From the original at the Blog found at:
http://kmaru.blogspot.com/2006/05/interview-ryan-mauro-on-iran.html



Interview: Ryan Mauro on Iran
Saturday, May 27, 2006
 

Last February we had the privilege of sharing the speakers' roster at the International Intelligence Summit with wunderkind geopolitical analyst and author Ryan Mauro. (For background, see our IIS posts: I - The Saddam Tapes, II - Notes and Impressions, III - Generals and Fathers Never Die, and IV - WMD to Syria With Russia's Help - in which we linked to a must-read interview Mauro did with FrontPage magazine).

Mauro is the 19-year old author of Death to America: The Unreported Battle of Iraq and founder of WorldThreats.com. He was originally hired at age 16 as a geopolitical analyst for Tactical Defense Concepts. A volunteer analyst and researcher for the Northeast Intelligence Network and the Reform Party of Syria, he is said to be the youngest hired geopolitical analyst in the country. Some kids hang out at the mall and play videogames; others find their niche in the reality-based community and take a running start at life.

We were delighted when Mauro agreed to a ten-question interview with KMaru earlier this week on the topic of Iran. We hope you'll find it as enlightening as we did.

KMaru: There's been a lot of discussion the last six months or so about whether [Iranian President] Ahmadinejad is 'crazy' or 'insane' that seems to want to impose a Western template on a guy who may not be 'Western' at all. Others see him as incredibly rational but with very different priorities in mind (e.g., realization of the prophecy of the 12th Imam). Still others see him as thoroughly versed in Western thinking but utterly sociopathic. None of these seem to do him justice. How would you characterize Ahmadinejad's strategic thinking process? His world view? What are his key assumptions? What are his key blind spots?

    Mauro: Ahmadinejad, in my opinion, isn't necessarily crazy, but is part of a crazy ideology that would be viewed as crazy by most Iranians. It is understood by most experts that he does seek to spark a confrontation to hasten the return of the 12th Imam, but he needs to be seen as the victim, not the aggressor, that sparks this confrontation. Any idea that he could lose a war with the so-called "infidels" is thrown out of his decision-making process, because such a war is to be interrupted by the re-emergence of the 12th Imam whose power could easily outmatch the infidels.

    This is why, in my opinion, you see him increasing the support to insurgents in Iraq and the Middle East as a whole, besides the obvious fact that pro-democratic developments in the region threaten his regime. Either the US will have to withdraw or confront Iran, making Ahmadinejad look like the victim. His favored scenario, I believe based on my analysis (rather than top-secret memos), would be a limited Israeli strike that fails to decapitate the regime or destroy his WMD programs. That would justify the use by Iran of all the tools at their disposal, and possibly undermine the popular resistance to the mullahs inside of Iran.

    However, it is important to note that while there are power struggles and policy debates among evil men who run Iran, that doesn't mean some are "less evil" and can be trusted to divide the regime. Even the so-called reformers or moderates, like Khatami and Rafsanjani, are radically anti-American with the same objectives. And no amount of moderates in the government take away from the fact that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, and his Council of Guardians, ultimately makes the calls.

KMaru: One school of thought seems to see current Iranian politics as the consistent and logical flowering of what was seeded with the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Another sees Iran as an essentially modern nation with strong secular-liberal tendencies that's been 'hijacked' only very recently by a few 'mad mullahs' that the vast majority of the population absolutely despises. I.e., there's a huge potential for a moderate middle to seize an opportunity to overthrow the regime. What do you see as true about each of these viewpoints? Where does each one depart most from the reality you observe? How do you assess the potential for regime change before the nukes are completed?

    Mauro: I believe that if, immediately after 9/11, we had aggressively supported democratic Iranian institutions with hundreds of millions of dollars just like Reagan did with Solidarity in Poland, there is a very strong possibility this regime would have fallen.

    I don't believe Iran will use nuclear weapons until an arsenal is established. According to Western intelligence estimates that I trust, we have a 1-3 year gap before Iran actually puts together nuclear weapons, although being able to make a warhead to fit on a ballistic missile is another story. However, if Iran has a sophisticated and large enough parallel uranium enrichment program, allowing them to utilize thousands of centrifuges, it is theoretically possible they the materials for nukes already. However, regime change can happen very quickly, so we do have time to stop this if we move quickly.

KMaru: What could we be doing to drive regime change in Iran that we aren't doing (or at least aren't saying we're doing) today? Which individuals or groups we should be looking to as the best 'levers' for such regime change? What do you see as the best and most-likely outcomes of a change in regime? (given that those are probably different!) What are the key risks we should watch out for? (E.g., a PR-driven 'regime change' that leaves most of the bad actors in place, one that gives bad actors the validation of a supposedly free popular election, or change to a regime that does less international boasting but that nonetheless continues pursuing its nuclear weapons program).

    Mauro: There are lots of Iranian organizations we can support. We can support moderate Shiites in Iraq who have a following in Iran, use the Kurds in northern Iraq to reach out the Kurdish minority there, and we can support the trade and labor unions, student and womens' rights organizations. The State Department can name dissidents being held in Iranian prisons and the President can tell their stories during his speeches, giving hope to the Iranians and bringing international attention to the human rights issues. The number of people and organizations we can support is enormous.

    At this time, I do not support backing the Mujahideen-e-Khalq resistance group, currently listed as a terrorist organization. I know there are good people in the organization, and understand they don't want to leave the MEK to join an umbrella alliance to topple the regime. However, from my research, I am convinced that the MEK is widely hated in Iran for a variety of reasons. Yes, they represent an "easy" way out as they have the means to militarily fight the regime if we give them weapons, and they have good intelligence sources. But supporting them will betray the trust of the Iranian people.

    Reza Pahlavi, son of the late Shah, is working to form an organization to bring together anti-mullah groups and topple them. He opposes military force against the mullahs and has called for targeted sanctions. Sanctions on military items and against specific companies helping the Iranian government and military, and specific individuals in the regime are the way to go. Sanctions that target the country as a whole, like we did to Iraq in the 1990s, are immoral and will work against us.

KMaru: If you could emphasize just three facts about Iran's preparations so far (e.g., military, social, etc.) for confrontation with the West that would galvanize U.S. public opinion if they were featured on the front page of the New York Times, what would they be?

    Mauro: I would emphasize all of Ahmadinejad's statements about the United States as being evil, predicting the destruction of the U.S. and Israel, and denying the Holocaust. Second, I'd give proof that Iran is harboring Al-Qaeda members and emphasize Iran's role in killing our troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. Third, I'd have an article about the dispersal of the nuclear sites and the creation of command and control sites to make a Western aerial campaign a failure.

KMaru: How do you respond to the view that says Iran's angry, despotic nuclear bluster is no different from that of another regime we've somehow managed to contain over many years: North Korea? What is it that Iran wishes to gain from this confrontation? How do they think about the potential for downside risk?

    Mauro: Here's the difference. Most dictators crave power above anything else, and as we saw in Libya, can be forced to choose between certain actions and holding onto their current level of power. However, the mullahs of Iran love power, but follow an ideology that cannot be bargained with. Ahmadinejad simply does not believe Iran will lose such a confrontation. The only way to change his view would be to somehow convince him that his beliefs about the hidden 12th Imam and the end times are false, which will never happen because opponents of his beliefs are labeled as evil infidels. That's the big difference. Other differences involve Iran's active support for radical Islamic terrorists and how the decision-making of the mullahs can't be rationalized without taking into context the extremist religious beliefs.

    Here in the West, many can't fathom a leader who would want to provoke a great war resulting in possibly millions dying, including the leader himself. We can't fathom a leader being serious in his predictions about the destruction of Israel. Some observers try to rationalize it by theorizing it's all part of a diplomatic game, with a diplomatic solution.

KMaru: Another comparison: Hitler. Many [including us] have sought to draw parallels between Iran and late 1930's Nazi Germany. What do you see as the places where those analogies stand up best? Where are they less useful in helping us to understand the current situation?

    Mauro: The ideology of the mullahs of Iran is very similar to the Nazis. From aspirations of world conquest, to putting the political focus on foreign and domestic enemies to build support, to sheer anti-Semitism, it's virtually the same. Even the American political situation is the same. Americans are growing more isolationist due to the Iraq War, and would rather appease than confront.

    The difference is that Iran has nukes, and that the West has the historical experience to know when and how to defeat future Hitlers. We know from the Cold War era how to help people overthrow tyrants. The consequences of inaction are much higher than during Hitler's reign, due to WMD, but the tools at our disposal are also much greater.

KMaru: Some would characterize Russia and China as our last best hopes for dealing peacefully with Iran. Others see them as unlikely to ever be broadly helpful but characterize them as parties we can use to pursue narrow political objectives (even if we have to hold our noses and make unpleasant compromises in order to do so). Still others wouldn't trust them as far as they can spit - especially after Russia's back-door financial interests in preserving Saddam's regime came to light. That school of thought might even characterize Russia and China as sharing Iran's interest in seeing us taken down a peg if not destroyed. How do you see Russia's and China's interests vis a vis Iran? How/where can they be useful in de-escalating or containing Iran's nuclear and expansionist ambitions (if at all)? Where should we steer clear of them altogether? How do you assess the potential for a U.S. strike on Iran escalating into a broader war with Russia or China?

    Mauro: Russia and China are not our allies. They have too much at stake in Iran. People often characterize it down to money. Sure, Russia and China are worried about their investments in Iran. However, there's also a geopolitical game going on. Russia and China are seeing their rogue state allies become isolated, or even removed (like Saddam). The main pillars of their power outside of their countries are under attack. I do not see Russia and China ever backing action against Iran. It'd be similar to America backing action against Saudi Arabia, for example, who, while the nation does terrible things, is an important partner for our geopolitical strategy. However, the difference is that the US will hopefully do as much as we can to limit the evils of the Saudis, without threatening our own national security.

    The collapse of the mullahs doesn't threaten China or Russia, except in the minds of the many figures in their governments who are paranoid about the growth of democracy and American power. Their assistance to rogue states is based sheerly on power and ambition, not national security.

    If the US goes to war with Iran, I don't expect an overt war with Russia or China. However, I wouldn't be surprised to see "corrupt individuals" from either nation help Iran buy advanced weapons, shred documents that incriminate Russia and China, and perhaps even the presence of "former communist" military and intelligence advisors in Iran. In my book and in other interviews I've done, it is clear Russia was helping Saddam covertly, even as Operation Iraqi Freedom progressed. I see no reason not to expect them to try this in Iran.

KMaru: A lot of attention has been paid to Iran's mixed success in developing long-range ballistic missiles, yet very little has been paid to highly successful efforts, sponsored by an Iranian government ministry to recruit suicide bombers (e.g., 55,000 just this spring in the wake of the Danish cartoon flap) or to the threat of container ships, 'fake' commercial airliners, speedboats and the like. If we assume that at some point Iran will have operational nuclear weapons, how do you think they will deliver them? What do you see as some of the targeting scenarios they might pursue? (E.g. Israel first, then several U.S. cities over many months; one massive, global, multi-point strike; a few big public venues; European capitals because they're easier to get to, a 'warning shot' test by Iran in the Iranian desert, etc.)

    Mauro: Iran's training in terms of nuclear weapons is currently focused on EMP detonation. A missile is shot into the air with a nuke and creates an electromagnetic pulse which, if done correctly, can knock out all the electricity over most of the North American continent. Power grids and computers knocked down. Economy destroyed. Command and control with military assets overseas end. Most of our technological advantages become obsolete. It's really a nightmare scenario and is much more effective than detonating a single nuclear weapon inside a city.

[This has been a hotly debated topic on various blogs and at the IIS. For one thing, it's more difficult to achieve the desired effect than some might imagine. A 1.4 megaton test blast 400 kilometers up over the South Pacific in July, 1962 impacted a wide area, but turned off only some of the lights in Hawaii, 1,300 kilometers away. It seems unlikely that the Iranians would achieve that much blast yield or altitude on their first go. The fact that it can be launched from a ship offshore however makes it a very serious threat. Whether it is stylistically consistent with Islamofascist terror patterns to date is another open question - a point that may be moot as the conflict escalates. More on EMP here; much more here. -KMaru]

KMaru: As you know, the range of 'intelligence' estimates on Iran's nuclear weapons production capability ranges from "they have several operational warheads already" to "they won't have anything useful for 5-10 years at least". There does not seem to be even a plurality of opinion around any particular timeframe. What do we really know about Iran's state of nuclear warhead production capability? When might they have one ready?

    Mauro: US intelligence on Iran is extremely poor. Some experts feel they have the bomb-grade material already. Most feel that all the necessary materials and components for a nuke should be assembled within 1-3 years. However, keep in mind that in recent history, the CIA has only overestimated an adversary's WMD, specifically nuclear, capabilities once--in Iraq (and the case is still open on that given the evidence that WMD went to Syria with Russian assistance).

    Estimates saying up to a decade or more are based on Iran's overt declarations, but mostly everyone knows there are hidden sites and there is hidden enrichment going on. I think the intelligence community is also being overly careful due to the intelligence failures in Iraq. Now, instead of looking at things with the worst possible outcome and preparing for it, the enemy's activities are being given the benefit of the doubt. Things are more likely to be overlooked, and warnings about an enemy's advancement will require an even greater standard of proof--which is impossible to do when your intelligence operations are not being effective.

KMaru: Other than late-night orders for Dominoes Pizza from outlets near the Pentagon, what early warning signs would you look for in advance of a U.S. and/or Israeli strike on Iran? What form should such a strike take? What would be its objectives? Timeframe? Follow-through actions?

    Mauro: There are so many variables involved in predicting such a strike, I prefer not to guess. Some sources are saying late 2006/early 2007 is the "deadline" the US is pushing. Some say the Israelis are only willing to wait less than a year, perhaps even less than six months. Others say that the U.S. feels we have a 3-year time period to work with before using military force. I believe there's a big debate going on and there's no firm answer.

    I do not believe Israel should participate in an air strike. The first step to prepare for a war is to isolate Iran via diplomacy and sanctions, and to support the democratic revolution. Revolution may be the quickest and safest way to topple the regime. However, we should never rule out force. If force is used, we need to topple the regime as quickly as possible because they will be expecting us, and will be prepared to use the first explosion as a trigger to unleash every weapon they've bought, and every terrorist at their disposal. It will be the confrontation with the infidels that Ahmadinejad has prepared for, and eagerly waited for. Regarding the specifics of a war, General Tom McInerney [USAF retired, 1994] has written on this and is an expert. I suggest looking to his writings for a very respected opinion on how a war would be carried out.

[E.g., see this article by McInerney in the Weekly Standard last month. We attended and reported on McInerney's talk at the IIS. While he is most definitely an expert on how to conduct an air campaign, he seemed woefully underprepared - at the time anyway - to address serious "what next" questions, contingencies or interdependencies with other branches of the military or political groups on the ground. As the saying goes: the military is great for breaking things and killing people (something that may be required in this case). They are not as good at "everything else".]

UPDATE: On a related note, the NYT reported yesterday that the U.S. is considering opening direct talks with Iran - all except for Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld and Rice, that is - raising the question of what the NYT means when it says "administration". European "allies" (oxymoron, much?) and murky, unnamed State Department sources (even further left than the CIA) are once again using the Fourth Estate to signal to the Iranians exactly what they've suspected all along: that over the last 40 years or so, we've grown far too eager to roll over and have our collective belly scratched rather than face harsh reality and follow through on what we've said all along - no nukes in the hands of the mullahs.