---

Colonel Gordon is the author of "Separated at Birth: How North Korea Became the Evil Twin.," and has a weekly column entitled "The Right Approach". Gordon grew up as the son of an Air Force officer, a WW II and Korean War veteran. He lived as a child in Japan during the Korean War. After the war his father left service and returned to New Orleans where Gordon finished schooling, graduating with a History degree from University of New Orleans. In 1967 Gordon turned back a three year graduate fellowship from University of North Carolina to volunteer for military service. He enlisted and after graduation from Infantry Officer Candidate School, Airborne and Special Forces training went first to Okinawa and Korea and then to Vietnam.

In Vietnam Gordon was a member of the highly classified Studies and Observation Group that conducted top secret reconnaissance missions into Laos, Cambodia and denied areas of Vietnam. Gordon says, "I was not a hero but was honored to serve in the company of heroes, most of them unrecognized because of the secret nature of the missions." Later Gordon went to Korea where he was the first American to attend a mid-level Korean officer's school and was charter member of a new Korean-US Combined Forces Command. From Korea he was assigned to the Pentagon where he was planned and managed military assistance to Central American countries in a volatile period. His last active duty assignment was as an exchange officer to the State Department where he was a political-military advisor to the assistant secretary of state for East Asia Pacific Affairs, a position then held by Paul Wolfowitz.

Gordon returned to Korea as a General Electric Aerospace vice president where he had a successful four year stint. He was then hired by the Korea Society in New York City to rescue that faltering organization.

He is currently expanding a speaking tours honoring Korean War veterans. The tour theme is "Remembering the Forgotten War."

---

RM: Colonel Gordon, the most pressing issue in Asia today is North Korea. Why is it we appear less aggressive towards Kim Jong-Il in comparison to Saddam Hussein or Ayatollah Khameini?

GC: In international affairs one size does not fit all. There were good reasons for military action in Iraq first as part of a coordinated strategy to apply pressure on both Iran and North Korea to act in a manner that conformed to US and allied expectations. In the past Kim Jong Il, for example, has done exceedingly well by bluff, bluster, and threat. US response had been to shower him with food, fuel oil, medicine, and other sustainables. After observing the rapid take down of an Iraqi army reputed to be 'elite' that was armed and trained on Soviet doctrine (similar to that of N Korea) Kim was impressed but still needs to be convinced. Our current strategy toward North Korea: multilateral, increasing pressure, threat of action, is the correct one and is necessary for success.


RM: Freedom appears on the march in Asia. Can you give us some insight onto the potential for democratic revolution in China and North Korea?

GC: China always is torn between control and independence; between centralization and decentralization. These trends are historic and predate communism. They continue today with the added dichotomy of free market economic development versus a controlled socialist economy. Outsiders do not see the intensity of the internal conflict until it boils in incidents like Tienamin Square. China, despite regime attempts to control it, has relatively open communications. If the fax machine stimulated the Tienamin movement the Internet will cook off the next explosion. What could prevent it? A perception of steady reform by the people. When will it come? When we least expect it, precipitated by an incident we might consider trivial.

Contrasted to China, or any other country, North Korea is a totally closed society. Listening to a South Korean radio station is a concentration camp offense. Gordon's pressure cooker theory: the tighter the lid is on a society, the more heat applied by repressive regime policies, the bigger the explosion of revolt. Look at Romania and E Germany contrasted to Poland and Hungary. Sufficient information flow to the oppressed people of N Korea would stimulate revolt. But until then they are held in check by Kim's police.

A real democratic revolution is not likely in either, but I could see it happening in China before North Korea for reasons stated.


RM: Many analysts suspect that China would use a war in the peninsula as a signal to take back Taiwan (or vice versa). Is this likely in your opinion?

GC: China would take all actions possible to avoid war anywhere in the region. Such a conflict would set back a peaceable reunification with Taiwan. A war would quickly escalate to bring in the US and Japan, not a desirable outcome. Peace, harmony, and a steady move to reunify is on China's plate now. It uses threat of force to prod and shape not as a realistic option.

I don't think China would automatically attack Taiwan if war or serious military action occurred on the Korean peninsula. China's interests are complex, as I noted, and would not be launched without careful consideration of all factors, including the Korean situation. Remember, China wants Taiwan as intact as possible.

Kim Jong Il is not going to launch war simply because of a China-Taiwan conflict with US involvement (remember the most opportune time was while America was tied up in Vietnam and public opinion would not likely have supported a Korean war). If they didn't move then it is too much of a generalization to think that some auto trigger mechanism would kick in with this scenario. Other factors at the time would have to be taken into consideration.


RM: There appears to be a debate in India right now as to how to react to China's growing power. Some want to become more anti-Western, whiles others wish to move towards the United States and our allies. Which side do you feel will prevail?

GC: India is an English-speaking democracy with shared Western values overlain over traditional Indian values. For decades the socialist leadership feigned a 'non-alligned' policy while tilting heavily toward the USSR. Subsequently they have seen the futility in such a policy and are looking to the US for the future. The US relationship with Pakistan causes some concern as does a rapidly strengthening China on its border. That said, drawing closer to the US and Australia makes excellent political as well as cultural sense and is likely to be the wave of the future for India.


RM: The United States has a commitment to Taiwan to send them weapons to defend against potential Chinese aggression. Do you really feel the American people have a stomach for a big fight over Taiwan?

GC: I hope China never decides to test US resolve. Others have done so and been surprised. Much would depend of course on the circumstances, but if China overtly moves on Taiwan the US would defend it (under present administration policies) and the president would be able to convince Americans of the need. It is an easier sell than Kuwait was in 1991.


RM: In July 2001, Russia and China signed a Friendship Pact, which seemed to indicate that Russia considered Taiwan a part of China. In the Pact, they agree to come to each other's defense should a foreign power, such as the U.S., get militarily involved in their internal disputes. More recently there's been war exercises and according to some reports, the Russians have practiced using tactical nuclear weapons in the Pacific in response to U.S. intervention over Taiwan. What role is Russia likely to play in a Chinese-American conflict over Taiwan?

GC: Again, I think the threat of such a conflict serves the Chinese better in prospect than in actuality. In poker parlance, the Chinese are a long way from being 'all in' over Taiwan. This is negotiation not confrontation. Russia, meanwhile, is trying to learn what it wants to be when it grows up. Still reeling from the unfulfilled transition from communism, Russia is struggling to see if it is a European or Pacific power or both. Any treaty between Russia and China is historically suspect. Russia does not have a dog in the fight between Taiwan and China and would sit it out and see what it could grab off in the aftermath.


RM: How likely is it that North Korea will sell weapons of mass destruction to terrorists? What is the purpose of their nuclear, chemical and biological weapons arsenals?

GC: Being starved for foreign currency and exhibiting a proclivity to sell anything (e.g., uranium, missiles, narcotics, slave labor) to bring in money, the North Korean regime could be counted upon to sell radioactive material, nuclear weapons, chemical or biological weapons to terror groups. My only surprise is that it has not already done so. It may mean that the regime is not as far along in the process as it claims.

The WMD is aimed at Seoul (<20 kilometers from the Demilitarized Zone) with its population in excess of 14 million. The threat is primarily designed to blackmail South Korea and its supporters into providing more assistance to North Korea, but it must be taken seriously nevertheless. Appeasement is not the way to counter it. Regime change is the only ultimate solution to the North Korean issue.


RM: What is the red line North Korea has to cross to provoke a really strong Western response? What are the limitations of our responses?

GC: To bring about a military attack - I assume that is your definition of 'really strong' - North Korea must engage in overtly aggressive action against its neighbors (Soiuth Korea, Japan, US) or must be caught red-handed in selling WMD to terrorists. I do not think that the first part of the hypothetical situation will arise, although the latter case may well happen.

If it does we are going to have to strike targets including regime targets while suppressing the N Korean air and artillery aimed at Seoul. Not an easy task. Plus we have to have at least tacit support from China that action is not aimed at it. S Korea may panic in such a case. It would be extraordinarily difficult but not impossible a task to carry out without at least some friendly civilian casualties. For this reason the present multilateral policies must be aggressively continued. See Chapter 12 in my book Separated at Birth: How North Korea became the Evil Twin, for an extensive discussion of a successful, non-military winning strategy in dealing with the North Korean threat.


RM: A lot of people criticize Pakistani President Musharraf for his unwillingness to implement democratic reform. But given the high level of anti-Americanism in Pakistan, shouldn't we be hesitant to support widespread democratic reform there?

GC: We have nothing to fear from genuine democracy. However, one man, one vote, one time is not democracy. A free and open Pakistan adjacent to a democratic India, a democratic Afghanistan, a democratic Iraq, and a future democratic Iran is in the world's best interest. The trick is to control and guide reform and not let it be stolen away as has been the case in some countries.

I'm a big believer in democracy now, if it is real democracy. Historically no democracy has made war on another. Even if America is not liked in a genuinely democratic Pakistan (an achievement that may consume much energy internally to make happen) it is unlikely that a democratic Pakistan would ally itself with a non-democratic state to hurt America.


RM: What can the United States do to counter China's rising power and potential aggression?

GC: Encourage steady, solid reform along parallel political and economic lines. Keep a strong, firm presence in the face of China. Chinese respect strength and have contempt for weakness. They will test continually and we must respond with quiet firmness. We must also be prepared militarily to counter any military upgrades that China makes.


RM: Is a multilateral policy preferable to a bilateral policy in dealing with North Korea?

GC: We must stay with the 6 Party talks because North Korea is very adept at dividing and conquering. For decades it played the USSR and China off against each other. It wants to do the same with the US, Japan, China, South Korea and Russia. It has already made deep inroads in separating South Korea from the US. Multilateral, constant, unified pressure is necessary.


RM: Can the nuclear situation in North Korea be separated from the human rights crisis?

GC: This has been a failed strategy world wide and unfortunately an arbitrary, capricious separation of the two issues is the policy that the State Department (in contravention to President Bush's stated intention) is following. First let's deal with the larger crisis, nuclear weapons, they say, then we'll have time to worry about the 'tangential' issues of counterfeiting, narcotics export, proliferation of missiles, and, oh yes, those messy prison camps and starvation reports.

Continuation of such a failed, inhumane policy is morally and politically unacceptable. In order to achieve success all issues must be on the table and resolved concomitantly. To delay reform and change of unacceptable behavior by the North Koreans in any one area jeopardizes progress on all issues. An example: when we thought in the Agreed Framework that we had solved the nuclear issue the North cheated on weapons R&D and continued to abuse its populace, sell narcotics, export missiles, and counterfeit US currency. All we did by cutting the deal was prop up a failing regime for another decade and extend the misery of its people, all the while giving the regime time to refine a WMD threat.

The North Korean people must be free! Now is better than later.

---

Copyright 2005, Ryan Mauro, used on MILNET with the Author's Permission