Douglas Hanson was a US Army cavalry reconnaissance officer for 20 years, and is a Gulf War I combat veteran.? He has a background in radiation biology and physiology, and was an Atomic Demolitions Munitions (ADM) Security Officer, and a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Officer.? As a civilian analyst, he has worked on stability and support operations in Bosnia, and helped develop a multi-service medical? treatment manual for nuclear and radiological casualties.? He was initially an operations officer in the operations/intelligence cell of the Requirements Coordination Office of the CPA, and was later assigned as the Chief of Staff of the Ministry of Science and Technology.


RM: Do you feel it was the right move to end the search for WMD in Iraq?

DH: I think it was the right thing. Keep in mind that the document exploitation center in Qatar still has a ton of papers to process, and a few ISG advisors will remain in Iraq. Duelfer’s report pretty much covered all of the key findings, including the oil-for-food scandal paper trail, which, if the Coalition had not intervened, would have put Saddam on the fast track to a robust WMD capability. Cost vs. benefit had already been exceeded, so they were correct in withdrawing most of their people.

I might add that contrary to major press reports, WMD were found. 155mm artillery projectiles with Sarin and mustard agent, and battlefield rockets with CW were found. These finds are ignored because they were old munitions from GW I. But the real issue is that they were still not accounted for in contravention of UN resolutions.

Duelfer’s report also confirms my analysis that Saddam retained an extensive regeneration capability in all areas of WMD - Chem, Bio, and Nuke. He was just waiting for inspections to end. Even David Kay said he was more dangerous then we thought.


RM: Why is it you focus on the suspicious nature of finds such as "pesticides" hidden in underground bunkers but Kay and Duelfer did not ?

DH: I don’t know why they did not think it was significant. With the exception of one report, all of the encounters with these pesticides in ammo dumps were public knowledge. It doesn’t take a super-genius to figure out that this was more than coincidence. In fact, both the CIA and the DIA had arrived at the same conclusion in the 90s that Saddam continued to manufacture precursors under the guise of legitimate agricultural and industrial enterprises. This is just a guess, but perhaps they felt confident that they would stumble on the “big one” and so these finds were initially thought to be insignificant.

The other issue is that at virtually every one of these encounters, it seemed as if the Army and Marine chemical detection gear, including mass spectrometers, under the control of trained specialists, were showing positive for agents, while the ISG tests were showing negative. It’s possible, though highly unlikely, that the entire US ground force training regimen and equipment were at fault. That is, until the Danes found Iraqi mortar shells with a mysterious liquid in them that tested positive for mustard agent. Later, US “experts” said that it was not mustard agent. The Danish Army was at a loss in explaining this little discrepancy. Hey! Join the club!

Bottom line is that ultimately we found the mechanisms and materials to regenerate his WMD capability, and this confirms now-retired General Tommy Franks view on Saddam’s WMD. Franks describes it as having a disassembled pistol on the table with the magazine and ammo sitting next to it. All Saddam had to do was assemble it, load it, and then pull the trigger. It was only a matter of time, not the lack of means.


RM: Is there any good information indicating that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction are in Syria, Iran or Libya ?

DH: There are reports with satellite photos out there somewhere that show truck convoys going into Syria. I certainly haven’t seen the photos, but it does make sense. Both the previous Iraqi regime and the current Syrian regime are Baathist, and we know that former Iraqi Baathist leaders are having a grand old time in Damascus with bucket loads of blood money. Of course, both nations were client states of the former Soviet Union, and when the Al-Qaqaa “missing” explosives story came up, it didn’t take long to remind the American people that evidence showed Russian advisors had seemingly assisted Saddam in moving the high explosives and WMD.


RM: How come the Duelfer and Kay Reports don't seem to make much of these reports? Wouldn't you think the Bush Administration would love to note these suspicious findings or to note intelligence indicating WMDs were moved outside of Iraq?

DH: Again, I’m speculating, but here are my thoughts. As far as the administration is concerned they have not been very good at communicating, or refuting, as the case may be, any of these reports even if they could possibly reinforce their case. But I would caution that the war has a very significant information operation aspect to it. So I wouldn’t jump to conclusions about any public disclosures by the Administration, Kay, or Duelfer. On the other hand, the reticence on everybody’s part may be due to the feelings that they all got burned to some degree on the usefulness of pre-war information.


RM: What do you think is the biggest problem with the Iraq Survey Group ?

DH: Technically they were very good, but outside of a small number of experienced field operators, I viewed the ones I encountered as being inside the beltway analytical types who were all of a sudden called out to prove their theories. Intelligence analysis for the sake of academic “what if” discussions and navigating the wickets to produce a strategic predictive product is all very necessary and has its place. But doing the field work while having to answer to an operational commander is quite a different animal. This is not meant to denigrate their efforts - a number of them lost their lives in service to their country. I think a better method would have been to attach ISG personnel to the combat divisions and regiments. In this way, the ISG could have made use of the units’ knowledge of their operational areas - the terrain, the enemy, the locals, the facilities, etc. Once suspected sites needed to be searched, or people questioned, then the units’ could provide the skills of Soldiers and Marines who actually do reconnaissance for a living. Once the search or interrogation was completed, then the intell cycle would continue and build upon previously gathered information.

But that’s just me.


RM: What issue do you feel is most important for the public to know about the inner politics and working of the Iraq Survey Group?

DH: I can’t comment on the internal politics, because I don’t know what they were. All I can do is comment on the group’s behavior and operations. My two articles on the actions of the ISG pretty well cover my observations. The only thing I can add is the comment of one of the other people in the Ministry of Science and Technology several months after I had left. It went something like: We should have been asking questions of the ISG, not the other way around. In other words, they appeared to be stepping into a situation that they had not prepared for in even a rudimentary fashion.

An example of their lack of planning and resident expertise was when they were forced to contract out for required personnel over nine months after the fall of Baghdad. One online defense related jobs service advertised in January of 2004 for the following positions in Iraq in a “potentially hostile environment:”

• Biologist/BW Analyst
• Chemist/CW Analyst
• Research Analyst
• Senior Intel Analyst
• Underground Facilities Analyst

In the meantime, it was entirely possible that more biological seed agents, precursors, and dual use equipment was being moved out of, or within Iraq, or secured in a secret facility. In addition to this belated effort to obtain the required skills to conduct a rigorous search, the document exploitation center in Qatar was still getting its feet on the ground. I also have it on good authority that the multi-million dollar center was using an outmoded database system and was staffed with people not well-versed in document exploitation.


RM: Do you feel that the CIA is making a mistake by dismissing virtually all defectors even remotely connected to the Iraqi National Congress ?

DH: That’s an excellent question, and extremely good timing given the latest adventures with Ahmad Chalabi. I don’t know the numbers they listened to, and the numbers they dismissed, but the CIA’s opposition to Chalabi and the INC goes back to the 90s in my opinion.

Back when the US was financing the INC in the Kurdish Northern No-fly Zone there was a distinct apathy to defectors with knowledge of WMD; Dr. Khidhir Hamza’s frustrating experience with them is a case in point. Another is that the CIA’s attempt to overthrow Saddam with the aid of a loose alliance of the INC, the Iraqi National Accord, and Kurdish rebels in 1995-6 had been thoroughly infiltrated by Saddam’s intelligence services. The attempt was defeated before it got off the ground, and while the CIA agents were bugging out, Saddam’s tanks rolled over our Kurdish allies without so much as a spitball thrown at them by US aircraft. CIA sour grapes CIA bungling, so blame it on the INC The CIA paying debts to their buddies in the INA All very strange.

Fast forward to the reconstruction after the war, and the CIA was still dropping bones to discredit Chalabi. Just within the last few days, the New York Sun reported that Chalabi’s political life had been rejuvenated and he was in a position to be elected to an important leadership position. Just a few days later, however, a Reuters report says that the Iraqi interim defense minister will arrest Chalabi on the charge of “maligning the defense ministry.” Navigating the Byzantine world of Middle East politics and their tribal medieval honor system is very tough. I think the CIA basically made friends with the wrong people over a period of decades, and then got their ass kicked in 1996 by Saddam, and then the blame-game lasted into the next century. Again, that’s my opinion only.


RM: What was the attitude of the Iraqi people towards the Coalition when you were there ?

DH: My experiences were generally that they were positive towards us or a neutral acceptance of our presence. However, this was before the full rise of the Baathist die-hards and Iranian mercenaries and other foreign terrorists. That’s not to say it was all hunky-dory. We were sustaining casualties virtually everyday, and the sad thing was that there seemed to be no coordinated effort at the Corps operational level to synthesize the intell and then go on the offense to root these guys out.


RM: What do you think of the theory that the intelligence provided by defectors was planted by Iran ?

DH: I don’t think much of the theory, although it wouldn’t surprise me if that was the case since Iran has been outmaneuvering the US in the Central Region for over a decade. This theory, however, doesn’t make sense in the long run. Iran wanting Saddam taken out is one thing, but ending up with the Coalition on your back and front doorsteps presents them with another set of problems.

But, stranger things have happened in this part of the world.

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Ryan Mauro is a geo-political analyst whose web site WorldThreats.com is a recognized top flight source for analysis on the world and nation.  Ryan's keen insight and independent analysis makes him a valuable guest writer and we are proud to offer his work on MILNET.