving lots of discussion in Washington comes from the 1996-1997 commissions, which recommended a separate Clandestine Service.


Congressional Joint Inquiry, September through  October 2002:

The Congressional Joint Inquiry on Intelligence Activities in Relation to September 11, 2001 led by Director Elanor Hill made no actual recomendations but clearly felt that the responsbility for the attacks on 9/11 lie with Al Qaeda, and that the U.S. must make changes to both homeland security and the intelligence input to the operation.


9/11 Commission Final Report, July 22, 2004

The final report was extremely critical of both the CIA and the FBI.  The failures were attributed both to systemic intercommunications problems as well as interpretation of legislation and erroneous adminstrative rules and regulations.  And while the Commission clearly felt particular low level workers did not execute specific duties that might have led to prevention, the management failure to either identify the crucial nature of those duties or to follow up to ensure the duties were performed made it impossible for the Commission to point out particular persons for disciplinary action, nor would that effort be condusive to future investigations.

Many of these items have been addressed within the Department of Homeland Security, however there is clearly a move on to make new and bigger changes in the FBI and quite possibly severe changes to the CIA.

The key recommendatons of the 9/11 Commission include five "unifying actions" focused on counterterrorism, all which have an impact on the U.S. Intelligence Community:

Future Action

Combining the concepts discussed in this section would a) create a cabinet level post overseeing all of the U.S. Intelligence Community with direct budget and chain of command authority, b) create a new Clandestine Service for covert action and counter intelligence overseas, c) make changes to reporting and analysis to better work with the consumers of intelligence output, and d) improve the counter terrorism analysis, information sharing, and budgets with an emphais on Department of Justice and the FBI..  Obviously that is huge effort.  More likely to occur is the U.S. Government will implement a number of the 9/11 Commission recommendations.  Indeed, the U.S. President announced on August 15 that he would create the office of the National Intelligence Director and establish the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).

In hearings before the Senate Governmental Affairs subcommittee, three former Directors of Central Intelligence, William Webster, R. James Woolsey and Stansfield Turner gave opinions which supported the seperation of responsibilities for the leader of the Intelligence Community from that of the Director of the CIA. The so called "spy masters" essentially supported the concept of a National Intelligence Director -- NID (See the MILNET briefing  on the related Committee meetings) and creation of the National Counterterrorism Center -- NCTC, but with caveats on the Commissions recommendations for dual hatting the NID's deputies.

One very interesting point to come out in the hearings was the fact that the Department of Defense may feel threatened by a possible movement out of its control of budget items for some of its 15 incorporated intelligence operations.  This includes NSA, NRO, and perhaps others.  The witnesses agreed that some basis for shared budget control between a new NID and the Secretary of Defense might be necessary in order overcome bureacratic hurdles in gaining approval of any legislation that modifies the budget process to that extent.  This issue may also explain the Bush Administration's reluctance to enthusiastically support all recommendations of the 9/11 Commision, while at the same time taking positive steps such as announcing the intent to establish an NID and NCTC. 

Note too that the NCTC will most likely be an expansion and enhancement of the existing Terrorist Threat Integration Center stood up in May of 2003 and run autonomously under the auspices of the Director of Central Intelligence.

Another very controversal recommendation which has received overwhelming condemnation was the idea of moving all covert and paramilitary action into the Department of Defense.  With few intelligence and military professionals voicing approval of the concept, this particular recommendation is unlikely to be acted upon.

Update details are in the full report sections below and summarized in a separate popup window.


UPDATE:  August 22, 2004

Senate GOP members of the Senate Committee on Intelligence announced they are backing a bill that would remove all intelligence activities from within the CIA and DoD, and place them under a wholly new National Intelligence Director.  Three departments including CIA operations would be effected and some four DoD agencies would be effected, the NSA, NRO, NGSIA, and the HUMINT activities within the DIA.


Update: September 9, 2004

The White House released the National Intelligence Executive Order detailing the President's changes to the intelligence community.  This follows a radio address that disclosed details previous to the release.


UPDATE:  September 10, 2004

McCain and Lieberman introduce S.2774 the "9/11 Commission Report Implementation Act of 2004" (PDF 449K) which essentially implements all of the 9/11 Commission recommendations, very much like the Roberts bill.  It is not clear at this time, if the Robert's org chart would be effected by the McCain-Lieberman proposal.


UPDATE:  September 15, 2004

Senate and House leaders committed to producing a minimum of legislation before the October recess, creating the National Intelligence Director position and giving the NID full budget authority over the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget -- essentially all the non-military portions of the intelligence community budget.  This appears to be fast tracked due to White House support and in MILNET's analysis reflects Congressional desires to implement what will be acceptable as a first step and not resisted by the White House and the Department of Defense. 

UPDATE:  November 23, 2004
 
Post 2004 election, Congress has failed to implement the changes proposed by the 9/11 Commission.  However the U.S. President continues to make changes that are within his power.  The White House announced on November 18, 2004 that the President, after appointing Porter Goss to head Central Intelligence Agency, directed the new DCIA to begin his own implementations of the 9/11 commission recommendations that effect the agency, specifically to increase the number of analysts and field operatives.  And admidst some nashing of teeth within the agency, a number of CIA top leaders have fled.  The directive is available on MILNET

Update December 5, 2004

The winter holiday Congressional recess resulted in a stalled bill for implementation of the 9/11 Commission recommendations.  As a result, a lame duck session is being considered and President Bush has thrown his support for a bill that leaves the 15 agencies within their own departments but does implement many of the NID recommendations of the Commission.  For more detail, see the Fox News report, House to Return for Intel Reform Debate.


Update December 8, 2004

After intense negotiation on language intended to preserve the national command authority and subordinate military chain of command in the specificiation and use of real time tactical intelligence assets and information for the battlefield warfighter as well as removal of a driver's license minimum standard requirement for states, the Bill H.R. 10 (similar to H.R. 5024, PDF 104KB) was reported out of the house and passed.  The U.S. Senate took up the bill T  and it was expected to pass shortly.  Fox News' "Fast Facts" has a nice summary of the bill's provisions.  At the end of the day on the 8th, the Senate had passed the bill, and it now waits for the President to sign it.

Update June 13, 2005:

The U.S. Department of Justice's Inspector General, after negotiation with the attorney of an accussed terrorist named in the investigation, released a declassified and redacted version of his report on the FBI's handling of Intelligence related to the 9/11 attacks.  The report echoes the 9/11 Commission findings and points out no less than the five chances the FBI had to pass on information on terrorists to the CIA.  The report intimates similar mistakes in the CIA, however, as the DOJ is the parent governmental organization of the FBI, the IG apparently did not feel it within his pervue to criticize the CIA.  It is clear, however, that changes were needed within the FBI.  It is also clear that the new National Intelligence Director will need to work closely with the Director of the FBI and the Secretary of Homeland Security to ensure similar mistakes do not occur in the future.  The text of the report is mirrored on MILNET



Introduction

The research for this document was conducted over a nine year span beginning early in 1995.  The author has collected, read and analyzed every document referred to in this analysis, pursuing an interest in Intelligence Community and International Terrorism.  While this had not been a full time endeavor, it has been one of the author's more scholarly efforts. The interest in the structure and operations of the U.S. Intelligence Community and covert operations has spanned two decades, thankfully with no opportunities to participate directly. Please read past the technical  literary faults and assess the information on its true value.  Note that due to the study of this area, MILNET, in its various forms over the last 20 years was among the first to raise the alarm about international terrorism and its destiny -- its arrival on our shores and killing large numbers of Americans first overseas, and at home.  While we may not have been the most authoriative source of that alarm, and certainly could not predict the details, we have consistently accused Congress and multiple parties and administrations of ignoring the warnings.  Saying "told you so" is usually worthless.  In this case, maybe it will serve to remind government officials that theirs is not the only minds that perceive of and recommend changes to the Intelligence Community.

The picture painted by the research is at the same time  illuminating, impressive, and sadly, depressing. All of the MILNET sources agreed that, "You cannot stop every terrorist in our society.  Sadly, they can stand up in a crowd, aim a rifle and shoot a 3 year old with some amount of impunity.  Our citizens are not armed and are led to believe our law enforcement can and will protect them.  Nothing is further from the truth.  Law Enforcement is an after-the-fact proposition.  Someone breaks the law and retaliation takes place.  It is only since 9/11 that there is a universal recognition that prevention can and must take precedence when it comes to terrorism.  We cannot stop a determined Terrorist willing to give up his or her life.  Impossible."

The sad truth is that we live in a free society, with incumbent rights for ourselves, and limits upon our local, state, and federal governments.  The result is that we rely on others, perhaps braver and better armed to protect us, and in the process have relegated ourselves to a certain helplessness. 

Putting that aside, our government has been and remains focused upon taking the steps to better protect us, and yes, prevention is a key element in every step they take.  MILNET's intelligence community and military contacts are adamant.  Protection of the population of this country, whether at home or overseas, is their paramount mission.  Many feel a sense of guilt when they consider that perhaps something more could have been done, and many take responsibility even if they were not directly involved in the decisions or lack therein which allowed the attacks to succeed.  Fortunately, they are all professionals and the self imposed guilt, whether right or wrong, has galvanized them into an incredible and forceful determination.  As one military officer related, "We are at maximum steel!  Don't F%$* with us, we have a nasty, deadly bite!" . 


A Few Words on the Research

In all, between 1949 and 1996 there were some 25 commissions, studies or major legislation proposals dealing with the Intelligence Community.  It should be noted that until the Murphy Commission, much of the analysis and reporting was highly classified until many years after their release.  Public acknowledgment of changes desired in the Intelligence Community and public discourse on the topic did not really take place until 1975.
  1. First Hoover Commission/Task Force on National Security Organization/The Eberstadt Report, 1949
  2. Intelligence Survey Group (Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report), 1949
  3. The Doolittle Report (Submitted directly to President Eisenhower), 1954
  4. Second Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government/Task Force on Intelligence Activities, 1955
  5. Bruce-Lovett Report, 1956 (presumably still highly classified)
  6. Taylor Commission Report, June 1961
  7. Kirkpatrick Report, 1961 (presumably still highly classified)
  8. The Schlesinger Report, 1971
  9. Murphy Commission, 1975
  10. Rockefeller Commission (Commission on CIA Activities within the United States), 1975
  11. Church Committee (Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities), 1976
  12. Pike Committee (House Select Committee on Intelligence), 1976
  13. Clifford and Cline Proposals, 1976, not implemented into law, but effected Presidential Directives
  14. National Intelligence Reorganization and Reform Act of 1978 (Huddelston and Boland, 1978-1980), not enacted
  15. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-511) (a small piece enacted out of NIRRA of 78)
  16. S.2284, 96th Congress legislation which did not leave committee, however the Hughes-Ryan Act portion did become law
  17. Executive Order 11905 - President Gerald Ford, 1976
  18. Executive Order 12036 - President Jimmy Carter, 1978
  19. Executive Order 12333 - President Ronald Reagan, 1981
  20. The Turner Proposal - DCI Stansfeld Turner, 1985
  21. Iran-Contra Investigation, 1987
  22. Boren-McCurdy, 1992 proposed legislation, not enacted
  23. Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community (Aspin Commission), 1995-1996, had great influence on the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 1995 (P.L. 103-359) of September 27, 1994
  24. U.S. Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 3/96
  25. IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century, 6/96
In addition, five significant legislation and commissions have occurred since the IC21 report:
  1. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (SR 735) enacted
  2. Modernizing Intelligence: Structure and Change for the 21st Century, General William Odom, 1997
  3. Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities to Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 1999, December 2000.
  4. Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities to Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 1999, December 2001
  5. National Commission on Terrorism, Ambassador Paul Bremer, August 2000
And of course, as a result of the 9/11 attacks, much has been done, in a somewhat emergency fashion to better improve our ability to thwart terrorism, all of which have effects on the Intelligence Community:
  1. The U.S. Patriot Act, October 2001
  2. Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities to Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, Dec. 2001
  3. Counterintelligence Capabilities and Performance Prior to 9/11, The Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence--HPSCI, July 2002
  4. Staff Statements, Joint Inquiry  9/11 into the Intelligence Community Response to the Terrorist Attack on the United States,  9/18 - 10/08, 2002
  5. Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, The Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence--HPSCI, December 10, 2002
  6. The National Homeland Security and Combating Terrorism Act of 2002, June 2002
  7. Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities to Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, Dec. 2002
  8. Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities to Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, Dec. 2003
  9. Staff Statements 15 thru 17, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, June 17, 2004
  10. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, June 22, 2004
The total number cited here is some 39 important commissions, reports and/or attempts at legislation over the last 50 plus years since the end of World War II, all aimed at improving the Intelligence Community.

 The IC21 report's conclusion is that most of the recommendations in the 25 important reports, legislation and commissions covered by their research have been implemented in one form or another.  However, our examination shows that many of the changes occurred as elements in National Security Council directives, Presidential Directives or specific agency regulation changes, all subject to change as each administration takes office. Only legislation has any permanent effect and the political winds tend NOT to modify legislation as easily as the other forms of directed change.  As we point out in the 9/11 Lessons section below, some common problems were noted but never effectively repaired.  These problems were instrumental in the Intelligence failure that contributed to the success of the 9/11 attacks.  The Joint Inquiry Staff in October of 2002 said as much -- we paraphrase here "lots of recommendations for major change have gone unheeded, maybe 9/11 will serve to accelerate and force the changes needed."  See the Future Section for the actual quote.





Early Intelligence Concepts



As the U.S. dreaded the war it could not avoid  in 1939, the U.S. Intelligence Community, such as it was, already was well conflicted internally. There were the academians who held that spying on each other was somehow "un-gentlemanly", a concept that had prevented investment on military procurement since before World War I.  Even overhead reconnaissance had a difficult time becoming a military endeavor.  It took a World War I pilot to pull out a pistol and shoot at his brethren looking down at the troops on the battlefield from a balloon for reconnaissance to even warrant defensive measures.

Thus the early efforts in intelligence were, to say the least, schizophrenic.  And that mindset continues today, with every decade finding those who would rather hire "nice guys" to "politely" spy on their opponents.  For many decades there was even a code amongst the spies themselves -- it was "bad policy" to kill the spies of your opponents in certain cities, least you start a sort of underground war in the dark circles of espionage.

It was not until 1946 that Congress began to deal with the issue, perhaps attempting to prestige events as the Truman administration began to prepare the country for an uneasy peace that would soon become the so called "Cold War". 

The soon to be  DCI Hillenkoetter and Colonel Bill Donovan (the man in charge of the mostly dominant WWII U.S. Intelligence agency, the O.S.S..) were arguing over who should have the power to do what, including defense attaches, state department drones, as well as those secret of all secret people the cryptographers.  Donovan, quite naturally, thought there should be one central clearing house, a Central Agency for producing the information required by the various "customers" in the government.  Hillenkoetter was afraid that this central agency would have too much power and was also concerned over how to parse out the domestic counterintelligence versus foreign counterintelligence.   Donovan saw no problems with lots of power.  FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover had his own ideas, holding onto domestic counterintelligence as tightly as he could, least the FBI just become a "super police department" for the U.S.

Thus the three opponents were watched over without much in the way of oversight and legal standing.  By 1947, Congress had come to grips with the problems, eliciting begrudging compromise from those most concerned.  The result was the National Security Act of 1947  codified in Public Law. 80-253 (found at 50 U.S.C. , Chapter 15 -- the code of the act, and USC 50 Title 18 which deals with the crimes Counterintelligence is supposed to guard against).  The act reputedly still has sections that remained highly classified.  Perhaps this is due to supposedly some language dealing with signals interception, the NSA and other related areas are too "telling" to allow the American public and our opponents to peek!

In the Act, the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency including construction of buildings, payroll and other mundane activities mask the more interesting points.  Each year, for instance, a Presidential directive is be forwarded to allow the reinstatement of certain authorities of the U.S. Intelligence Community.  The Act details Congressional oversight, Presidential authority to direct the Intelligence Community to conduct covert action, limits on said authority and reporting requirements, as well as funding issues such as transfer of defense services or what could be loosely termed as equipment.  Some of these provisions were added post Iran-Contra and some portions have been repealed or allowed to lapse. For instance, it remains a federal offense to "transfer" equipment or services that Congress has specifically denied funding for, a provision added to ensnare White House intelligence operatives who might try to sneak equipment or services to organizations the Executive Branch wishes to help but Congress does not.

Sections 441-442 have been omitted from the public record, and these may be the classified portions alluded to earlier.

The Act clearly spells out what are the elements of the Intelligence Community Circa 1947:

"The term ''intelligence community'' includes -
    (A)
      the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, which shall include the Office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, the National Intelligence Council (as provided for in section 403-5(b)(3) of this title), and such other offices as the Director may designate; ''403-3(b)(3)''.
    (B)
      the Central Intelligence Agency;
    (C)
      the National Security Agency;
    (D)
      the Defense Intelligence Agency;
    (E)
      the National Imagery and Mapping Agency;
    (F)
      the National Reconnaissance Office;
    (G)
      other offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national intelligence through reconnaissance programs;
    (H)
      the intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Energy, and the Coast Guard;
    (I)
      the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State; and
    (J)
      such other elements of any other department or agency as may be designated by the President, or designated jointly by the Director of Central Intelligence and the head of the department or agency concerned, as an element of the intelligence community."

Note that this pretty much describes the agencies that exist today, with the exceptions being the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (B&IR) (Circa 1981), Drug Enforcement Agency, and the new intelligence clearing house within the Homeland Security Department.  It should also be noted that while the act clearly spells out that anything which could be deemed part of the "National Foreign Intelligence Program" is part of the U.S. Intelligence Community, there is an exception.  Any "programs, projects, or activities of the military departments to acquire intelligence solely for the planning and conduct of tactical military operations by United States Armed Forces" are not deemed as part of the Intelligence Community.  Presumably this is to ensure that the military can conduct its own tactical intelligence without trotting their data or analysis over to the Director of Central Intelligence.

Note element (H) in the definition above includes the "...elements of the ...Federal Bureau of Investigation" are included as members of the U.S. Intelligence Community and therefore fall under the direction of the Director of Central Intelligence.  This most likely did not make Edgar Hoover very happy. 

Reading through the act is enlightening and shows the post WWII planners had a clear idea of how they wanted to protect the United States from those who would attack it.  The very fact that the FBI (tasked with domestic counterintelligence) and the CIA (tasked with foreign counterintelligence and offensive covert operations) are lumped together indicates that the planners at the time saw the necessity for the agencies to act in accord. The reality, probably stemming from J. Edgar Hoover, was that the agencies have never cooperated that closely.  In fact, there have been petty rivalries between each and every agency of the Intelligence Community, at least up until 9/11, and probably sometime after and to some degree still exists, even after the formation of the Department of Homeland Security.

It should be noted where the 1947  focus of Intelligence Community remained. Nearly all the listed entities are focused externally.  There is little mention of borders or immigration.  The State Department handles visas and approves entry, while the Border Service controls the borders.  The INS controls aliens once they are in this country, and the Coast Guard watches our borders adjacent to the sea.  All of that fits in items (H) and (I) above, and are included with the "intelligence elements" of the armed forces and FBI.  All the other agencies, some six of them, are focused externally, in the obvious post World War II, "prevent Pearl Harbor" mentality.

As we will point out, world events will immediately exacerbate this mindset as the Soviet Union brings down the so called "Iron Curtain".

The early attempts at establishing the post-war intelligence apparatus developed problems.  A now all too familiar theme was cited by the Hoover Commission, almost immediately in 1949:
" A principal concern of the task force was the adversarial relationship and lack of coordination between the CIA, the military, and the State Department. It suggested that this resulted in unnecessary duplication and the issuance of departmental intelligence estimates that "have often been subjective and biased." In large measure, the military and State Department were blamed for their failure to consult and share pertinent information with the CIA. The task force recommended "that positive efforts be made to foster relations of mutual confidence between the [CIA] and the several departments and agencies that it serves." 3
What?  The State Department, the Department of Defense and the rest of the intelligence community are not communicating with each other?  How novel!  Today we recognize the old problems that obviously have been plaguing the Intelligence Community for over 50 years.  At the time, however, the revelations were pretty devastating.

Not surprisingly, the Hoover Commission's Task Force on National Security Organization headed by Ferdinand Eberstadt, a staunch central control advocate, cited the lack of central control as the problem.  Congress and the Executive Branch agreed to provide the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence authority over all the Intelligence Services.  As is typical in government, the authority was made legal, but in the way of the "dotted line", leaving each of the agencies still headed by a strong and powerful figure -- the FBI in particular still being led by J. Edgar Hoover, an extremely powerful, nasty politician and accomplished bureaucrat.

Covert operations were to be coordinated and directed by the DCIA, with the only exception during war, in which case the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Department of Defense would assume command and control.

The Eberstadt task force, recognizing the effects new technology would have in the years to come, also recommended the Intelligence Community "...collect, collate, and evaluate scientific and medical intelligence". 3

During this period, the Intelligence Survey Group led by former Allen Dulles and ex O.S.S. officer evaluated the CIA's performance since 1947 and this group echoed many of the recommendations by the Hoover Commission.  In addition, the ISG forcefully recommended the current structure of the CIA with separate deputy directors for "coordination, estimates, research and reports, and operations."

DCI Walter Bedell Smith in 1950, reorganized the CIA using most of the suggestions of the ISG group, with emphasis created, as usual in response to world events which highlighted the deficiencies in the Intelligence Community (The fall of China to Communism and then the Korean Conflict both of which left U.S. Intelligence with hands in pockets and red ears.

A key element in his new structure were directorates to specifically formulate national level intelligence estimates, improving a poor "customer service" problem in the CIA.  The current National Intelligence Estimate -- NIE -- process is based upon this Bedell Smith change.
Effects of the Cold War



It did not take long for the nice structured planning of the World War II Intelligence leaders to take on new significance.  Well before the first atomic weapon was dropped on Japan, U.S. Intelligence recognized that the U.S. was going to be involved in a war of spies. Classic espionage agents were engaged in classic methods to coerce or conjole key players in the U.S. atomic program, taking our secrets to the Soviets.  Thus for the intelligence community, the Cold War began well before the end of the hot one known as WWII.

When the hot war was over, our so called allies in Western Asia were no less anxious to get their hands on more and more of the information about nuclear weapons, as well as conventional weapons, tactics and national strategies.  The result was the Intelligence Community gearing up for repelling Russian, and later Chinese and every other small Communist dictator's attempt to infiltrate our nation.

The mindset, of course, was to counter the "Red Menace".  And like the period prior to the U.S entering World War II, the split personality of "nice guys" and "stinky untouchables" remained.  However, the heads of the agencies within the Intelligence Community, appeared to have adopted the  necessary schizophrenia.  This included a tendency to collect information on anyone that the agencies thought were subversive.  The so called "Chinese Wall" between law enforcement and counterintelligence amounted to a thin barrier in many cases.  However, countering a virtual flood of information concerning the efforts to build a fusion weapon -- the Hydrogen Bomb, was a dismal failure.  Moreover, the efforts at domestic spying required to catch the spies even after the fact set into place practices that later would create severe domestic surveillance problems that would plague the Intelligence Community for many decades.

It is clear then, that the Cold War built up a deadly and sinister competition between the U.S. Intelligence Community and their chief foe, the Soviet KGB.  The Soviet Military's GRU was also quite active, and thus the U.S. was virtually under siege by fairly well trained officers of both organizations.  Our counterintelligence officers  faced highly intellectual and ideological agents amongst their own citizens.  Still, stupid mistakes were made and eventually a goodly number of agents on both sides were caught in the act and paid the ultimate price, either publicly, or clandestinely.

In 1954, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, in response to Congressional prodding in the way of the so called "Second Hoover Commission" asked General Jimmy Doolittle to assess the Intelligence Community.  At this time, a pattern had been already set in place -- every four to eight years, at the time of each administration, someone was looking at reorganizing the Intelligence Community.  This trend has not changed appreciably over the years since 1947.

Doolittle made a remarkable comment in his report back to Eisenhower, echoing the Cold War mentality of the times:

" It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means and at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game...If the United States is to survive, long-standing American concepts of "fair play" must be reconsidered. We must develop effective espionage and counterespionage services and must learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated and more effective methods than those used against us. It may become necessary that the American people be made acquainted with, understand and support this fundamentally repugnant philosophy". 3

For the first time, in public discourse, the "nice guy-mean guy" schizophrenia became an issue for the Intelligence Community. It would not be the last time the issue was raised, by no means.  Today, there are continued arguments of who we "hire" as agents, and whether assassination should be a tool of government.  Even the targeting of Saddam Hussein by military bombers was the subject of some controversy in more recent times.

Another remarkable situation in Eisenhower's time involved the coordination and authorizations for covert operations.  Eisenhower and the National Security Council issued directives that, in 1961, created the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board - PFIAB. However, Congress did not create specially vetted committees to provide oversight on intelligence until the mid 1970s. As we will see the PFIAB comes and goes, and in one case, with disastrous results.

As a result of the Hoover Commission's findings, Eisenhower instituted "two new NSC Directives, 5412/1 and 5412/2, were issued pertaining to covert activities in March and November 1955, respectively. Together, these directives instituted control procedures for covert action and clandestine activities. They remained in effect until 1970, providing basic policy guidelines for the CIA's covert action operations". 3



Effects of Internal Surveillance and the Turmoil of the Sixties



In the tumultuous years of desegregation and anti-war hysteria, the U.S. Intelligence Community came under intense fire.  Practices deemed a requirement to stop the red menace were quickly revealed too repugnant for the American citizen.  When civil libertarians learned of surveillance on Martin Luther King, for instance, the outcry sounded for years, enabling careful new legislation, and unfortunately many regulations interpreted to comply with those limited new laws that went way beyond the bounds of common sense or the legislative intent.

The result was that throughout the next three decades, U.S. domestic surveillance became less and less capable.  Also, certain fiascoes overseas, and misinformation campaigns conducted during the Vietnam War, all contributed to a heightened oversight environment due to mistrust of the military and the Intelligence Community.  And finally fully handcuffed intelligence operatives in the field.

However, legislation created key legal frameworks for surveillance inside the U.S. that internal surveillance organizations (primarily the FBI, but presumably elements of the NSA) could legally use with the proper groundwork.  Much of today's legal standing for non classified (i.e. not NSA) domestic surveillance is based upon this early work by a somewhat confrontational Congress and the leaders in the Intelligence Community.

This period in the Intelligence Community history is dominated by two themes.  Mis-management and Turmoil.  Both were, however, effected by the Executive Branch, rather than the Intelligence Community itself.  It became clear after the ill fated Bay of Pigs.  This largess  invasion was first envisioned by the Eisenhower administration to be a plausibly deniable covert operation.  The failure pointed out that the Executive branch was not setup to run cover operations and that the Intelligence Community still did not have covert operations firmly under control. The small covert operation envisioned by the Eisenhower administration had became a beach landing with unmarked U.S. aircraft in support and huge numbers of participants.  At the last minute, support in crucial areas was pulled in an effort to mask U.S. involvement.  However the operation to overthrow Castro was doomed from the moment the Executive Branch became involved in operational details without judging properly their deniability. 

The result was yet another commission and set of recommendations.  The Taylor commission recommended:

"... the creation of a Strategic Resources Group (SRG) composed of representatives of under secretarial rank from the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense. With direct access to the President, the SRG would act as a mechanism for the planning and coordination of overall Cold War strategy, including paramilitary operations ... including the opinions of the JCS in the planning and implementation of such paramilitary operations. In the context of the Cold War... a review of restraints placed upon the United States in order to make the most effective use of the nation's assets, without concern for international popularity." 3

CIA's Inspector General, Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr. also published a still classified report which it is thought to have laid much of the blame for the failure on the Bay of Pigs on the CIA and bad advice to President.  Regardless, Kennedy reinstituted the PFIAB (it's not clear why it wasn't already in operation), and the new DCI was directed to take on more and more of the central coordination role.

In 1971, the Schlesinger Report, a forty seven page study commissioned by President Nixon noted the intelligence "...community's "impressive rise in...size and cost" with the "apparent inability to achieve a commensurate improvement in the scope and overall quality of intelligence products."

Once again under attack, the CIA was about to undergo change yet again.

During the Vietnam War and as a result of the Watergate scandal which eventually led to President Nixon's resigning from office at the threat of impeachment, public confidence in the Intelligence Community reached an all time low.  The media, fanning the flames, produced numerous alleged accounts of abuse for decades, and fueling the "good guy" sentiment, trotted out assassination attempts.  While much of the so called abuse was over inflated or outright distortions, the seamy side of covert operations created a sour taste in the mouth of the American public.  Combined with revelations of the Intelligence Community surveiling U.S. citizens in legal protest (for instance anti-war protesters, Martin Luther King and the civil rights movement), Congress went on a feeding frenzy.

Poorly framed legislation created the new oversight committees and before rationale judgment took over, many of the affairs of the covert side of Intelligence were not only disclosed, but sources and methods were compromised as well.  It was not until a number of years later did Congress repair the repairs, creating procedures and processes for handling of information and vetting of the committee's members. 

This period was both traumatic and destructive to the CIA field operators, the first of three such periods that cut the agency's ability to conduct foreign information gathering through human resources.

No less then four groups made studies and recommendations during the period, mostly focusing on oversight and the "stemming" of perceived illegal or repugnant activities in the CIA.  The nice guy was back, the mean guy was relegated back to the dark corner.

However, little in the way of legal changes were made, other than the establishment of the oversight committees and their authority via budget and review. 

This period also saw the implementation of Intelligence Community control by the Executive Branch via the Executive Order. In the IC21 Appendix C, a long list of recommendations were boiled down into the first of three Presidential orders that have set the standard used today for the Intelligence Community. 

Ford, Carter and Reagan, each issued an Executive Order outlining the overall policy and tasking for the agencies within the Intelligence Community.  Reagan's EO12333 still forms, according to IC21, the " mandate concerning the managerial structure of the Intelligence Community" 3. 


Effects of the Turner Years



Stansfeld Turner, the Director of Central Intelligence under U.S. President Jimmy Carter, was given the undeniably career limiting task of "putting the reins" to what Congress interpreted as a runaway CIA.  Within a few short years, field operations in the CIA and presumably other intelligence community agencies working overseas, found themselves "on the outside".  HUMINT -- Human Intelligence information all but dried up. 

Turner's concept was to rely less and less on covert action thus removing the angst between a public image concerned Congress and an agency engrossed in fighting the dirty war of clandestine operations.  He was tremendously successful in that regard.

New oversight requirements on the CIA and leaks in Congress cost the lives of a large number of recruited agents and not surprisingly, this fact did not escape new potential foreign agents.  The ability to place or recruit someone outside the U.S. became impossible.  Finding officers from the U.S. who could mix in the circles of those we needed to keep watch over was also exceedingly difficult, especially as International Terrorism exploded throughout the Middle East and spread into Europe.

Thus the United States became less and less capable of dealing with foreign intelligence issues, and a new reliance on TECHINT -- Technical Intelligence infused the community. TECHINT was not a bad source for intelligence.  The problem was, however, that one can only see so much from 80,000 feet or from a satellite in orbit.  SIGINT could surely intercept private and perhaps even classified conversations.  However, intelligence gathering without the "feet on the ground" was simply inadequate to the task of protecting the nation.

Never-the-less, Turner followed his orders and watched as the Air Force, the National Reconnaissance Office  and the NSA became the principle gathers of intelligence for the Intelligence Community. CIA officers with years of experience began leaving in droves, retiring or in some cases, going to work for other allied nations like the U.K. Australia, or Canada.

When the Shah of Iran's rule of that country suddenly collapsed, the Intelligence Community could only say "We told you so" because they were getting a "bad feeling", but without any hard data from agents in place. 

Similarly, the killing of U.S. soldiers in their barracks in Beirut pointed out the Community's helplessness in the Middle East.  U.S. Forces had become a prime target for Terrorists, and it seemed like there was nothing that could be done to protect them.

During this period, work was begun on the Boren-McCurdy legislation that would have done a major reorganization of the Intelligence community however, stiff opposition to the plan by a major consumer of national intelligence output, the Defense Department essentially killed the legislation.  It is worth noting that a common reorganization theme emerged once again, separating analysis and coordination under different "hats" as well as a separate director for covert operations, similar to the Clandestine Service concept proposed later in the mid 1990s.

Another outcome during this period was the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Authorization - FISA process.  This established a means for domestic agencies to conduct surveillance of U.S. citizens or non citizens when there was a link to foreign agents or officers.  The process requires the approval of  a special court and places a limit on how long the surveillance can be conducted before a more stringent probable cause requirement must be met.  The difficulty in getting a FISA warrant, however, set into motion one of the other human nature failures that would later prove to be perhaps the Intelligence Community's worst failure.

The 1990s and Terrorism



Years later, the fall of the Soviet Union caught the intelligence community by surprise to such a degree that the CIA was ridiculed by even their staunchest supporters.

A smart Director pointed back to the Turner years and lay the blame squarely in the former DCIA's lap.  Unfortunately, Congress and several Presidents also had a hand in "demasculating" the CIA well before the fall of the Soviet Union and well before Turner's sad duty. Not to mention several DCIs on whose watch things happened that fired up Congress into a long lasting confrontational behavior with both the Executive Branch and the Intelligence Community.

  However the United States finally had a nice "clean guy" look at the CIA, and accordingly, it was pretty much ineffective.

Domestically, the Intelligence Community was hampered even worse.  The mid 1980s and 1990s was a time when revelations about key Soviet agents in the U.S., including agents recruited within the FBI and CIA  came to light.  The embarrassment was nothing compared to the damage done to the field during the preceding decades and indeed to future operations. 

Into this environment was added an ever increasing internal right wing sentiment that  had festered from the 60s and 70s.  From religious zealots to survivalist or militia fanatics, the Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms of the U.S. Treasury Department found themselves facing well organized and increasingly violent adversaries.  They turned to the key domestic counterintelligence agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Unfortunately, while prevention of a crime is always in the mind of law enforcement, the FBI was well skilled at investigations of crimes after they had been committed, finding the felons, arresting them, and taking them through the legal process to incarceration.  This was as true for cases of the ideologically driven violent to bank robbers or white collar criminals. 

As domestic terrorism began to peak, the Justice Department and Congress agreed to fund FBI Counter terrorism efforts throughout the nation.  Patterned after task forces that were fairly successful during violent eruptions of domestic ideological groups in the 60s and 70s, the new countertenor organizations also began to focus on foreign soured terrorists.  Unfortunately, we only hear of failures in this regard, and none were more spectacular than the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center by foreign sourced terrorists and the 1995 attack on the Federal Building in Oklahoma City by domestic ideologists.

In the end, by 1996, it was clear that the Intelligence Community was broken both domestically and overseas.  In 1996, several studies were completed, taking advantage of private think tanks as well as Congressional staff personnel, which recommended a separation of clandestine operations from more overt intelligence activities. 

One key piece of legislation implemented was the The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, finally putting some teeth into U.S. anti-terrorism law and spelling out certain acts and tools of the terrorists that require new responses.  For example the act spells out certain prohibited materials making possession illegal as well as allowing the Attorney General to elect to deport a contaminated person rather than imprison them while waiting for trial.  It also also allows government agencies to expend emergency funds for prevention or post-event cleanup efforts, removing the financial burden for a city or state when time is of essence.  Read the MILNET summary for further information.

Work which had begun at the close of the twentieth century was accelerated by events overseas as U.S. soldiers were again under attack by foreign terrorists.  Our Middle Eastern ally's failures were no less spectacular than our own, and reliance on those allies for HUMINT had proven to be a total failure.  The message was given, but once again not received.

In 1996, the U.S. Congress commissioned an appraisal of the Intelligence Community.  This Commission produced a landmark set of recommendations, the first of their kind since the early discussions, albeit in secret, of the Hillenkoetter era. The  U.S. Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community produced the following recommendations:
The chapters of the Commission's report are telling as well:
  1. The Need to Maintain Intelligence Capability
  2. The Role of Intelligence
  3. The Need for Policy Guidance
  4. The Need for a Coordinated Response to International Crime
  5. The Organizational Arrangements for the Intelligence Community
  6. The Central Intelligence Agency
  7. The Need for a More Effective Budget Structure
  8. Improving Intelligence Analysis
  9. The Need to "Right-Size" and Rebuild the Community
  10. Military Intelligence
  11. Space Reconnaissance and the Management of Technical Collection
  12. International Cooperation
  13. The Cost of Intelligence
  14. Accountability and Oversight 3
In all fourteen areas, the Commission made several recommendations for changes.  However it is not clear how many of these resulted in actual legislation or operational requirements levied on the Intelligence Community.  As we learned on 9/11, at least one of the major goals was not implemented to the degree needed -- agencies did not work well together and barriers to information flow were not removed. 

The report is a long read, however it is highly recommended.  It should be read cover-to-cover, especially Appendices A and B which cover history, evolution and overview of Intelligence in the U.S.

Also in 1996, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence commissioned a study by its own staff on Intelligence for the 21st century. The staff study produced the report IC21:  The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century.  The report also included a look back in history to proposals for Intelligence Reorganization back to 1949.  This perspective documented in Appendix C, IC21:  Appendix C. CRS Report: Proposals for Intelligence Reorganization 1949-1996 is also highly recommended reading.

The IC21 report also looked some 14 areas on interest in the Intelligence Community of the future:
  1. Intelligence Community Management
  2. The Intelligence Requirements Process
  3. Collection Synergy
  4. SIGINT: Signals Intelligence
  5. IMINT: Imagery Intelligence
  6. MASINT:  Measurement and Signatures Intelligence
  7. Collection: Launch
  8. A Clandestine Service
  9. Intelligence Community "Surge" Capability
  10. Intelligence Support to Military Operations
  11. Intelligence Centers
  12. Intelligence and Law Enforcement
  13. Intelligence Communications
  14. Congressional Oversight 3
As in the Commission report, IC21 spells out key recommendations in each of the 14 areas.  The most controversial area was the recommendation to implement a central agency for all clandestine operations, the "Clandestine Service". The recommendation summary is worth repeating here:

Recommendations
  • There should be a single US clandestine service (the "Clandestine Service,") under the Director of Central Intelligence's (DCI) direct supervision.
  • For intelligence collection tasking and requirements purposes, the Clandestine Service should respond to the regular community wide collection management process.
  • The Clandestine Service should be managed by a Director who is a career intelligence professional.
  • The Clandestine Service should have a two-star professional military intelligence officer as a Deputy Director responsible for support to the military and for coordination, as appropriate, with the military services, regional commanders and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
  • The Clandestine Service should have organic to it the administrative and technical support mechanisms that are critical to its unique functions and essential to its success.
  • The personnel system should ensure the recruitment of highly qualified junior employees, the development of talented clandestine operators and managers, and the aggressive removal of marginal and unsuitable employees.
  • The military cadre of the Clandestine Service should consist of military clandestine operations officers having a viable military career track within that specialization and of the same high professional and personal qualifications as the civilian cadre.
  • The DCI needs to reaffirm and reiterate throughout the IC, his designation of the Clandestine Service's role to lead the IC in its conduct of foreign clandestine operations, i.e., espionage, counterespionage, covert action and related intelligence liaison activities abroad.
  • The Clandestine Service Chief of Station should act as the US government's on-site focal point for the deconfliction of all intelligence and law enforcement activities abroad with an appeals process functioning through the Ambassador and/or a Washington-based interagency mechanism.
  • There are numerous other findings and recommendations within this study that will be pursued by the Committee in other ways, particularly through the annual authorization and regular intelligence oversight process." 3

The key element to this set of recommendations is to centralize all clandestine activity such as "espionage, counterespionage, covert action and related intelligence liaison activities abroad".  It is interesting to note that for the most part, this is was already the case with the CIA, however, Congressional oversight and funding along with regulations which stripped the field activities of any real capabilities had essentially removed HUMINT and covert operations capability from the agency.  Moreover, by this time, the experienced individuals recommended were no longer in service, having left in disgust.

Again it is not clear how "there are numerous other findings and recommendations within this study that will be pursued by the Committee in other ways, particularly through the annual authorization and regular intelligence oversight process" was actually going to happen in the light of decreasing budgets and less and less money placed in field operations, as well as the refusal, through oversight, to "hire" agents whose pedigree was not politically correct.  

And while the Intelligence Community are in the vast majority professional and dedicated individuals, it is hard to imagine them competing in the modern world with less in the way of tools and without experienced field management. In the end, it becomes clear that only five years after the study was published, many of the recommendations had not been implemented.

It is also clear that had both sets of studies had been fast tracked into actual changes, many of the deficiencies noted after 9/11 would have been repaired, and perhaps, just perhaps, the 9/11 events might have turned out differently.

In retrospect, the long history of "adjustments" the operation of the Intelligence Community, few changes have been effective, and most of the total recommendations have been tried or cast aside. 


Hart Rudman Commission on National Security for the 21st Century

Throughout a three year period starting in July of 1998, the Hart Rudman Commission looked at what future national security issues would be for the 21st century.  In the report, the following statements stand out:

"1. The president should develop a comprehensive strategy to heighten America's ability prevent and protect against all forms of attack on the homeland, and to respond to such attacks if prevention and protection fail;

2. The president should propose, and Congress should agree to create, a National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) with responsibility for planning, coordinating and integrating various U.S. government activities involved in homeland security. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) should be a key building block in this effort."  I

The Gadfly executive editor (from where we found the suddenly unavailable Hard Rudman reference),  Thomas F. Schaller also adds:

"In short: A call for presidential-level, comprehensive action to fundamentally restructure the intelligence bureaucracy, and specifically the creation of a new agency to coordinate and manage the various streams of intelligence-gathering, and develop terrorist assessments and response plans."    I

Schaller's conclusion is quite a leap from the paragraphs he cites, however there is the implication in the call for a creation of a "NHSA" that could lead to that conclusion.  Not having access to the Hard Rudman Commission report at its official site (www.nssg.gov)  is extremely frustrating in that respect and its sudden unavailability is reprehensible if not criminal.

We were able to finally find a copy of the phase three recommendations J on the Council of Foreign Relations site and stole it in its entirity.  The operative paragraphs read:
"The combination of unconventional weapons proliferation with the persistence of international terrorism will end the relative invulnerability of the US homeland to catastrophic attack. A direct attack against American citizens on American soil is likely over the next quarter century. The risk is not only death and destruction but also a demoralization that could undermine US global leadership. In the face of this threat, our nation has no coherent or integrated governmental  structures.

"We therefore recommend the creation of a new independent National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) with responsibility for planning, coordinating and integrating various U.S. government activities involved in homeland security.  NHSA would be built upon the Federal Emergency Managemetn Agency, with the three ogranizations currently on the front line of border security -- the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, and the Border Patrol -- transferred to it.  NHSA woudl not only protect American Lives, but also assume responsibility for overseeing the protection of the nation's critical infrastructure, including information technology.

"The NHSA Director would have Cabinet status and would be a statutory advisor to the National Security Council. 

"...The potentially catastrophic nature of homeland attacks necessitates our beign prepared to use the tremendous resources of the Department of Defense (DoD).  Therefore, the department needs to pay far more attention to this mission in the future.  We recommend that a new office of Asistant Secretary of Homeland Security be created to oversee the various DoD activities and ensure that the necessary resources are made available.

"New priorities also need to be set for the U.S. armed forces in light of the threat to the homeland.  We urge, in particular, that hte National Guard be given homeland security as a primary mission, as the U.S. Constitution itself orders.  The National Guard should be reorganized, trained, and equipped to undertake the mission.

"Finally, we recommend the Congress reorganize itself to accomodate this Exectuive Branch realignment, and that it also form a special select committee for homeland security to provide Congressional support and oversight in this critica area. "  J




Post 9/11 Lessons



It is clear in the summer of 2004, that the U.S. Intelligence Community's failure was monumental.  Assigning blame to anyone besides Congress, however, is fruitless.   Funding is always the culprit, and legal limitations placed by years of libertarian abuse and sensitivity to privacy and race issues may have contributed largely to 9/11.  Clearly the failure of the Intelligence Community to change itself is a leading cause of many of the problems we point to today.  However, leadership in both the Legislative and Executive branches, especially in the cause of driving change into the Intelligence Community, also can be found lacking.

And while some will claim changing huge bureaucracies "overnight" is an impossible tasking, it is also clear that post 9/11 -- literally within days, many changes took place without the benefit of Congress and year long studies. 

In our estimation, however, a mindset toward traditional domestic law enforcement activities instead of focusing on prevention probably contributed more to the disasters in New York, the Pentagon and in the field near Philadelphia.  Had the FBI been focused on dogging the footsteps of every student visa holder or other temporary alien visitor, a classical approach to counter espionage, things would undoubtedly have turned out differently.  Whether the insane and politically correct Department of Justice regulations were at fault, or whether the FBI was not given enough information by its sister organizations does not remove the responsibility for proper leadership.  Too many careers would be put at risk to fly in the face of bureaucratic principles in place one would suppose and therein lies the major failure of the FBI. 

By now, it is also clear that prior to 9/11, the interaction between key elements of the Intelligence Community agencies tasked with providing for our homeland security was a dismal testament to overreaction to the excesses of the 60s and 70s.  And we paid dearly.  From political correctness in personnel activities within the agencies to careerism preventing focused and aggressive pursuit of terrorists all contributed heavily to missing some very important clues to the coming events of 9/11.  Even the FISA process contributed, with agents opting to "take other avenues" to get warrants and perhaps adding delays in inspecting a key piece of evidence -- a laptop with the plans for using aircraft as missiles. 

Moreover, the sensitivity to immigration and racial overtones contributed to a lax visa and immigration policy that truly defies logic.  The 9/11 pilots did not go unnoticed, there just seemed to be no real focus on their clandestine activities which would ring the alarm bells.  In essence, not only did the alarms not ring, there was no button to press -- no effective way for a citizen let alone an officer of the government to execute a rapid response to any of the telltale clues.

With all that said, the chief failure is one of intellectual prowess. It's been called time and time again, "Connecting the Dots". The saying is appropriate.  Dot's imply an invisible trail.  And while the trail now looks anything but invisible, it takes a certain mindset to draw the appropriate conclusions without the weight of 9/11 to prod your thinking.  Post 9/11 it seems ludicrous that a mildly paranoid officer of the FBI would not "pull it all together", however, given the conditions at the time, it is sadly understandable.

The House Select Committee on Intelligence - Counterintelligence Capabilities and Performance Prior to 9/11, The Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence -- HPSCI, July 2002 10  made a large number of recommendations.  Those that are pertinent to this analysis are:

CIA
FBI
 The staff also noted that the FBI had reported in June 2001 that there was a critical shortage of special agents with some proficiency in languages necessary for counterterrorism, let alone those with native langauge skills in those languages.

NSA
 Congress

Congressional Joint Inquiry, September through  October 2002:

The Congressional Joint Inquiry on Intelligence Activities in Relation to September 11, 2001 led by Director Elanor Hill made no actual recomendations but clearly felt that the responsbility for the attacks on 9/11 lie with Al Qaeda, and that the U.S. must make changes to both homeland security and the intelligence input to the operation.


 
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States: June 2004

The   9/11 Commission Staff Statements indicate the tenor of the pending report from the Commission.

Paraphrasing, the staff said:
  1. Lack of HUMINT in the Mideast and a nearly total reliance on foreign intelligence gathering made warnings non-specific and not actionable.
  2. Crucial meetings between the 9/11 attackers and their handlers overseas was not passed on to those who could have stopped the hijackers upon their first entry into the U.S.
  3. A crucial and timely intercept of a foreign national with the necessary evidence to sound the alarm was not explored in a timely fashion -- leaving discovery until well after the events
  4. An almost laxidaisical immigration and student visa policy allowed the attackers a) into the country, b) to overstay their statutory regulated time, and c) to essentially hide anywhere in the U.S. with full impunity.
  5. A shameful level of internal combat readiness with a focus on external threats meant a total ineffective response to the first attacking aircraft, and probably contributed to the many deaths in the Pentagon.  7
Essentially, the 9/11 attackers, once they came into the U.S. in the final phase of their plan, had nothing to fear from U.S. Immigration or Counterintelligence officials, nor could our military prevent any number of follow up attacks, had they occurred, at least for several hours.  If 210 hijackers had come into this country, some 70 buildings could have been struck in major cities throughout the nation, all without a shot being fired from our own forces and with little likelihood of one of the attacks being prevented.

Giving credit where credit is due, Congress responded to 9/11 with speed and accuracy. The enactment of the Patriot Act, while pounced upon by the shrill voices of over-sensitive libertarians, provided the tools to allow for common sense surveillance inside this country.

The Executive Branch and Congress also cooperated quickly in a major overall of homeland security, codifying the Department of Homeland Security and making a major change in the level of cooperation between all federal law enforcement and counterintelligence efforts that has not been seen since midway through World War II.

Other changes have occurred which have heightened our level of paranoia and indeed increased our readiness.   However as was stated at the beginning of this briefing, we cannot stop a determined terrorist willing to give up his life to take out thousands of our citizens, let alone a lone wolf intent on killing only a few.

A number of recommendations have been put forth since the 9/11 tragedy.  Recurring themes dealing with structure, culture and bureaucracy abound.  For instance, Ambassador Paul Bremer's 2000 National Commission on Terrorism found:
[Emphasis by MILNET]

The 9/11 Commission Staff made the following recommendations:
[Emphasis by MILNET]

Another key piece of analysis took place in October of 2004.  The Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Report made the following recommendations:

The 9/11 Commission, in its Executive Summary of the final report released on July 22, 2004, suggested the following goals and recommendations for changes to the Intelligence Community.
Intelligence Goals

"Determine, with leadership from the President, guidelines for gathering and sharing information in the new security systems that are needed, guidelines that integrate safeguards for privacy and other essential liberties."

"...ensure adequate supervision of how they are used, including a new board to oversee the implementation of the guidelines needed for gathering and sharing information in these new security systems."

Specific Recommendations

"We call for unity of effort in five areas, beginning with the unity of effort on the challenge of counterterrorism itself:
[Emphasis and parended remarks by MILNET]
The Commission also specified that the National Intelligence Director (NID) should have three deputies, one each for Foreign, Domestic and Defense Intelligence.

Another very controversial recommendation was the concept of moving all covert paramilitary action out of the CIA and into the Department of Defense, an idea which so far (as of August 17, 2004) has received universally negative responses from people inside and outside the Intelligence Community and the DoD.

In terms of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the Commission essentially ratified the current Terrorist Threat Integration Center setup.  This new center substantially improves the place, tactics and methods for intercommunication of the many separate intelligence agencies that handle intelligence on terrorism as well as operations. (See the MILNET notes from Director Brennan's Statement from the Governmental Affairs hearings to get more details on the TTIC).   It is operated autonomously under the auspices of the Director of Central Intelligence and recently began moving its key memberhship into one large facility, with the CIA and FBI counterterrorism centers to complete their movement to the new facility shorlty.

The Commission also suggested that planning for operations take place in the center, creating an unusual working setup.  MILNET believes that the current TTIC setup implements most of the objectives in the forms of tactical sugggestions, however, the individual agencies today still handle planning and execution of the operation.

The Commission also recommends the formation of the National Intelligence Centers.  The language implies that not just the standard ABCs of intelligence (CIA, FBI, NSA, DIA, etc.) would be NICs, but also other contributors that have standalone missions could be NICs.  Again, similar to the current intelligence center operation in DoHS, representatives from the NICs would have "desks" in the NCTC.  The NICs would all report to the NID, providing yet another controversial concept for the Intelligence Community, adding a possible "loop around the top" reporting path for the different agency employees.

Responses to 9/11 Commission's Final Report

As late as July 29, 2004, the U.S. President was holding working group meetings with his advisors on which and how to act on recommendations from the 9/11 commission.  The President's working group consisted of:
As the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee brought back its membership early from Congress' summer break to debate the 9/11 Commission final report, the President announced he would create the office of the National Intelligence Director and implement a National Counterterrorism Center -- NCTC.  It is not yet clear how much power over budget and hiring the new NID will have.  e4

Meanwhile the Governmental Affairs Committee e1, e2 held two extremely informative hearings, the first on August 3 and the second on August 16.  The first questioned key high level officials in the counterterrorism segment of the Intelligence Community, including the current director of the TTIC, John Brennan.

The second hearing featured a panel of three former Directors of Central Intelligence; Judge William Webster who was also a former Director of the FBI as well as a former DCI, R. James Woolsey, and Admiral Stansfield Turner.

It was clear that all of the hearings witnesses (both hearings) were in favor of the NID position as well as separating the responsibilties of leadership of the Intelligence Community from that of directing the Central Intelligence Agency. 

Equally unaminous was the support for the National Counterterrorism Center -- NCTC. In fact, it was the opinion of Mr. Brennan that the NCTC would be an expansion and enhancement of the current TTIC and his ready answers to the Committee's questions implied his readiness to accept nomination as the Director for the NCTC should the President choose to do so.

On August 3, 2004, Senator Diane Feinstein sent a letter to President Busy urging his support for the Intelligence Leadership Act, S.190, legislation proposed in January of 2003 that would create a Director of National Intelligence -- DNI, separting the Director of Central Intelligence from day-to-day administration of the CIA.  Instead, the legislation would create a Director of the CIA -- DCIA.


The Future



Much debate has occurred since 9/11, some of which centered around adopting an intelligence approach similar to MI-5 and MI-6 in the United Kingdom.  MI-5 is focused entirely on internal surveillance and counterintelligence, while "Six" is focused on the external.  The two communicate well when a foreign national crosses into the U.K., however, much like the FBI and CIA, there is a rivalry between the two that at times defies the professional interests of the organizations.

The Clandestine Service idea from the IC21 study returned briefly.  However, in later proposed legislation (prior to 9/11) Senator Joe Lieberman was particularly vocal in focusing all issues dealing with security inside the nation in the hands of one department. 

Building on work actually begun before 9/11, the events of September galvanized a reluctant President to adopt many of the Government Affairs Committee recommendations.  First an advisor on Homeland Security was created and Lieberman's bill went through three years of debate before finally codifying the new Department of Homeland Security which implements many of the changes needed to correct inter-agency communication.

The results bode well for the future.  Whether it be INS or Border Patrol, Coast Guard or Intelligence gathering, the Department of Homeland Security is the place where information on threats to the U.S. populace or infrastructure will be analyzed with that particular attention to prevention. 

The following analysis looks at the various elements found lacking in the 9/11 events, with a focus on how the counterterrorism mission applies to the Intelligence Community. Some adjacent area attention is also added to make a more complete analysis -- for instance -- operational activities that could, should or would be related to intelligence.

Military
The second effort to look at 9/11  known as the 9/11 Commission (National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks on the United States) published its report on July 22, 2004.  In the statements from the staff released prior to the final report, the following dialog is quoted:

"At 10:31, General Larry Arnold instructed his staff to broadcast the following message over a NORAD chag log:

"10:31 Vice President has cleared to us to intercept tracks of interest and shoot them down if they do not respond, per CONR CC [General Arnold]."

In upstate New York, NEADS  [North Eastern Air Defense Sector under the command of NORAD- MILNET] personnel first learned of the shoot down order from that chat log message:
Floor Leadership:  You need to read this...The Region Commander has declared that we can shoot down aircraft that do not respond to our direction. Copy that?

Controllers:  Copy that, Sir.

Floor Leadership:  So if you're trying to divert somebody and he won't divert--

Controllers:  DO [Director of Operations] is saying no.

Floor Leadership:  No?  It came over the chat... You got a conflict on that direction?

Controllers: Right now no, but--

Floor Leadership: Okay?  Okay, you read that from the Vice President, right? Vice President has cleared.  Vice President has cleared us to intercept traffic and shoot them down if they do not respond per CONR CC [General Arnold]."
In interviews with us, NEADS personnel expressed considerable confusion over the nature and effect of the order.

Indeed, the NEEDS Commander told us he did not pass along the order because he was unaware o fits ramifications.  Both the mission command and the weapons director indicated they did not pas the order to the fighters circling Washington and New York CIty because they were unsure how the pilots would, or should, proceed with this guidance.  In short, while leaders in Washington believed the fighters circling above them had been instructed to "take out" hostile aircraft, the only orders actually conveyed to the Langley pilots were to "ID type and tail."

.  .  . 

"Had it not crashed in Pennsylvania at 10:03, we estimate that United 93 could not have reached Washington, DC any earlier than 10:13 an most probably would have arrived before 10:23.  We examined the military's ability to intercept it.

There was only one set of fighters orbiting Washington DC during this timeframe -- the Langley F-16s.  The were armed and under NORAD's control.

But the Langley pilots were never briefed about the reason they were scrambled.  As the lead pilot explained, "I reverted to the Russian threat...I'm thinking cruise missile threat from the sea.  You know you look down and see the Pentagon burning and I thought the bastards snuck one by us...[Y]ou couldn't see any airplanes, and no one told us anything."  The pilots knew their mission was to identify and divert aircraft fling within a certain radius of Washington, but did not know that the threat came from hijacked commercial airliners.

Also, NEADS did not know where United 93 was when it first heard about the hijacking from FAA at 10:07.  Presumably FAA would have provided the information, but we do not know how long it would have taken, nor how long it would have take NEADS to find and track the target on its own equipment.

Once the target was known and identified, NEADS needed orders to pass to the pilots.  Shoot down authority was first communicated to NEADS at 10:31.  Given the clear attack on the United States, it also possible -- though unlikely -- that NORAD commanders could have ordered the shoot down without the authorization communicated by the Vice President.

[The Inquiry Staff may not be aware of the courage and resolve of U.S. fighter pilots -- we believe a pilot noting a track to the Capitol building or the White House would indeed take independent action, assuming of course at the speeds involved there was time to note a track...- MILNET]

NORAD officials have maintained that they would have intercepted and shot down United 93.  We are not so sure. We are sure that the nation owes a debt to the passengers of United 93.  Their actions saved the lives of countless others, and my have saved either the U.S. Capitol or the White House from destruction." 12

In reading the section above, one cannot help but agree with the assessment that we owe so much to the passengers aboard American flight 93.  It is pretty clear from what post event information the staff of the inquiry could gather, that there probably were no fighters in position to shoot down flight 93, nor did those who MIGHT have been in position have the orders to do so.  The loss of the White House or the Capital Building would have been an enormous blow heaped upon the already staggering losses on 9/11.  We are so fortunate, it is beyond belief.

And what is the chief cause of this near catastrophe? Incredibly asininely poor local intelligence.  The first thing to fix in the future is our own local intelligence communication.  Incidentally, while we take that subject on below, the MILNET contacts laugh and tell us the military and the Intelligence Community fixed that problem long ago as part of their own post mortem -- "it's pretty obvious when you have a chain of command failure like that -- although now that it's fixed, you'd be hard pressed to find someone to admit it ever existed.  But it's in the backs of their minds -- especially at NEADS, that's for sure."


The Military and Local Intelligence

Intelligence is only as good as those who can use it.  In this case, intelligence of the local kind -- between the Secret Service, NORAD, NORAD's problem child at NEADS, the FAA, and the Executive Branch appear to not be on the same conversation.  This seems awesomely stupid.  It is awesomely scary that the pilots of the Langley F-16s did not know that their target is a hijacked United flight 93.  It is just as scary that the order to shoot down is intercepted at NEADS and never communicated to the pilots.  Thus a simple breakdown in local tactical intelligence AND a failure in the chain of command could have resulted in our losing the Capitol building or the White House. As one of MILNET's cohorts responded to the reading of the statement, "That is not only shameful but ludicrous!  When I can pretty much get my kid on the phone 300 miles away in an freakin' instant?  I know we can do better than that!"


CIA

Clearly we start from the beginning before the aircraft are even in the air.  The first thing to do is perhaps the most radical, and perhaps undoable. The CIA, while invested with a huge number of very capable professionals, is still a tool of the Cold War.  We need HUMINT in the worst way, yet it is not clear the CIA, as it stands today, can facilitate the recruitment and sustained performance we need.  This is more than just a case where the agency has a poor reputation and foreign confidence is dismal.  A number of our sources tell us that there is a huge morale problem in the field -- what remains of it -- and a lack of effective field leadership has not groomed new leaders to replace those who left in droves in the 1980s and 1990s.. 

Having said that, we also realize the CIA has the most impossible job, and while we criticize, bear in mind, only the KGB got close to getting this job right, and they still screwed up from time to time.  We'd not like to see the repressive regime in the United States that was needed to back up the KGB's efforts. 

And having said THAT, no one we talked to had any ideas how to fix the field problem in the CIA with any certainty.  Lots of idea, but no clear cut do this and it will get a whole lot better. Good people are out there, but one has to wonder if they are good enough, and if they are not, how do we get the experience and smarts that we need?

And of course, there is that communication problem.  Again our contacts tell us the domestic side has a nice handle on the concept of a central clearing house for domestic intelligence now based in the Department of Homeland Security.  We highly recommend oversight to literally be crawling all over that place.  We HAVE to know that those folks are doing the communication thing and doing it right.  We do not need to hear later that Congress and the Executive Branch could not figure out how to get those people ANYTHING they need to get their jobs done.

The good news is that the technical improvements in the Intelligence Community continue to bear fruit.  However we caution against overreliance on TECHINT.  We already know is extremely dangerous. 

TECHINT is great for the Soviet age.  It may be hard to hide the movements of a tank division from satellites or recon aircraft (manned or unmanned).  However, it is quite easy to move terrorist cells anywhere on the globe with technical tools being none the wiser.

Throw technology at communication, and money at training our people to relay information when they get it.  Here technology pays off big time.  It is very inciteful that our budget folks have not kept the Intelligence Community up-to-date with computers and communications.  The technology frightened always tend to spend money elsewhere.  And when the bugget cutters start snipping away, its salaries and technology.  If there is blame it lies at the bickering between the Executive Branch and Legislative branch -- specifically the budgetary process.  Whatever the political philosphy in operation, the lives of our citizens obviously depend on our Intelligence Community.  Maybe Washington will quit throwing bureaucracy at the probem and start making intelligent decisions on how to spend money on intelligence.

And MILNET wonders why it has taken so long for the Intelligence Community and Congress to realize that having the Director of Central Intelligence also responsible for administering the Central Intelligence Agency is a huge mistake.  Either role is an extremely daunting full time job that takes up more than the average working day.


Foreign Counterintelligence

Simply put, we need to restructure our foreign counterintelligence operations, it is paramount that we "get closer" to our enemies.  We need to be able to detect, deter, and prevent terrorist operations before they move into our country. 

Simply focusing on domestic or foreign attackers is a losing proposition.  We must be vigilant at home and we must be vigilant afar.  It would be far better to fight the terrorist who lives and breathes far away then in our local towns and cities. 

One approach that appears to have worked well, is to plant the seed of democracy right in the heart of the terrorist's favorite part of the world, and watch them flock there like lightning to a lightning rod.  Perhaps over the next few decades, we can continue that approach, rather than wait for the terrorists to once again attack one of our major cities with new weapons -- nuclear, biological, or chemical.

HUMINT isn't just trying to bribe some snaky character to betray his country, you need to plant someone.  You know, like as in an American Sleeper in Tehran?  If we are so inept that we cannot do this, then pack it in.  Surely there must be SOMEONE in this country who has the drive, guts and brains who will also fit right into a terrorist organization the Middle East or Asia?  Someone?  What IS the problem?

As former DCI Woolsey implied in the Governmental Affairs hearings, the inabilty to recruit people of questionable character has had a huge detrimental effect on HUMINT operations and MILNET believes that it is an underlying cause to U.S. inability to have detected and possibly prevented the events on 9/11.


FBI

The FBI.  We hasten to defend the good people there -- we know some of them.  But with the good comes the bad.  There is a culture there that simply has to go.  Our contacts tell us in the year following 9/11, the attitude and ability to make things happen with the FBI was tremendous.  "They get it" is the usual comment. The problem of course is that unless the culture changes and permanently, in a few more years, won't the albatross roost once again?  Unfortunately, as we stated earlier, without some legal remedy to force the culture change, we will continue to see slow and unwilling or outright failure to change.

If an agent in one city cannot trip the alarm all over the nation when he finds a Middle Eastern fellow with all kinds of suspicious things happening around him, what is going to happen when the terrorists manage to recruit WASPs in Boston?   The race card is red herring.  But when racial profiling helps you find the bad guy and you STILL can't figure it out, the we won't stand a chance when that heads-up vanishes!

We assume the patriot act and new guidance to managers in the FBI since 9/11 has fixed some of the surveillance issues. Of course, for the last 50 plus years, the Intelligence Community has been changing, right? 

If an agent cannot do a surveillance job because of race, religion, or creed, then he should not be in surveillance.  If an agent runs into bureaucratic B.S. while chasing down facts in an investigation, there HAS to be a way to go right around management without endangering his or her career.  Come on, we can figure out how to do that, can't we?  And hey, screw the career, it is not more important than thousands of lives.  Make it easy for the FBI agent to tell his story afterwards so we can go after the people who stopped him or her from doing their job.

How do we know that the FBI has finally "gotten it"?  Because the Director assures it is so?  Sorry, that's not good enough.  We need some people in there making a nuisance of themselves while the FBI PROVES they have changed.

Again, we will really never know if the FBI has reformed or improved.  So why not just start over? 

Here's an idea.  Send an email to every agent, "you now work for the DHS.  a) Tell us what you are working on, and we'll assign you to your new boss.  b) By the way, if you know a PC/Careerist, give us your vote for giving them a new career in the garbage detail."  Of course, point b) is ludicrous but you'd be surprised how many votes some people would get and it might help you start cleaning house by interviewing the "winners" today.

Obviously steps taken by Director Meuller since 9/11 have produced a marked improvement.  Perhaps the establishment of the office of the National Intelligence Director will ensure future FBI behavior which satisfies the country's needs to protect against Terrorism.

Other Agencies and Databases

The move to quickly snap up any agency that provided intelligence necessary for Homeland Security was a bold and courageous move on the part of Congress and the Executive.  For once, a real cooperation -- whether it was kicking and screaming all the way or not -- was a fine thing to see.  The Department of Homeland Security is the right answer, and looking at the Intelligence Center there appears to be the right answer too.


FAA

The FAA is key element of local intelligence.  They have all the info on the air.  Duh!

We don't  want to hear that the FAA couldn't find some higher level manager to tell NORAD that they have four hijacked airplanes until they planes are all on the freakin' ground.  As in crashed into buildings!  Come on now!

And hey, if the FAA provides key information to the military combat types, then why aren't they part of the Intelligence Community?  Come on, get on the same page! 

And why is this a non sworn, non uniformed agency?  This is not NASCAR!  The FAA needs accountability and dedication.  If a soldie