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Douglas MacGregor is the best-selling author of “Breaking the Phalanx” and is an independent defense and foreign policy consultant with Glenside Analysts, Inc. He served in the Gulf War, served in the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe during the 1999 Kosovo War, and served as an advisor to the Department of Defense during the run-up to Operation Iraqi Freedom. He spent 28 years in the military.

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RM: Did you support the invasion of Iraq?

DM: As a serving professional soldier, I was not asked whether I supported anything. I was asked what it would take to quickly remove the regime from power. I responded to the Secretary of Defense with a concept plan involving 50,000 men that was predicated on several important assumptions:

1. Iraq's potential use of WMD against assembling US and UK forces in Kuwait made it too dangerous to assemble a large force. This was the genesis of the standing start or cold start. Moreover, we could not logistically sustain a force greater than 150,000 based on the cuts in force structure made by the Army generals during the 1990s. Light infantry had no value in the country until initial hostilities ended. Armored forces provided mobility, protection and firepower, essential ingredients for a speedy conclusion to hostilities. The force I wanted had more armor and firepower in it than the larger force of armor and light infantry that was ultimately assembled.
2. No occupation of Iraq by US or British Forces. Iraqi military and police would be retained, integrated into the offensive or rapidly restored once the regime was gone. Iraqi generals would take over and announce UN supervised elections within 6-9 months.
3. Armor heavy force designed to reach Baghdad quickly, avoiding distracting fights along the way without air strikes of any kind until we were well over the Euphrates River. 15,000 infantry were supposed to fly in once the city fell to rapidly restore order until Iraqi Arab troops took over.
4. Armor heavy force would withdraw into the desert leaving the cities and towns in Iraqi hands. Force would withdraw within 90-120 days south of the Euphrates and establish itself in An Nasiryah responding to requests for assistance from the interim military government
5. No trip to the UN. The intervention would begin without notice to anyone, least of all to the UN. Cover story was intervention in the horn of Africa.
6. Finally, I personally thought we should finish the war we began in January 1991. We did that, albeit poorly in April 2003 after giving SH and his inner circle time to escape much as we did for Osama bin Laden. Then, we started a brand new war when we occupied the place, something I always opposed.
   
   

RM: What are some of the mistakes made that has led to the current problems we face?

DM: Answer: Occupation, occupation, occupation. Christian Europeans in US or UK uniform have no business occupying a Muslim Arab country under any circumstances. The criticality of ensuring that Arabs were always governed and administered by other Muslim Arabs was ignored with terrible consequences. The more American conventional combat troops you put into Iraq, the sooner you get a rebellion against our presence.

 

RM: Paul Bremer and some other experts say the criticism of their firing of the Iraqi Army is unwarranted, because the Army dissolved as we invaded. The troops shed their uniforms and went home. What is your response to this?

DM: Bullshit. The majority of the force did what we asked them to do. They did not fight. We actually called general officers commanding forces and told them to stay in their offices and keep their troops at home and they would have a role in the post-war Iraq. When 3rd ID arrived in Baghdad and took the city for the next four weeks, officers commanding Iraqi troops reported daily to US battalion commanders asking for instructions and volunteering to go into the city to restore order. McKiernan actually met with a group of Iraqi generals who provided the names of officers in the grade of colonel and below who could be quickly recalled to restore the Iraqi Army to full strength and health. We rejected these overtures. The US generals lacked any moral courage and opted to do nothing until Bremer arrived. Bremer is not telling the truth.

 

RM: How big of a role does Syria and Iran play in contributing to the violence and how do we counter it?

DM: All the states surrounding Iraq have a stake in what happens inside Iraq, but none of the surrounding states has a stake in the success of the US occupation. Thus, all are involved with Iranian influence being the greatest.

 

RM: What is your assessment of how Moqtada al-Sadr has been handled?

DM: Stupidly. We have no interest in refereeing the internal disputes. We have no interest in converting Shiites into enemies the way we have Sunnis.

RM: How would you have responded to Moqtada al-Sadr’s sectarian violence and attacks on U.S. troops (or even Iraqi government forces) if this occurred on your watch?

DM: First, occupation was a mistake. Second, having occupied it, we needed to avoid confrontation with the numerous militias and movements of which Moqtada's was the largest. Once his forces attacked us, we had to respond and we did eventually get it right with the armored force we sent in. However, we absolutely should never have mentioned this man by name and turned him along with a host of others into rock stars. We tend to personalize too much. Mark Kimmit on behalf of Sanchez and Abizaid made dozens of dumb remarks that actually enhanced this guy's stature.

 

RM: What do you think of the theory that some Iraqi WMD may have gone to Syria?

DM: I have seen no credible evidence for this claim.

 

RM: If you were put in charge today, what would you do to bring about a democratic, relatively secure Iraq?

DM: Get out immediately. There will be nothing resembling Anglo-Saxon democracy outside of Central and Northern Europe and North America anyway. Japan is hardly democratic by our standards. Latin America certainly is not. Africa is a disaster. China is a very successful fascist state. We need to get out of the business of exporting democracy at gunpoint and develop a decent respect for the cultures and governments of other nations. However, if we leave Iraq, the parties inside the country and the region will have an incentive to work out new arrangements, something that will not happen while we are there. I also do not believe in the regional war theory if we leave.

 

RM: Would you support an effort to back the democratic opposition forces in Iran to cause internal regime change?

DM: We need to proceed carefully here. The urbanized population hates the religious regime. The rural population that supported it whole-heartedly in 1979 is backing away. Frustration inside the country with the government's economic failures is high. But if we strike Iran, we will unite it. In contrast to the artificial states of the Arab World, Iran is a viable state with a credible history. There is a strong national consciousness, something missing from most Arab states. The point is we need to avoid adopting solutions that pit the United States against the people of Iran.

 

RM: Are you in favor of a total and immediate withdrawal? What would be the consequences of this?

DM: Yes. We need to announce our imminent withdrawal and begin a deliberate move south of the Euphrates River. From the beginning we should have made it known what our conditions for withdrawal were. Now, we must simply leave. This move will take several months. At the same time, we need to make it clear that we will not back any of the factions. We should consider leaving a small residual force in Kurdistan to forestall the possibility of Turkish intervention. As for the die-hard supporters of this pointless and destructive occupation and their warnings of catastrophe, I do not subscribe to the "sky is falling" theory. I think the Iranians will continue to restrain their friends in Iraq. I think that the King of Jordan and the King of Saudi Arabia will do whatever they can to protect and sustain the Sunni population. I think that they Syrian regime desperately wants to off-load its refugees back to Iraq.

However, if a regional war pitting Sunni against Shiite were to occur, the real question is why should we be in it? How does it help us to participate? And, finally, once we are out, we will have real maneuver room, on all sides. There is no reason why we can not do business with everyone, but clearly the Sunni states of the Arabian Peninsula will become more, not less dependent on us when the Shiite dominated state of Iraq emerges on the map.

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Ryan Mauro is a geo-political analyst whose web site WorldThreats.com is a recognized top flight source for analysis on the world and nation.  Ryan's keen insight and independent analysis makes him a valuable guest writer and we are proud to offer his work on MILNET.