MILNET: Espionage Overview

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Aldrich Ames Case |  Robert Hanssen Case

Target England, Russian Espionage in the U.K., 1918-1940s  |  Target-Ciphers  |  Atomic Spies

FBI Famous Espionage Cases  |  FBI History Page

The MILNET Intelligence Blog

This report will use FBI and CIA historical documents as well as non-fiction authorities and lecturers as the basis for presenting an overiview of the important espionage cases from prior to World War II to present. The overview will be broken up into four sections: Prior to World War II During World War II Post World War II and the Cold War Post Cold War to Present Necessarily, our information will be based upon open sources, as found in released government documents -- typically declassified with or without redactions 1, non-fiction novels -- such as generated by popular historians like Nigel West, Bob Woodward, or Jeffery Richelson 2, documents or lectures from former government officials like David Major or William Colby, or from publicly available courses such as that offered by CI Centre 3 First, the overview will provide some background on espionage's key element, recruitment of agents in the target country. As you will see, we make extensive use of KGB cases in our overview as well as the more detailed sections. This is due to a simple, inescapable fact. The KGB's First Chief Directorate (FCD) was an extremely capable, highly successful espionage organization that stole the world's most important secrets, including plans and verification of theories for production of fission and fusion powered nuclear weapons -- the atomic bomb and the hydrogen bomb. Not stopping there, however, the KGB also became quite good at focusing its attention on specific targets and either eliminating them or clandestinly watching them until the time was right for arrest, typically pulling in an entire network of spies. Not that the KGB was without its spectacular failures. But the usual publicized cases were those were a Soviet agent or network of agents was exposed after years of activity. To get some information from an agent is wonderful in the intelligence game, to have an agent working productively for years is incredible. The Soviets were indeed masters at the intelligence game. And perhaps ten to twenty years from now, we will find that the Russian SVR, which for all intents and purposes replaced the KGB on October 11, 1991, is just as effective as the KGB.
Background on the KGB The KGB had its roots in Lenin's Secret Police known, not too fondly by the citizens in Russian and many Soviet "States" to be, as the CHEKA. CHEKA was formed on December 20, 1917 according to The Sword and Shield, 22 by Christopher Andrew and Soviet Defector Vasili Mitrokmin. The KGB's internal security arm continued to be called CHEKA and the name struck fear in the hearts of Soviet citizens for decades. According to Andrew and Mitrokmin, the members of the organization even were paid on the 20th of the month to celebrate the foundation of the organization.

Andrews and Mitrokhin also tell us that the CHEKA soon formed a special section to deal with non-domestic (out of country) intelligence activities, the Innostranyi Otdel or INO.

Much of the early years of these organizations and directorates were focused on the "White Guards" and anti-Tsarist activities. Eventually, the "Red Terror" which includd periods of fast purges ordered by Stalin, chewed up not only those alleged to have been conspirators in the government but also in civilian life and the intelligence services.

Decades later, however, the organizations grew at such speed that major sections were managed by geographical region (see the Target England page on MILNET).

The new structure included the rezidentura typically an office within each of the Soviet diplomatic missions. The rezident, a legal officer such as a military or cultural attache was also accompanied by an "illegal", a Soviet officer posing in a "non-intelligence" position and without diplomatic immunity.

And just as quickly, the Soviets also broke out the internal security and counterintelligence component away from the foreign intelligence gathering and management sections.

The First Chief Directorate became the foreign intelligence arm, specializing in espionage development of techniques, training, support and actual field operations. Richelson's Sword and Shield2 describes the KGB organization that functioned for most of the post WWII era, when it was at its height of effectiveness.

For a short period of time in the late 1940s, the two major intelligence organizations, the KGB (at the time called the MGB) and GRU were combined in the "Committee for Information"¹. By 1953, the committee was gone and the two organizations were once again acting separately. Perhaps a little more information exchange occurred by there still remained little trust between the two.

Of greatest importance in the success of the KGB was the FCD's Directorate S, which ran "illegals" -- that is, KGB officers who went into the target country without diplomatic immunity -- real spies who recruited agents, sometimes posing as intelligence officers from the target's home country or a country the target had sympathy for. Targets included more often than not, someone with an idealogical reason for working for the officers such as a member of the local communist party, or as emigree's found themselves targeted by the KGB officers.

Throughout the remainder of the Cold War, the FCD of the KGB perfected the tradecraft of espionage. Fictionalized with some small degree of accuracy, John LeCarre provide us with exceedingly detailed but entertaining stories of George Smiley²¹, a droll beauracrat in the British Secret Service who eventually winds up heading the service as he uncovers the moles who match very closely those we know in reality as the Cambridge Group (again see the Target England page for details. LeCarre uses terms like "Moscow Rules" to describe the "art" of dead drops, the use of a single chalk line and/or a brass thumbtack to inform a controller that his agent believes the area is clear for operation, backup drops and backup meeting places. All of which tends to match actual Soviet spy trade.

In reality, Andrews and Mitrokhin²² indicate that the Soviet tradecraft probably came from the Tsarist era's Okhrana, a small predecessor organization to the Cheka.

In this overview, we will talk more about persuassion and the recruitment of agents rather than tradecraft.

Classic Recruitment

The classic methods for recruitment used by foriegn agencies is epitomized by the Soviets. They focused on extremely productive recruitment -- that is, the Soviets tried to install an agent for the purpose of the "big take" -- a piece of information that will be worth all the effort they are prepared to put into the recruitment. In other words, the classic recruitment will go all out to get the really important information and take the risk of losing the agent over the long run. Thus they were happy to offer money or other incentives, use blackmail, or any other techniques that got them an agent.

The Classic Recruitment includes a relationship with the recruited agent however, since the big take was in the cards, the Soviets realized that pushing their agents might mean a short relationship. They chose to live with this possibility.

As you will see with other recruitment strategies (namely the Chinese), this choice (living with a possible blown agent early on) is not the only effective means to getting what you need.

Since the relationship with the agent may turn out to be a long term recruitment, the classic recruitment focuses on a rewards system that will continually entice the recruited agent to not only continue providing information, but perhaps to be able to target the agent for specific information rather than "what just happens to come across the desk."

Typically this works best when the money card is used in the recruitment process and does not work well where Ideology is the major card played. In some cases Ego driven recruitment may provide an inducement if the handler plays the agent correctly.

The classic espionage approach is described in use by the Soviets by Richelson in the acronym MICE⁴ which stands for:

• Money
• Ideology
• Comprimise
• Ego

In the U.S., money is typically a major factor, although the amount of money used by Soviet agents was quite small in most cases when considering what their agents were asking their recruited agents to do. The exception was Ames whose payroll was extremely high.

Today, ideaology is typically used to entice immigrants to provide information to the foreign espionage agent. However, during the years following World War II and during the cold war, this was quite an effective approach.  The method was to entice potential recruits who shared a common belief in communism or socialism to also share information -- typically in the form of documents or photographs (for information on cameras and other technical tools, we highly recommend H Keith Melton's books⁵ on that subject.

Comprimise is known as the dark side of intelligence operations and the Soviets were masters. Typically the methods are ineffective for long term recruitement however. Techniques include the "honey pot", using woman to get target men in position for blackmail. Other means of blackmail could be used as well, from finances to family problems. A majority of blackmail techniques center around sexual comprimise, and in some cases sexual behavior that would be impossible to disclose and still retain position or clearances.

Ego is perhaps the most tricky of the lot since it requires a fine touch to get by the guard of the targeted recruit. The technique involves making the subject feel important. The agent recruiting is effusive in their praise and over time builds up the recruit's image of their activity such that they feel like a genius or a hero. This technique is especially effective if the recruit is not receiving the recognition they feel they deserve, a condition many scientists and managers feel in the military-industrical complex. In many cases ego reinforcement includes "the additional pay you deserve", adding in the Money motive to lock the recruited agent into place.

The preverse Soviet handlers, in some cases, would then use the money exchange as a further incentive -- letting the recruit know that they have evidence of the money exchange and that they were not afraid to use that to blackmail the agent into continued involvement and perhaps improved production and performance.
 

The New Recruitment Techniques

In the case of Chinese espionage, a newer, more subtle method for recruiting agents is also being used -- in some cases these new technques may be used in combination with more classical recruitment methods. The newer Chinese strategy is based upon finding people with knowledge of their own, relying upon intellectual property rather than documents, and targeting "good guys" who are reliable and don't think of themselves as traitors or criminals.

In effect, the Chinese are looking for small results and in some cases a specific answer to a particular scientific problem or component of information. The Chinese have typically stolen knowlege, rather than documents or physical items.

In retrospect, it appears the Chinese technique ignores all aspects of classic recruitment save one. Especially in the case of their preying upon the scientific community, the Chinese feel a reliable conspirator is more important. Moreover, they want a long term relationship based upon trust, at least in the beginning, where the agent doesn't really understand they are an agent, other than a minor committment to providing information. Money is typically not used, since this would imply the conspirator is a "bad guy", disloyal and a paid informant -- unreliable. Similarly, the Chinese do not use the comprimise technique in their usual practice of targeting scientists since that too would contradict their philosophy of maintaining a good self image for the conspirator. And while the Chinese might use a subtext of the Idealogy theme -- "We are proud of you as a countryman" -- the Chinese agent provocteur will typically shy away from using the idealogoy card. More often than not the Chinese agent is more interested in simply having a conversation with the target and eliciting and receiving a key point of information.

Dr. Paul Moore, of CI Centre, likens the Chinese approach to kind of marketing appeal used by Colleges to get money from their alumni⁶:

• We are truly proud of you and all our alumni
• We know you have worked hard and now have lots to offer
• Especially in your case -- you have accomplished so much!
• We are a small college and need all the aid we can get
• Can't you just give us a little help?

Of course the alumnis would be replaced with country of origin or racial extraction.

Thus the Chinese technique of choice is a sub text of the ego technique. Focusing on immigrants, the Chinese will approach a particular scientist who they suspect may have the knowlege in the area where the Chinese Scientists have become stuck in their research. For example, if the Chinese nuclear program has run into a road block, they might go after a U.S. scientist who originated from Taiwan and engage him or her in conversation. After making their pitch, the Chinese agent might simply request help by the way of a hint or solution to the problem they face ⁶.

Of course once the agent has been recruited, they may go back time and time again for more information, using conferences and conventions as meeting places, typically pitting a Chinese Scientist against an immigrant Scientist in the target country.

In the case of Classic Espionage techniques, the result of being discovered may be life in prison or even the death penalty. In the case of Chinese Espionage techniques the target will most likely face public ridicule and lose their job. And of course getting another job in their field will be impossible. As Dr. Paul Moore explains it, "...the normal success in classic espionage is conviction and incarceration. In typical Chinese targeted espionage, the targetloses his job. This is hard for the public to understand and especially with Congress, the expectation is that the individual should face an espionage trial. This expectation is not realistic in the real world." ⁶

Dr. Moore also points out that in a world of political correctness and ultra sensitivity to racial profiling, it is extremely difficult to teach American scientists or their managers about the Chinese espionage threat.

Clearly, the Chinese can use the technique with any ethnic culture simply by using an agent matching the target individual. But again, the difficulty in getting "open minded" scientific management to train their scientists of the dangers is inhibited by political correctness and sensitivity to ethnic differences.

The results of this ignorance and over-sensitivity will be continued cases of successful espionage by the Chinese and other nations that adopt the new "reliable agent" techniques. And of course, the classic techniques continue to work as well as long as you have enough cash and agents trained in the classics.
 

As promised, MILNET now presents a overview of major Espionage cases during the period just prior to the entry of the U.S. into World War II and covering major cases up to the present date.

Major Cases Prior to World War II

Prior to the United States entering the fray of World War II, FBI agents turned their attention to suspected espionage activity in the U.S.  Both Italian and German agents were measuring the U.S. for both strategic intelligence (was the U.S. prepared to go to war and if so what industrial and military could the U.S. capitalize on to make war) and tactical intelligence (what specific military units were stood up and what were there capabilities and order of battle).  What they found was a huge industrial complex well asleep and quite docile, reporting back that while the danger was large if awoken, the U.S. was most likely not of a mind to join a war so far from its shores.  Ironically, this information was passed to the Japanese and never updated prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and was not refuted by Intelligence Officers in Japanese Intelligence as well as a number of naval officers trained in U.S. colleges.
 

Vonsiatsky Case ¹⁴

One of the cases of interest was the case of Anastase A. Vonsiatsky and his co-conspirators.  The FBI " Famous Cases" case history for Vonsiatsky begins:

"As a result of investigative activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),  Anastase A. Vonsiatsky, Gerhard Wilhelm Kunze, Dr. Otto Willumeit, Dr. Wolfgang  Ebell, and Reverend Kurt E. B. Molzahn were indicted on June 10, 1942, by a Federal  Grand Jury at Hartford, Connecticut, for conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act. On  August 25, 1942, the last member of the group was sentenced in Federal Court, thus  bringing an end to the third major espionage ring broken by the FBI since the  Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor."

"On June 6, 1942, a complaint was filed at Hartford, Connecticut, charging Vonsiatsky
 with conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act. He was taken into custody on the same
 date at Providence, Rhode Island, and later removed to Connecticut. On June 10,
 1942, the Federal Grand Jury at Hartford, Connecticut, indicted Vonsiatsky and the
 four other persons previously named on charges of conspiracy to violate the
 Espionage Act."

There are a number of other cases described in the FBI "Famous Cases" document on Vonsiatsky prior to World War II.

George John Dasch ¹⁵

The FBI "Famous Cases" case history for this case begins:

"Shortly after midnight on the morning of June 13, 1942, four men landed on a beach  near Amagansett, Long Island, New York, from a German submarine, clad in German  uniforms and bringing ashore enough explosives, primers, and incendiaries to support  an expected two-year career in the sabotage of American defense-related production.  On June 17, 1942, a similar group landed on Ponte Vedra Beach, near Jacksonville,  Florida, equipped for a similar career in industrial disruption."

William Sebold, U.S. Double Agent  ¹⁶

Sebold, a German emigree was forced into being a German agent after returning to Germany to visit relatives.  Once reaching the U.S. he turned double and provided valuable information on a spy ring headed by Frederick Joubert Duquesne. The spy ring, consisting of some 33 men and women had setup shop in New York, where Sebold was given the work name of Harry Sawyer.

As Sawyer, he helped the FBI setup a radio station to act in his stead, taking in messages and reporting back to German handlers via shortwave.  Eventually the FBI closed in on the spy ring and arrested them all.  The FBI "Famous Cases" case history reports:
 

"Sebold's success as a counterespionage agent against Nazi spies in the United States is demonstrated by the successful prosecution of the 33 German agents in New  York. Of those arrested on the charge of espionage, 19 pleaded guilty. The 14 men  who entered pleas of not guilty were brought to trial in Federal District Court, Brooklyn,  New York, on September 3, 1941; and they were all found guilty by jury of December 13, 1941."

Major Cases During World War II

Garbo ^{6, 7}

The most impressive Espionage case involved a U.S. double agent, code named Garbo.  Garbo was a Spanish national who had devoted himself to thwarting any extermist organization and viewed the Nazis as the epitome of that class.  Interestingly enough, Garbo had a difficult time convincing the British (who he turned to first) that he could be of help.  After being rejected at the British Embassy in Spain, he offered his services to the Germans, obstensibly to setup a German spy network in Britain and using a cutout in Spain to transmit to the Germans.  In actuallity, Garbo, a fascinating creative genius, faked this network by inventing personalities, situations, and events.  Soon he had the Germans sending him money to run this network, with reports flowing from Garbo back to his German Intelligence control officer.

Once established as a bonafide  German spy, he then went back to the British to once again be turned down.  In parallel, the British were beginning to intercept communications between Garbo and the Germans, and frantically began to look frantically for Garbo's network of spies in England -- spies that only existed in Garbo's mind and his messages to the Germans.

Frustrated, Garbo then went to the American Embassy and was finally able to get some interest.  When the Americans shared the info with the Brits, they finally tumbled onto this man being the fellow that was running the network they had been chasing all over England.  Eventually the Brits began to feed disinformation and kept copius files on Garbo's fantasy agents in order to ensure they never broke the fictional charcters being presented.

Garbo's biggest contribution came around the invasion of D-Day, when the Allies used the Garbo network to misinform the Germans of where and when the invasion was to occur, actually stopping Panzer tanks in the tracks on the way to reinforce at Normandy.  Without that effect of Garbo's work, many thousands of D-Day soldiers would have been added to the D-Day casualties and quite possibly the tide turned against D-Day.

As David Major, professor at the Centre for Counterintelligence and Security Studies states, "...imagine a world where D-Day was a huge failure and the Allies were pushed back into the sea ... imagine what German procgrams which could have matured given another year or two -- squadrons of jet fighters, perfection of the V-2 rockets and the ultimate payload the atomic bomb..." ⁶

For more information on Garbo, see Nigel Wests excellent book^{6, 7} on this incredible wartime story.
 

The Breaking of German Codes - Ultra and Enigma ⁶

In the technical arena, the story of the Enigma machine is perhaps the most mis-understood but never-the-less one of the most important in World War II.  The U.S. and British Intelligence Services combined efforts to capture and decode the enigma machine, as well as lay hands on the operational order for use of the code machine -- essentially the code book and specific operational procedures for use of the machine.  This allowed Allied cryptogrophers to listen in on German transmissions.  Throughout the war, the Germans remained convinced that no one could break their codes. An extremely brute force and rudimentary (to today's standards at least) analog computer was used to simulate the enigma machine, allowing U.S. cryptographers to break the codes being  used and allow U.S. intelligence officers to "read the German's mail".
 

The Breaking of the Japanese Codes - Purple ⁸

A similar operation allowed the U.S. to also break the Japanese codes, enabling the Allies to listen in on key Japanese messages, including one that led to the interception and shoot down of one of the most important Japanese Naval Commanders while travelling in a transport aircraft.  Many also attribute successes at the battle of Midway and retaking of the Phillipines as being due at least in portion to the decoding of the "Purple" code of the Japanese.

For details and an excellent protrayal of the events surrounding the decoding as well as some pretty remarkable arrogance on the part of the U.S. Navy, you might look at Michael Smith's The Emperor's Codes : The Breaking of  Japan's Secret Ciphers.⁸

For a more entertaining presentation of the U.S. O.S.S. efforts during this time, we suggest W.E.B. Griffin's⁹ excellent and exciting fictional protrayal of O.S.S. activities in the Pacific Theatre.  For more factual information, we recommend the U.S. CIA documentary publication online The Office of Strategic Services: America's First Intelligence Agency
 

Iva Toguri D'Aquino, a Japanese American, born Iva Toguri in the U.S. travelled to Japan just prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. While there she took Japanese Language and culture lessons trying to assimilate into the Japanese culture.

She eventually got a job in the Domei News Agency in Tokyo and in 1943 was working as a typist. In November of 1943, she began her career as a broadcaster, calling herself Orphan Annie or "your favorite enemy Ann". Speaking in English she added dialog to records played on the air intended to serve as propoganda and negatively influence U.S. soldiers moral at the same time provide aid and comfort to Japanese soldiers through ridicule of the U.S. and its soldiers.

Later, she was dubbed, "Toyko Rose". Tokyo Rose broadcast throughout the war and was eventually held as a security risk following the war. She was released but taken again in September of 1948. Eventually sh was taken back to the U.S. and tried for treason since she had never given up her U.S. citizenship.

Tokyo Rose was sentenced to 15 years, and served seven for treason. The FBI " Famous Cases" case study states:

"Mrs. D'Aquino's trial began on July 5, 1949, the day after her 33rd birthday. Sixty-one days later,on September 29, 1949, the jury brought in a verdict of guilty of the count in the indictment which read, 'That on a day during October, 1944', the exact date being to the Grand Jurors unknown, 'said defendant, at Tokyo, Japan, in a broadcasting studio of the Broadcasting Corporation of Japan, did speak into a microphone concerning the loss of ships.' Mrs. D'Aquino, who had gained notoriety as Tokyo Rose, had become the seventh person to be convicted of treason in the history of the United States."

Major Cases During the Cold War

The Martynov Case 15

A Soviet officer approached an Army officer about to retire in 1954.  The officer was asked, in a lenthgy process of plying him with drink and conversation if he would meet with the agent in the U.S. near the Army Staff College and pass on some documents from the college.  The officer said he would think about it, left, and promptly reported the whole affair to the authorities.

Counterintelligence then mascaraded as the officer and set about laying a trap for the Soviets.  Eventualy Martin Martynov fell into this trap and was later deported.  The FBI "Famous Cases" case history states:

"On February 21, 1955, the Department of State declared Martynov persona non grata  in connection with his espionage activity, and he departed the United States on  February 26, 1955."
 

In one of the most dramatic cases of successful espionage against the U.S., this case involves the theft of the atomic secrets and their delivery to the Soviets.  The Rosenbergs, Julius and his wife Ethel were recruited using the ideaology card, the pair never receiving payment for their delivery of the U.S. atomic secrets to the Soviets.  Authors Aleksandr Feklisov and Sergei Kostin tell the tale from the viewpoint of the Soviet handler of the Rosenbergs, and includes key information on Ethel's brother Greenglass and others involved in the conspiracy.

Other authors have revealed that Greenglass, in order to save his wife, lied about certain points in Ethel's participation that ultimately led to Ethel Rosenberg's execution.

The Rosenberg case has some controversy tied to it.  The FBI was solicited under the Freedom of Information Act to provide further information and that file is available on the FBI Web Site.

Operation Solo  ^{6, 10}

Morris Childs, a disenchanted communist party member, ailing and aged, allowed himself to be recruited by the KGB and what followed was an amazing charade that kept the U.S. informed of key decisions at the highest levels of the Soviet government from the 1950s to the mid 1970s.

Morris, as the premier U.S. double agent during the Cold War, is one of the best success stories for U.S. Intelligence.  As a member of the American Communist Party, he was continually invited back to the Soviet Union to recieve information on the goals of the Communist Party, and was recognized as the displaced leader of the true communist American Government, receiving treatment that matched that perception.

Verified by later released KGB documents, Morris' role in Cold War espionage was crucial.  For instance, he delivered a crucial warning of the Sino-Soviet split as it was happening, enabling the U.S. and allies to take advantage of differences between Soviet and Chinese communist party goals.  Nixon, Reagan and Kissinger are said to have credited much of their successes during the Cold War were due in part to information received from the efforts of Morris, his wife Eva, and his brother Jack ^{.6, 10}
 

Petrov (fictious name) - Industrial/Military Secrets Case ¹⁸

Russian Intelligence officer approaches an engineer who worked at the Grumman Aerospace plant in a "commercial establishment" and struck up a conversation.  The Russian then artfully manuevered the engineer into agreeing to provide some information on the F-14 program to him.

The engineer reported the contact to his superiors and immediately became a double leading the Russian on through varius exchanges of information until finally:

"Petrov asked if the engineer had the confidential material ready. In response, the engineer removed a large grey envelope stashed in the back of the car which contained a copy of an F-14 engineering report, a roll of film containing a copy of the same report, and several pages that were classified "confidential" from another report. The engineer then handed the envelope to Petrov who placed it into his attache case. Petrov, after giving the engineer a small, white envelope in return, got out of the car and started to walk toward the parking lot's exit. At this moment, based upon a prearranged signal, FBI Agents immediately intercepted and arrested Petrov before he could escape. The Russian, seeing that capture was imminent, attempted to dispose of the evidence by throwing his attache case high into the air. However, it was immediately  retrieved by one of the FBI Agents."

Reino Hayhanen and the Hollow Coins ¹⁹

A rather involved and lengthy investigation is started when a paperboy discovers a hollow nickel and a local police detective turns it over to the FBI.  Inside the hollow coin is an enrypted message that the FBI has difficulty in decrypting.

Five years later a Soviet KGB Lt. Colonel asks to defect and the puzzle is unraveled.  Through careful interrogation and discovery of a holled bolt and several other hollowed coins, the code was learned and the message in the nickel was decoded.  The defector, Reino Hayhanen, told the FBI of his two controllers, "Mikhail" and "Mark".  Mikhail (Mikhail Nikolaevich Svirin) had already gone home to Russia, however, Mark was thought to still be active.

Eventually in inspecting items in Hayhanen's apartment, they found a piece of steel with microfilm inside that identified another agent.  The FBI report states:
 

"The  microfilm bore a typewritten message which identified "Quebec" as Army sergeant Roy Rhodes and stated the Soviet agents had recruited him in January, 1952. Full information concerning Rhodes' involvement in Russian espionage was disseminated to the Army; and following a court-martial, he was sentenced to serve five years at hard labor."

"Indicted as a Russian spy, Colonel Abel was tried in Federal court at New York City  during October, 1957. Among the government witnesses to testify against him was his  former trusted espionage assistant, Lieutenant Colonel Reino Hayhanen.

On October 25, 1957, the jury announced its verdict -- Abel was guilty of all counts. He  appeared before Judge Mortimer W. Byers on November 15, 1957, and was  sentenced as follows (the three sentences to be served concurrently):

Count One (Conspiracy to transmit defense information to the Soviet Union), 30 years'  imprisonment.

Count Two (Conspiracy to obtain defense information), 10 years' imprisonment and  $2,000 fine.

Count Three (Conspiracy to act in the United States as an agent of a foreign  government without notification to the Secretary of State), 5 years' imprisonment and  $1,000 fine."

John Anthony Walker ²¹

John Walker was a U.S. Navy Chief Warrant Officer who, as a Navy code clerk and supervisor of clerks, had access to the cryptological secrets used in day-to-day message traffic as well as top secret highly classified message traffic. Walker, in order to offset losses from bad investments, went to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. and volunteered to supply decoded communications and encryption material, which the Soviets readily accepted. For 18 years he sold such material to Soviets as well as recruited his son Michael Walker, his brother Arthur, and a friend Jerry Whitworth, all military with access to various levels of secure information. The FBI " Famous Cases" case study published on the Norfolk FBI Office web site, states:

"On May 20, 1985, after an intensive FBI investigation, John Anthony Walker Jr., then retired, was arrested and charged with espionage. Walker, his son Michael, Jerry Whitworth, and Arthur Walker were all convicted of espionage. John Walker, Jr. was sentenced to life in prison. Arthur Walker was sentenced to three life terms and fined $250,000. Jerry Whitworth was given a 365-year sentence and ordered to pay $410,000. Michael Walker, as part of his father's plea agreement, was sentenced to 25 years in prison."

Aldrich Aimes  ¹²

Aldrich Aimes, a career CIA Officer was found to be an agent for the Soviet Union over most of his 30+ year career in the CIA.  Aimes was especially damaging to U.S. spy networks and is thought to be responsible for the sweeping up of various networks and the deaths of hundreds of agents.

The FBI "Famous Cases" case history begins with

"Ames was arrested by the FBI in Arlington, Virginia on espionage charges on February 24, 1994. At the time of his arrest, Ames was a 31-year veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), who had been spying for the  Russians since 1985. Arrested with him was his wife, Rosario Ames, who had aided and abetted his espionage activities."

The Hanssen Case  ^{6, 11, 13}

Robert Phillip Hanssen, a career FBI man, shocked his neighbors and colleagues in the FBI when he was arrested for spying for the Soviets at at least three key periods of his FBI career.  Hanssen was thought to be a brilliant analytical agent, with knowledge of a wide spectrum of FBI facts in his role in budgets and accounting for the agency's intelligence divisions.

Hanssen was a classic "for the money" agent for the Soviets, being paid over $600,000 for his efforts on behalf of the Soviets..

The FBI affidavit quoted in the FBI "Famous Cases" case history alleges that

"...Hanssen compromised numerous human sources of the U.S. Intelligence  Community, dozens of classified U.S. Government documents, including "Top Secret" and "codeword"  documents, and technical operations of extraordinary importance and value. It also alleges that Hanssen  compromised FBI counterintelligence investigative techniques, sources, methods and operations, and  disclosed to the KGB the FBI's secret investigation of Felix Bloch, a foreign service officer, for espionage"

Hanssen is known today for a bent view of the world around him and had an exceedingly strange relationship with his best friend, a person he recommended to the KGB to recruit.  ⁶
 
 
 
 

• CI Centre Home Page
• CI's Resources Page - Excellent reading!!!
• The FBI's Famous Cases on the FBI Web Site  (do a search on "Famous Cases")
• The CIA's history and publications on the CIA Web Site

¹  Redactions are edits made by government officials to remove sensitive information from declassified documents or documents retrieved through the U.S. Freedom of Information Act.  Typically they appear as blacked out lines as if a wide black ink marker was used to obliterate the text underneath.

²  Jeffrey Richelson has written a number of intereseting non-fiction books ⁴  ranging from those detailing dry subjects such as the structure and organization of the U.S. Intelligence Community to more exciting material describing the espionage techniques of the KGB.  See the MILNET bibliography for further information.

³  The Centre for Counterintelligence and Security Studies provides a series of courses taught by experts from the KGB, FBI, CIA and other intelligence communities.  These courses are highly recommended to anyone interested or with a need to understand the field of intelligence or security.  Also see the recent SpyCruise^tm writeup from the MILNET Chief Editor.

⁴  Sword and Shield,: The Soviet Intelligence and Security Apparatus, Jeffrey T. Richelson, Ballinger Publishing Company, 54 Chruch Street, Harvard Square, Cambridge, MA., Copyright 1989, 02138-3730, ISBN 0-88730-035-9 (cl), 0-88730-039-1 (pb).

⁵  The Ultimate Spy Book, H Keith Melton,  DK Publishing, Copyright June 1996, ISBN: 0789404435

⁶  SpyCruise, Dr. Paul Moore, Ray Wannall, Nigel West, Hayden Peake, Ken Crosby, Oleg Kalugin, H Keith Melton, and David Major, March 10-17, 2002, Regal Empress, travelling between Tampa Florida, Grand Caymans, Roatan, Honduras, Belize, and Cozumel, Mexico.

⁷ Operation Garbo : The Personal Story of the Most Successful Double Agent of  World War II (with Juan Pujol) , Nigel West,  Random House, Copyright, September 1986, ISBN: 0394547772

⁸   The Emperor's Codes : The Breaking of Japan's Secret Ciphers, Michael Smith, Copyright June 2001, Arcade Publishing; ISBN: 155970568X

⁹  Behind The Lines, W.E.B. Griffin, Copyright June 1996, G K Hall & Co;  ISBN: 0783817223 (Paperback Jove Pubns; ISBN: 0515119385) or The Fighting Agents, W.E.B. Griffin, Copyright (reissue hardcover) June 2000, Putnam Pub Group; ISBN: 0399146121, (Paperback Jove Pubns; ISBN: 0515130524).

¹⁰  Operation Solo : The Fbi's Man in the Kremlin, John Barron, Copyright September, 1997, Regnery Publishing, Inc.; ISBN: 0895264293

¹¹  The Bureau and the Mole: The Unmasking of  Robert Philip Hanssen, the Most Dangerous Double Agent in FBI History, David Vise, Copyright December 2001, Atlantic Monthly Printing; ISBN: 0871138344

¹²  Famous Cases - Aldrich Hazen Ames - Espionage, FBI Online, retrieved on March 21, 2002

¹³  Famous Cases - Robert Philip Hanssen Espionage Case, FBI Online, retrieved on March 21, 2002

¹⁴  Famous Cases - Vonsiatsky Espoinage, FBI Online, retrieved on March 21, 2002

¹⁵  Famous Cases - George John Dasch, FBI Online, retrieved on March 21, 2002.

¹⁶   Famous Cases- Frederick Joubert Duquesne, FBI Online, retrieved on March 21, 2002.

¹⁷  Famous Cases- The Atom Spy Case, FBI Online, retrieved on March 21, 2002.

¹⁸  Famous Cases- Espionage in the Defense Industry, FBI Online, retrieved on March 21, 2002.

¹⁹  Famous Cases- The Hollow Nickel, FBI Online, retrieved March 21, 2002.

²⁰  Famous Cases- Tokyo Rose, FBI Online, retrieved March 22l, 2002.

²¹  Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, John LeCarre

²²  The Sword and the Shield, Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, Copyright 1999, Basic Books, 10 East 53rd St, New York, N.Y. 10022-5299, ISBN 0-465-00310-9.