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MILNET Brief The Middle East: Threat From Syria, 3/8/2005, Updated 5/31/2005 "...attempts to separate and distinguish shades and aims of Islamic terror are quickly losing their relevance..." - Israeli Mosad head Efrayim Halevi at meeting of NATO Council in Brussels on 06/22/2002. |
"kidnapping, hostage-taking, bomb-attack on innocents, and hijacking".This conundrum for world leaders is that which separates them for anti-war or pacifist idealists. It is far easier to say "no war" then to parse out what is defensible as necessary violence or split hairs about attempts to reduce collateral damage or random attacks directed at non-combatants. If one does not draw the line at any violence, then where does one decide to place the boundary on civilized behavior?
- the Bonn Summit in 1978
Clearly Director Halevi has a finely tuned focus on Syria, and we chose his speech to introduce our threat assessment for a specific purpose. No one nation feels the threat from Syria more than Israel. Over its history it has looked at its mid 20th century beginnings and stared past its borders to the likes of Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon -- all of whom were eager to grind the people of Israel into the dust of the land granted them by the United Nations. Indeed, the Israelis have withstood numerous attempts to do just that and from each of those directions, save perhaps, Jordan."Terror has served as a tool for attaining political objectives for many years. History knows many cases in which terror was a very powerful and potent tool for achieving national liberation. This has recently resulted in an attempt to define and draw distinctions between various categories and nuances of terrorism: for example, the ten Palestinian groups operating from Damascus have been defined as quasi-legitimate movements acting for the liberation of Palestine. We saw an attempt, which continued for a long time, to avoid a confrontation with the true reality of this phenomenon, for the sake of the interests of "realpolitik."
Thus, Syria, which provides cover for these groups, was permitted to win a seat as a respected member of the Security Council, and this month its representative is even serving as the council's chairman, and this has happened at a time when the Palestinian Islamic Jihad sent a suicide bomber to blow up a bus in northern Israel, causing the deaths of some twenty people. The leader of this organization, Ramadan Shallah, took responsibility publicly for this attack as he sat in his headquarters in Damascus being interviewed by the Al-Jazirah television network, which is watched by millions across the Arab and Muslim World.
My argument to you here today is that attempts to separate and distinguish shades and aims of Islamic terror are quickly losing their relevance. Why? First and foremost because of the scale and intensity of these terrorist acts. They are no longer being restricted to specific regions in the world. Hamburg, Milan, Brussels, London, Miami, Kuala Lumpur -- this is just a random list of big cities where terrorists have lived, worked out their plans, and prepared to carry out their operations. Second, the use of suicide terrorists in New York, Washington, or Jerusalem is the fulfillment of a modus operandi motivated not only by its professional utility, but no less by its ideological and religious probity. The method has taken on a transcendental, supernatural significance."
- Israeli Mosad head Efrayim Halevi at meeting of NATO Council in Brussels on 06/22/2002
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| Baathist Party (Ruling party in Syria,
formerly in Iraq) |
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| Druze | |
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| Manonites | |
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LF |
| Palestinians | |
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PFLP-GC HAMAS FRC FI DFLP |
| Shi'i | |
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Hizbollah |
| Sunni | |
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LMIU
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| Other | |
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"...Syria has increasingly relied on a strategic deterrent based on ballistic missiles and chemical warfare capabilities, as the ultimate guarantor of regime survival against potential regional adversaries. Syria also likely sees the development of these weapons as a cheaper alternative than trying to achieve conventional parity with Israel. As a result, Damascus has continued to develop and expand its ballistic missile and chemical weapons capabilities, and, to lesser extent, biological weapons capabilities. Syria is likely to maintain and improve these capabilities over the long term.
"...The new regime of Bashir al Asad likely will maintain and improve Syrian missile and chemical and biological warfare capabilities." 2
2"Syria sought CW-related precursors and expertise from foreign sources during the reporting period. Damascus already has a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin, and it would appear that Syria is trying to develop more toxic and persistent nerve agents. Syria remains dependent on foreign sources for key elements of its CW program, including precursor chemicals and key production equipment. It is highly probable that Syria also is developing an offensive BW capability.Contrasted to the report released covering the period of January through June of 2003, the U.S. intelligence agency has added a concern for Syria's nuclear research, and confinues to confrim in no uncertain terms that chemical and biological weapons programs are in production phases, and that ballistic missile and advanced conventional weapons development and acquisition have not abated in the least.We will continue to monitor the potential for Syria’s nuclear R&D program to expand.
During the second half of 2000, Damascus continued work on establishing a solid-propellant rocket motor development and production capability with help from outside countries. Foreign equipment and assistance to its liquid-propellant missile program—primarily from North Korean entities, but also from firms in Russia—have been and will continue to be essential for Syria’s effort. Damascus also continued its efforts to assemble—probably with considerable North Korean assistance—liquid-fueled Scud C missiles.
Syria continues to acquire ACW—mainly from Russia and other FSU suppliers—although at a reduced level from the early 1990s. During the past few years, Syria has received Kornet-E (AT-14), Metis-M (AT-13), Konkurs (AT-5), and Bastion-M (AT-10B) antitank guided missiles, RPG-29 rocket launchers, and small arms. Damascus has expressed interest in acquiring Russian Su-27 and MiG-29 fighters and air defense systems, but its outstanding debt to Moscow and inability to fund large purchases have hampered negotiations " 11
"Nuclear. Syria—an NPT signatory with full-scope IAEA safeguards—has a nuclear research center at Dayr Al Hajar. Russia and Syria have continued their long-standing agreements on cooperation regarding nuclear energy, although specific assistance has not yet materialized. Broader access to foreign expertise provides opportunities to expand its indigenous capabilities and we are looking at Syrian nuclear intentions with growing concern.MILNET suggests the reader to note that the nuclear research facility provides adequate nuclear waste material to build numerous so called dirty bombs, certainly enough to lob dirty bomb warheads into any of the neighbors on the missile threat map shown earlier in this report.Ballistic Missile. During the first half of 2003, Damascus continued to seek help from abroad to establish a solid-propellant rocket motor development and production capability. Syria's liquid-propellant missile program continued to depend on essential foreign equipment and assistance—primarily from North Korean entities. Damascus also continued to manufacture liquid-propellant Scud missiles. In addition, Syria was developing longer-range missile programs such as a Scud D and possibly other variants with assistance from North Korea and Iran.
Chemical and Biological. Syria continued to seek CW-related expertise from foreign sources during the reporting period. Damascus already held a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin, but apparently tried to develop more toxic and persistent nerve agents. Syria remained dependent on foreign sources for key elements of its CW program, including precursor chemicals and key production equipment. It is highly probable that Syria also continued to develop an offensive BW capability.
Advanced Conventional Weapons. Syria continued to acquire limited quantities of ACW, mainly from Russia. Damascus's Soviet-era debt to Moscow and inability to fund large purchases continued to hamper efforts to purchase the large quantity of equipment Syria requires to replace its aging weapons inventory." 12
"Syria has come under strong pressure from the United States since the invasion of Iraq. In some areas, such as preventing the movement of foreign fighters through Syria to Iraq, Syria seems to be trying to accommodate U.S. demands. Nevertheless, on the question of abandoning its WMD capabilities, especially chemical and missile programs, Syria has so far given no indication that it is prepared to follow Gaddafi's lead [Libya recently admitted to WMD programs including nuclear waepons and has since began to fully cooperate with nonproliferation measures -- MILNET].Syria sees its nonconventional weapons capabilities as a counter to Israel. If it is prepared to put those capabilities on the negotiating table at all, it would probably do so only in the context of a peace settlement with Israel. Even then, Syria might argue that it needs to hold on to those capabilities as long as Israel retains nuclear weapons." 13
The report also gave a brief bio of mister Einhorn:
"Robert J. Einhorn is a senior adviser in the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) International Security Program. Before coming to CSIS, he was assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation. This article is adapted from a speech he delivered January 28, 2004, at the Paul C. Warnke Conference on the Past, Present, and Future of Arms Control, which was co-sponsored by the Arms Control Association." 13