MILNET Brief Beres on the Mideast "A force multiplier is a collection of related characteristics, other than weapons and force size, that make a military organization more effective in combat. A force multiplier may be generalship; tactical surprise; tactical mobility; command and control system; etc. The presence of a force multiplier creates synergy. The unit will be more effective than the mere sum of its weapons... IDF assessments must consider the capabilities and intentions of Israel`s nonstate enemies; that is, the entire confuguration of anti-Israel terrorist groups. And once again, such assessments must offer more than a group by group consideration. Rather, the groups must be considered in their entirety, as they interrelate with one another..." - Dr. Louis Rene Beres, 'Israel, 'Palestine' and 'Correlation of Forces' In The Middle East |
War is never far
from the minds of prudent Israelis, and prudent operational planning
must always look closely at the regional "correlation of forces." Drawn
from the military lexicon of the former Soviet Union, this concept is
usefully applied as a particular measure of armed forces, from the
subunit level to major formations. Additionally, it has been used to
compare resources and capabilities on both the levels of military
strategy and of so-called "grand strategy." This meaning is closely
related to the concept of "force ratios" used more commonly in Western
armies.
Today, with renewed preparations for a Middle East "peace" that would
include a Palestinian state, Israel must undertake prompt assessments
of enemy states with particular reference to the "correlation of
forces." Here it must seek more than an "objective" yardstick for
measurement of opposing forces. Although the IDF is assuredly comparing
all available data concerning both the quantitative and qualitative
characteristics of units, including personnel, weaponry and equipment,
its commanders will need to know more to establish Israeli force
superiority at decisive places and times. This is especially the case
in matters of grand strategy, where opposing forces could soon be
endowed with genuine weapons of mass destruction.
What, exactly, should be the IDF concept of "correlation of forces?"
First, it must take careful account of enemy leaders` intentions as
well as capabilities. Such an accounting is inherently more subjective
than assessments of personnel, weapons and basic logistic data. Such an
accounting must be subtle and nuanced, relying less on scientific
modeling than upon carefully informed profiles. In this connection, it
will not do to merely gather relevant data from all of the usual
sources. It will also be important to put Israeli strategists into the
shoes of each enemy leader, determining what Israel looks like to them.
Second, the IDF correlation of forces concept must take account of
enemy leaders` rationality. An adversary that does not conform to the
rules of rational behavior in world politics might not be deterred by
any Israeli threats, military or otherwise. Here the logic of
deterrence would be immobilized and all bets would be off concerning
expected enemy reactions to Israeli policy. This point now pertains
especially to growing existential threats from Iran. There, if the
Islamic regime is permitted to complete its still planned
nuclearization without preemptive interference, Israel could find
itself face-to-face with a suicide bomber in macrocosm.
Third, IDF assessments must also consider the organization of enemy
state units; their training standards; their morale; their
reconnaissance capabilities; their battle experience; and their
suitability and adaptability to the prospective battlefield. These
assessments are not exceedingly difficult to make on an individual or
piecemeal basis, but the Ministry of Defense needs to conceptualize
them together, in their entirety. To get this more coherent picture
will require creativity and imagination, not merely the more ordinary
analytical skills.
Fourth, IDF assessments must consider the capabilities and intentions
of Israel`s nonstate enemies; that is, the entire confuguration of
anti-Israel terrorist groups. And once again, such assessments must
offer more than a group by group consideration. Rather, the groups must
be considered in their entirety, as they interrelate with one another
vis-a-vis Israel. And these groups need to be considered in their
interactive relationship with enemy states. This last point might best
be characterized as an IDF search for pertinent "synergies" between
state and nonstate adversaries.
Fifth, IDF assessments must take special note of the ongoing
metamorphosis of a nonstate adversary (PLO) into a state adversary
(Palestine). With this metamorphosis, Israel`s strategic depth will
shrink to less manageable levels, and a far-reaching enemy momentum to
transform Israel itself into part of the new Arab state will be
energized. How shall Israel "live" with Palestine? In one respect, the
codified institutionalization of disparate enemies into "Palestine"
will actually provide some geostrategic benefit to Israel (now reprisal
and retaliation will likely be easier and more purposeful), yet there
will also be a corresponding and consequential loss of vital
territories.
In the matter of synergies, the IDF must also consider and look for
"force multipliers." A force multiplier is a collection of related
characteristics, other than weapons and force size, that make a
military organization more effective in combat. A force multiplier may
be generalship; tactical surprise; tactical mobility; command and
control system; etc. The presence of a force multiplier creates
synergy. The unit will be more effective than the mere sum of its
weapons. IDF responsibility in this area concerns (1) recognizing enemy
force multipliers; (2) challenging and undermining enemy force
multipliers; and (3) developing and refining its own force multipliers.
Regarding number (3), this means a heavy IDF emphasis on air
superiority; communications; intelligence; and surprise. It may also
mean a heightened awareness of the benefits of sometimes appearing less
than completely rational to one`s enemies. This last point is
especially important, and warrants serious and immediate study.
Correlation of forces will essentially determine the outcome of the
next Middle Eastern war. It is time for Israel to go well beyond the
more usual numerical assessments to "softer" considerations, and to
focus especially upon the cumulative importance of unconventional
weapons and low-intensity warfare in the region. A key dilemma in this
focus will be the understanding that, in certain circumstances,
preemption is both indispensable and infeasible, and that any suitable
expression of "anticipatory self-defense" will require skillful and
authoritative clarifications.
From the original
article in the Jewish
Press.