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MILNET: Counter Intelligence
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Counter intelligence is conducted in order to disrupt and if possible eliminate foreign attempts to collect intelligence in country. In the U.S., there are a number of agencies that provide counter intelligence, however, the lead agency is the Federal Bureau of Investigation. However, several agencies in the U.S. Intelligence Community provide their own teams. Just recently, the National Aeronautical and Space Administration, NASA, has added counter intelligence teams to thwart attempts form unfriendly countries to steal U.S. space technology. This team is led by a Counter Intelligence chief reporting to the NASA Chief Administrator. Reporting to the chief are two directors and they in turn manage individual lab or facility directors across the nation.
The F.B.I.'s counter intelligence directorate counters both espionage and terrorist activities through separate divisions. More often today this includes security background checks as well as lie detector tests where individuals are privvy to extremely sensitive information. Typically this use of the lie detector is aimed at determining if an individual has had contact with espionage agents or has diseminated classified information to unauthorized personnel.
Counter intelligence typically makes use of other intelligence assets, especially human assets, to point to "moles", espionage agents within their own intelligence apparatus. For instance, C.I.A. agents conducting operations in the Soviet Union were on occassion told by their foreign agents that someone in the F.B.I. was feeding U.S. operational and agent identity information to them. As a result, a hunt began for the Soviet Mole in the U.S. intelligence community. Eventually, the FBI uncovered Bob Hanssen, a well respected, highly placed FBI agent. Hanssen's arrest shocked fellow agents. Previous to the FBI mole, Aldrich Aimes was arrested for similar activities in the CIA.
Classic Recruitment
The classic methods for recruitment by the Soviets focused on extremely productive recruitment -- that is, the Soviets tried to install an agent for the purpose of the "big take" -- a piece of information that will be worth all the effort they are prepared to put into the recruitment. In other words, the classic recruitment will go all out to get the really important information and take the risk of losing the agent over the long run. Thus they were happy to offer moeny or other incentives, use blackmail, or any other techniques.
The Classic Recruitment includes a relationship with the recruited agent. Since it is may turn out to be a long term recruitment, the classic recruitment focuses on a rewards system that will continually entice the recruited agent to not only continue providing information, but perhaps to be able to target the agent for specific information rather than "what just happens to come across the desk."
Thus defending against classic recruitment is difficult. The counteragent must detect changes in behavior or lifestyle that indicate recruitment.
Countering The Techniques for Recruitment
Techniques for counter intelligence vary by the country targeting U.S. interersts. For instance, the more classic soviet espionage approach is described by Richelson the acronym MICE1 which stands for:
In the U.S., money is typically a major factor, although the amount of money used by Soviet agents was quite small when considering what their agents were asking their recruited agents to do.
Today, ideaology is typically used to entice immigrants to provide information to the foreign espionage agent. However, during the years following World War II this was quite an effective approach to entice potential recruits who shared a common belief in communism or socialism.
Comprimise is known as the dark side of intelligence operations and the Soviets were masters. Typically the methods are ineffective for long term recruitement however. Techniques include the "honey pot", using woman to get target men in position for blackmail. Other means of blackmail could be used as well, from finances to family problems.
Ego is perhaps the most tricky of the lot since it requires a fine touch to get by the guard of the targeted recruit. The technique involves making the subject feel important. The agent recruiting is effusive in their praise and over time builds up the recruit's image of their activity such that they feel like a genius or a hero. This technique is especially effective if the recruit is not receiving the recognition they feel they deserve, a condition many scientists and managers feel in the military-industrical complex.
The New Recruitment Techniques
In the case of Chinese espionage, a newer, more subtle method for recruiting agents is being used. In effect, the Chinese are looking for small results and in some cases a specific answer to a particular scientific problem or component of information. The Chinese have typically stolen knowlege, not so much documents or physical item.
In retrospect, it appears the Chinese technique ignores all aspects of classic recruitment save one. Especially in the case of their preying upon the scientific community, the Chinese feel a reliable conspirator is more important. Moreover, they want a long term relationship based upon trust, at least in the beginning, where the agent doesn't really understand they are an agent, other than a minor committment to providing information. Money is typically not used, since this would imply the conspirator is a "bad guy", disloyal and a paid informant -- unreliable. Similarly, the Chinese do not use the comprimise technique in their usual practice of targeting scientists since that too would contradict their philosophy of maintaining a good self image for the conspirator. And while the Chinese might use a subtext of the Idealogy theme -- "We are proud of you as a countryman" -- the Chinese agent provocteur will typically shy away from using the idealogoy card. More often than not the Chinese agent is more interested in simply having a conversation with the target and eliciting and receiving a key point of information.
The Chinese technique of choice is a sub text of the ego technique. Focusing on immigrants, the Chinese will approach a particular scientist who they suspect may have the knowlege in the area where the Chinese Scientists have become stuck in their research. For example, if the Chinese nuclear program has run into a road block, they might go after a U.S. scientist who originated from Taiwan and engage him or her in conversation. After making their pitch, the Chinese agent might simply request help by the way of a hint or solution to the problem they face 2.
Of course once the agent has been recruited, they may go back time and time again for more information, using conferences and conventions as meeting places, typically pitting a Chinese Scientist against an immigrant Scientist in the target country.
In the case of Classic Espionage techniques, the result of being discovered may be life in prison or even the death penalty. In the case of Chinese Espionage techniques the target will most likely face public ridicule and lose their job. And of course getting another job in their field will be impossible. As Dr. Paul Moore explains it, "...the normal success in classic espionage is conviction and incarceration. In typical Chinese targeted espionage, the targetloses his job. This is hard for the public to understand and especially with Congress, the expectation is that the individual should face an espionage trial. This expectation is not realistic in the real world." 2
1 Sword and Shield,: The Soviet Intelligence and Security Apparatus, Jeffrey T. Richelson, Ballinger Publishing Company, 54 Chruch Street, Harvard Square, Cambridge, MA., Copyright 1989, 02138-3730, ISBN 0-88730-035-9 (cl), 0-88730-039-1 (pb).
2 Spy Cruise, Dr. Paul Moore, March 16, 2002, Regal Empress, somewhere between Cozumel, Mexico and Tampa, Florida, USA.