MILNET:

MILNET Brief
Summary and Analysis of the
Governmental Affairs Committee Hearings on 9/11 Commission, August 2004

"Various proposals for managing "need to share" and preserving "need to know" had to address the almost Byzantine system of intelligence control that evolved during the three decade period."

- William Webster, former Director of Central Intelligence and Director of the FBI

On August 16, 2004, before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, three former Directors of Central Intelligence were asked for their learned opinions on the concept of a National Intelligence Director proposed by the 9/11 Commission. This followed a rather informative discussion on August 3, 2004 when witnesses from various agencies discussed the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) concept also recommended by the 9/11 Commission's final report.

This brief will first explore the former DCIA's comments on the position of National Intelligence Director, and then summarize and analyze their comments on the National Counterterrorism Center -- NCTC concept. We will also include comments from the August 03, 2004 witnesses.

A National Intelligence Director

The 9/11 Commission, looking to focus the government on better coordination and budgeting for the Intelligence Community has recommended the establishment of a National Intelligence Director, and suggest that the post should be a cabinet level post, with the NID residing in the White House. Moreover, the Commission also suggests deputies who can focus on several areas to allow the NID to delegate specific areas of intelligence activities while remaining the chief administrator and advisor to the President on Intelligence matters.

MILNET's contacts in the Intelligence Community are split on the concept. Some reflect that more bureaucracy is the "last thing we need", others are happy to see a change in the overwhelming responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence. Today, the DCI is also the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and many believe the two jobs create conflicts in the Intelligence Community, as well as overwhelm the person "in the chair".

Legislating things such as deputies and determining their specific responsibilities is frowned upon by all of our contacts. Who becomes the active leader -- a deputy reporting to the NID, or the Director of one of the 15 Intelligence agencies. The negative political realities of bureaucratic power come to play in the structure outlined by the Commission.

Executive Summary

The detailed notes on the two hearings are available on MILNET and in this brief we also feature a detailed summary of each of the testimonies of the three so called "Spy Masters" remarks. Since even our summary is lengthy, we also provide a set of points in which they all agree, and those where they do not.

Agreement:

A National Intelligence Director is needed
The NID must not also be dual hatted as the Director of the CIA -- thus you could conceivably simply remove the DCI from his responsibility to manage directly the CIA and you would have your NID
Budget control over all or a larger portion of the Intelligence Community budget would be useful in assuring the NID has the power of the purse and therefore able to more effectively direct and control the community. One former DCI thinks it is absolutely necessary, one believes either way will work, and one thinks the leadership capability and relationship with the President are far more important than budget control.
The concept of dual hatted Deputies is a non working idea and should be abandoned.
The concept of moving all paramilitary operations to DoD is absolutely a huge mistake
Need to Share has to be balanced with Need to Know, not replace it.
The NCTC is an excellent idea, especially if it is built upon the current Terrorist Threat Integration Center or TTIC established by President Bush and stood up in May of 2003.

Disagreement:

Two of the former DCIs do not believe the NID should be in the executive office of the President, that is, not a cabinet member, one thinks it doesn't matter -- the personality and a good working relationship with the President will suffice to make the position constructive.
One former DCI believes that the Commission's recommendations ignore other important terrorism aspects and focus far too much on al Qaeda.

MILNET's Analysis - Executive Summary

Clearly the Governmental Affairs Committee Hearings were able to verify a widespread acceptance of both the NID and NCTC concepts. However, the Hearings also exposed several issues that legislation (if necessary) will need to deal with:

NID's budget authority will challenge that of the Department of Defense
NID's authority over traditional DoD intelligence agencies may require the NID to make decisions of a strategic nature that will effect DoD's tactical needs
The necessity for Congressional action may be mute. With the stand up of the TTIC, the President has, through Executive Order, already taken action without the need of legislation. The current agencies operate under a renewable Executive Order that each administration renews in order to restate the agencies responsibilities. It is perceived that this could easily be the case for the NID and the NCTC. In fact, Admiral Stansfield Turner's revelation that as DCI under President Carter, he was ordered by the President to assume the duties of DCI only, leaving the administration of the CIA to his deputy. Thus, he was essentially, under Executive Order, operating as the NID. This sets a critical precedence and may relieve the Congress from legislation.
However, the conglomeration, on a permanent basis, of multiple agencies participating in the NCTC may require funding from Congress for the purposes of facilities and equipment, especially if the move to truly and fully integrate information technology for all the IC agencies is implemented.

Detailed Summary of Testimony

In the table below, we list the key statements made by Mr. Webster and Mr. Woolsey. Mr. Turner's written comments were not available as this brief was being written, however, we have added our notes on the statements made during the hearing. While the opinions of the witnesses shown below are mostly verbatim, some paraphrasing was necessary in order to produce a consumable level of detail.

DCIA		Opinions on NID
Judge William Webster DCIA, 5/87 to 9/91 (Reagan and Bush) Also a former Director of the FBI, and Judge in the Federal Appellate System		Written Statement NID Concept: Omission and errors in conclusions in errors were due to human mistakes and misjudgments. Others attributable to constraints, both legislative and administrative -- related to Church and Pike committee reports to the 2001 Patriot Act provisions on sharing of intelligence. Various proposals for managing "need to share" and preserving "need to know" had to address the almost Byzantine system of intelligence control that evolved during the three decade period. It is remarkable what has been accomplished by consensus building. Whether the Congress elects to create a true Director of National Intelligence or to beef up the real (as opposed to cosmetic) management authority of the Director of Central Intelligence...the designated leader must be clearly and ambiguously empowered to act and to decide on issues of great importance to the success of the Intelligence Community and the country. There are a number of DCI authorities, widely assumed by the American public to exist already, which are, in fact imprecise, easily frustrated, and not in regular use. They are: Management of the intelligence budget authority to name or at least approve the recommendation for Presidential appointment of the top leaders of the Intelligence Community; and performance review and evaluation of these community leaders. These authorities could be granted to: the Director of Central Intelligence, who is also the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; a Director of Central Intelligence who is separate from and senior to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, or a newly created National Intelligence Director who would replace the present Director of Central Intelligence. Control of the budget is essential to effective management of the Intelligence Community. The number of new positions needed to manage the outreach and responsibilities of the NID should be carefully controlled. The DoD must be assured that intelligence tasking necessary to support combat commanders does not move away from the control of those commanders. The NID position -- detailed responsibilities: DCIA has created a number of centers located for convenience at CIA headquarters. I believe these should stay with the intelligence leader, be denominated at his discretion (not legislated) and located where and his principal advisors think most appropriate. The Commission would keep responsibility for clandestine covert operations in the CIA but place lead responsibility for paramilitary action in the military. I would prefer to keep that model on small "turn on a dime" activities in the CIA. Larger scale actions that are essentially troop engagements should be in defense. While the leader of the Intelligence Community must be the principal advisor on intelligence to the President, he must work hard to avoid either the reality or the perception that intelligence is being framed (read "spun") to support a foreign policy of the Administration. The head of the Intelligence Community does not need to be located in the White House and to avoid these problems, I believe he should not be. The FBI should be, as it has in the past, a part of efforts to coordinate national intelligence collection efforts with international activities. This is more in the nature of putting the information together, completing the dots and other efforts to avoid information gaps. Trusted Information Network: Inability to rapidly identify and capture information of value to other agencies aggravated the circumstances leading to the 9/11 tragedy. The Commission recommends an overhaul of our information systems to better process, share and protect intelligence across the agencies. This has considerable merit. I am told that over 88 separate [Congressional] committees and subcommittees now oversight the Homeland Security Department. Consideration should be given to a joint committee on intelligence.
R. James. Woolsey DCIA Feb, 93 to Jan. 95. (Bush Sr, Clinton) Also Undersecretary of Navy and member of the Arms Reduction Negotiations Team		Written Statement 9/11 Commission's Threat Assessment The Commission seems focused exclusively on Sunni Islamists, in particular al Qaeda. One would think that the Islamists of Tehran and their iinstrumentalities would deserve some attention. And a strategy to bring change to the Middle East...should at least mention the issue of oil dependencies. There is no thorough treatment in the Commission's report of our enemies, even those in the Middle East, even those based there who may attack us here at home. It [the Commission] seems to assume that the only relevant enemy is al Qaeda because it is the organization that conducted the 9/11 attack. We unfortunately also need to pay attention to other totalitarian movements in the Middle East who are our enemies and to state activity, in particular that of Iran and those who do the ruling mullah's bidding -- such as Hezbollah and Moqtada Sadr in Iraq. If Shi'ite Islamists (or secular Baathists) prevail in Iraq, the consequences will ultimately be severe for us, including an increased likelihood of attacks in this country. It [The Commission] would have been well advised to consider a more comprehensive assessment of our enemy than it apparently did, such as that contained in Paul Bremen's remarkable recent work, "Terror and Liberalism". [Paraphrasing a long monologue on Iraq and cooperation with al Qaeda] The Commission got it wrong. Our intelligence shows disturbing reports of Iraqi-al Qaeda contacts in the 1990s, Iraqi training of al Qaeda in combat, bomb-making, and CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) capabilities...there was evidence of Iraq providing "safe haven" in Baghdad the Northeastern Iraq and training in explosives, poisons, gases, and operational cooperation. A major question regarding the threat to us is whether we face only al Qaeda and other Sunni Islamist, or whether we are in a long war against several totalitarian enemies in the Middle East. [They are] perfectly capable of working together here and there (generally not on specific operations) to our detriment. In my judgment, on the issue of the threat to us, the Senate Select Committee [on Intelligence] has done a far better and more comprehensive job than the Commission. The NID Issue: I concur with the Commission's recommendation to split the current job of Director of Central Intelligence and give one individual responsibility for managing the Intelligence Community and serving as the President's chief advisor on intelligence, and to give another the responsibility for managing the Central Intelligence Agency. I also agree with the recommendation to establish a National Counterterrorism Center reporting to the NID. ...and with the thrust of the recommendation to have more focused oversight (involving fewer people) of both the Intelligence Community and the Department of Homeland Security. On the Current roles of DCIA: ...in the field of terrorism, the need for integrating the management of foreign and domestic intelligence is clear. For the current DCI to do this would put the individual who heads the country's foreign clandestine collection also in a supervisory role over domestic intelligence collection. The combined tasks [of DCIA, DCI and the President's chief advisor on intelligence] might be barely manageable in terms of the time required for them when the DCI has a close working relationship with the President, a cordial with all in the Congress who are interested in intelligence....that oversee and approve the funds for the Intelligence Community. ...in 1993 Congress was in session 195 days, and had 205 appointments on Capital Hill -- more than one a day. I believe that dealing with Congress...would be easier for an NID to handle because he would not have the day-to-day responsibility of managing the CIA. [paraphrasing] As DCI I had to meet with around 200 people working for Congress. Of the two solutions recommended by the Commission, I would strongly favor a joint intelligence committee organized along the lines of the old Joint COmmittee on Atomic Energy,. In my opinion the appropriations process for intelligence works well and I see no need to change it. I am in favor of a bill that provides for joint appointment of senior managers in the DoD intelligence agencies (such as NSA) by the NID and the Secretary of Defense and, ...gives the Secretary of Defense (and the Attorney General in some cases) the right to appeal these NID decisions to the President. On Information Sharing and Security: The Commissions recommendations regarding greater information sharing ...and the overall intelligence budget disclosure include some good ideas, but they generally tilt too far, in my view, toward disclosure and wide dissemination of intelligence. Hostile infiltration info our government, or for that matter blabbermouths, are not solely "Cold War assumptions" that are "no longer appropriate" as the Commission suggests. ...it [the Committee] might want to look carefully at Wahhabi/Isalmist infiltration into our prison chaplains and perhaps other parts of our government -- in my view such infiltration should be treated seriously, and may be a larger, not a smaller, problem than during the Cold War. ...the issue is not just how to share more widely but how to share wisely. On the role of the NID: ...development of new collection methods can benefit from a degree of competition between agencies and within limits, freelancing and risk-taking should be encouraged. The NID should not stifle this [friendly] competitive tradition within the intelligence community. Much of intelligence is judgment, not clear information, and it is frequently a good idea to let a minority view be set forth in an analysis -- even if most believe there is a low probability that the possibility suggested by the minority will occur. Responsibly-developed judgments about a course of events that might be low probability but would have a high impact should always get a hearing. When I see press reports that we are listening into bin Laden's satellite telephone, my instinct is not to share signals intelligence more broadly but rather to return to a system of rigid control... Transferring Covert Paramilitary Action to the Pentagon: A Very Poor Idea I completely disagree Covert paramilitary operations are those for which secrecy, or at least official deniability, needs to last after the military engagement. Clandestine military operations are different. If covert paramilitary operations were assigned to the armed forces...not only would our military become the instrumentality through which we, essential, lie about a past military operation, but there would be pressures for the military to become subject to the requirements for formal Presidential findings and CIA-type controls. Subjecting our uniformed Special Forces to these types of delays and controls would, in my view, severely restrict their potential effectiveness in the war in which we are engaged. Conclusion: It is important to remember that much of the preparation for 9/11 took place among very few individuals and in places where U.S. foreign intelligence does not collect -- such as the U.S. and Germany. Also, satellites tell us very little about terrorists and signal intercepts tell us less and less the more we talk about them publicly and terrorists adjust the way they communicate. [paraphrasing] it is far more important to discuss how using clandestine or covert cover operations to penetrate terrorist networks than it is to figure out the "wiring diagram" for the Intelligence Community -- "I favor the establishment of an NID, but compared to many intelligence questions, it is a secondary matter.
Admiral Stansfield Turner DCIA from 1977 to 1981 (Carter) Also Commander of NATO's Southern Command		On the issue of NID - I was a guinea pig. My first meeting with President Carter resulted in an oral instruction, "concentrate on being the director of central intelligence". As a result I delegated most of the CIA administrative tasks to the Deputy Director. This freed me up to participate in the analytic process of Central Intelligence. The output of that process deserves the attention of the Director of Central Intelligence, and indeed unless the DCI directly participates, then he will not be available to render decisions where different analysis are in conflict. The budget process had one person to make the final approval and that was me. Those who did not agree with budget could take their reasoning to the President. A Deputy was assigned to get cooperation for particular areas, i.e., Collection, Analysis, etc. As the deputies sat around the table trying to solve a problem, they might decide that a satellite photo might lead to an intercept recommendation which in turn might lead to assigning a human agent in place to get further information. I encourage Congress to separate NID responsibilities from the responsibilities of the Director of the CIA. The heads of the analytical agencies within the main departments (State, Defense, DoHS) should not be subject to NID's hiring and firing. The Secretaries of State or Defense should be able to have someone doing their intelligence that they can have confidence in - to do otherwise would create a whole host. I suggest you draw a line - intelligence is only tactical if it is tasked by a commander in the field, otherwise it is strategic. The NID should direct the dissemination of the information. It is perfectly reasonable to protect sources and methods, but there needs to be a balance directed by the NID, in what needs to be disseminated to whom to serve the nation rather than a particular department or agency. It was appropriate for DoD to control our intelligence in the Cold War period, but now that is not so clear. This may be an opportunity to modify that aspect of the Intelligence Community operation.

MILNET Analysis

Mr. Woolsey's testimony seemed to resonate with our intelligence contacts. Our Intelligence Community contacts voiced a common opinion -- "The idea of creating the post of NID -- especially if it separates the responsibilities of the Director of CIA from Director of Central Intelligence, is a great idea. But there are far more pressing issues in Intelligence to tackle first and we should not be wasting time on worrying about the office of the NID." Mr. Woolsey voiced a similar opinion in his written statement to the Governmental Affairs Committee hearings on August 16, 2004. He did, however, go on to say he endorsed the idea of an NID with some caveats.

In looking at the general tenor of the former DCIAs comments, one could clearly hear them say "Good ideas on several points -- NID and National Intelligence Centers, but "forget the flawed idea of putting paramilitary ops in the hands of the DoD or dual hatting Deputies to the NID."

Their logic is also quite clear. For example, the DoD's operational capabilities and tasking are typically, in the majority, not focused on paramilitary activities. Special forces is the exception, and their operations are extremely reactive to threats and focus on rapid response to evolving threat and response requirements. To place them in the near stranglehold of the "hoops" that the CIA covert ops must go through would be a major tragedy. While it might make some anti-war types feel better about keeping better control over those particular operators, it would have serious detrimental effects on our military readiness and our ability to mount special operations. MILNET's spec-ops contacts were 100% unanimous in repudiating the Commissions' recommendation on paramilitary operations, one citing cynically, "...this is typical of bureaucratic interference in an area they have no clue about. "

It was also clear that while Mr. Woolsey contended that the NID should not be a cabinet member, it is also clear that one of the chief factors in his decision to resign from his post as DCI was due to a lack of contact with President Bill Clinton. Mr. Woolsey contends that you cannot legislate the trust of the President, and that the President will need to choose an NID who will be willing to "be the skunk at the party" when it comes to telling the President the facts as they are, rather than "what the boss wants to hear".

The other reason, as former DCI Webster stated is that the leader of the Intelligence Community can not be perceived, rather rightly or wrongly, to modify his analysis or his analysts analysis to suit political winds.

One of the most revealing points the hearing brought out, and almost tangentially, was the fact that currently the Department of Defense controls 80% of the Intelligence Community budget. This is due to the fact that there are a number of monolithic intelligence organizations under the purview of the Secretary of Defense. For instance there are the four:

Defense Intelligence Agency - Runs the attaché system, special aircraft and special surveillance for tactical intelligence
National Security Agency - Signals intercept for both tactical and strategic purposes
National Geo-Spatial Agency - mapping and photo interpretation
National Reconnaissance Office - manages launches and intelligence platforms in space

Plus the DoD has an intelligence department in each of the five services, Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines and Coast Guard -- essentially the G-2 for each service. Not mentioned and noted by MILNET was the [speculated] intelligence office specific to Special Operations.

Thus any changes to the leadership of the Intelligence Community will create the opportunity to radically modify the budget process and specifically the size and allocation of the Department of Defense budget. This is likely to become the key issue around which the majority of debate will center, and indeed may produce a much longer debate than anyone focused on the war on terror will wish to undertake before making changes.

There is one other complication. The Committee, on August 16, 2004, managed to stumble upon a significant element in the Intelligence Community puzzle. Retired admiral Stansfield Turner revealed that at the onset of the Carter Administration and the Admiral's tenure as DCI, the President, by Executive Order, created the first equivalent of the NID by ordering Stansfield to "run Central Intelligence". Turner therefore delegated the day-to-day administration of the CIA to his Deputy. Thus for his entire tenure, Stansfield was able to focus on the DCI responsibilities and was freed from that second hat at CIA.

The dilemma is that the actions of Carter make it possible for future Presidents, unless specifically denied the authority by passing new laws to the contrary, to essentially create the NID position by Executive order (which essentially President Bush has already done on August 15, 2004). Thus, in a rare instance of upmanship gone right, the President may have taken the wind out of the sails of the Committee and future legislation. MILNET is sure that this issue will hamstring the efforts to formalize the NID position and responsibilities through legislation, while each successive President will ratify and/or possibly modify the position via their own Executive Order. This may also be the case for the NCTC, since the President, via Executive Order, stood up the TTIC without Congressional approval. As the reader will see below, the only issue that might remain is the budgetary authority for salaries and facilities to support the NCTC.

National Intelligence Centers and the National Counterterrorism Center

The first of two panels in the August 03, 2004 hearing provided excellent insight into the current operational support, planning, and analysis in the Intelligence Community. Key to the discussion was the testimony and questioning by the Governmental Affairs Committee of John Brennan, the Director of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center or TTIC.

The TTIC is run under the auspices of the Director of Central Intelligence, however it is an autonomous organization. It essentially puts in place, physically, representatives from the 15 Intelligence Community members and allows for a new level of communications between all.

In the cross examination like questioning, it became clear that a lot of progress has been made since 9/11, and that the Commission's recommendations on a National Counterterrorism Center NCTC is modeled after the TTIC. Indeed, President bush announced on August 2, that he would create the NCTC and the National Intelligence Director position. Director Brennan made it clear that he expects the TTIC to evolve into the NCTC.

Panel Member		Testimony on NCTC
John Brennan, Director of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center		Written Testimony TTIC Briefing In the January 2003 State of the Union message, the President called for the creation of an integrated center to merge and analyze all threat information in a single location. On May 1 of 2003, that vision became a reality with the stand up of TTIC. For the first time a multi-agency entity has access to information systems and databases spanning the intelligence, law enforcement, homeland security, diplomatic, and military communities that contain information related to the threat of international terrorism. In fact, TTIC has direct access connectivity with 26 separate U.S. Government networks -- with more planned, enabling information sharing as never before in the U.S. Government. There exists within the TTIC joint venture: Real time collaboration among analysts from a broad array of agencies and departments who sit side-by-side sharing information and piecing together the scattered pieces of the terrorism puzzle These partners include not only the FBI, CIA, and the Departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security, but also other federal agencies and departments such as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Health and Human Services, and the Department of Energy. As envisioned by the President, this physical integration of expertise and sharing of information enables and empowers the key organizations involved in the fight against terrorism. Collectively, they are fulfilling their shared responsibilities in a fused environment, doing business jointly as TTIC. This fusion and synergy will be further enhanced when CIA's Counterterrorist Center and FBI's Counterterrorism Division co-locate with TTIC in the coming months. This integrated business model not only capitalizes no our respective and cumulative expertise, but is also optimizes analytic resources in a manner that allows us to cover more effectively and comprehensively the vast expanse of terrorist threats that will face the Homeland and he U.S. interests worldwide for the foreseeable future. Critical Points: TTIC is serving as a force multiplier in the fight against terrorism. Provides the President and key cabinet officials a daily analytic product on the most serious terrorist threats and related terrorism information Serves as a common found for decision making regarding the actions necessary to disrupt terrorist plans Information and finished analysis are now fused in a multi-agency environment so that an integrated and comprehensive threat picture is provided. If there are analytic differences on the nature or seriousness of a particular threat, they are incorporated into the analysis. The TTIC embodies several of the characteristics of the 9/11 Commission's proposed National Counterterrorism Center -- NCTC. It is an existing center for joint intelligence Staffed by personnel from the various agencies Well positioned to integrate all sources o information to see the enemy as a whole It is likely that for these reasons, the Commission saw to use the TTIC as the basis for the NCTC concept. Verbal Testimony: MILNET notes that several interesting points came out during the question and answer portion of the hearing. What follows are MILNET notes which paraphrase (albeit closely) the significant Q &A. More complete details are contained in the MILNET notes document. Sen Collins: Mr. Brennan Q: Federal government was not ideally configured to deal with terrorist threat. If you were to structure it, what you recommend? A: We need to take this opportunity to understand all the parts of U.S. government that comprise the intelligence mission. Over the years, there have been individual initiatives in individual agencies, but there has not been an effort in a fused and integrated manner for the entire I.C. Just like Goldwarter-Nichols revamped the military, we need to understand the Intelligence Community and create legislation to support that IC's wide architecture, including mutual dependencies and growing elements. We haven't taken the time to step back and build a system of systems. Q: Do you agree with the concept of an NID? A: A person on top, but not quite like the Commission has defined it. Sen. Lieberman: Let me give you an impression -- you don't fully embrace the 9/11 Commission recommendations -- which would deprive you of some of your agency's independence. The Commission said we have severe stovepipes, no info sharing, and no one in charge. And we are told that while improved, the problems still exist. Q: The Commission said that the NID who is in charge by giving budgetary control over constituent agencies. How do you feel about that? Mr. Brennan: A: I fully endorse authority and budget -- Congress must establish how that is accomplished. Programming decisions, for instance of a satellite movement, today rests in the hand of the DDCI in the DCIs office. Presumably that authority can move to the direction of the NID. Sen Coleman: We are here at a time of war, and a macro change in intelligence. The 9/11 Commission was an indictment of the status quo. If we were to suffer an attack, there would be another commission -- would there be another condemnation of the status quo. Tell me today -- what is that you need from us? Mr. Brennan: I wouldn't like to happen is to make changes without a lot of forethought. The system works today better than it ever has. Can it work better? You betcha. Moving precipitously to make changes rapidly would be a huge mistake. Coleman: Two question - 1) is the present structure speedy enough and 2) with the single NID head, how would the minority view get to the policy makers. Mr. Brennan: Who is in charge of what? You must design - architecturally - the means for the information to flow up to the policy makers. We are still configured in the old ways, and we need to look at that total architecture to improve. Sen. Durbin: There are some fundamental barriers at TTIC - you operate with assignees from other agencies FBI and DHS. You hoped to 300 analysts, yet today you have less than half that you hoped for -- using other agency's people to fill the gaps. CIA analysts must request FBI agent to check his agency's database and report if he found anything. I don't think this is the way to protect the U.S. Brennan: CIA can access FBI databases, your impression is incorrect. We are able to search integrated in multiple access across the multiple systems. Not integrated completely, but it works quite well. Any analyst can access any database from within the TTIC. Having said that, there needs to be a national architecture, in addition an information technology technology to match. Congress has funded disparate systems, we need to change that. Durbin: What has stopped this? Has Congress? Brennan: Senator, the systems are so complicated. The Commission fails to offer the specifics to solve the technological problems. Sen. Hartuk: My concern is that staffing NCTC will rob people from other agencies, we need the right people at the right time. What is the current recruitment situation at TTIC and will NCTC face this or similar/worse problems? Brennan: We receive analysts from other agencies assigned to us - any redundancy should be intentional not unintentional. Last thing I want to do is deprive the other agencies of needed resources. Sen Shelby: Some of has have proposed the NID with total control and that includes budget. You've made a lot of progress. We must make certain that the changes we propose architecturally, will accomplish the goals we set out to accomplish. What's the number one problem in the Intelligence Community. Is it the lack of gathering information, is the the lack of analyzing the information or is it the lack of sharing the information. Brennan: The concept is a shortage of people is a relative one. You need to be able to make maximum usage of the people that you have. Sen Shelby: What will be the future of terrorism analysis if the NCTC is operational? Brennan: TTIC is not part of the CIA exactly, already . The NCTC needs to be a center of gravity of analysis, assign responsibility to different areas, any legislation you craft needs to make those authorities clear. Sen. Notenburg: Is a cabinet officer the right approach? Mr. Brennan: The NID needs to be independent. Sen. Carper: The good news is that there are good ideas in your minds, the bad news is that the ideas are in your minds, our job is to get it out of your minds and turn it into legislative form. I look for areas of consensus to help me assess the Commission's recommendation. I would like to hear from your perspectives -- if you do nothing else -- if we do this and if we do anything, don't do that... Pistole: Be precise - ambiguity creates a vacuum and we try to fill it on our own and waste time doing so. Delineate responsibilities and authorities clearly. Brennan: The Commission got it right at 100,000 foot level. What should happen is fine, but with it should comes a number of "how do you do its". Lots of precision required -- all this scholarship just skims the surface of a lot of complex issues.
John Pistole, Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigations		Written Testimony Following the events of 9/11, Director Meuller of the FBI implemented a comprehensive plan that fundamentally transformed the FBI with one goal in mind: establishing the prevention of terrorism as the bureau's number one priority. No longer are we content to concentrate on investigating terrorist crimes after they occur; the FBI now is dedicated to disrupting terrorists before they are able to strike. Director Meuller has overhauled our counterterrorism operations, expanded our intelligence capabilities, modernized our business practices and technology, and improved coordination with our partners. FBI Priorities: Director Meuller established a set of ten national program priorities that strictly govern the allocation of personnel in every FBI program and field office. Field offices must allocate all necessary resources to ensure that all terrorism-related leads are addressed before resources can be dedicated to other priorities. To implement these new priorities, we increased: Special Agents to terrorism matters by 111 % Intelligence Analysts by 86% Linguists by 117% We also established a number of operational units and entities that provide new or improved capabilities to address the terrorist threat. These include: 24/7 Counterterrorism Watch - CT Watch National Joint Terrorism Task Force - NJTTF both of which manage and share threat information. The Terrorism Financing Operation Section - TFOS, which centralizes efforts to stop terrorist financing; Document and media exploitation squads to exploit material found both domestically and overseas Deployable Fly Teams which lend counterterrorism expertise wherever it is needed. the interagency Terrorist Screening Center - TSC Foreign Tracking Task Force -- FTTF Terrorism Reports and Requirements Section which disseminates FBI terrorsim-related intelligence to the Intelligence Community Counterterrorism Analysis Section which connects the dots and addresses the indicators of terrorist activity against the U.S. from a strategic perspective. We made our senior managers accountable for the overall development and success of our counterterroism efforts. Intelligence Program The FBI is building an enterprise-wide intelligence program that has substantially improved our ability to direct strategically our intelligence collection and to fuse, analyze, and disseminate our terrorism-related intelligence. Director Meuller elevated intelligence to program-level status, putting in place a formal structure and concepts of operation to govern FBI-wide intelligence functions and establish Field Intelligence Groups in every field office. New Workforce FBI is actively working to build expertise in intelligence. 3/22/2004 Director Meuller adopted a proposal to establish a career path in which new special agents are initially assigned to a small field office and exposed to a wide range of field experiences. After approximately three years, agents will be transferred to a large field office where they will specialized in one of four program areas: Intelligence Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence Cyber Criminal We will establish a formal Intelligence Officer Certification that can be earned through a combination of intelligence assignments and training. Once established, this certification will be a prerequisite for promotion to the level of Section Chief at FBI HQ, or Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) at the field level, thus ensuring that all members of the FBI's highest management levels will be staffed by fully trained and experienced intelligence officers. We have implemented a strategic plan to recruit, hire, and retain intelligence Analysts. In our Special Agents hiring program, we have updated the list of critical skills we are seeking in candidates to include intelligence experience and expertise, foreign languages, and technology. We continue to grow the Field Intelligence Groups -- FIGs established in every FBI field office and are on track to add some 300 Intelligence Analysts to the FIGS in FY2004. As of June 2, 2004, there are 1,450 FIG personnel, including 382 special agents and 160 employees from other government agencies. The FBI's Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence has been given personal responsibility for developing and ensuring the health of the FBI intelligence personnel resources. This includes analysts, agents, language analysts, surveillance specialists, and others. Information Sharing and Coordination There is now a Special Agent or Intelligence Analyst in each Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) dedicated to producing raw intelligence reports for the entire national security community including State, municipal, and tribal law enforcement partners and other JTTF members. These "Reports Officers" are trained to produce intelligence reports that both protect sources and methods and maximize the amount of information that can be shared. We have enhanced the level of coordination and information sharing with State and municipal law enforcement personnel. We expanded the number of Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs), increased technological connectivity with our partners, and implemented new ways of sharing information through vehicles such as the FBI Intelligence Bulletin, the FBI National Alert System, and the interagency Alert System, and the Terrorist Screening Center. We joined with our Federal partners to establish the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, exchanged personnel, instituted joint briefings, and started using secure networks to share information. We also improved our relationships with foreign governments by building on the overseas expansion of our Legal Program; by offering investigative and forensic support and training, and by working together on task forces and joint operations. Finally, the FBI has expanded outreach to minority communities, and improved coordination with private businesses involved in critical infrastructure and finance. Verbal Testimony: MILNET notes that several interesting points came out during the question and answer portion of the hearing. What follows are MILNET notes which paraphrase (albeit closely) the significant Q &A. More complete details are contained in the MILNET notes document. Sen. Lieberman: Let me give you an impression -- you don't fully embrace the 9/11 Commission recommendations -- which would deprive you of some of your agency's independence's Commission said stovepipes, no info sharing, and no one in charge. And we are told that while improved, the problems still exist. Q: The Commission recommends that we have an NID who is in charge by giving budgetary control over constituent agencies. How do you feel about that? Mr. Pistole: A: I think the key is that the NID has the authority as well as the access and confidence of the President, and the NID be accountable. If delineated in budgetary terms or some other way to make that possible, then that is fine. I personally really don't have enough knowledge in this case to make a recommendation. Sen Collins: Q: The 2002 Gilmore Commission recommends a center that would be responsible for planning intelligence operations. Should the NCTC have an operational role in CT? A: Yes, when it comes to overall planning to look at and find gaps, coordination, etc., "We've identified a gap, we think the FBI should take steps to solve that gap" and then let the FBI to actually address solving the gap. Sen Coleman: We are here at a time of war, and a macro change in intelligence. The 9/11 Commission was an indictment of the status quo. If we were to suffer an attack, there would be another commission -- would there be another condemnation of the status quo. Tell me today -- what is that you need from us? Mr. Pistole: FBI changes include changes in collection, analysis and dissemination, in these areas we have made wholesale changes since 9/11. What do we need? Defining the lanes for each agency -- how does that come down to actual operations - so that we know who does what. Coleman: Two question - 1) is the present structure speedy enough and 2) with the single NID head, how would the minority view get to the policy makers. Mr. Pistole: To question one, yes. As far as two, any actionable info results in someone taking action to follow up on it. That happens through the current process -- they are no impediments. Sen. Hartuk: My concern is that staffing NCTC will rob people from other agencies, we need the right people at the right time. What is the current recruitment situation and will NCTC face this or similar/worse problems? Pistole: The cadre of analysts and linguists should be close to the operations people. Yes, there is an active competition for analysts. Sen. Notenburg: I am not for delay, but I am for thoroughness. Let's not move so quickly that we make a mistake. Should we look at a fixed term of ten year to move across the administration. Pistole: It is a benefit to FBI. Sen. Carper: The good news is that there are good ideas in your minds, the bad news is that the ideas are in your minds, our job is to get it out of your minds and turn it into legislative form. I look for areas of consensus to help me assess the Commission's recommendation. I would like to hear from your perspectives -- if you do nothing else -- if we do this and if we do anything, don't do that... Pistole: Be precise - ambiguity creates a vacuum and we try to fill it on our own and waste time doing so. Delineate responsibilities and authorities clearly. Sen. Levin: Question on Deputies -- three different agencies. The Commission recommended deputies in their own agencies who also report as Deputies to the NID -- someone suggested this just isn't workable. -- Doubled hatted deputies. Pistole: If they have their own job of running their organization as well as reporting to the NID, it is problematic.
Lt. General Patrick M. Hughes Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security, former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency		Written Testimony I became the Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis, part of the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate, on 17 November 2003. Through the Homeland Security Act of 2002, IAIP is charged with integrating relevant information, intelligence analyses, and vulnerability assessments (whether such information, analyses, or assessments are provided or produced by the Department or others) to identify protective priorities and support protective measures by the Department, by other executive agencies, by State and local government personnel, agencies, and authorities, by the private sector, and by other entities. [Our task is ] to provide the connectivity, the integration, the communication, the coordination, the collaboration, and the professional intelligence work necessary to accomplish the missions of, and the products and capability necessary for the customers and the leadership of DHS. Simply put, we perform the intelligence and threat analysis of Department of Homeland Security. IAIP is moving forward in carrying out our statutory responsibilities which include: Providing the full range of intelligence support to senior DHS leadership and component organizations and to state and local and private sector respondents Mapping terrorist threats to the homeland against assessed vulnerabilities to drive our efforts to protect against terrorist attacks Conducting independent analysis and assessments of terrorist threats through competitive analysis, tailored analysis, and an analytical red cell Assessing the vulnerabilities of key resources and critical infrastructure of the United States Merging the relevant analyses and vulnerability assessments to identify priorities for protective and support measures by the Department, other government agencies, and the private sector Partnering with the intelligence community, TTIC, law enforcement agencies, state and local partners, and the private sector, as well as DHS components to manage the collection and processing of information within DHS involving threats to the Homeland into usable, comprehensive, and actionable information Disseminating time sensitive warnings, alerts and advisories to federal, state, local governments and private sector infrastructure owners and operators It is the mandate to independently analyze, coordinate, and disseminate information affecting the homeland that makes IA unique among its Intelligence Community partners. The analysts within Information Analysis are talented individuals who draw on intelligence from other components within DHS, IA's fellow Intelligence Community members, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), and federal, state and local law enforcement and private sector entities. The analysis produced is coordinated with the vulnerability assessment and consequence predictions identified by the Infrastructure Protection half of the IAIP Directorate. The Office of Information Analysis communicates timely and valuable threat products to state and local officials, federal sector specific agencies (as indicated in HSPD-7), and the private sector as is appropriate. We are in position to effectively manage information requirements from the state and local governments and private sector entities that are vital to protecting the homeland. IA is the heart of the intelligence effort at DHS. It is responsible for accessing and analyzing the entire array of intelligence relating to threats against the homeland, and making that information useful to those first responders, state and local governments, and private sector. IA provides the full-range of intelligence support to the Secretary, DHS leadership, the Undersecretary for IAIP, and DHS components. Additionally, IA ensures that best intelligence information informs the administration of the Homeland Security Advisory System. Central to the success of the DHS mission is the close working relationship among components, the Office of Information Analysis and the Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP), and the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC), to ensure that threat information and situational awareness are correlated with critical infrastructure vulnerabilities and protective programs. Together, the three offices provide real time monitoring of threat information and critical infrastructure to support the Department of Homeland Security's overall mission. This permits us to immediately respond to and monitor emerging potential threat information and events, and to take issues or information for more detailed analysis and recommendations for preventive and protective measures. IA and TTIC IA is responsible for translating the analysis done at the TTIC into actionable data for State, territorial, tribal, local, and private sector officials responsible for homeland security. At present, we talk at least daily and as specific threats pertinent to the homeland arise. IA and TSC IA has a productive relationship with the Terrorist Screening Center. While both perform duties that result in information being passed to local first responders and state and local officials, both entities have separate missions. IA provides the full spectrum of information support necessary for the operation of the Department of Homeland Security and for the benefit of Federal, State, Local, and Private Sector officials throughout the United States, to secure the homeland, defend the citizenry and protect our critical infrastructure. In contrast, the TSC is in the process of developing a fully integrated watch list database which will provide immediate responses to border-screening and law-enforcement authorities to identify suspected terrorists trying to enter or operate within the United States. the TSC has quickly become an essential resource for local law enforcement, its federal government contributors, and other users. Through the matching and cross-referencing of lists, the TSC is allowing those personnel on the front lines of the fight against terrorism to access the information they need to identify and detain suspicious individuals. Improving Information Sharing and Collaboration We must assure that we formalize a process which will improve information sharing and collaboration. The Department is charged with this responsibility by law and by Executive Order. Our goal is to effectively, efficiently, and synergistically pass and receive information in all of its forms for the benefit of the United States Government, our State, tribal, territorial, local, and private sector partners, and other DHS entities. In order to achieve this goal we must develop technical and procedural transparency and interoperability in mind to the greatest extent possible. Information sharing involves working with the Department of Justice (DOJ), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Department of Defense (DOD), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and others. For instance, as part of this effort, the DOJ and DHS information sharing staffs are working hard to bring the Homeland Security Interactive Network (HSIN), Law Enforcement Online (LEO), and the Regional Information Sharing System (RISSNET) together with the goal of making the systems more compatible as quickly as possible. Conclusion I am most mindful of the need to the civil liberties and personal privacy of our citizens and to preserve and defend our Constitution and our way of life. In the end, we are. I am focused on defeating the terrorists before they can strike. That is why we exist. Verbal Testimony: MILNET notes that several interesting points came out during the question and answer portion of the hearing. What follows are MILNET notes which paraphrase (albeit closely) the significant Q &A. More complete details are contained in the MILNET notes document. [MILNET should note that Assistant Secretary Hughes did not read directly from his written statement in the hearing and below we add notes from his actual verbally delivered statement which add to that which was submitted in writing): DHS will support the NCTC and the NID to defeat terrorists and prevent terrorism in the U.S. The current DCI chairs a meeting each evening, of agencies from all 15 agencies. Key to DHS' ability to perform its primary function, are alliances between local law enforcement and DHS. The partnership with FBI is critical and successful and we must expand this further In terms of the NID, or any equivalent, clear, clean, short lines of command and control are necessary for the leadership of the Intelligence Community to be successful. The following are key questions and responses from Lt. General Hughes: Sen Collins: Q: The 2002 Gilmore Commission recommends a center that would be responsible for planning intelligence operations. Should the NCTC have an operational role in CT? Lt. General Hughes: A: I believe the idea is to have enough planning expertise especially at strategic level to interface to operational planning. Q: With your years of experience in both the CIA and the FBI, how would you characterize the NCTC participation. A: Operational entities must take part in the operational planning, however at a strategic level, I support a planning role, but not at the actual operational level. Sen. Lieberman: Let me give you an impression -- you don't fully embrace the 9/11 Commission recommendations -- which would deprive you of some of your agency's independence. The Commission said we have severe stovepipes, no info sharing, and no one in charge. And we are told that while improved, the problems still exist. Q: The Commission said that the NID who is in charge by giving budgetary control over constituent agencies. How do you feel about that? Lt. General Hughes: A: I too support NID idea -- I think it is improvement to have a central authority over all IC, but I don't see that the problem of disputing tasking in the example given will be solved unless the NID has ultimate authority or there is a method to go to the President to resolve differences. Speed and precision are vital we should be careful not to add too many layers -- we need to act swiftly when necessary. Sen. Spectre: I disagree with the double hatting...of the deputies and certainly not double hatting the top intelligence officer. Gen Hughes, you were the head of DIA. Q: Could the NID run the intelligence community without budget authority. Lt. General Hughes: A: People should be fungible across the intelligence. A CIA officer can be assigned to DIA and vice versus. Thus budget authority is not necessarily required. It would be helpful, yes. Sen. Hartuk: My concern is that staffing NCTC will rob people from other agencies, we need the right people at the right time. What is the current recruitment situation and will NCTC face this or similar/worse problems? Mr. Hughes: There are fears that the competition will become a problem-- there are very few experienced people in the domestic area. Sen. Notenburg: Is a cabinet officer the right approach? Mr. Hughes: The NID should be unvarnished and unbiased. Sen. Carper: The good news is that there are good ideas in your minds, the bad news is that the ideas are in your minds, our job is to get it out of your minds and turn it into legislative form. I look for areas of consensus to help me assess the Commission's recommendation. I would like to hear from your perspectives -- if you do nothing else -- if we do this and if we do anything, don't do that. Hughes: No simple answer -- complicated recommendations from the Commission and takes some time and some care to get it right -- some of this should be REALLY thought through way. Form should follow function -- the statement has stood the test of time - the form could change the function - so we need to be careful to make sure we don't do that
Phillip Mudd, Deputy Director, Counterterrorism Center, CIA		Written Testimony I believe the President's establishment of NCTC will build on the concepts already in place in the DCI Counterterrorist Center and TTIC, helping us coordinate better across the government to fight this war. This government has the most powerful counterterrorist capability in the world; we must commit to ensuring that we coordinate effectively so that we attack this target with a unified approach. A National Counterterrorism Center, coordinating across the US Government's analytic and other elements, will strengthen our effort, particularly relating to threats we worry most about, those that affect the US homeland and people. Assigning responsibilities across the government through NCTC planning could ensure that missions are clear and accountability well defined. A Center that could improve the link between foreign intelligence and homeland defense would be a valuable addition. In short, the Kean Commission is right in focusing on the importance of collaboration and cooperation across the government. And right to ask for an entity that is charged with ensuring and facilitating cooperation. As the President said, this remains a nation in danger and at war, so as we try to improve our intelligence capabilities, I would recommend that we ensure that we do not harm what already works well. The President is right in counseling care: in the midst of calls for great change, we are prosecuting a war with great success. Since September 11, we have made strides toward partnerships across and beyond the government, including CIA, the FBI, the US military, and foreign partners, steps that have given us a powerful weapon against our adversary. CIA is a flexible organization, and we operate in that fashion so that we can adapt quickly to changes in world events or patterns we observe in our enemies. Since September 11, with the help of the Congress, we have more resources to fight the war. We have closer collaboration with law enforcement, the number of FBI Special Agents serving in the Center has doubled and TTIC is helping to integrate more information every day. We are supporting not just military units from Washington, we are living and fighting and sharing intelligence with them on the battlefield. We should look at additional change in the context of the change we already have undertaken. The challenge posed by Al-Qaida and its affiliates remains daunting. Despite the increase in resources we have committed to this mission, the combination of the global reach and relentless drive of this enemy means that we are fighting this war every day on many fronts, around the globe, with officers who are stretched. And due to the operational successes of these officers, the volume of information we have flowing in is huge. We are succeeding against this adversary because of the dedication and capability of our officers and the partnerships that we have strengthened in recent years. We have literally joined forces with our colleagues in law enforcement and in the armed services to help make this country safer. We see the results today in terrorists dead or captured. That said, this adversary remains a deadly threat to us around the world, as you saw in the chilling threat information we recently began to uncover. And so are other terrorist groups. This cooperation is reflected in the number of detailees from other agencies we have in the Counterterrorist Center and in the way the DCI has directed us to fight this war. For example, the Acting Director has continued the practice of chairing a meeting each evening that includes not only CIA officers but also representatives from other agencies across the US Government. Part of what makes that meeting successful is the ability of these individuals to reflect the richness of their home agencies, each of which brings unique talents, capabilities, authorities, and perspectives to the table. The alliances we have worked to evolve during the past three years, including the global relationships we have developed with security services around the world, are critical. This war requires close cooperation with law enforcement and military entities that have capabilities CIA does not and should not. As we study proposed changes, we need to ensure that change improves our alliances with law enforcement and the military. The details of the Commission's proposals are not specific enough for me to judge their impact on our ability to, for example, retain close coordination with the FBI Special Agents working in CTC. What I do know is that this partnership is an integral part of our counterterrorism operations. We need it to continue in CTC and to expand upon it in the National Counterterrorism Center. We need clear, clean, short lines of command and control. Opportunities to roll up a terrorist or prevent a deadly attack often demand immediate action. This is a war of speed. Analysts in the Center are critical to its operations and critical to keeping policymakers apprised of current and future threats. The synergy between analysts and operations officers is the great strength of CTC, and the information-sharing partnership between analysts and operators in CTC could not be stronger. Our analysts reflect the day-by-day, and sometimes minute-by-minute, pace and scope of our operations, and our operators understand the target better by virtue of their partnership with analysts. This partnership has created a unique fusion: our analysts may write intelligence for the President one day and help operators interview a terrorist the next. Counterterrorism tasks require a combined application of knowledge and tools in ways that sometimes do not allow us to distinguish between analysts and operators. The Center I help manage needs officers like these to sustain its energy and effectiveness. As we work together to build the NCTC, we will want to make certain that we enhance important partnerships such as these. My perspective from the trenches of this war is that my colleagues and I welcome organizational change that will help us do our mission. We welcome a dialogue about what change is needed. Finally, I thank you for listening to what I have said about the proposals you are considering today. I want to offer, today, whatever I can do to help you implement this new initiative. Verbal Testimony: MILNET notes that several interesting points came out during the question and answer portion of the hearing. What follows are MILNET notes which paraphrase (albeit closely) the significant Q &A. More complete details are contained in the MILNET notes document. Sen Collins: Mr. Mudd Q: How are disputes - who makes the final call in disputes over intelligence tasking. For instance moving satellite at CIA request, and DoD does not want it moved -- who decides? A: We support others in this case -- DoD for active combat zone, CIA runs clandestine authority, FBI does the decision on Sen. Lieberman: Let me give you an impression -- you don't fully embrace the 9/11 Commission recommendations -- which would deprive you of some of your agency's independence. The Commission said we have severe stovepipes, no info sharing, and no one in charge. And we are told that while improved, the problems still exist. Q: The Commission said that the NID is in charge by giving budgetary control over constituent agencies. How do you feel about that? Mr. Mudd: I embrace the Commission's recommendations. However, I do question the difference between coordination and direction -- umbrella ideas are good -- We need to keep structures that allow us to operate in days, hours or even minutes. -- There are some things that make it hard to move fast, let's avoid them. For instance, the NID could have the authority to re-prioritize a satellite position, and have the responsibility to decide on conflicts between different users and missions. Sen Coleman: We are here at a time of war, and a macro change in intelligence. The 9/11 Commission was an indictment of the status quo. If we were to suffer an attack, there would be another commission -- would there be another condemnation of the status quo. Tell me today -- what is that you need from us? Mr. Mudd: As the adversary has changed, we must change. We are toe-to-toe with them today. This is a war of people -- every persons makes a difference. I fear that there will be a sense that after the current leaders in Islamist terror are gone that we can let our guard down. We cannot do that. Sen. Hartuk: My concern is that staffing NCTC will rob people from other agencies, we need the right people at the right time. What is the current recruitment situation and will NCTC face this or similar/worse problems? Mudd: The broad government has a limited pool of expertise -- you are correct, there is a relatively small pool of qualified person -- also note that it is a multi-year process - five to ten years to REALLY have a weapon to degrade the enemy using our analysts. Sen Shelby: Some of has have proposed the NID with total control and that includes budget. You've made a lot of progress. We must make certain that the changes we propose architecturally, will accomplish the goals we set out to accomplish. What's the number one problem in the Intelligence Community. Is it the lack of gathering informaiotn, is the the lack of analyzing the information or is it the lack of sharing the information. Mr. Mudd: The biggest problem is people - finding the people to do the job at the covert level. We have the responsibility to support our operators and to reflect what we know to the President. TTIC can help us fuse the other information. The center [CIA Counterterrorism Center] I have now controls the operations -- the vision we have for the future is a place that can coordinate between other agencies. The fusion mission is critical - we cannot conduct that fusion in the CIA ourselves. Sen. Notenburg: I am not for delay, but I am for thoroughness. Let's not move so quickly that we make a mistake. Should we look at a fixed term of ten year to move across the administration. Mudd: Term is not important but must have the confidence of the President -- The President should be allowed to pick someone whom he is comfortable with. However, ten years is too long for a DCI, I don't think you could ask for that in the NID. Sen. Notenburg: Is a cabinet officer the right approach? Should the Congress be involved in Mudd: I don't want the NID to be in the White House -- need to keep an air gap between the White House and the leader of the Intelligence Community.

MILNET Analysis

The first of two NCTC panels was comprised of representatives from the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, the CIA's Counterterrorism Center, the FBI's Counterterrorism Section, and the Department of Homeland Security.

Once again, the panelists are unanimous in their opinions. They believe the NCTC is an excellent concept. Naturally three of the panelists would feel this way, as they are intimately and somewhat enthusiastically involved with the new Terrorist Threat Integration Center. The fourth, the representative from the Department of Homeland Security sees the benefits to Homeland Security of the current TTIC and is enthusiastic about an expanded version which evolves into the NCTC.

The key elements in all their statements focus on the chief characteristics of success in the TTIC and presumably will only improve in the proposed NCTC -- it is clear the witnesses on the panel believe the NCTC will ultimately become an expanded version of the TTIC. Indeed, as one Committee member began probing as to the current TTIC facility's ability to expand beyond its current capability to hold the personnel and equipment needed for the current mission, the Director of the TTIC defended it vigorously.

The TTIC is in the process of integrating the FBI and CIA counter terrorism centers into the TTIC facility. From the testimony, it is also clear that the current facility is not able to hold everyone and everything they would like to have. Further expansion may be problematic, requiring yet another building and move to occur to fully implement the NCTC. Also, the current TTIC does not feature fully integrated computer facilities for all the agencies involved, and as the expansion to encompass the NCTC takes place, it is just as clear that the problem will become more critical -- especially since there is no master plan yet. In fact, the TTIC Director Brennan states that the overall infrastructure plan needs to be finalized and approved so that the Congress can begin funding that program.

The job of the NCTC as stated by the Commission matches that of the current TTIC:

a multi-agency entity has access to information systems and databases spanning the intelligence, law enforcement, homeland security, diplomatic, and military communities that contain information related to the threat of international terrorism.

...TTIC has direct access connectivity with 26 separate U.S. Government networks -- with more planned, enabling information sharing as never before in the U.S. Government...

Real time collaboration among analysts from a broad array of agencies and departments who sit side-by-side sharing information and piecing together the scattered pieces of the terrorism puzzle
These partners include not only the FBI, CIA, and the Departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security, but also other federal agencies and departments such as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Health and Human Services, and the Department of Energy.

Director Brennan is naturally proud of his charge's accomplishment, the TTIC being a one of kind and demonstrates the needed all agency cooperation and ability for any analyst on site to be able to access databases and institutional knowledge of any of their peers in other agencies, even those beyond the traditional Intelligence Community.

Issues that face the NCTC concept are similar to the individual Intelligence Community agencies:

Analysts and Linguists are in short supply - even considering the raw untrained recruits.
Training of both takes many years, 5 years for an analyst for instance. This produces a capable analyst but certainly not a seasoned, high performance analyst that we need
The Information Technology problems have been worked around but certainly not overcome. When probed on this topic, Director Brennan made it clear that the complexity of actual and direct integration has not even begun to be tackled. Senator Durbin was pedantic in questioning why the integration has not taken place, while Brennan was obviously irritated and frustrated at the lack of understanding on the Senator's part which attempted to apply the process was so trifle as to be a crime that it had not been planned and begun already.

MILNET understands this frustration - on the part of both parties. Unfortunately, it is an old problem and one in which MILNET has criticized Congress and the U.S. Government before. While Senator Durbin is a capable manager, lawyer, and administrator, he is technologically naive. He may also be intelligence naive despite his long years involved in intelligence oversight -- that is, doesn't understand the particular technological requirements for technology used in storing and presenting intelligence information. Even when explained in layman's terms, he may not have the basic understanding to comprehend what he is hearing. As we have said before, Congress needs to build their committees with people who have the technological background and occupational experience necessary to adequately assess, question, and generally provide oversight to the organizations they are responsible for overseeing. If this requires hiring non elected officials, so be it. To do otherwise creates worse problems and in the case of Intelligence and the war on terrorism, we do not have the time to waste on functionally "dead ears".

And of course this brings up the problem with the American Electorate. We tend to elect electable politicians, not those with technological knowledge or professional experience in the fields they are legislating. Rare exceptions have been the occasional astronaut, business leader, or physician. In other words, we do not need lawyers with immense legal experience, but technicians, engineers, and managers with enough legal training to write legislation. It would be far better to hire legal help to write legislation than to hire technologists. Ironically, the significance of a technologists with legal training versus a lawyer with a smattering of technological knowledge has escaped both the electorate and Congress itself.

In any case, MILNET agrees with the assessment of the panel members, if only from a "paper" approach to the analysis. Obviously the panel members have real world experience and are experts in the Intelligence Community. With their approval for the Commission's NCTC recommendation, it is pretty clear that Congress and the Administration will move forward.

However, in order to spend budgeted monies, legislation may be necessary in order for the NID to have actual budgetary authority and thus have real capability to run the NCTC as he or she desires. One thing is clear. The President has not found it necessary to protect Americans while waiting for Congressional analysis and funding. Clearly, any help will be greatly appreciated, but MILNET cautions Congress to build upon what the administration has already done, and be careful not to undo good work which has shown great success.

Sources:

Hearing Statements, Reorganizing America's Intelligence Community: A View from the Inside U.S. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee hearing, August 16, 2004.
Hearing Statements, Assessing America's Counterterrorism Capabilities, U.S. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee hearing, August 03, 2004.
William Webster, former Director of Central Intelligence, written statement submitted to the U.S. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee hearing, August 16, 2004.
R. James Woolsey, former Director of Central Intelligence, written statement submitted to the U.S. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee hearing, August 16, 2004.
John O. Brennan, Director, Terrorist Threat Integration Center, written statement submitted to the U.S. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee hearing, August 03, 2004.
John S. Pistole, Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigations, written statement submitted to the U.S. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee hearing, August 03, 2004
Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes, Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis, Department of Homeland Security, written statement submitted to the U.S. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee hearing, August 03, 2004
Philip Mudd, Deputy Director, Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency, written statement submitted to the U.S. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee hearing, August 03, 2004