Iranian Progress Toward Developing Nuclear Weapons
July 28, 2004, Updated 06/17/2007
"Iran's primary national objectives are threefold: ensuring the survival of its Islamic government, limiting foreign influence in the Middle East, and spreading Islamic fundamentalism abroad. Tehran seeks to strengthen its political, economic, and military positions as a regional power and to reduce the influence of the West, especially the United States, in the Persian Gulf, and in the greater Middle East. In addition, Iran champions Muslim causes worldwide, supporting Islamic activism in other areas in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Iran's efforts to add to its military power and acquire NBC weapons and missiles support these national objectives."

- U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, Section on the Middle East Nuclear Proliferation, April 1996 2

Clearly the U.S. Government has, for some time, recognized the nuclear threat posed by Iran.  This is especially true today as the U.N. and IAEA struggle to keep a lid on the quickly spreading nuclear disease in the Middle East and Asia.  As most non-proliferation experts will complain, the process for keeping new countries becoming nuclear armed is obviously, distressingly, quite broken. 

The key to the problem are the so called rogue nations -- North Korea for instance, who appear to be supplying the most difficult key element in developing a test device -- weapons grade fissile material.  No wonder than, that these same experts look at Iran with increasing trepidation.

Well before 1996, U.S. Intelligence analysts 1 knew the Shah of Iran was interested in the necessary industrialization to create a nuclear weapon.  In fact, the U.S., in a policy now looked upon as suicidal, sold Iran a small nuclear research reactor.  However, when the Islamic Revolution overthrew the Shah, it led to a temporary abandonment of the Iranian nuclear program lasting for a decade. 

However, as the U.S. reported in 1996,  the so called moderate government   emerging in Iran had once again begun to take the steps all too familiar to non-proliferation experts.  From heavy water nuclear reactors to uranium enrichment programs, Iran has already gone down the  road other third world nations have traveled.  With help from China and Russia, it appears Iran now have all the technology they need to begin (if they haven't already) to produce weapons grade material.  With the possibility of jump starting their program with ready-to-go material from someone like North Korea, it is only a matter of time before Iran becomes a known, weapons tested nuclear state like India and Pakistan, the latest in the "nuclear club"  In fact, it appears to be a race before North Korea or Iran conducts a nuclear test first. 

Of course the diplomats remain busy pursuing their efforts, however, many experts feel the efforts are in vain and that time will clearly show nothing other than force will prevent a nation from becoming a nuclear nation.

Below we list the chronology of events which clearly spell out the development program in Iran.


TimeFrame
Event
Analysis
1967
Shah of Iran institutes exploratory research into indigneous production of weapons grade fissile materials.  Small research reactor purchased from the U.S. and brought online at the Tehran University
The Shah of Iran was increasingly worried about Iraq and Israel, both hostile and well known as also exploring nuclear capability. 1
1970
Iran signs the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
The move is cited by U.S. officials as an example of how peaceful dissemination of nuclear technology can and should take place.  This niavite is mourned by non-proliferation experts and will come back to haunt the western world.
1979
Islamic Revolution Halts all NBC research
While other international relations effects of the revolution in Iran were deemed disastrous, perhaps this was a temporary silver lining in the cloud for diplomats and non-proliferation experts.  This was short lived however, as only a decade later the programs were back on again.
1984-1988
Iran acquires SCUD-B Missiles from Libya and/or North Korea.  Nearly 100 fired at Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war, but armed with only conventional warheads.
Also fired 10 Chinese Silkworm cruise missiles one hitting U.S. flagged tanker in Persian Gulf another striking in Kuwait.
Capable of delivering a prototype nuclear weapon 300 kilometers.
The Iranian Defense Miniistry also began its own indigenous missile development program as well as acquired Chinese SA-2 equivalent missiles (100 km range) and SCUD Cs from North Korea (200 km range).
1988
Major loss in the Iran-Iraq War, led to Hashemi Rafsanjani's covert pledge to never allow Iran to be the victim again, some believe aiding in his election as the President in 1989.

While Iran's so called moderate government postures to win favor in Europe and other western capitals, their actions  clandestinely prove otherwise.  One intelligence analyst from AFI claims Iran is the world's leading terrorist exporter and will also stop at nothing to a)develop NBC weapons capabilities, and b) use the technologies to futher their power base in the Middle East.  MILNET believes this analysis is on the mark, with further evidence of this Iranian mindset shown througout this document.  Included are eyewitness reports from covert operators who found themselves targets or near targets of Iranian covert operations to gain knowledge and material on the open and black markets. 
1988-1996
Iran agrees to purchase and begins to take delivery of portions of a research reactor that could easily be used as a training reactor for a plutonium (weapons grade) production facility. (purchase in 1990 from China). China also sells Iran an electromagnetic isotope separation unit which can be used to generate enriched uranium for weapons grade material.
Documented publicly in 1996, however it is thought that classified intelligence data shows purchases and delievery of equipment began in the late 1980s.  Intelligence analysts cite confirmed dual and single use purchases thorughout the period.

Several anonymous sources in the Intelligence community indicate covert sanctions or clandestine pressure brought to bear by western intelligence agencies against the suppliers in nations "friendly" to U.S. and its allies.  Some of these companies are in allied nations as well.  Cited are France,Germany as well as China and a number of the former nations of the Soviet Union.
1994
 Iran signs purchase agreement with China and U.S. President Clinton enacts an oil embargo against Iran as a sanction.
1995
Iran signs cotnract with Russian for completion of Bushehr reactors.
U.S. Diplomatic response pledges to add commercial sanctions to anyone supplying Iran.  Few sanctions follow however, and none against Russia.
1996
Adds more Chinese and North Korean missiles to the Iranian ballistic missile inventory, including SCUD-C and CSS-8 (modified Chinese SA-2)
Also has continued to purchase more capable cruise missiles
An open secret 2 were the plans announced and presumably carried through to acquire North Korean NoDong missiles which could reach Saudi Arabia, Israel, or Turkey.  Also exposed to the current SCUD-B and SCUD-C missiles are Afghansitan, Bahrain, India, Iraq,Kuwait, Pakistan, Qatar, Syria, United Arab Emirates and the Southern Asian nations of the former Soviet Union.

The U.S. publicly available analysis indicates that the Iranians, in 1996, also fielded a number of SU-24 bombers capable of delivering nuclear weapons.
1997
U.S. Intelligence indicates with a very high confidence 3 , confirmed by several allied nations, that Iran has increased funding and effort in their NBC programs as well as made progress in missile programs.
Rather than respond with full denials to U.S. revleations of hard evidence of the Iranian program, the government has admitted to existence of equipment choosing deception -- "it's all for peaceful energy research".  The rationale used is that Iran would rather sell its own non-nuclear energy resources, thus gain revenue, and use nuclear energy to sustain their modest domestic energy needs.  Meanwhile the technology purchases and builds continue to point to more than is necessary, and defying the dual use paradigm by magnitudes.
1998
Intelligence Community sources 1 indicate the U.S. and its allies have pressured the Ukrainian  manufacturer of steam turbines, Turboatom to renig on their contract with Iran.
This appears to be a waste of time, since steam turbines are a necessary development for a peaceful use of nuclear power, the focus and energy should be on more nefarious items.  Some analysts believe the semi-public revealation may be a cover for other equipmetn that was being shipped through Turboatom, thus stopping the turbine shipments may have also severed a clandestine equipment pipeline.  This cannot be confirmed, however.
1999
The U.S. finally imposes commercial sanctions against companies in Russia. Sanctions against Russa itself do not take place leaving many to wonder how effective commercial sanctions against Russian companies will be without a sanction against the country itself.  Part of the problem, most analysts believe, is that U.N. sanctions are extremely difficult if not impossible to levy against a permanent member of the U.N. security council, so the U.S. cannot take any Russian sanctions to the next step.
2000
The Wisconsin Project publishes an excellent chronology  4 of the Iranian Nuclear program after several media outlets cite CIA information on Iranian progress.  Slow progress by the Russian contractors on the Bushehr complex.
Some believe Russia is succumbing to pressure from the world community and is dragging their feet.  But slow progress is still progress and members of the intelligence community continue to forecast a nuclear weapon by 2002.
March 2001
MILNET and AFI publish articles on the threat posed by Iran, including not only terrorist activities and support but the ongoing nuclear program.  The U.S. Government and media outlets also charge Iran with harboring terrorists and continuing to build a nuclear program.
Iran's denial continue to fit the pattern of deception expected.  As 2002 looms closer, the Intelligence Community does not alter its estimates for a nuclear weapon by 2002.
1/29/2002
U.S. President Bush names Iran as part of the 'Axis of Evil' in the State of the Union Address.  Iran denies they support terrorism and say they do not participate in nuclear weapons trade or development.
The denials are again, part of the pattern against increasing worldwide pressure to own up to their nuclear program.  The President's speech clearly puts pressure on Iran, Iraq, and North Korea.  MILNET publishes an article citing hopes diplomatic pressure will prevent Iran and North Korea from testing their first device, and indeed to abandon their programs.  MILNET is pessimistic, however.
12/13/2002
CNN Splashes 5 commercial satellite photo of Iranian nuclear facility and cites U.S. spy satellite photos that reveal the site is more than it seems.  IAEA demands Iran reveal the purpose of their nuclear facilities, Iran denies existence.
U.S. Intelligence analysts and several anonymous sources confirm that the Iranian facility has far more traffic in military weapons researchers than a peaceful energy facility should host.  Clearly something sinister is going on at the site. 

Iran's denials fit the pattern of deception expected.  MILNET and AFI had earlier published articles on the Iranian threat repudiating the denials.
2/9/2003
Iran finally reveals the existence of their nuclear sites and invites in IAEA, and the follow up report from the IAEA demands more details, clearly indicating the IAEA has found the evidence that traces of weapons grade material has been found.  Iran refuses.
U.S. diplomacy may manage to tame the beast, however while MILNET hopes along with most others that diplomacy will succeed, history has shown that rogue nations tend to use diplomacy as cover while they complete their work.  MILNET believes Iran will be the next nation to test a nuclear weapon, if not beaten to the punch by North Korea.

Iran's program is thought to be further ahead than North Korea's program, however no clear evidence of fissile material in place prevents the Intelligence Community for confirming either country has a testable weapon.  Most analysts will say, however, "Any time Now".
3/17/2003
Time magazine 7 splashes photos taken from their own sources that  show the Iranian facilities and warns that the U.S. may find itself embroiled in another conflict shortly. (photo is linked to the Time Magazine article and may get unlinked if Time moves or deletes the image). 
Media hype and political agendas aside, it is clear everyone must take notice of the Iranian refusal to reveal their program.  Their continued refusal indicates the secrecy and progress in the program.  As the program gets closer to the completion of a test device, MILNET believes the dialog will get shriller and the denials eventually to cease, the refusal to accept or deny being the indicator the weapon(s) are ready.

June 2004
All media outlets report on the ElBadarai (IAEA chairman) report 10 that cites Iran may already have all the ingredients to test a nuclear weapon.  Traces of weapons grade material continue to be found and the possible sites for weapons grade material manufacture continue to be overly busy.
MILNET concurs with media hysteria in this case, having predicted this from as early as 1996 and tracked the progress since then.

MILNET believes Iran is waiting for the appropriate moment to conduct its test, already having constructed one or more devices.  Sources which wish to remain anonymous are split 50-50 on whether the device is actually ready for test.  This is a state of affiars very similar to the months leading up to the first test of a device by India.
June 2004
Federation of American Scientists 9 continues to support the claims that Iran's nuclear program is sufficient to build nuclear weapons
The FAS is perhaps a notorius anti-U.S. Government operation when it comes to things nuclear or any sort of weapon for that matter, making their analysis appear very much independent of U.S. political interests..  Their site has an excellent review of the Iranian nuclear puzzle at:   http://fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/nuke/  .  Their analysis includes the statement:
"It is generally believed that Iran's efforts are focused on uranium enrichment, though there are some indications of work on a parallel plutonium effort. Iran claims it is trying to establish a complete nuclear fuel cycle to support a civilian energy program, but this same fuel cycle would be applicable to a nuclear weapons development program. Iran appears to have spread their nuclear activities around a number of sites to reduce the risk of detection or attack."
 - Federation of American Scientists, Iran Nuclear Weapons, Recent Developments
Also, MILNET's sources indicate the weapon is built and awaiting the "right moment" to be tested.
July 2004 Iranian Scientists break seals on centrifuges that can be used to create weapons grade material
AP's George  Jahn reports the IAEA was notified by Iran that it's voluntary lock up of centrifuges has been lifted and the seals were confirmed broken, only one month after IAEA demands answers to questions on traces of weapons grade material found.  Irritating the non-proliferation commmunity is the fact that the IAEA has known for several weeks that the seals have been broken and the facts were leaked -- the IAEA did NOT report the incident to the public.  Moreover, a state run TV agency was told the centrifuges had been put back into operation on June 29.  It is not clear from the article how long reporters at AP have known.  The Telegraph in the U.K. voiced the opinion that Iran may believe they can take advantage of the U.S. due to the government being paralyzed by the election campaign.
July  2004
Iranian scientists attempting to buy deuterium gas
AP reports U.N. diplomats have reported that Iran is attempting to buy deuterium gas, a substance that is used to boost the yield of nuclear weapons.
Sep 2004
Iran says they have started to prepare 37 tonnes of raw uranium for processing in centrigures

CNN Reports that Gholamreza Aghazadeh, the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organisation, told reporters in Vienna Tuesday that Iran had begun converting 37 tonnes of raw uranium into fuel for nuclear centrifuges, Reuters reported.

One nuclear expert told the news agency that, if enriched, that would be enough material for five nuclear weapons.

March 2005
Iran Admits Nuclear Facility is Underground
The admission concerns the Natanz facilities and includes centrifures which are used to process uranium by separting U-238 from precursor U-235, a necessary step toward creating fissile material for a nuclear weapon. Yet, Iranian government officials still claim they are not enriching fuel, directly contradicting their own admissions.
May 2005
Several reports indicate the negotiations with EU representatives are not going well, and indications are that Iran continues to process materials destined to aid them in building their first nuclear weapon.
Some intelligence sources indicate that all the while the EU negotiators having been "working with top officials" in Iran, their weapons and missile programs have not slackened on bit. 
May 2005
British Prime Minister Tony Blair states Iran should be called before the U.N Security Council and explain evidence that points to their nuclear weapon program  as well as their continued enrichment programs  22
Clearly Blair is preparing the way for tougher action as Iran rthumbs its nose at European negotiators.
May 2005
Iranian Parliment votes to continue enrichment program all the while still declaring Iranian nuclear program is strictly for peaceful purposes. 23
Many analysts are now looking at Israel and the U.S. to begin making preparations for direct action against the known and suspected nuclear facilities.
June 2005
Ahighly confidential International Atomic Energy Agency report states that Iran has been working with laboratory samples of Plutonium as early as November of 2003, nearly a year earlier than previously thought.
The revealation changse the geometry for analysts attempting to put together the puzzle of the Iranian nuclear weapons program, dramatically chaniging how soon the nation could arrive at the ability to build and test a weapon.  With Iran continuing to play the yes, no game in terms of negotiations with various parties all over the world, and its continuing denial and deception about a weapons program, this news is a quite a blow to non-proliferation experts.
June 2005
Iran's President Elect Mahmoud Ahmadinejad says Iran will continue its "peaceful" nuclear program 25
With no rationale reason for a nuclear program and processes on going that are extremely useful for a weapons program, the claim of a peaceful program is hardly believeable.  Worse, the hard-liner victory in the Iranian election inidcates any further diplomacy will fail.  Hopes that a more moderate Iran will cease its weapon program have vanished with the election.  MILNET's opinion is that something other than diplomatic efforts will be required to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear nation.  The clock is ticking til the first Iranian nuclear test.
October 2006
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert warned on Thursday that Iran would have "a price to pay" if it doesn't back down from its nuclear ambitions, hinting broadly that Israel might be forced to take action." according to an AP News story. 26
The warning comes after a year of Iranian provocation by Iranian President Ahmadinejad who is quoted as saying Iran will "...destroy Iran" and refusing to halt the Iranian nuclear program leading to the production of weapons grade nuclear material.  MILNET has been warning that Israel will be "boxed in a corner" for over two years now, and it is clear that Israel is finally admitting publicly what others have been saying quietly.  See the Daniel Project final report by Louis Rene Beres, et all.
November 2006
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad says Iran will have "completed its fuel cycle" by February-March of 2007, and brags about bringing thousands of centrifuges online.  And then goes on to say the world accepts an nuclear Iran. 29   .
The IAEA report lists several issues with the Iranian program, specificallyo the enrichment facilities at Natanz:
  • no response to request for more information on its enrichment program
  • no access to suspicious equipment/military personnel possibly involved in nuclear activities;
  • denial of a request for a copy of the uranium metal diagrams;
  • no information on apparent experiments linking nuclear and ballistic missile research.  30
Remarkably, the comments occur with tepid response from all quarters, as if everyone is convinced there is nothing to be done -- who knows how to stop the Iranians?  This is doubly dangerous, for MILNET believes [OPINION] that Israel, while watching the tepid response, will decide it is up to them to do something about the problem, and their solutions will be both dramatic, swift, and deadly.
February-March 2007
The IAEA reported that the Iranian Centrifuge facitlity at Natanz has completed the 164 unit cascade, adding to the 10 and 24 unit cascades in the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant that already existed.  The 164 unit cascade is at the production EFP and in which the first 18 will be tested shortly.  The current enrichment quality is at 4.2% U-235 proving the design efficiency of the facility.  Iran continues to deny remote monitoring of the 3000 machine hall but pledges to allow frequent inspector visits. Iran also stated that once the hall reaches 500 machines, all monitoring will cease.  34, 35
The hall, which is supposed to eventually consist of some 3000 machines, is clearly aimed at production of large quantities of highly enriched uranium.  Iran's current enrichment quality is only one pass through the cascades away from becoming weapons grade material ensuring that at anytime they wish to manufacture weapons grade material, they are only weeks away from doing so.  The IAEA report, naturally, as their operation remains totally dependent upon public inspection regimes, ignorant of any clandestine facilities.  The refusal to allow inspections and monitoring of the EFP facility once the count of machines reaches 500 would only be necessary because at that point, the amount of material produced and which could be diverted is in the classic weapons production regime and therefore would be secret.
March 2007
Iran has refused to cease their Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant experiments and continued with building the production EFP facility.  The U.N., on March 23, 2007, approved new, tougher sanctions against Iran, despite Iran's warning that such sanctions would be illegal and therefore they would be forced themselves to go "illegal", which implies they will begin to defy the terms of the NPT and cease cooperation with the IAEA.  35, 36, 37, 38
Some analysts (including MILNET) assume going illegal also means that Iran's statement is the first public acknowledgement that they will start a weapons program.  Typically nations do not admit to such a program until it is well underway.  MILNET assumes the Israelis may find this announcement by the Iranians as the trigger for final planning on a direct strike against nuclear and conventional forces of Iran.
April 2007
The IAEA reports that Iran's publicly visible (as inspected by the IAEA) uranium enrichment capacity has doubled since their last look in March, now operating some 164 separation centrifuges in the gallery they hope to have 3000 such devices in operation.  39
And with incredible naivite, the IAEA also says that this is not enough capacity to create a bomb in the near term.  As usual, the IAEA, because they are shown any bomb program discount the ability for the Iranians to hide or operate centrifuges.  Incredibly, they also claim that just because the enrichment process to date is low in enrichment quality (4% or thereabouts), that this also means it could still be a decade before bomb material is produced.  This is EXACTLY the logic used with North Korea, yet they surprised everyone by developing a weapons some five years before the most aggressive estimates.  Clearly the IAEA has learned nothing from their own dismal track record.
September 2007
Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is reported by the Associated Press 42 as having stated that Iran now has 3,000 uranium enrichment centrifuges.  The AP story also cites the IAEA 's lower figure of 2,000.
If we've learned anything from listening to the IAEA, it is that they really don't have a clue.  Their statement that the number is more like 2000 may be correct, however, next week, it wouldn't be surprising to hear that they underestimated...and clearly despite Iran's claim to be cooperating, the key point here is that the IAEA HAS NOT SEEN the entire enrichment hall at Natanz.  This type of pussy-footing around is exactly what creates the "oops, we were mistaken" reporting that the IAEA is now infamous for.  Look for Iran to cease cooperation with the IAEA, AGAIN, when news rounds of sanction are imposed. Then of course, the IAEA count will be worthless.  It should also be noted that Iran may be telling the truth on their count for the simple reason that they have another 1000 centrifuges elsewhere -- in a location not subject to IAEA monitoring or indeed outside the knowledge of public sources. Now that is an OOPS.
June 2008
A Washington Post article cites a report which  indicates that Pakistani nuclear proliferaor A.Q. Kahn may have sold Iran the design for a so called "compact" nuclear weapon -- a higher technology nuke that weighs less and is smaller -- ideal for mounting in a ballistic missile nosecone.  The information comes from drawings discovered in the investigation in 2006 of Swiss businessmen Maroc, Urs, and Friedrich Tinner who identified by the U.S., U.K and IAEA investigators as black market smugglers of nuclear secrets.  40 The report is being cited by David Albright a "prominent nuclear weapons expert who spent four years researching the smuggling network."  The blueprints allegedly "offered instructions for building a compact device...The lethality of the device would be little enhanced, but its smaller size might allow delivery by ballistic missile."  Albright is also a former IAEA inspector according to the Washington Post article.   40

High tech nuclear weapons use various methods to enhance the explosive power -- for instance by squirting key chemicals into the blooming detonation to better "burn" the nuclear material and thus convert more of its mass into energy. Also construction details can ensure less of the nuclear material is blown away from the hot center of the nuclear reaction, thus keeping more nuclear "fuel" close by to participate in further mass conversion.  Thus a smaller weapon can produce the same nuclear yield with less overall heavy and bulky weapons grade material. 

The release of this information some two years after its discovery may indicate an increase in U.S. support for stiffer sanctions.  At the same time, the U.K. announced it would be supporting much more stringent sanctions against Iran, beginning with a ban on business with Iran's largest bank.
July 2008
An Associated Press article 41 reports that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has stated that Iran now posesses 6,000 uranium enrichment centrifuges.  The statement was made in a speech to university professors in the city of Mashhad, Iran.  Earlier IAEA reports said bak in April of 2008 that attaining a number of 6,000 was plausible by summer, making it quite likely that the Ahmadinejad statement something more than a macho boast.
The number is troubling because in February of 2008, Iranian officials confirmed they had begun installing IR-2 centrifuges that churn out enriched material at a rate more than double that of Iran's earlier centrifuges.  Iran has stated their intent to move to full rate production using some 54,000 centrifuges.
If you assume Iran can add 3,000 new centrifuges every quarter, they will have an additional 6,000 by years end.  This puts enough centrifuges in place to produce a weapon in LESS than 18 months as ealier thought possible.  Once again, the predictors who have not been alarmed by Iran's "peaceful" nuclear program are showing signs of embrassment.  Unfortunately, OOPS is not a good thing to hear from the IAEA or the U.S. Congress when it comes to Iran's nuclear program.


  1. Personal Interviews of Intelligence Sources who wish to remain Anonymous - MILNET, April 1996-June 2004
  2. Proliferation: Threat and Response, U.S. Department of Defense, The Office of the Secretary of Defense, April 1996
  3. Proliferation: Threat and Response, U.S. Department of Defense, The Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 1997
  4. Iran Nuclear Milestones, The Wisconsin Project, August, 2000.
  5. U.S. Has Photos of Secret Iran Nuclear Sites, CNN.com, 12/13/2002
  6. State of the Union Address, President George W. Bush, January 29, 2002
  7. Iran's Nuclear Threat, Massimo Calebresi, Time Magazine, March 17, 2003
  8. Iran's Nuclear Program.  Part I:  It's History Payvand's Iran News, Mohammad Sahimi, 10/02/2003
  9. Iran Nuclear Weapons Recent Developments, Federation of American Scientists (Last updated June 2004)
  10. IAEA Non Proliferation Report on Iran, January 3, 2004, MILNET mirror copy
  11. The U.S. Congressional Reporting Service (CRS): Iran's Nuclear Program, Recent Developments, 3/4/2004 (Mirror)
  12. The U.S. Congressional Reporting Service (CRS): Arms and Weapons of Mass Destruction Suppliers, 1/3/2003 (Mirror)
  13. Iran Resumes Building Centrifuges, George Jahn, Associated Press, at Seattle Times Online,  July 28, 2004
  14. Iran Starts Atom Tests in Defiance of EU Deal, Telegraph, U.K., July 27, 2004
  15. Iran Seen Trying to buy Nuke Substance, A.P., MSNBC Online, July 28, 2004
  16. MILNET: Iran
  17. The Centrifuge Connection, The Bulletin of American Scientists, March/April 2004
  18. Iran Can Produce Nuke Warheads in Days, WorldNetDaily, 2/28/2004
  19. Proliferation: Threat and Response - January 2001 version (PDF: 4.29MB)
  20. Nuclear Threat Reduction Measures for Pakistan and India, Sharon Squassoni, CRS, 2/17/2005
  21. Iran Admits Nuclear Facility is Underground, A.P., Fox News Online, 3/7/'2005
  22. Blair: Iran Should Face U.N. Security Council, A.P., Fox News, 5/12/2005
  23. Iran Passes Pro-Enrichment Bill, A.P., Fox News, 5/15/2005
  24. U.N. Iran Has Used Plutonium For Years, Fox News, A.P., 6/15/2005
  25. Iran President Elect:  We Will Pursue Nukes, Fox News, A.P., 6/26/2005
  26. Israeli PM Warns Iran Over Nuke Program, A.P.,  Fox News, 10/19/2006
  27. The Daniel Project final report, Louis Rene Beres, et all, April, 2004.
  28. Iranian Nuclearization And Israel's 'Arrow':  Implications For Preemption Option, Dr. Louis Rene-Beres, mirrored on MILNET with permission of the author.
  29. Iran:  Nuclear program will be operating by February, A.P., CNN, 11/14/2006
  30. IAEA finds plutonium at Iran waste facility, A.P., MSNBC, 11/14/2006
  31. IAEA Report Says Iran Has Bomb Plans, Fox News, 01/31/2006
  32. Iran Calls U.N. Resolution 'Invalid' and 'illegal' and vows to continue enriching uranium, International Herald Tribune, 12/23/2006
  33. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant..., Washington Post, 02/22/2007
  34. Iran Defies U.N. Deadline on Enrichment, Kwame Holman, PBS Online NewsHour, 2/22/2007
  35. Iran's Centrifuges:  How Well Are They Working?, Jacqueline Shire and David Albright, The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), 03/15/2007 (MILNET Mirror), HTML Version
  36. Iran's Top Leader: We Will Pursue Nuclear Activities Regardless of Sanctions, A.P.,Fox News, 03/21/2007
  37. U.N. Security Council Imposes New, Tougher Sanctions On Iran, A.P., Fox News, 03/25/2007
  38. Iran Partially Suspends U.N. Cooperation, A.P., Yahoo! News, 03/25/2007 
  39. Boost in Iran's Capacity To Enrich Uranium Noted, Dafna Lizner, Washington Post, 04/19/2007
  40. Smugglers Had Design For Advanced Warhead, Joby Warrick, Washington Post, 6/15/2008
  41. Iran Posesses 6,000 Centrifuges, Associated Press/Military.com, 7/26/2008
  42. Iran Says It Is Now Running 3,000 Uranium Centrifuges, A.P./Washington Post, 9/3/2007