MILNET: U.S. Military Helicopter Briefing

MILNET Brief
Army Helicopter Brief: Can the DoD Recover From Its Mistakes

"You can't get one commander in Iraq to let one helicopter come home...Fixed-wings (jets) are great, ... but can they get down and do the rooting in a low level in the cities? Can they see down the alleyways? Right now they can't."

- Brig. Gen. E. J. Sinclair, commandant of the U.S. Army Aviation Center at Fort Rucker, Alabama. ¹

Update

From battles in urban Iraq where pausing to look down a street or hovering overhead to identify targets not visible by a fast mover jet, it is clear that helicopters are more than just troop transports in Iraq. So important the army commanders in Iraq are begging for more and every one that gets shot down has a major impact on operations in the theater.

Why does this surprise many who build budgets in the DoD? Simply put, Mogadishu. The Black Hawk Down syndrome it is called by some. Helicopters are frighteningly easy to shoot down. As vulnerable as "an egg with wings on it" ⁵says one of MILNET's usual sources. "A crash just waiting to happen and in combat, multiple that by ten" ⁵ said another. A maintenance sergeant looking out at a ramp of helicopters is bound up with tension, or so we hear. A common mumble is "Someone is going to die in one of those and soon". ⁵ Indeed the helicopter's flying ability has not changed much since the Vietnam war.

Some will scream foul at these statements, but the truth is, that increased airspeed, higher hovering power and thus better cargo/troop/weapons load capability don't mean squat. "The rotating wing supported by an opposing torque force to keep the front pointed where you want it -- that is the problem." ⁵ our sources say.

Don't take their words as gospel, go look at the DoD's own analysis of helos in combat or check out the design documents of companies like Sikorsky, Bell or France's Aerospatiale. Hidden in these documents are numerous warnings against combat aircraft designs for helicopters.

You don't have to be a good shot to shoot out a rotor disk -- the area swath cut by the blade of a helicopter. An automatic weapon in the hands of a child firing upward at the sound of a helo is as deadly as a sniper to a soldier in an open field. Shoot the rotor and it goes unbalanced, destroys itself and down comes helo. Pilots, arms, passengers and all. "They tend to spin around too, making it hard to see where you're going to die!" ⁵

So despite the dangers, why do Commanders love them so? Because they CAN hover, peek up over an artificial or natural horizon. They can defy gravity and get the high view then modify it dramatically in seconds, all at the hands of an adroit pilot with the guts of steel and "an ass just waiting to get shot off" ⁵. To be a helo pilot requires intestinal fortitude unlike most other pilots. After all, "your life expectancy is low, and that's over the streets of L.A., let alone over the streets of Baghdad." ⁵

And thus the DoD, striving to correct the cold war thinking that produced the Comanche attack chopper program, chopped that chopper off at the knees. Despite a nearly finished product being ready, the Department of Defense killed the stealthy lightweight helo design and vectored the funds to what appeared to be more rationale programs.

What they did, actually was attempt to repair huge problems in the overall Army helicopter program, a disease that had begun decades earlier. While the Comanche would be extremely useful on a battlefield where radar stealth could provide surprise and nighttime attack ability up until the time hearing directed the enemy to its position, the fact is that real life battles facing the Army are extremely asymmetrical. That is, no front lines, rather soldiers participating in urban warfare, and frankly a "cluster-f***" ⁵ of unimaginable proportion. The future for Army Aviation is more of the same, frankly, with their own modernization plan ¹¹ still relying upon rotating wing aircraft well into 2020.

Thus the Black Hawk Down syndrome. The concept is based upon the idea of an American chopper getting shot down over enemy territory and the natural all out effort to rescue crew and passengers in the heart of an enemy stronghold. When that stronghold is in the middle of hostile, indigenous civilians, armed with AK-47s, then of course it gets worse. While generally cities in Iraq like Baghdad are not comparable to Mogadishu, Somalia, there are sections where it would be hard to tell the difference.

And when the U.S. takes the War on Terror to where the fight to make a country free of Islamic nutballs, there are definitely going to be people armed to the teeth like those in Mogadishu. Look back at news reports of some folks in Iraq celebrating the literal pulling apart of American bodies. A flying tank is vulnerable, and most helicopters are not even close to a flying tank.

The mistake made by the Pentagon is one caused by budget conscious generals and their civilian counterparts who are trying to satisfy the blood thirst of successive Congresses. The problem arises because instead of asking for what they want to prosecute wars in the new era of war craft, our military leaders have succumbed to asking for what they "can make do with".

A light scout helicopter has been on the books for the U.S. Army since the Korean War. Yet, surprisingly, transports and gun ships are found aplenty in the inventory. A hovering tactical fighter called the Harrier has been around for decades, yet its modern replacement is STILL not in the inventory.

The Army's helicopters are profiled below. Note we take a rather sarcastic and negative approach to these craft. Do not confuse a rationale desire for better equipment with being disloyal or disparaging our fine U.S. military. We pick on helos only because we KNOW our military can do better, especially when Congress and the Pentagon can manage that rare event and work together to build truly capable weapons systems.

Kiowa

The Kiowa OH-55? Not even close. Light and underpowered, and HUGE! Why? Money went elsewhere of course, so the OH-55 was drafted into place. Even though this chopper entered service in 1991, it's design is as a commercial helicopter adapted to military roles and both cruises very slow, it has the loiter capability of not more than 2.5 hours, assuming it took off right next door to the target area.

**OH-58D Kiowa Warrior Light Helicopter**
Crew:	2
Max gross weight:	5,500 lbs (armed)
Empty weight:	3,289 lbs
Height:	12 ft, 10.6 in
Width:	6 ft, 5.4 in
Length:	33 ft, 4 in
Rotor diameter:	35 ft
Max cruise speed:	128 mph
Range:	299 miles (sea level, no weapons, 10% reserve)
Ceiling:	19,000 ft
Armament:	Air-to-air Stinger (ATAS) (2 round launcher); .50 caliber machine gun (500 rounds); HYDRA 70 (2.75 in) rockets (7-shot pod); HELLFIRE missiles (2-round launcher)

U.S. Army Factfile found at: http://www.army.mil/fact_files_site/kiowa/index.html

The Army fact file says the Kiowa's mission is to:

"Conduct armed reconnaissance, security, target acquisition and designation, command and control, light attack and defensive air combat missions in support of combat and contingency operations. Replaces AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters (those that function as scouts in air cavalry troops and light attack companies) and OH-58A and C Kiowas in air cavalry troops. Will be replaced by Comanche."

With no Comanche in the works, the Pentagon is now fishing around for the light helicopter replacement. The shrinking military budget, produced by both conservative and liberal parties in office anxious to show responsibility to the home front, have created a helo force that frankly is decades behind the principal weapons of the Air Force and Navy they operate with. Not that we'd turn down a free Kiowa if we were handed a title today!

Apache

The Apache, the Army attack helo is another case of neglect Designed for the Cold War battlefields in Europe, the helicopter first entered service in 1984, some years before the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war. To give you an idea of the mindset in the Pentagon, this chopper was being designed at the peak of the cold war arsenal and prior to SALT I treaty and the slow draw down of nuclear inventories.

A highly capable and deadly machine, it has performed well whereever the Army has assigned it. Maintenance is a little on the high side however, and it is a large machine requiring huge aircraft to transport. Given time to prepare and transport, however, they are extremely nice to have at the rear of the battlefield, ready to take their guns and rockets right where they are needed well before any Tank could deliver them. The helmet mounted sighting system for the chain gun is very high tech and when it works it is fantastic. A squeeze of the trigger quickly eliminates opposition troop carriers and will severely damage a tank, making it a sitting duck for the hellfire missiles.

Rather than be the front line, primary assault chopper for the U.S. today, however, the Apache should be the aging machine already replaced and slowly being taken out of service.

**AH-64 Apache Longbow Attack Helicopter**
Combat mission speed:	167 mph
*Combat range:*	300 miles
*Combat endurance:*	2.5 hours
*Length:*	49 ft 5 in
*Mission weight:*	16,600 lbs
*Armament:*	HELLFIRE missiles, 2.75" rockets and 30mm chain gun linked to the gunner's helmet mounted sighting system
*Crew:*	2 (pilot and co-pilot gunner)

U.S. Army Factfile found at: http://www.army.mil/fact_files_site/apache/index.html

Blackhawk

The UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter, the mainstay of regular and special forces was designed in the late 1960s and put into service in 1979. It's latest model is the L model. That's old, folks. The Navy's LAMPs is into its fourth generation, and the Air Force and Special Operations versions are well advanced but the basic design is ancient. The basic transport, this workhorse for the Army is a prime indicator of where money has gone -- elsewhere

**UH-60 Blackhawk Helicopter**
	UH-60A	UH-60L
*Mass gross weight:*	20,250 lbs	22,000 lbs, 23,500 (external cargo)
*Cruise speed:*	139 kt	150 kt
*Endurance:*	2.3 hrs	2.1 hrs
*Max range:*	320 nm	306 nm
*External load:*	8000 lbs	9000 lbs
*Internal load:*	2640 lbs (or 11 combat-equipped troops)
*Crew:*	4 (2 pilots; 2 crew chiefs)
*Armament:*	Two 7.62mm machine guns

U.S. Army Factfile found at: http://www.army.mil/fact_files_site/blackhawk/

In that sometimes surprising way things happen, the Blackhawk has undergone some great improvements in its long lifetime. A little quieter, more OOMPH, and lots of new avionics make the special ops birds pretty damned nice. The price tag is a little steep however at some $5.9 million each. Of course, the Air Force version costs more in the $10 million dollar range with even newer on board systems included. Below are the current upgrade plans of the Blackhawk, items that a newly designed aircraft would come with built-in. The list is quite long and is indicative of what a 21st century "bird" would field:

"Tier 1 aircraft may commonly be referred to as the UH-60L+. The UH-60L+ cockpit will incorporate Force XXI digital battlefield capability. All nav/com avionics and selected flight instruments will be replaced with Multifunctional Display (MFD). The first tier will provide life extension, digitization, and other enhancements to make the UH-60 relevant and effective on the modern battlefield.

Tier 2 aircraft may commonly be referred to as the UH-60(X) until formal designation is received. The second tier will focus primarily on performance related capabilities needed to support the Army Vision that can not be achieved today within acceptable cost, schedule and risk constraints. The achievement of tier 2 performance levels will rely on the development and qualification of technology that is currently not available. Current operator and maintainer UH-60A/L training material, devices, and simulators will be required to continue UH-60A/L training until the fully modernized UH-60(x) has replaced all systems in the field." ⁶

Chinook

The CH-47 CHINOOK is "the other transport" helicopter designed along the long "wiener dog" look of a long line of helicopters that goes back into the 1950s. It's predecessor was in use as far back as just after the Korean War. Upgraded with powerful twin turbines at the tail, the CHINOOK is an extremely capable transport chopper. However, it has had some problems in the high altitudes of Afghanistan. Hell, most helicopters don't like the Afghani mountains, the Russian Mi-24 Hind being the exception.

**CH-47 CHINOOK Combat Transport Helicopter**
Max gross weight:	50.000 lbs
Empty weight:	23,401 lbs
Max speed:	170 knots / 184 mph
Normal cruise speed:	130 knots / 137 mph
Rate of climb:	1,522 ft/min
Rotor system:	three manual-folding blades per hub (two hubs); 225 revolutions per minute; 60-ft rotor span;
Troop capacity:	36 (33 troops plus 3 crew members)
Litter capacity:	24
Sling-load capacity:	26,000 lb center hook; 17,000 lb forward/aft hook; 25,000 lb tandem
Minimum crew:	3 (pilot, co-pilot, and flight engineer)

U.S. Army Factfile found at: http://www.army.mil/fact_files_site/chinook/index.html

In any case, the CHINOOK has provided valuable service despite its first entering service in 1962 and its 1950s design. An upgrade program that spanned over a decade beginning in 1982 added more powerful engines, new avionics and rotor systems adding life to this already overextended design. The Army's fact file states:

"CH-47D version, which remains the U.S. Army standard and features composite rotor blades, an improved electrical system, modularized hydraulics, triple cargo hooks, avionics and communication improvements, and more powerful engines that can handle a 19,500 lb load – nearly twice the Chinook’s original lift capacity. An upgrade program exists to remanufacture 300 of the current fleet of 425 CH-47D’s to the CH-47F standard. The MH-47E is the Special Forces variant of the Chinook and will be remanufactured to the MH-47G.

The Chinook’s cockpit accommodates two pilots and an observer. The communications suite includes jam resistant HF and UHF radio systems and the helicopter is equipped with an Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) interrogator. Three machine guns can be mounted on the helicopter, two in the crew door on the starboard side and one window-mounted on the port side. Additionally, the helicopter is equipped with a suite of countermeasure systems, which could include one or more of the following: a missile approach warner, jammers, radar warner, and chaff and flare dispensers.

The Chinook has a triple hook system, which provides stability to large external loads or the capacity for multiple external loads. Large external loads such as 155mm howitzers can be transported at speeds up to 260km/h using the triple hook load configuration. Multiple external loads can be delivered to two or three separate destinations in one sortie."

The Problem with the DoD

The Army recognized the need for better equipment during the Vietnam War and aside from the Apache, has yet to receive what they have been requesting. The Blackhawk and Kiowa are excellent fills, but a modern hovering war craft is still far from reach. With the primary attack chopper design being over 20 years old, it is time to fund a 21st century helicopter program, encompassing a scout, transport, and attack chopper with the Army's new structure and tasking in mind. The problem we note is a chronic underfunding of helicopter programs by budget concious administrations either forced to put the Army in the backseat by political requirements or through a desire to focus on domestic issues by a complacent electorate. Competition for funds from the other services, also strapped by the cold war drawdown, only exacerbates the problem further.

Part of the problem also comes from left field, literally. The advent of unmanned aerial vehicles -- UAVs -- has thrown a huge wrench into the tactical thinking of the planners in the Pentagon. This applies to any and all airborne missions, whether it be recon, attack, or perhaps in the not to distant future, air superiority. Why risk a manned, extremely heavy and power hungry helicopter or fighter when you could, conceivably, send in an unmanned model airplane to do the trick. Of course, the Predator is a long shot from a model airplane, but you get the tenor of the thinking.   It IS far cheaper to send in a UAV, or even a combat version, the much vaunted Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle or UCAV for short. The UCAV is armed with deadly rockets and very precise targeting systems, both on board or slaved to troop carried ID device like a UV laser designator. With hours of loiter time, they make the manned vehicle a stupid choice in some missions.

But when it comes to putting soldiers on the ground right where you want them, not thirty miles from your objective, the helicopter is truly the answer. And more than transporting the guys on foot, you need to have some air power to cover their scrawny butts while they are about their business. Again, the helo is king, able to swing into position, put a missile on target, and then swoop away to get into position for the next target.   No tank can do that in the urban setting without nosing through buildings creating collateral damage a magnitude worse than the helo and rockets create.

With over $14 billion saved by cutting the Comanche, the Army has proved they can change direction. Of course the money saved hides the fact that the DoD had to pay some rather huge "false start" penalties to the contractors. No matter, they did indeed change direction. The problem remains, however, with funding for a scout the only change in the helicopter program worth mentioning. Upgrades to aging airframes seems to be the watchword across all the services, and the Army is no exception.

According to an August 2004 A.P. article citing the Iraqi General's feelings on helos, the moneys will be spent on "Upgrades are in the works for aging Black Hawk and Chinook transports and Apache gunships. Pilots will get more cockpit training before joining combat units."¹

Great. Also the funds will help in the development of a new scout helicopter. Also good news. Unfortunately,   two generations of Army commanders will go in and out of the service before anyone will be able to take advantage of the scout helo. As usual, the Congressionally handcuffed DoD is decades behind the power curve.

While not surprising to anyone who has watched the military-industrial complex for the last thirty years, it is still disheartening.   One can only hope the new found interest in homeland security since 9/11 will also foster a look at what domestic battle planning can do with a hovering transport and aerial attack vehicle.   We remind those folks, we need flying tanks that are maneuverable as a hummingbird and ideal for urban settings. Armor 'em up, able to resist being shot at by rifles and an RPG, give them enough power to loiter as long as they need, and to get in and out of position quickly. It's a big demand, but HEY that's what the Army needs.

Alternatives

One has to wonder how the Joint Strike Fighter will perform in the ground support role when compared to the helo. For instance, hanging air-to-ground missile pods on an F-35 will cut down its top airspeed. Will the F-35 have the target acquisition abilities of the Apache?   And should the plane need to sneak into radar guarded territory to deliver a surprise attack, will the hovering jet replacement for the Harrier have any advantages over the axed Comanche or for that matter, give us more than a Black Hawk upgraded to the latest in avionics and engines? Won't a child with an AK still be able to point up and pop holes in the hide of the hovering sitting duck called the Joint Strike Fighter? Perhaps. However, there is a possibility, one supposes, for that design to lead to a larger engined version, slower, but capable of being that hovering tank, outfitted with plenty of armor and firepower. A pair of 50mm or 75mm Vulcan cannons mounted on an armored box seems more appropirate than a little fighter. The close air support role of a fast jet flying "down and dirty" to deliver payload is useless in downtwon Baghdad TODAY! Or tomorrow, thank you very much.

If pigs had wings -- ah, now that ancient saying makes even more sense. Maybe, by adding a ton of armor, the F-35 can be the forerunner of a new hovering recon and attack vehicle that does not use a rotating disk above it that can be shot out by an adolescent. Doesn't anyone in the Pentagon read sci-fi? We need hover vehicles armed to the teeth. Vehicles that are armored, reliable, relatively inexpensive, rugged and dangerous to the enemy. While helos and jumpjets are some of these things, they are not even close to meeting the majority of requirements -- things we know we've needed since the Vietnam War and certainly after Afghanistan and two Gulf wars.

Since Mogadishu set back hovering recon and attack thinking by a decade, it is hard to fault the Pentagon. Frankly, however, it is hard not to point a finger at the imagineers in weapons systems designers. Why there is not a ducted fan hovering UCAV is beyond comprehension. Perhaps its a matter of software. With DoD buying so much off the shelf, it is pretty clear the Pentagon has a hard time finding good software jocks to write code that would allow an autonomous UAV to swoop in, pick out a target and then blast it to hell and gone. Can you imagine the uproar if a UCAV decided a Mercedes full of a Mom and kids in downtown Baghdad was deserving of a hellfire missile?

Why there isn't that big tank like affair with ducted fans and a pair of vulcan cannons or even a small howitzer, defies logic. Special Operations flys the MC-130E Combat Talon I gunship. Essentially this is a C-130, a four engine turboprop aircraft that is awesome in its firepower. It generates high volume large guns (70 to 120mm) as well as a rapid firing howitzer howitzer. Of course, the MC-130 is just as awesome in its incredible vulnerability. The seem to get shot down with some rapidity.

The "Spooky" concept in Vietnam was basically the same airframe and called the AC-130 Spectre. Surely in nearly forty years, the imagineers in army weapons could have come up with a replacement using ducted fans? Yep, we're back to the tank that hovers.

MC-130

While it is not hard to imagine the reluctance to design such a vehicle, and God knows you almost HAVE to have a pilot to fly a hovering vehicle. The current hovering vehciles are a crash about to happen and only a human can keep them airborne most of the time, but never all the time. Seems the DoD, in this respect, is not only still wrapped up in cold war thinking, but incredibly, still trapped in the last century. We can and should do better.

UAVS/UCAVS

We mentioned this earlier. In the bibliography below we list the vintage 1998 seminal search document from the DoD that first publicly lets an RFP for a Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle ². Several designs have already been made public, with great drawings and pretty exciting performance estimates. And of course the success of Predators in Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq make it clear that the concept has -- if you'll pardon the expression -- wings (legs?).

As we pointed out earlier, it is easier, perhaps, to send in a rather expensive but unmanned craft to do what a VERY expensive manned vehicle does today. Especially if the budget minded consider how much it costs to train an Apache or Kiowa crew.

Certainly non-manned vehicles offer less weight carrying requirements for recon and surgical strike capabilities. After all the human cargo weight differential will allow much larger weapons or at least a smaller airframe with the same weapons, do the math.

Thus a contingent of planners have thrown their weight behind the use of RPVs and UAVs to replace the helo gunship or recon aircraft in dense urban situations. Many believe the quieter and stealthier unmanned vehicles will prove to be far more effective and even if we spend the same on them as their predecessors, the savings in life and increased effectiveness will make the effort well worth the time and money spent to get us into position to take advantage of the new technology. And after all, they argue, isn't it always the case of technology replacing the human who is far more prone to error. Even if the vehicle is Remotely Piloted, the savings in life will more than pay for the device.

Update:

ARH-70A Arapaho

A contract let in 2005 designed to be a replacement for the Kiowa means the Army should be ready to begin deploying this new helo shortly. The Arapaho is based upon the well proven Bell 407 helicopter. The Arapaho can be armed with "AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, GAU-19 (12.75mm) Gatling gun pods which fire at 2,000 rounds a minute, Hydra 70 air-to-ground rockets and up to seven 2.75in guided or unguided rockets such as the Folding-fin Aerial Rocket pods (FAR pods)." The aircraft will also have the EFW "helmet display and tracking system based on the ANVIS/HUD-24T. The system has a day / night helmet display and Line-Of-Sight (LOS) electromagnetic head-tracker. EFW is also supplying the helicopter's data transfer system. The suite also includes an embedded GPS / inertial navigation system and Smiths Aerospace Integrated Standby Instrument System (ISIS)." ¹³

ARH-70A Arapaho Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH)


Gross Weight:	At IGE Hover 4,000 ft: 19,200 lbs; at service ceiling non-hover): 20,000+ lbs
Useful Load:	1,868 lbs (847 kg)
Speed:	161 knots (140 KTAS) max, 130 mph (113 KTAS) cruise
Range:	>162 nm (> 300m) at 4000 ft. and 95 deg. F, loiter at 60 kots, 4000 ft, 4 hrs (Bell 407)
Length:	36.7 (11.19m) (41.6ft X 7.7 ft. Rotor folded, 36.6ft X 24.1 ft. folded)
Width:	Swath: 35.4 ft side-to-side.; Bell 407 Std: cabin and skids 8.8 ft (2.68m) Tail: 7.3 ft 2.2m)
Height:	10.2 feet, 11 in. (3.32m), Swatch: 36.7ft (11.19m) front-to-back
Engine:	One Honeywell HTS900-2 turbine, 970 shp (723kW)
Rotor system:	Main: 35.4 ft diameter (10.67m), four blades, 7.8 ft ground clearance (2.36m) (Bell 407) Tail:
Sling-load capacity:	26,000 lb center hook; 17,000 lb forward/aft hook; 25,000 lb tandem
Minimum crew:	2 (pilot, co-pilot)
Ceiling:	20,000 ft. (1,219m)
Armament:	0.50 cal Gatling gun, 7-tub 2.75" FFAR (foding fin rocket) launcher or 38 std rocket tube bundles
Other Features:	Modern, Common Avionics Architecture System (CAAS) Digital glass cockpit Full-color multifunction displays Night vision capability Plug-and-play capability for network or systems of systems

Bell ARH-70A Brochure (MILNET Mirror) (PDF: 2.6MB), Bell 407 Tech Specs (MILNET Mirror) (PDF: 953KB)

UH-723A Lakota

The U.S. Army announced in late 2006 that the UH-72A Lakota will be used to free up UH-60 Blackhawks being used in duty better suited to the lighter UH-72, allowing the bigger helicopters to be transferred to the National Guard for operational missions.

UH-72A Lakota

UH-72A Lakota Light Utility Helicopter (LUH)


Max gross weight:	7,903 lbs
Useful Load:	3,953 lbs
Max speed:	145 knots
Length:	33.4 ft
Width:	5.7 ft
Height:	11.5 ft
Rotor system:	36.1 ft main rotor with 6.4 ft. tail rotor
Troop capacity:	8
Litter capacity:	24
Sling-load capacity:	26,000 lb center hook; 17,000 lb forward/aft hook; 25,000 lb tandem
Crew:	3 (pilot, co-pilot, and flight engineer)
Ceiling (Max Hover)	11,300 ft

Conclusion

The Pentagon's error was allowing the Army's helicopter program to languish while other programs received top dollar. In fact, if one looks at the Army's weapons system budgets compared to the Air Force and Navy, it looks like they have been -- well -- we won't use the hind quarter reference used by our military vets. Suffice to say that the Army needs an infusion of cash and quickly. Some crash programs to prevent crashes so to speak.

Fast Track the scout program

Investigate UAV/UCAV and remotely piloted versions to the full extent and if reasonable build a mix of operational capabilities using BOTH, not favoring one or the other.

Take the Navy's approach to the next generation, the Helo X programs with 21st century goals not remake of 1960s/70s technology. Calling a UH-60 upgrade an X program is not funny and insulting to the American public's intelligence. This program should encompass the scout, transport, and attack chopper replacements with slow but well armored and deliver much more firepower with greater precision.

Elect a Congress that is not anti-war/anti-weapons oriented. If we are going to have a military, then we have to continue to have the best. Short funding them is not only ludicrous, but dangerous. Quit whining about millions spent unwisely, weapons development will always require adjustments and occassionally will require better gear to follow. Overly criticial procurement policies stifle our ability to move forward AND push the technology.

Of course, the chances of anyone in the DoD getting a chance to propose such programs is slim. The Navy and and Air Force still appear to be getting the lionshare of the defense budget. This is the usual DoD mistake, one which we have been accustomed to worrying about for over thirty years.

Who knows, though? Perhaps the Rumsfeld Military Transformation will include taking the Army into the 21st century and funding will flow to heavily armored hover vehicles that are not so vulnerable.

Sources:

Army Looks at New Choppers, Associated Press, Fox News Online, 8/1/2004
Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle Solicitation, DARPA, 3/9/1998 (MILNET Mirror)
Batallion Scout Helicopters, Carlton Meyer, Editor of G2mil.com, undated.
Briefing on the Restructure and Revitalization of Army Aviation, Department of Defense, Les Brownlee, 2/23/2004.
Interviews with military officers and retirees who wish to remain anonymous, MILNET, May thru July 2004
UJ-60L / S-70 Blackhawk, Global Security.org
UH-55D Kiowa Warrior Fact Sheet, U.S. Army Fact Files, The Pentagon, Washington D.C., undated.
AH-64 Apache Fact Sheet, U.S. Army Fact Files, The Pentagon, Washington D.C., undated.
UH-60L Blackhawk Fact Sheet, U.S. Army Fact Files, The Pentagon, Washington D.C., undated.
CH-47 Chinook Fact Sheet, U.S. Army Fact Files, The Pentagon, Washington D.C., undated.
U.S. Army Aviation Status and Modernization Plan, DoD, MILNET Mirror (PDF 2.3MB)
Military Aviation: Issues and Options Combatting Terrorism and Counter-Insurgency, Chrisopher Bolkcomp, Congressional Reporting Service, 1/24/2005
ARH-70A Arapaho Armed Reconaissance Helicopter, USA, Army-Technology.com, 3/11/2008