MILNET
Brief
The
Iraq Plan, 01/11/07
"When I addressed you
just over a year ago, nearly 12 million Iraqis had
cast their ballots for a unified and democratic nation. The elections
of 2005 were a stunning achievement. We thought that these elections
would bring the Iraqis together — and that as we trained Iraqi security
forces, we could accomplish our mission with fewer American troops.
But in 2006,
the opposite happened. The violence in Iraq - particularly
in Baghdad — overwhelmed the political gains the Iraqis had made. Al
Qaeda terrorists and Sunni insurgents recognized the mortal danger that
Iraq's elections posed for their cause. And they responded with
outrageous acts of murder aimed at innocent Iraqis. They blew up one of
the holiest shrines in Shia Islam — the Golden Mosque of Samarra — in a
calculated effort to provoke Iraq's Shia population to retaliate. Their
strategy worked. Radical Shia elements, some supported by Iran, formed
death squads. And the result was a vicious cycle of sectarian violence
that continues today."

- President George Bush, Televised Speech, 01/10/07 4
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The Iraq Plan will involve sending in up to 20,000 new troops by moving
forward replacement timetables and holding back many of those scheduled
to be deployed out of combat. In addition the President has set a
number of political goals for the Iraqi government, most of which will
be used as tripwires to further U.S. involvement, more or less, in
Iraq. The President emphasizes that Prime Minister Malaki of Iraq
believes more troops are needed to bring stability to Baghdad.
The plan has been described by many as a temporary surge for a period
of approximately six months that allows the U.S. to aid the Iraqis to
stabilize the situation mostly in Baghdad where the majority of the
violence occurs. The plan also addresses the logistics route for
insurgent supplies from Syria in through the Anbar Province of
northwest Iraq.
With the goal to stem sectarian violence the plan includes:
- Control the Shiite and Sunni militias - Stop them from continuing
to
terrorize the Sunni minority
- Distribute Iraqi oil revenue to the country's people including
the factional religious sects
- Easing
government restrictions on members of former Iraqi leader Saddam
Hussein's Baath Party
Democrats, via their uber dissenting mouthpiece Senator Ted Kennedy
from
Massachusetts have claimed they will cut off any funding. Kennedy said
in a speech in Washington before the National Press Club, "Our bill will say
that no additional troops can
be sent and no additional dollars can be spent on such an escalation
unless and until Congress approves the president's plan. Our proposal
is a straightforward exercise of the power granted to Congress by
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution." Unfortunately for the
Democrats, Congress already approved the war in November of 2002,
and the money to be used for the troop movements in 2007 are
already in place for preparing for the next wave of troop replacements
and cannot
be withdrawn.
Kennedy's statements are grandiose at a minimum and
hyperbole at best, since Article I provides power of Congress to
declare war, which it already has done. In any case, the
President's troop movements, certainly a hot political issue, only
amount to a 15% increase, hardly a big increase worth crying
about. Indeed deployment of troops can be accomplished for a
period of up to 60 days without Congress' approval according to current
law, and new legislation cannot effect any timetables during that
time. At most, a future allocation of funds such as a
supplemental, may be the first opportunity for Congress to exercise
their power to limit Presidential action. That process is
expected
to begin in late February. Despite Kennedy's irrational
call for what would soon become a Constitutional showdown, one which
most scholars believe the Democrats would lose, there will undoubtedly
be a push by Democrats to start an early withdrawal of troops.
The plan calls for the majority of the troop increases, indeed
nearly all, to be used to stabilize Baghdad and rout out the majority
of
the insurgents, both Shiite and Sunni. Once security improves,
then the U.S. forces will insert Iraqis into the fight and pull back as
support. 18 Iraqi Brigades will remain in positions along with Iraqi
Police, in the neighborhoods of Baghdad to continue to enforce
security. The job will require much more hands-on training of the
Iraqis and the U.S. advisor forces have already been increased in
anticipation for that actuality. To summarize the changes in
security strategy in Baghdad:
Before
|
New
Plan
|
U.S. would clear
insurgents out of a neighborhood, then leave to fight elsewhere, with
only token force left behind, typically Iraqi Police.
|
U.S. and Iraqi troops will clear
insurgents, militants, militia out of neighborhood, then leave Iraqi Army Brigades behind to
enforce/motivate Iraqi Police.
|
U.S. allowed Iraqi
Army troops to be embedded in U.S. formations
|
U.S.
forces will be embedded in Iraqi formations
|
U.S. and Iraqi
formations not allowed into certain areas due to political or religious
sensitivity
|
U.S. and Iraqi forces go where
they need to go to prosecute militants, insurgents, militia and their
supporters with no regard for
political affiliation or religious sect.
|
Also key in the strategy is the shoring up of security in the Anbar
Providence of northwest Iraq. Anbar provides a logistics and
support route from Syria into Baghdad and indeed the entire
country. For his reason, the U.S. will add at least a brigade
there to aid in current missions to weed out the insurgents and some
small Al-Qaeda forces that can be found there.
According to sources talking with journalists at Fox News, the 82nd
Airborne's 2nd Brigade, which is Kuwait today, will be the first of the
forces to go in, but it is not clear if their destination will be
Baghdad or Anbar.
Below is the Fact Sheet 6
on the Iraq Plan published by the White House on 1/10/07:
Fact Sheet: The New Way Forward in Iraq
Highlights
of the Iraq Strategy Review (PDF)
Background
Briefing by Senior Administration Officials
In Focus: Renewal in
Iraq

The President's New Iraq Strategy Is Rooted In Six
Fundamental Elements:
- Let the Iraqis lead;
- Help Iraqis protect the population;
- Isolate extremists;
- Create space for political progress;
- Diversify political and economic efforts; and
- Situate the strategy in a regional approach.
- Iraq Could Not Be Graver – The War On
Terror Cannot Be Won If We Fail In Iraq.
Our enemies throughout the Middle East are trying to defeat us in
Iraq. If we step back now, the problems in Iraq will become more
lethal, and make our troops fight an uglier battle than we are seeing
today.
Key Elements Of The New Approach: Security
Iraqi:
- Publicly acknowledge all parties are responsible for quelling
sectarian violence.
- Work with additional Coalition help to regain control of the
capital and protect the Iraqi population.
- Deliver necessary Iraqi forces for Baghdad and protect those
forces from political interference.
- Commit
to intensify efforts to build balanced security forces throughout the
nation that provide security even-handedly for all Iraqis.
- Plan and fund eventual demobilization program for militias.
Coalition:
- Agree that helping Iraqis to provide population security is
necessary to enable accelerated transition and political progress.
- Provide additional military and civilian resources to accomplish
this mission.
- Increase efforts to support tribes willing to help Iraqis fight
Al Qaeda in Anbar.
- Accelerate and expand the embed program while minimizing risk to
participants.
Both Coalition And Iraqi:
- Continue counter-terror operations against Al Qaeda and insurgent
organizations.
- Take more vigorous action against death squad networks.
- Accelerate transition to Iraqi responsibility and increase Iraqi
ownership.
- Increase
Iraqi security force capacity – both size and effectiveness – from 10
to 13 Army divisions, 36 to 41 Army Brigades, and 112 to 132 Army
Battalions.
- Establish a National Operations Center, National
Counterterrorism Force, and National Strike Force.
- Reform the Ministry of Interior to increase transparency and
accountability and transform the National Police.
Key Elements Of The New Approach: Political
Iraqi:
- The Government of Iraq commits to:
- Reform its cabinet to provide even-handed service delivery.
- Act on promised reconciliation initiatives (oil law,
de-Baathification law, Provincial elections).
- Give Coalition and ISF authority to pursue ALL extremists.
- All Iraqi leaders support reconciliation.
- Moderate coalition emerges as strong base of support for unity
government.
Coalition:
- Support political moderates so they can take on the extremists.
- Build and sustain strategic partnerships with moderate Shi'a,
Sunnis, and Kurds.
- Support the national compact and key elements of reconciliation
with Iraqis in the lead.
- Diversify
U.S. efforts to foster political accommodation outside Baghdad (more
flexibility for local commanders and civilian leaders).
- Expand and increase the flexibility of the Provincial
Reconstruction Team (PRT) footprint.
- Focus
U.S. political, security, and economic resources at local level to open
space for moderates, with initial priority to Baghdad and Anbar.
Both Coalition And Iraqi:
- Partnership between Prime Minister Maliki, Iraqi moderates,
and the United States where all parties are clear on expectations and
responsibilities.
- Strengthen the rule of law and combat corruption.
- Build on security gains to foster local and national political
accommodations.
- Make Iraqi institutions even-handed, serving all of Iraq's
communities on an impartial basis.
Key Elements Of The New Approach: Economic
Iraqi:
- Deliver economic resources and provide essential services to all
areas and communities.
- Enact hydrocarbons law to promote investment, national unity, and
reconciliation.
- Capitalize and execute jobs-producing programs.
- Match U.S. efforts to create jobs with longer term sustainable
Iraqi programs.
- Focus more economic effort on relatively secure areas as a magnet
for employment and growth.
Coalition:
- Refocus efforts to help Iraqis build capacity in areas
vital to success of the government (e.g. budget execution, key
ministries).
- Decentralize efforts to build Iraqi capacities outside the Green
Zone.
- Double the number of PRTs and civilians serving outside the
Green Zone.
- Establish PRT-capability within maneuver Brigade Combat Teams
(BCTs).
- Greater integration of economic strategy with military effort.
- Joint civil-military plans devised by PRT and BCT.
- Remove legal and bureaucratic barriers to maximize
cooperation and flexibility.
Key Elements Of The New Approach: Regional
Iraqi:
- Vigorously engage Arab states.
- Take the lead in establishing a regional forum to give support
and help from the neighborhood.
- Counter negative foreign activity in Iraq.
- Increase efforts to counter PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party).
Coalition:
- Intensify efforts to counter Iranian and Syrian influence inside
Iraq.
- Increase military presence in the region.
- Strengthen defense ties with partner states in the region.
- Encourage Arab state support to Government of Iraq.
- Continue efforts to help manage relations between Iraq and Turkey.
- Continue to seek the region's full support in the War on Terror.
Both Coalition And Iraqi:
- Focus on the International Compact.
- Retain active U.N. engagement in Iraq – particularly for election
support and constitutional review.
Sources:
- Officials:
Troop Surge in Iraq to Begin This Month, Nick Simeone, Trish Turne
of Fox News, and the A.P., 01/09/07
- Sen.
Levin Supports Temporary Surge of U.S. Troops in Iraq, With Conditions,
Fox News, 1/04/07
- Official:
First wave of troops to Iraq by Jan. 31, MSNBC, 01/09/07 (A.P. and
Reuters contribution to the report)
- Text of the
President's Speech, Fox News, MILNET Brief, 01/10/07
- Highlights
of the Iraq Strategy Review (PDF), The White House, 01/10/07
- Fact
Sheet: The New Way Forward in Iraq, The White House, 01/10/07
- The
Iraqi Plan, Secretary of State Condeleezza Rice, The White House,
01/11/07
©
Copyright 2006, Michael G. Crawford