Ryan Mauro's Geo Political Analysis

Iraq Study Group: A Substitute for Victory

As critics debate over the recommendations put forth by the Iraq Study Group, politicians on all sides have been given an easy pass. The Iraq Study Group's positions will become every major presidential aspirant's position. Any politician willing to challenge this report's conclusions will be seen as narrow-minded, and out-of-touch with the situation in Iraq. As of Wednesday, December 6, 2006, the major debate ends, and the question becomes how to implement these changes to bring stability in the region. However, stability will require the consent of the Baathists of Syria and the mullahs of Iran.

It is clear that the ISG does not understand Iran and Syria when they write, "Given the ability of Iran and Syria to influence events within Iraq and their interest in avoiding chaos in Iraq". In the very same paragraph, they write "Iran should [my emphasis] stem the flow of arms and training to Iraq; Syria should [my emphasis] control its border with Iraq. Herein lays the obvious strategic miscalculation of the Baker-Hamilton Report: It admits that Syria and Iran are responsible for violence in Iraq, yet calls for engaging them (when our negotiating hand isn't particularly strong) because they have an interest in avoiding chaos. If they want to avoid chaos, then why don't they stop the arms flow, the training camps, and the infiltration coming from their borders that creates the chaos?

The use of the word should in that paragraph best demonstrates our current attitude towards our enemy. The word should needs to be replaced by the word, must. Violence in Iraq will not end as long as the Iranian regime is in power, and U.S. forces leaving Iraq will only cause greater strife as the fragile government is forced to accommodate, rather than resist, the hegemonic goals of Iran. If after three and a half years of backing violence hasn't convinced the ISG members that stability in Iraq isn't in Iranian and Syrian interests, and then we should disregard any suggestions they have on the regional dynamics at play.

The ISG Suggestions: Great ideas with no idea how to implement them.

The Iraq Study Group rehashes every problem we all know about, and does a good job of advocating the long-term objectives we must have, such as disarming militias, national reconciliation, reconstruction, and training and advising Iraqi forces. However, the United States is already working hard on much of this, and the ISG's suggestion was simply to do it faster, without providing detailed analysis of how to do that. For example, the ISG calls for more quickly training and establishing Iraqi security forces, yet does not provide more ideas as to how to do that besides adding more embeds. The ISG calls for engaging Syria and Iran to help us, but does not explain how we can do that short of sacrificing our objectives in Iraq and providing them with only carrots, not sticks, for their misbehavior. The ISG calls for greater international assistance, but does not give concrete reasons as to why a new diplomatic offensive would bring this about. The international community resisted help in the aftermath of Saddam's fall when the prospects for success and investment in that success were the highest, so it would be wise to question the likelihood of increased international assistance.

There are some suggestions that are good, including benchmarks, how to share oil revenue (so that everyone has a financial stake in the future of Iraq), moving the Iraqi National Police and Border Police to the Defense Ministry, vast changes to the Interior Ministry, and paying the tribes that hold the oil pipelines based on output. The ISG report points out where there is a lack of funding points out how little funding is actually given to establishing Iraqi forces. Every time there is a lack of funding for something important in Iraq should bring outrage, as monetary expenses should not be an obstacle to winning (and ultimately, protecting and responsibly bringing home our troops).

The report correctly states that violence in Iraq will not end until political accommodation is reached between the various sects. However, we must discourage violence as a way to negotiate as such an accommodation is reached. We must also understand that many of those we fight, including those who conduct sectarian cleansing, do not want to change Iraqi politics, they want to eliminate it. Political representation and human rights may be desired by peoples of all kinds, but it is obviously not valued by those who wish to derail the very existence of those values. The enemy kills civilians in order to exaggerate to the West the size of their constituency, and if we give legitimacy to their methods, it will only continue as more and more demands are made by them.

Public talks of threatening to cut off support for the Iraqis if they don't meet adequate benchmarks encourages the enemy to make sure such benchmarks aren't reached (so as to bring about such a rift); pushes Iraqis to find other protectors like Iran or militias; strikes fear that we'll cut and run and thereby providing a disincentive for Iraqis to stand up; and promotes poorly thought-out decisions made for speed's sake rather than efficiency. Some level of pressure on Iraqis is healthy and promotes hard decision making, but it must be done in a very careful manner, and most likely, done privately.

The ISG Report makes the mistake of equating stability in Iraq with Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. However, there was no substantial decrease in violence in Iraq when Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip, and there is no dramatic increase when Israeli retaliates for rocket attacks. Some pundits have said that the road for peace in Jerusalem runs through Baghdad, but now the ISG report has flipped that to say, "The road for peace in Baghdad runs through Jerusalem." This is a flawed assumption. Moqtada al-Sadr is not thinking of Israel when his militia kills innocent Sunnis or fight Iraqi security forces. The Sunni Arab insurgency isn't thinking of Israel when they kill innocent Shiites, and Al-Qaeda in Iraq isn't bombing Shiite shrines because of the establishment of Jewish Israel. Again, the ISG report has a noble goal of making advances towards peace in Israel and the Palestinian territories, but fails to note that such negotiations have been ongoing for years and are consistently torpedoed by terrorist organizations backed by Syria and Iran.

Perhaps most interesting is the ISG's report on troop levels. Page 38 states that "adding US troops might temporarily help limit violence in a highly localized area. However, past experience indicates that the violence would simply rekindle as soon as U.S. forces are moved to another area." The ISG bases their assumption that an increased troop presence will not help because they have to leave the area after a certain period of time. The reason they leave, though, is because they're needed elsewhere where troops aren't present. The ISG report claims that our current strategy of "Clear, Hold, Build" isn't working, but in reality it isn't even being implemented. U.S. forces clear, but do not long hold, and sometimes try to build (with little success due to the insurgents who simply came back in). The answer is simple: If the forces did not have to leave, violence would be limited, therefore until Iraqi forces can take care of the "hold" part of the strategy, we will and that will require more forces for that task. Whether that is done by changing the composition and use of the forces we currently have, or by sending more forces in is a secondary decision, as the first must be to change the purpose. Yes, it will strain and bring much hardship onto our military, but if that's a main argument then the question becomes, "How badly do we want to win? Are we willing to put that extra strain on the military and pay the extra money to win this war?" I would argue that if the answer is no, then we have lost the war of wills.

Conclusion: In search of short-term stability, we bring delayed, long-term instability.

In 1991, under Baker's watch, the Iraqi people were betrayed, sacrificed at the alter of stability, compromise and never-ending diplomacy. Based upon my talks with countless Iraqis and those who work with them, we still have not regained their trust, and most question our commitment to their pursuit of freedom, human rights and a better life.

Iraqi bitterness, for the most part, stems not from American might, but from American half-measures that bring only pain to their lives. As reported countless times, every time you speak to a group of Iraqis, you hear the same questions: "How can you put a man on the moon but not turn on my electricity? How can you be a mighty superpower but not defeat the insurgents threatening my family?" The conclusions they reach are that either the United States isn't so strong and is bound to leave them behind defenseless, or that our intentions aren't noble. Talks of a withdrawal or dividing up Iraq do nothing but feed the prevalent conspiracy theories in Arab culture about American goals.

A key mistake in the ISG report is the idea that the U.S. can not use force to stem sectarian violence. Contrary to common punditry, sectarian violence and insurgency are not the inevitable results of trying to bring democracy into the Arab world. Sectarian violence, while always present on a small level in Iraq, did not substantially spike in the aftermath of Saddam's fall, but did when terrorists like Abu Musab al-Zarqawi made a conscious decision to provoke such violence. The present sectarian violence should not be seen as a new battle, but rather a change in tactics by the insurgents and terrorists that are unfortunately working.

The ISG report is correct in noting that there is a deadly cycle of attacks and reprisal attacks, with each side refusing to lay down arms out of fear of the other side. However, it has to be observed that the Iran-backed Mehdi Army of Moqtada al-Sadr has led two revolts, both being crushed but Coalition forces failed to make the final blow. The ISG report is also correct in discrediting the idea that Iraqis want a partitioning of the country, as every credible poll shows a majority of Iraqis favor a unity government and reject the idea of partition.

The sudden spike in Al-Sadr's power comes from Iranian support, and from a desire on the part of Iraqis to join areas of security, which unfortunately requires local militia control. Although the militias were always powerful, they decline of the moderate Ayatollah al-Sistani and the rise of the extremist al-Sadr has its roots not in the ideological beliefs of Iraqis, but in the failure to defeat, or at least contain and reduce, the Sunni Arab insurgency. Therefore, the current sectarian violence should be looked upon as the result of failing to use appropriate force.

The United States must find a way to use more force inside Iraq, and outside Iraq. The debate over whether more troops should be sent must be debated. Will it result in less violence, or will a subsequent rise in nationalism result in more violence? On the one hand, places like Tal Afar and Fallujah that were insurgent strongholds are now relatively quiet due to a troop presence, but on the other hand, some polls like the one cited by the ISG, indicate a majority of Iraqis (61%) support attacks on our forces, although this is the same group that had a poll that aimed to prove Fox News viewers are the most uninformed about foreign policy (for example, if the respondent said Saddam worked with Al-Qaeda, it meant they had adopted a falsehood according to the group). However, the polls also show that the rise in such support occurred over the past year, parallel to a rise in those who felt the US presence resulted in more violence than less. Is the poll accurate? Is such support the result of unconditional opposition to an American presence, or simply dissatisfaction with our performance? These are all questions that must be debated in deciding whether to initiate a major increase of the number of troops in Iraq.

The ISG report is right that violence won't end until Iran and Syria end their current posture in Iraq, but they are wrong in how to bring about this. The ISG blames a perception on the part of the Iranians that we advocate regime change, despite the fact the US has done little encourage such a fear. For all the debate about Iran and Syria, though, page 25 warns us that "Funding for the Sunni insurgency comes from private individuals within Saudi Arabia and Gulf states." Therefore, we must warn the Saudis of consequences, while simultaneously doing all we can to reduce our dependency and therefore, lack of leverage over them.

The United States must start providing harsh disincentives for Iraq's neighbors. Steps towards regime change in Iran must be taken, such as working with Iranian opposition groups demanding a legitimate, national referendum on the government; helping form a government-in-exile; encouraging alliances between Western and Iranian labor unions to oppose the regime; financial, political, moral and when possible, intelligence support to the opposition. Similar steps can be taken towards Syria, although success in Iran is extremely likely to bring about success in Syria, thereby removing two customers for North Korea's regime to live off of. The Iraqi and American governments can reveal proof of Syrian and Iranian involvement in militia and insurgent activity in a PR offensive, helping to reduce support for people like Al-Sadr and other proxies.

The Baker-Hamilton desire to establish stability and regional consensus in the Middle East will be bought with the blood, sweat and tears of every freedom fighter in the region. Our best allies will not always have a capitol or have borders. Our allies are the oppressed people who want regime change and just need a little help from the West. We need to recognize that the natural human desire for freedom from tyranny is our best weapon and wield it mercilessly. Just like Ronald Reagan helped the Europeans free themselves from Communism, we can help the Syrians and Iranians free themselves from oppression and tyranny. If we don't, then the enemy will grow stronger, our allies will question our commitment to freedom, and we'll find ourselves stuck in enlarged conflicts we could have minimized or prevented.

As Nick Guariglia, a writer for my web site, WorldThreats.com recently wrote: "In the end, this is not about stability but instability; unpredictably and without warning perpetrating instability, and destabilizing everything and everyone that deserves to be destabilized."

Ryan Mauro
Author, "Death to America: The Unreported Battle of Iraq"
Analyst, Northeast Intelligence Network and Tactical Defense Concepts
Founder, WorldThreats.com