Terrorism Threats for October and November of 2006
By: RYAN MAURO (TDCAnalyst@aol.com)

An interesting article was sent to the author in October. As reported by Richard Miniter, an Iraqi defector to Turkey going by the name of “Abu Mohammed” spoke to Gwynne Roberts of England’s Sunday Times. Mohammed claimed that, in 1997, he was a colonel in the Fedayeen and went to the suspected terrorist training camp known as Salman Pak and saw that men were being trained to hijack aircraft, specifically a Boeing 707, utilizing knives. Mohammed said that Colonel Jamil Kamil and Major Ali Hawas met him at the site and, that Major Hawas told him that the men he saw in line for food were members of “Osama Bin Laden’s group,” the PKK and the Mujahideen-e-Khalq.

• An Iraqi Intelligence Service memo, dated March 28, 2001, discusses how the Iraqi government should react to the expected hard-line the new Bush Administration would take. Among the interesting quotes from the memo are “Prepare…call to strike the presence and interests of America” and “work to commit some nations like France, China, Russia and Japan to economical agreements that make implementation of the smart sanctions to have negative effect to the interests of these nations.”
• Another document from March 25, 2003 indicates that the PFLP terrorist organization led by Ahmad Gibril pledged to Iraqi officials in Damascus to send 500 fighters, including some trained in “suicide martyrdom” through Syria. The meeting was approved by Taha Yassin Ramadan, then a vice president of Iraq. It also discusses the use of remotely-guided bombs.
• A newly elected Democratic congressman, Chris Carney, has confirmed that Iraq worked with Al-Qaeda, even though he opposed the decision to invade Iraq. He worked as a senior counter-terrorism and intelligence advisor for Doug Feith in the Pentagon, and stated that Iraq had links to every terrorist group in the region. He also stated that suggestions, and supporting information, that an insurgency would take place in Iraq were brushed off. He stated that on a 0-10 scale, Iraqi ties to Al-Qaeda were about a 2.5.

Middle East

Sectarian violence and the U.S. daily death toll in Iraq dramatically increased in October, and some said it was timed for the US mid-term elections. Whatever the reason, the US has reached an extremely challenging dilemma: The more aggressively the US responds to the militias, the less stable the Iraqi government becomes, yet the US cannot allow such violence to continue. It must be remembered that political support from Moqatada al-Sadr was responsible for electing Nouri al-Maliki. Additionally, aside from a vicious military offensive, al-Sadr cannot be defeated by the Coalition forces because of support from Iran. Iran continues to send millions of dollars and equipment, including high-grade military explosives and specialized timers, to al-Sadr’s Mehdi Army. The equipment used by the Mehdi Army is said to bear Iranian “fingerprints” and is of the same make that Hezbollah used in its recent conflict with Israel. In additional raids by the Iraqis, a modern communications system from Iran’s Defense Ministry was seized, and pictures were posted on the Internet.

Moqtada al-Sadr is claiming that he’s lost control of the Mehdi Army, and that “rogues” are responsible for the sectarian violence. The sectarian violence is not politically beneficial to al-Sadr, as the vast majority of Iraqis oppose it. However, if he wants to advance Iran’s interests, destabilize the government, hold some leverage over the Iraqi leadership, and force the removal of US troops, then he would likely back such violence. The question is: Is al-Sadr playing a clever political gambit by having his militants conduct such violence, and then denying his role, or has he indeed lost control of the Mehdi Army to genuinely rogue members?

New evidence indicates that Iran is also sponsoring radical terrorist groups rather than just the Shiite militia. The Guardian recently interviewed a terrorist, going by the name “Abdullah”, who described how he worked for Abdullah Shafi, a Kurdish terrorist from northern Iraq. “Abdullah” claimed Shafi led Ansar al-Islam and was expelled from Iran after the US invaded Iraq because he was mobilizing suicide bombers. “Abdullah” explained that he was trained in a camp on Iranian territory and given safe haven, money, weapons and a place to stay. Abdullah claimed that 19 of his 20 campmates were sent to fight in Iraq, but he was sent to Afghanistan to fight alongside the Taliban and was captured in Afghanistan.

Con Coughlin reported that the Revolutionary Guards’ Al-Quds Force are training “hundreds” of Al-Qaeda operatives at camps on the outskirts of Tehran that have been previously used by other sponsored groups like Hezbollah. Key leaders have been harbored since 2001, and the increased relationship is the result of orders from Ahmadinejad. According to the report, Iran is building relationships with rising figures in the group, such as Seif al-Adel, in order to increase their influence over the groups activities as the power of the senior leadership declines.

Obviously, the biggest development in Iraq was the verdict to hang Saddam Hussein for his role in the massacre of around 150 Shiites in Dujail in 1982. This is a big development since it will provide valuable insight into the insurgency. There were some pro-Saddam demonstrations in Tikrit, and other places, none of which indicated significant popular support, but certainly enough to support an insurgency. Although large-scale violence did not follow the verdict, we need to observe closely how the insurgents respond to this development.

If there is a significant insurgency response over the next few weeks, then would be clear that their goal is a return to power of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath Party. This would be discouraging since the Coalition thought no one would be loyal to such a cause. On the other hand, it could also demonstrate that, by executing Saddam and the top leadership of the Ba’ath Party, the insurgency’s goal of reinstituting the Ba’ath Party can be dealt a severe, if not fatal, blow. If the verdict is viewed as irrelevant, then there are other factors behind the insurgency that are more complex, and thus, more difficult to address.

There is a cycle in Iraq that must be broken. The lack of security due to the mostly Sunni insurgency has caused an increase in power for local hard-line leaders who use militia to protect the community, many of which are tied to Iran. Major elements of these militias, usually the Mehdi Army, but parts of the Badr Brigade have also played a role, contribute to sectarian violence, which results in increased support for the Sunni insurgency. Sometimes the conflict is essentially anti-American/democracy Sunnis killing anti-American/democracy Shiites, and vice versa but, be that as it mat be, this conflict results in continued instability and always expands to include attacks on civilians.

By supporting sectarian violence, Iran has successfully been able to polarize the political groups in Iraq, destabilize the government and reduce Iraqi control outside of Baghdad, reduce the influence of the moderate Ayatollah al-Sistani, create more support and power for Iranian-backed militia, decrease unity in the Iraqi security forces, and inflict US and Iraqi casualties resulting in an increased likelihood of an American withdrawal.

As noted above, Moqtada al-Sadr claims he no longer has firm control over the entire Mehdi Army, and some rogue members are responsible for sectarian violence. The Telegraph in the UK reported on the Shia version of Zarqawi, known as Abu Deraa, who has killed thousands of Sunnis. He reportedly left the Mehdi Army in early 2006 and is behind much of the sectarian violence. It would be interesting if evidence should came to light that Abu Deraa is receiving Iranian support, or has any level of cooperation with the Mehdi Army.