Palestinian Armed Forces, an Overview for 2001 Richard M. Bennett
The Palestinian Security Services born out of a political compromise and like so many of the previous International agreements foisted on the Middle East, a combination of ignorance and diplomatic expediency. Now some years after the signing of the Oslo accords, the complicated task of establishing a viable security force in the Gaza Strip and West Bank continues apace. The first major problem to overcome was that when the first elements of the new force arrived they were mainly veterans of the Palestinian Liberation Army and were quite frankly unsuited for the task. Uncomfortable with the transformation from a military to a police role, a lack of training and equipment, combined with an over reliance on day to day support from the local population contributed greatly to the level of distrust and unease shown by the Israeli military.
The PSS as presently organized is top- heavy with administration and flawed by being divided into numerous factions. This, while from a professional security view, is ludicrous, fits neatly intoYasir Arafat’s scheme of things. Dedicated to the design of ‘divide and rule’, Arafat ensured that no one part of the PSS would be strong enough to challenge his authority. However, this situation is about to change with the more overt military and intelligence units gaining more influence and moves are now believed to be underway to begin the essential rationalisation of the security apparatus. This could indeed prove to be the first real threat to Arafat’s rule, but the long-term consequences for the stability of this area remain very much open to question.
An review of Palestinian military organization and capability
The General Security Service (GSS) was established in May 1994 under the Director General Nasr Yusef. It acts as a co-ordinating body for a number of organizations, the most relevant being;
The National Security Force (Quwat al-Amn al-Watani) a para-military force of some 8,000 based on the West Bank and 6,000 in Gaza, with most of its officers being former PLA personnel
General Intelligence (Mukhabbarat al-Amma), the official Palestinian Authority Intelligence gathering organization, both internal and external, believed to be about 3,500 strong.
Military Intelligence (Istkabbarat al-Askariyya), a smaller service tasked mainly for internal security duties and protection of the regime, approx. 500 personnel
Civil Police (al-Shurta Madaniyya), also known as the Blue Police, for their uniforms.
This is the PA’s main law enforcement agency and has some 6,000 officers on the West Bank and a further 4,000 in Gaza. There is also a Plainclothes Internal or Preventive Security force of 2,200 in Gaza and 2,800 on the West Bank.
Aerial Police (Shurta al-Jawiya), a ‘skeleton’ air arm, based on Fatah’s Force-14, presently equipped with 2 Russian Mi-8 and 3 Mi-17 Helicopters.
Coast Guard (Shurta Bahariyya), this unit officially for anti-smuggling operations with 5 Machine-gun armed Motorboats, 1,000 personnel and based in Gaza. It is in fact, an elite Special Forces Commando group trained for anti-terrorist and special operations tasks.
To counter the influence of the GSS, Arafat has under his personal command the
Special Security Force (al-Amal-Khass), established in 1995 as a ‘watchdog’, to conduct surveillance on other Palestinian organizations. With 500 personnel, it is important for its fierce loyalty to Arafat.
Presidential Security (al-Amn al-Ri’asah), this is an elite security force of around 3,500. The majority are former members of Arafat’s former security guard, Force-17 and are still usually referred to as such.
Armaments available to all the Palestinian Security Forces include;
Armored Vehicles
Approx., 50 including BTR40, Walid and BRDM 4x4 Reconnaissance Vehicles. UAZ-469B Machine-gun armed Russian ‘Jeeps’
Infantry Support weapons
122mm Katyusha Rocket Launchers, tube-launched and manportable these largely inaccurate weapons still have a considerable capability against fixed or civilian targets, usually range 3 to 5 miles.
60mm LAW M72 Light, US made shoulder-launched Anti-Tank Rockets, probably smuggled in from either Israel or Jordan.
Russian RPG-7 and RPG-16 shoulder-launched Anti-Tank & Anti-Bunker Rockets.
Dozens of Israeli Wire-guided Anti-Tank Missiles, probably Russian AT-3 Saggers captured originally from either the Egyptians or Syrians have been smuggled to the Palestinians. These weapons have a range of several miles and a capability to destroy soft-skinned vehicles and many armored personnel carriers. Most modern Israeli Tanks are effectively protected by improvements in frontal armor, but a lucky side shot could disable the running gear and leave the vehicle vulnerable to further attack
60 or so US and Russian 81mm Mortars. Highly effective weapons in the right hands as they are able to 'lob' mortar bombs over buildings into the street beyond or over a hill from a concealed position
10 Russian Twin 23mm Zu-23, effective Anti-Helicopter Air Defence Guns. The Palestinians however lack effective training and radar, so weapons will have only a very limited effectiveness, and life span probably.
Dozens of Russian 14.5mm ZPU-1 Anti-Helicopter and Anti-Light Armored Vehicle Machine-Guns, the heavy calibre of the ZPU make them one of the Palestinians most effective weapons. Towed or manhandled, they are easy to use, and move or conceal.
10 or so Russian SA-7 GRAIL shoulder-launched Anti-Aircraft Missile System.
A rather out-dated weapon, the SA7 could still prove effective, in skilled hands, fired from roof-tops or from the back of a vehicle against low-flying Israeli helicopters in built-up areas.
Small Arms.
Total believed to be 55,000, with many M16 and AKM fitted with sniper-scopes, including US 55.56mm M16, Russian 7.62mm AK47, AKM, AKMS & 5.45mm AK74 Assault Rifles.
Israeli 9mm UZI, Czech 7.65mm Skorpion M61 and German 9mm MP-5 Sub-Machine Guns.
Russian 7.62mm RPK and 5.45mm RPK-74 Light Machine Guns.
Russian 12.7nmm DSHk Heavy Machine Guns.
Other weapons
Large stocks of Russian & Chinese Anti-Personnel and Anti-Tank Grenades, with some locally manufactured copies.
Stocks of Russian, Italian & Chinese Anti-Tank and Anti-Personnel Mines
Considerable stocks of military plastic explosives, Semtex, and RDX.
The military performance of the Palestian forces has come under close scrutiny on numerous occasions in the last five years and none more so than on two particular occasions, the first being during the so-called Hasmonean tunnel riots in September 1996 when the bloody violence inflicted a large number of casualties on both sides. However, the important lesson learnt by the Palestian forces was that, although heavily out numbered by the local Israeli Army units the Palestinians were able to inflict a significant number of casualties with basic weapons and traditional guerrilla warfare techniques. Accurate sniper fire cost the Israeli's a number of officers and clever use of concealment was usually effective, unless the Israeli's were prepared to use direct fire with the consequent dramatic increase in civilian casualties.
Since 1996 the Palestinians have prepared for future conflicts by improved combat training, particularly in street fighting with house-to-house, close-quarter battle and laying really effective 'booby-traps'. Mining, concentration on sniper techniques, along with the purchase of several hundred high-tech sniper-scopes for M16 and AK rifles and attempts to obtain, and then perfect the use of surface-to-air missiles.
As long ago as February 1997 a former Israeli Scout was arrested in possession of a stolen military vehicle loaded with weapons. During the investigation it was discovered that air defence missiles had been top of a priority list of equipment to be stolen. In fact, the Palestinians have been more than a little successful in breaking into Israeli Military establishments and stealing a wide range of weapons.
Other sources of military equipment have been the smuggling routes through Jordan, or across the Mediterranean from Italy into the Gaza Strip and via the network of tunnels linking Eqyptian territory to the Gaza. Though Israeli security discovered some tunnels, many others have survived and continue to provide a route for the smuggling arms and equipment. However, high-tech weapons will only become available to the Palestinians in any quantity when the international community finally agrees to turn a blind-eye to the other Arab nations in the area supplying direct from their own stocks. A further rise in the shocking numbers of civilian casualties by the use of even heavier weapons by Israeli Forces may well create just such a set of circumstances. Saddam Hussein's recent announcement on the 8th of February of the creation of an Anti-Israeli Liberation Army suggests that there are already moves by certain Middle Eastern countries to exploit the situation further.
The second and more puzzling occasion has been the lack of effectiveness shown during the year 2000 by members of the Palestinian forces in trying to control the street violence that has erupted so often during the on-going, and so-called second Interfada. With few notable exceptions, the 'blue police' have simply turned a blind eye, while the more heavily armed and better-trained security elements were noticeable by their absence. Whether this has been due to incompetence or a simple unwillingness to get involved. Or, as seems likely a deliberate, politically motivated act to further militarize the local population, and ensure a increased willingness to continue to accept the necessity of violence in the struggle for a Palestinian homeland, will long be a matter of contention. Whatever the reasons may be, the effect has been to provide a new generation of militants, and victims. A less expected bi-product of the renewed violence has been that certain members of the local population, and the police co-operated, for whatever reason with the Israeli Command on the West Bank and this resulted in the assassination of a number of leading Palestinians by Israeli undercover hit squads. This too, has led in turn to the execution of a number of Palestinian's accused of collaboration.
Considerable attention has been paid to small unit combat training, until 1999 largely at platoon or company level, but since the start of 2000 there have been at least eight Battalion sized exercises and although not of the highest or most realistic standards, Palestinian officers are now becoming more practiced in handling combat units of up to 600 men . Where the Palestinian forces really are short of experience and capability is in the use of armored vehicles, however this may also soon be rectified as a number of Palestinian officers are completing armored training course's according to so far unconfirmed reports in both Iraq and Russia. Indeed, Saddam Hussein may well be prepared to provide a limited number of such vehicles via Syria. It would be relatively easy to conduct training in armored warfare under cover of Syrian Army activities in the Bekaa valley, where some heavy weapon and anti-tank firing is already in progress by specialist Palestian force units.
With this multiplicity of often-conflicting organizations and duties, it is no wonder that the general consensus is that the Palestinians are nothing more than a disorganized para-military police force, with no real fighting ability. While it is true that there is still a noticeable lack of many of the expected attributes of an Army, a co-ordinated general staff, operational planning, a trained officer corps, organized and well-equipped military units, effective command & control and logistic support. This should not blind the reader to the success achieved by Palestinian forces on the occasions when they have fought within their limitations and used the traditional low-intensity tactics of snipers, ambushes and street-fighting.
While the present Palestinian Forces lack a genuine ability to take on the Israeli Military Machine, something they continue to share with many much larger Arab Armed Forces, they do now have a considerable nuisance factor and should not be quickly or easily beaten in any future conflict.
However, with the recent election of Arik Sharon the potential for conflict appears to have risen considerably. Sharon's determination to protect Israeli interests and his track record of using hard line military tactics creates a different potential battleground for Yasser Arafat's forces. Confrontation is likely to occur not only around the well-known religious sites and Israeli settlements, but increasingly over area's of disputed administrative or police power, business and commercial area's, transport and the public utilities, electricity, water etc. The Palestinian's may too, wish to extend the 'interfada' to involve more overseas interests from tourism to industry, particularly in the face of a more confrontationalist and combatative style of Israeli Government.
The Palestinians WILL need heavier and more effective anti-tank and air defence weapons, and a more skilled and experienced officer corps. Only other Arab nations could quickly provide this capability with both volunteers and equipment, but of course this carries with it the risk of further internationalizing an already dangerous and complicated situation.
© Richard M. Bennett 2001
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Source material checked with;
AFI 'INSIGHT' Research Files on Middle East/Weapons
Military Balance 2001 The IISS, London
ICT, Herziliya, Israel
Ananova Press Association
ERRI, USA