MILNET
Brief The
Israeli Land Attack Plan Against Iran, 12/08/06
"We do what we think is
best for us, and if it happens to meet
America’s requirements, that’s just part of a relationship between two
friends. Hezbollah is armed to the teeth and trained in the most
advanced technology of guerrilla warfare. It was just a matter of time.
We had to address it."
- Shabtai Shavit, Knesset
National-Security Adviser, former head of Mossad, after the Summer 2006
Israeli attack into Lebanon 3
"I am not advocating an Israeli
pre-emptive military action against
Iran and I am aware of its possible repercussions...I consider it a
last resort. But even the last resort is sometimes the
only resort."
- Deputy Defense
Minister Ephraim Sneh, a former general in the Israeli Defense Forces 10
This briefing is a fictional representation of a
possible Israeli strike deep into Lebanon that sometime after its
inception, turns into a direct assault against the southwestern border
of Syria as a feint while Israeli aircraft go after targets in
Iran. The idea is
quite simple in contemplation, not so simple in execution.
However, of all the forces in the Middle East, only the Israelis have
the intestinal fortitude, security awareness and imminent threat
consciousness combined with an adequate military force to bring it
off. A little of which we talk about here was stated in the Daniel Project Final Report2, worked on by Dr. Louis
Beres, et all, at the request of the Israeli Defense Forces and
recently declassified and published on several sites including
MILNET. The report is used as background to motivations and
strategies, the tactics are MILNET created and responsibility for them
lies here. We also make use of several reports cited at the
bottom of this briefing, however we only lightly footnote the text.
Since we admit up front this is pure speculation, we don't feel the
necessity to prove our point...simply take the matter under
consideration and perform your own thinking and research if you feel
you must. We will endeavor to use our standard methodology,
citing [OPINION] or [SPECULATION] and then returning to
[BRIEFING] for groups of
paragraphs. Our intent however, is to
present a factual representation of the situation and then fictionalize
tactics that
COULD be used by the Israelis. Note that while we like to believe
we have some basic military tactical knowledge, we are far from experts
in the military arts. Our conjecture is thus a layman's approach to an
Israeli March into Tehran given a layman's understanding of the
conditions on the ground and nearly as importantly, in the air.
[BRIEFING] MILNET began this
work directly in the months following the summer
incursion north by the Israelis. The impetus was the odd Israeli
force
strength and activities noted by several news veterans including
monsieur Aspel from CNN. After re-reviewing the Daniel Project
Final
Report (which we have been told was well received by many elements of
the
higher chain of command in the IDF), we realized that the summer foray
could have, indeed may have been in fact nothing more than a
reconnaissance-in-force mission to determine how difficult the land
passage to Iran would be.
Clearly Israeli forces perched on the southern border of Iran would be
of great concern to Tehran, enough so to bring sharp focus
there.
Remember that possibility as we move further into the main battle
progress.
[SPECULATION] In any case, the
delay in Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon was not unexpected and by
that time, it was clear to MILNET that the Israelis were up to
something. As they drew back, allowing the International Forces
to move
into "security positions" along the Israeli border, the ballet-like
performance was remarkable. Indeed this would
be a welcome outcome for the Israelis since they would effectively move
back from the border without worry about Hezbollah incursion south
while they regrouped. This would also allow the Israelis to move forces
into place on their side of the border in rapid fashion with little
concern for force protection during the moves, other than the usual
(daily) worries of internal terrorist attacks on their army forces as
they moved about. In the end, the movement of International
Forces
were most likely carefully watched and dispositions, while clearly
flexible, were in the fashion of those securing rather than defending
against real attack, somewhat static.
However, this MILNET briefing waned until mid November due to a lack of
real intelligence flowing in. This is not unusual, MILNET is
after all, subject to the vagaries of open source intelligence and
sources who either have no knowledge of clandestine activities, are not
in place to perceive the situation on the ground even as civilians, or
unable to talk about what they know out of security concerns.
When all three groups are quiet however, our antenna pick up. So
we have been watching for other indicators to confirm something was
a brew. We watched and noted several stories that indicated fresh
but low level activity with patience.
[BRIEFING] By November of
2006, indicators of Israeli losing patience began to
surface again. From statements of officials to the relatively
benign
political attacks on the Israeli government from what should have been
a major
calamity for Israeli citizens indicates someone was whispering "wait,
we are not yet finished, this was only a feint." While none of
MILNET's network has officially reported this effect, several have
hinted at the possibility. Oh there were plenty of "man on the
street" reports from Israel in the news, and claims that the government
faced a crisis, but these seemed to disappear in a few nights, perhaps
indicating the presence of the whisper campaign.
This is intriguing when combined with the appearance on November 16 of
Benjamin
Netanyahu on Glenn Beck's CNN Headline News show. The former
Israeli Prime Minister came to talk about the current situation with
Iran. In that interview, he said that he felt like he could now
understand how the 30s happened...people heard Hitler say he what he
was going to do, but didn't believe him. The President of Iran is
saying he is going to exterminate Israel, and Netanyahu says he
believes him. This simple truth tells us a lot about others in
Israel see the Iranian threat. It is cut and dried.
This interview, we admit, has led to
much rapid review of several tactical and strategic issues covered
previously by MILNET, including the creation of several new briefs
covering the differences between Sunni and Shiite, the chaos fostered
by Iran and Syria in the Mideast and probably rationales by both
nations for that continued effort, and finally, a look again at those
suspicious circumstances as Israel withdrew from the conflict with
Hezbollah in the summer.
[OPINION] And finally in
December as President Bush shuttled about his mission to refocus the
Iraq strategy, meetings between participants in another strategy melded
well into our scenario, including Vice President Cheney delivering
fairly innocuous public messages to the Saudis, and the meetings
between
Bush personally with a number of leaders including Blair of the U.K.,
and Olmert of Israel. All disguised perhaps as Iraq strategy consensus
building but also perhaps masking yet another task before the U.S. and
their ally, Israel.
[SPECULATION] Several
faithful former military contributors shared some tactical knowledge of
the Lebanese area with us, and our own deliberations pointed clearly
that time was of essence. If the Israeli intelligence we believe was
gathered at some cost this summer is to amount to being worth "the
cost" taken to gather it, then that intelligence must be acted upon in
a relatively short time.
Hezbollah dispositions are fluid by the nature of their activities
vis-a-vis Israel. However within a few months time the
intelligence on Hezbollah emplacements and major dispositions could
still be relied upon to be in-situ. Moreover the displacement and
disposition effects of the International Security Force along the
border would need to be brilliantly visible in order for Israel to make
a rapid advance into Hezbollah's lines once again. As we
indicated previously, those forces are not in any strength able to
create a protective force, only able to provide alarm and and "honest"
effort to keep the peace. Faced with a full out Israeli invasion,
we believe those forces will disperse rapidly after sounding the
alarm. And indeed that is one of the first handful of things we
expect to happen in our fictional Israeli attack to the north.
[BRIEFING]
Conditions:
First and foremost we need to look at the Israeli, Lebanese
(Hezbollah), and Iranian forces involved. We have done so in
several earlier pieces in great detail, and will only summarize the
military elements of import to our discussion.
Israeli Ground
Forces: (Data as of June 1999, verified improved through July
2004)
The Israeli Defense Force fields some 4300 Merkava main
battle tanks varying
from the Mark 4 class down to the more populated Mark 3 class.
These are
formidable, with the newly acquired Mark 4 class being aim and fire on
the go while the
tank is in operation at high speeds. These tanks also feature a
revolving magazine producing higher rapid fire capability than any tank
it is likely to run up against in the Middle East. Even the Mark
3s are extremely capable, with fielding on the run firing, reactive
armor and laser guided computer enhanced fire control for their 120mm
main gun. A Patton-like high speed
moving ground assault at any point can be achieved with a simple radio
call, the Israelis "mounting up" like heavy calvary and swiftly moving
to cut off supply lines. In addition, a point that will be made
in our battle scenario, the Israelis can easily take to the roads or
the countryside to swiftly punch through lines and progress nearly
unhindered to any objective they desire, bypassing the defenders in
such a rush that a small token force can face to the rear to mop up
those who unwisely choose to follow.
In addition to the main battle tank force, the Israeli's field numerous
light tanks for harrying flanking forces, cutting down less heavily
defended support groups and logistics lines. Among these are armored
personnel carriers that can fight while delivering troops to the
cutting edge of the battle, mop up, and reenter for rapid movement
along the main incursion line. This too will become important if
Israel looks further North as their objective rather than taking over
ever hamlet on the route.
The Israelis could easily field some 2000 tanks out of country without
seriously effecting its homefront defense, as well as some 4700 well
maintained and modernized armored personal carriers carrying at least
47,000 troops to battle in well protected vehicles. Follow up
vehicles would bring to bear some 1000 155mm towed artillery and
miscellaneous field rocket units and perhaps up to 600,000 ready to
fight Israeli soldiers. Of these perhaps a full 1/4 have seen
action on the border or in country fighting indigenous Palestinian or
external incursions, and another 1/8 may have separately participated
in the summer of 2006 incursion into Lebanon.
In addition it is SPECULATED that the Israeli Arrow Rocket could be
mobilized and brought along to be employed where necessary to defend
against airborne targets, moved ahead and re-emplaced. This
would be
carried out the IDF teams we speculate have practiced this technique
ad-nauseum since the Daniel Report was first considered by the
IDF.
And of course, the Israelis may be able to bring along the already
mobile Patriot systems, being careful not to deplete either missile
system needed at the Israeli border.
Israeli Air
Forces: (Data as of June 1999, verified improved thru July 2004)
The Israel Air Force offers air superiority in large numbers.
With some 524 air-to-air capable fighters, the Israeli Air Force will
quickly own the skies over Lebanon and further north. In 1985,
Israeli F-15s, refueled in the air, reached targets 2000 miles away,
making them quite capable of dual tanker traps and reach far into Iran.
The IAF support aircraft include several hundred F-4 aircraft which
field anti-radiation
missiles capable of taking out anti-aircraft gun emplacements as well
as surface to air missile batteries. In addition to the IAF "wild
weasel" style aircraft, the IAF also features AWACs airspace battle
control facilities and in-flight air-to-air refueling
capabilities. Both allow for extension of the Israeli air
elements further and deeper into Lebanese air space. With plenty
of fighters, the combination creates a relatively effective air
superiority that would allow Israel to control the skies over Lebanon,
not just for the sake of the ground battle there, but also to use
northern Lebanese airspace for purposes looking even further north.
In addition, units of the Israeli Defense Forces can also quickly fly
overhead UAVs to further their look into enemy territory. These are
dispatched from various mobile units and thus carry the capability
wherever the Army chooses to go, and providing targeting info to ground
attack aircraft at will.
And finally, the IAF can put into an extended distance air campaign an
estimated 300 F-16 ground
attack fighters each capable of delivering some 15,000+ pounds of
ordinance on target in addition to carrying long range fuel
tanks. The Israelis have purchased more than enough JDAM kits to
outfit any size bomb to precision delivery capability nearly equal to
that of the U.S. and far superior to anything Iran has in their
inventory. This capability allows the Israeli ground attack
aircraft to choose targets with precision AND has lowered their miss
rate to infinitesimal, killing the targets they seek and rarely having
reapply new targeting. These are all weather, anytime fighters
with
well trained pilots. The IAF also has the some F-4 aircraft which
can be used
to pound heavy targets in all weather but limited to mostly daytime
sorties. These are also in-air refuel-able, thus can be retanked
as needed to extend the aircraft target range.
[SPECULATION]
The summer of 2006 only saw a small portion of the awesome IAF taking
to the skies, yet they IAF was extremely capable in the Air.
While some SAM activity was noted, no aircraft were lost to ground
fire.. And of course packages could be diverted from their
staging areas in the north to attack as needed along that northern
route. By "overstocking" the staging area up north near the
Iranian southern border, the Air Force can thus provide for attacks on
targets of opportunity or rapid reaction to problems as the slower
ground assault grinds its way north towards the Iranian
border. In our scenario, Israeli border defense would be
carefully calculated to allow massive offensive units to fly north,
leaving behind only enough to defend against a border push by the
Lebanese. It is believed that the Israeli border defense units,
under separate command and well positioned could easily hold off such a
push until reinforcements from the interior could be delivered.
[BRIEFING] Hezbollah Ground
Forces: (Data as of 07/21/06)
It is believed that the Israeli Defense Forces got a very good look
this summer at the Hezbollah military capability on the ground.
It is estimated that Hezbollah and the Lebanese Army still fields some
71,000 troops, 310
tanks (mostly old Soviet T-45 and T-54),
and 24 helicopters. Hezbollah rockets include an unknown
number of
Katushya (range: 29km), Fajr-3
(range: 45 km), Fajr-5 (range: 75km). All thought to be supplied
by
Iran. Missiles used by Hezbollah are the Zelzai 1 and Zelzai 2,
again
thought to be supplied (or provided at little or no cost) by
Iran.
"Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah said in May that the Shiite militia
group had 12,000 rockets." 19
Well
dug in (many in fortified underground bunkers complete with bunks,
kitchens, etc.), the forces are also somewhat mobile in
that their main intent is to provide a fluid force for supporting
Hezbollah and Hezbollah supported guerrilla forces and weapons and
logistics trains to support suicide bombers moving in regular waves
into Israel through Lebanon. This fluidity is not without a cost
however, as the mobile armor component of Hezbollah is at best outdated
and in many cases discovered this summer, only has effect in numbers
not accuracy or training. A concerted Israeli effort is predicted by
MILNET to trash these mobile elements, leaving the actual troops and
support elements to the mercy of extremely capable Israeli main force
elements.
Hezbollah/Lebanese Air
Force
Does not exist in any number to be concerned with. Hezbollah is
said, however to have at least 1,100 military personnel assigned to the
Air Force, they must be doing something. That's a lot of guys
working on maintenance of 24 helicopters. Below is a table lifted
from John Pike's Global Security.com 20
[SPECULATION]
The IAF found
little resistance in the air and lost no aircraft in the summer foray,
and saw few SAMs or even shoulder launched rockets to contend
with. While this may be luck, MILNET believes that Hezbollah is
armed with urban warfare and classic urban defense and ground taking
equipment such as RPGs, effective only against helicopters. While
this may be effective for a short while, IAF training and years of
dealing with these threats during Israeli helicopter driven retaliation
have meant few losses will be given over to Hezbollah surface to air
attacks.
Israeli Foreknowledge
While most analysts agree that Israel was this summer chagrined at a
perceived "under read" of the Hezbollah force strength and underground
bunkers, weapons caches and other support infrastructure, that element
of surprise is not only gone, but well understood now by the Israeli
planners. Indeed MILNET believes that the summer movement might
well
have been a feint intended to accomplish three things: 1) cleanup
the
border area, hoping for international forces to come in to "secure" the
zone, allowing Israeli forces to regroup for their main attack later in
the year; 2) recon the path leading north toward the northern Lebanon
border; and 3) assess Hezbollah (and one would suppose the lightweight
Lebanese indigenous Army) ability to hold back Israeli mobile
excursions.
[OPINION] If you take
the MILNET attitude toward the summer "foray" you will see
that the possibility exists that Israel is now in possession of most of
the intelligence it needs to make a brutal and deadly dash to the
north, cut off Hezbollah from defending Lebanese targets, let alone
offer help to the Iranian border forces, and make way for a push across
into Iran. Several tactical considerations for this exist.
First,
Israel moved about, seemingly randomly during the summer battle, with
its movements only making sense if one has the concept of
recon-in-force in mind. Not all Israeli forces did this of
course, but
there were several news reports that lead one to believe this is true.
[SPECULATION] Second,
whether Israel limited its forces due to purposeful tactical
considerations or miscalculation, they never-the-less accomplished one
very large goal. They made the enemy "pop-up" from its rat holes
and if
Israel takes new action soon, those previously hidden emplacements will
not be able to moved quickly. Indeed it has been widely reported
that
the underground caches and command and control areas were surprisingly
large in number, well beyond public knowledge would have
predicted.
Third, the Israeli forces were not "chased out" of Lebanon. Quite
to
the contrary, and indicated by U.S. reluctance to put all that much
pressure on Israel at the time, the IDF tarried in certain areas,
withdrawing only as it was clear international security forces could be
seen moving in. This allowed the IDF to "lay down" their
re-entrance
corridors with some preciseness.
The International
Security Forces:
All that need be done by Israel to begin their push into Lebanon is to
give warning for the International forces to move back or face a new
Israeli push. It should be noted that the forces "arrayed" as
security in the zones around Israeli border with Lebanon are token
forces, only able to call attention to forces moving in from either
direction, not able to prevent any wholesale movement. Thus if
Israel takes the initiative, it could not be restrained for more than a
few hours if those forces stand and fight, and that time would not
effect the outcome in the slightest.
These security forces know this...indeed may have already been
instructed that if faced with more than a probe to withdraw. Thus
MILNET believes the security forces will sound an alarm if pressed, and
then retreat out of the main incursion line. A few salutes may be
exchanged as the largest Israeli land attack force in history rolls by.
[BRIEFING] Iranian Border
Forces on the Border with Lebanon (Data as of July 2004):
The Iranian border forces are a separately commanded collection of a
few brigades of the 350,000 active Iranian regular Army. They are
supported by a small number of attack and support helicopters as well
as main battle tanks of which perhaps only 1000 are available for all
of Iran, it is not clear how many are already stationed near the
southern border or are within reach within a few days time. If one were
assume a 1/4 were on the border and another 1/4 could be brought in as
timely reinforcements, this means only 250 on day one and perhaps 500
on day two. The most capable of these are the T-72s (about 480)
and the indigenously produced Zulfiqar
(mix of T-72 and T-48 parts numbering a total of 100) at full strength
and when fully parts provisioned. Again, half that number (one
supposes defending the southern half of Iran) would thus yield 290 T-72
class tanks. They may feature (if well maintained and
calibrated) laser guided, on the move fire control, making them
"somewhat" modern.
[OPINION]
Most of the nearly 700 aircraft are well aged and
while generally combat capable, it is not clear the numbers cited can
be
delivering ordnance against a ground assault force. The highest
numbers of aircraft are extremely well aged F-4 and F-5 aircraft
imported into Iran prior to the Islamic Revolution that ousted the Shah
of Iran in 1979. Purposeful western limitations on parts for
these aircraft and draconian measures to unauthorized transshipment
have
left Iran to "catch-as-catch-can" for maintenance supplies. Thus
perhaps half the force are "ramp queens" being used as maintenance
birds, stripped as needed to keep the other half flying. As aged
aircraft, these are
also highly vulnerable to Israeli air superiority fighters who may be
able to clean them from the skies in short order from tankered refueled
staging areas well beyond the Iranian ground fighter's range.
This advantage will be key in the main battle scenario if the Israeli
opt for stage two in their battle plan.
Iranian Main Army
Forces (Data as of June 1999):
Sometime after an alert to Israeli incursions into Iranian territory
(or more likely airspace) main elements of the Iranian Army can be
maneuvered to block forward progress. A clear third of the
overall Iranian forces can maneuver along a north to south battle line
reaching to the border. These forces would effectively stop any
advanced rate incursion and mire the Israeli forces into a tight and
deadly land battle. These forces would consist of some 290 T-72
class
main battle tanks, 400 APC, and 300 plus armored fighting vehicles,
along with some 175,000 to 200,000 (adding callable regional reserves)
rather new, non battle hardened troops. While this is a
major battle sized formation of units, it is not clear how much
maneuver time in the field these new soldiers have, and of course they
are nowhere as battle ready as they need to be to repel a major force
excursion into Iranian territory. Here are two tables from the
MILNET Briefing on the Iranian Military 23 :
* delivered prior to the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979
From a Rand Report on Iranian Military
Strengths 24
[SPECULATION]
One mitigating factor aids the Iranian forces. The recent summer
"exercise" between Hezbollah and Israel may have set the Iranian
military chain of command to thinking about what would have happened
had the Israelis pushed further North. This may have, at a
minimum, produced some hastily drawn up heavy defense plans that have
been exercised and fine tuned in the months since July of 2006.
[BRIEFING] Iranian Air Force
(Data as of June 1999):
The Iranian Air Force would respond to an incursion with some xxx xxx
aircraft capable of responding in a timely fashion to air
attackers. These aircraft would be joined shortly thereafter by
xxx xxx, xxx xxx, and xxx xxx fighters all of which are much less
capable and whose numbers will be dramatically reduced by inability to
be launched due to maintenance problems (lack of parts being cited as
the number one reason). However, the overall force will be
capable of delaying any token Israeli air attack. Here is a table from
the MILNET Briefing on the Iranian Military 23 :
Aircraft
Made
in
Count
Mission
Comments
F-14
U.S.
50
Air
Defense
Poorly
maintained, Little/no AAM, gun only
MiG-29
Russia
6
Air
Defense
Highly
capable, heavy maintenance costs, fuel hungry
F-7M
China
35
Air
Defense
Fairly
modern and capable
F-4D/E
U.S.
260
Attack/Defense
Very poorly
maintained, parts not available to Iran
some in ME market
F-5E/FII
U.S.
260
Attack/Defense
Very poorly
maintained,
parts not available from U.S., some in ME market
Su-24
Soviet
30
Attack
Some parts
purchases with Russia have taken place, these may be the best
maintained of all Iranian aircraft
Su-25K
Soviet
7
Attack
Seized
during Gulf War (Iraq inexplictedly flew them out)
May be operational but doubtful
Mir F-1
France
24
Attack/Defense
Seized
during Gulf War (Iraq inexplictedly flew them out)
May be operational but doubtful
[OPINION] However, a
concerted major air assault by the Israeli, risking large numbers of
their air superiority wings, will decimate the shorter range and less
target capable Russian originated aircraft and once these are removed,
the older F-4 and F-5 (the major bulk of the Iranian Air Force)
aircraft will
be forced to flee or be destroyed. Indeed MILNET believes the
older aircraft may in fact sortie only to flee further north to protect
Tehran or several nuclear material production or weapons plants. This
"strategic" retreat may not help if they find themselves flying to
locations that will be sorely tested in the next days of the battle.
[BRIEFING] Iranian Navy
(Data as of June 1999):
While we do not believe there will be any sort of naval engagement
between the Israelis and Lebanon or Iran, any U.S or coalition forces
in the Persian Gulf may find themselves attacked, creating pressure on
the Israelis to cease and desist. Here, therefore, is a
list of naval assets as well as batteries capability of mounting damage
offshore:
To deliver cruise missiles the Navy may utilize a number of surface
ships as well as several submarines:
#
Ship Type
Designation
Spd kts
Armament
Manu.
3
Submarine
Kilo
(Type 877)
Diesel Electric
17 sub
10 surf
six 530mm torp tubes
Guided and autonomous Torpedoes with Sonar, passive homing, active
homing or wire guided (one wired at a time)
Wide array of mines
AA Missile launcher in sail
for SA-14 Strela Missile
Sub has surface range of 3-6 K miles, and 400 miles submerged.
Subs are said to need significant refits
ex-Soviet
3
Frigate
Vosper Mark 5
Sa-am Class
39
1x5 C-802 launcher
1-Mark 8, 4.5" Gun
U.K.
2
Corvette
Bayandor-class
18
2 76mm guns
very austere sensors,
warfare and fire control
U.S.
10
Fast Attack
Hudong-class
4 CS-801/802
China
10
Missile Patrol
Kaman-class
38
2-4 CS-801/802
1-76mm gun
French
3
Fast Attack
Chaho-class
BM-21 Rocket Lnchr
23mm Guns
N Korea
2
Patrol Craft
Cape-class
40 mm and 23 mm guns
U.S.
3
Patrol Craft
PGM-71 Parvin
40mm and 20mm guns
35
small patrol
machine guns
SA-7/SA-14
5
Hovercraft
BH-7
60-70
7-8
Hovercraft
SRN-6
60-70
2
Minesweeper/
Minelayer
MSC-292/268
Shahrock
1
Minesweeper
Riazzi-class
1
Minesweeper
Conv. Ajar LST
4
LST
Hengam
(Larak-class)
Can carry six tanks, 600 tons of cargo and 227
troops
3
LST
Hormuz-class
Can carry 9 tanks, 140 troops
Iran/S.Korea
3
LST
Hormuz-21
1800 ton capacity
3
LSL
Fouque-class
176 ton capacity
Syrian Land Forces
The Syrian Army is some 200,000 strong, with the following equipment as
reported by our former partner AFI in September of 2001:
"The Army Command in Damascus directly controls the
Republican Guard Mechanized Division (an armored division in all but
name), which is equipped with around 350 T-62/72 main battle tanks, 350
BMP-2/3 armored infantry fighting vehicles and BTR-60/70 armored
personnel carriers. In addition, there are 50 BRDM-2 armored
reconnaissance vehicles, 30 122mm 2S1 and 20 152mm 2S3 self-propelled
artillery, 50 23mm ZSU-23-4 self-propelled air defense and 30 122mm
BM-21 multiple rocket launchers. This unit always receives the latest
and best equipment, such as the T-72M main battle tanks, BMP-3 armored
infantry fighting vehicles and will be the first to be re-equipped with
new self-propelled guns. Additionally the Army Command has direct
control of several independent motorized infantry brigades, including
the 'Desert Guard' and the elite 120th Mountain Infantry Brigade.
The heavily fortified defense zone between Damascus and
the Golan Heights has grown to include two independent artillery
brigades and two independent anti-tank brigades with up to 1,200
T-54/55 tanks in hull-down static defense positions. There are some 100
122mm M-31/37 and 50 152mm M-37 field guns in static defensive
positions and up to 300 85mm M-44 and 100mm T-12 anti-tank guns,
protected by large scale minefields and supported by massed
anti-aircraft guns." 25
[OPINION]
The Syrian tanks, APC and self propelled artillery arrayed at the
border is substantial, however faced with a rather large Israeli
invasion force, will have to spread least they be flanked. Thus they
will become vulnerable. Despite this, the Israelis will not have
an easy time of it. They will take losses on any incursion into
Syrian territory.
[BRIEFING]
Syrian Air Force
Again we draw from the AFI "Primer" on the Syrian military:
"On paper, the Syrian Air Force (SAF) is still a highly
impressive force, with some 40,000 personnel, 90,000 reserves, and
hundreds of combat planes. But with a growing percentage of aged
equipment, lack of spare parts, a limited amount of annual flying hours
and with little or no advanced training, its actual combat
effectiveness is strictly limited.
While there is little doubt about the bravery of
individual pilots (even taking off during the disasterous air war with
Israel in 1982 took considerable courage), the fact is that on every
occasion there has been serious air combat between the two nations, the
SAF has been mauled by the IAF. The SAF Command has, therefore, been
forced to accept that this situation is unlikely to change in the near
future and, as mentioned above, seek alternative solutions.
The current combat strength, approximately 50% of which
is fully operational, comprises some 90 Su-22, 20 Su-24, 170 MiG-21,
134 MiG-23, 40 MiG-25, 60 MiG-29 and 48 Mi-24/25 air craft, equipped
with AT-2, AS-7, AS-12 & HOT Air-to-Surface and AA-2, AA-6, AA-7,
AA-8 & AA-10 Air-to-Air Missiles. Many Syrian airfields are well
protected against air attack with hardened shelters, camouflaged
dispersal sites and heavy air defense."
"The air defense of Syria and its occupation force in
Lebanon is provided by an independent command with some twenty-five air
defense brigades, each with six surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries.
With some 55,000 personnel, it presently fields around 650 SA-2, SA-3
and SA-5 static launchers, 200 SA-6 mobile triple launchers and some
4,000 anti-aircraft guns ranging from 23mm to 100mm in caliber. In
addition, there are two independent SAM Regiments, each with four
batteries of 48 SA-8 and SA-10 mobile SAMs. Its early warning system
comprises some several dozen mobile and static early warning radar
sites scattered around both Syria and Lebanon.
Although Syria has obtained useful technical
information resulting from the Serbian and Iraqi experience of Western
air strikes and has hardened much of its command and control systems,
unless there is a considerable upgrade in its capabilities, it will
still provide little serious opposition to Israeli air supremacy." 25
The
Attack
MILNET's chief editor is rather well versed at writing fiction, so
these next sections will read like a novel. Accept them for what
they
are...a look at what could be, and let yourself imagine the
possibilities.
[SPECULATION From here forward until noted otherwise]
It is 3:00 am along the Lebanese border at Majd al-Krum near the
Lebanese-Israeli border. International
Security
Forces are just getting into the midpoint of their graveyard
shift at guard, a time of yawns but still enough awake to hear a sudden
silence amongst the wildlife around them. A whispered "Ho" is
passed
around, the indicator the Sergeants have noticed the quiet and perhaps
one of the officers has been alarmed by the ELINT gear in his command
cupola telling the real story. Jamming, like the last ten
nights, but
a lot more of it and this time he is totally cutoff from his command
bunker further to the North. "Uh Oh" says the corporal as he hears a
faint groan of mechanics far to the south.
His Lieutenant strides up out of breath. "It's the
Israelis. They
sent warning. They are coming. Big time. Time to pull
out. We're
heading West, B company is heading East. We're making a hole."
"What? I thought we were supposed to hold this ground, L.T."
"Not against this bunch. He Pusta, you want to stand and fight a
thousand Israeli tanks and a shit load more troops or are you coming
with us?"
The soldier looks at his officer and smiles. "Lead the way,
Lieutenant, I'll just make sure no one is following, kay?" He
salutes,
turns and picks up the gear he had laid out in the wide depression he
thought he'd be holding for a few more months.
South of that position, the largest Israeli force in history is
grinding along, no longer worried about quiet progress. The
Iranian
overhead recon no longer in view of their operation, and all but a few
radio sets surviving the jamming, the alarm would be slow to spread and
far, far too late. Hopefully, in the mind of the Israeli force
commander, the Internationals would be running for the hills right
about now and they'd not face anyone until the first Hezbollah bastard
popped up with a "Oh shit" in arabic. He'd be toast pretty soon.
Overhead, a phalanx of Israeli fighters were escorting a package of
"wild weasels" as they look for SAM radar units to light up looking for
them. If they see any, they will fire missiles like the U.S.
Shrike which home in on the radar signal and destroy the necessary
guidance for the SAM missile launcher, and for most SAM systems, the
missile itself.
The entire "package", protected by Israeli fighters, will time
their attacks to remove the threat to ground attack aircraft and then
retreat while another "package" will flow in, this one full of the
ground attack aircraft, ready to pounce on any targets foolish enough
to foray out where they can be seen. This will include most any
vehicle moving about at 3:30 am in the morning, so arab vendors in
Lebanon should be wary.
Line
of Advance
By 4:00 am, the alert should have been sounded throughout Lebanon, and
word would have by now reached Iran and Syria that their allies in
Lebanon, their
paid for assassins, Hezbollah, are in trouble again. By this
time, the massive Israeli invasion force will have reached Naama on
their
trek north, and met some light resistance. Light because the
force will undoubtedly have overrun Hezbollah's sleeping encampments,
the terrorist army having mistaken the ability of the International
Security force to provide them any sort of security. By 4:30 am,
the cleanup crew of the IDF will have spread out in a rear widening
phalanx and destroying the now wide awake Hezbollah attempting to run
up the ass of the massive force. By 5:00 am, Hezbollah leaders
behind the fast moving land mobile force, will realize Lebanon is not
the target. Unfortunately, they will most likely die with those
thoughts on their minds, and no comprehensive communications will reach
Iran.
Meanwhile, north of the approaching Israeli attack's main thrust,
Hezbollah will be boltering from their bivouacs, convinced they will be
able to hold back and delay the Israeli attack just like they did a few
months ago. Unfortunately, they are dead wrong. Israeli
attack fighter bombers will swoop in en-masse and pommel any heavy
equipment. Then the attack choppers will decimate lighter
vehicles and troops in numbers that will overwhelm. By 6:00 am,
Israel will have advanced with little resistance noted, as far as
Baalbek, Lebanon.
In the meantime, the air offensive will be well underway. The
northeastern provinces of Iraq may hear fighters overhead and as dawn
breaks, they will begin to see numerous contrails of Israeli AWACS and
air-to-air refueling tankers as they wait for the next wave of
"packages" to form up.
Decision
Point
Here it becomes very risky for the Israelis. They have several
decisions to make, one of which might surprise you after all this lead
up. Mossad has been looking carefully for the Nuclear Materials
production facilities that Iran has been hiding from the IAEA.
With Mossad having no great success, they never-the-less have
suspicions. The Knesset, fearful of annihilation, has granted the
field commander the possible option to destroy at his leisure, any site
he feels is suspicious enough. It would be best, the logic goes,
to destroy Tehran University in total and kill thousands of innocent
students in their sleep, if it means also destroying those with the
knowledge of how to re-institute the nuclear capability of Iran.
The Knesset has struggled with this, but its most influential leaders
have recited the Hitler syndrome and the Iranian Prime Ministers own
promise to destroy Israel time and time again. Eventually they
were convinced that if given the opportunity they should destroy all
possible sources of the deadly industry that will surely snuff out the
Israeli nation.
Border
Crossing
The green light is given and the Israeli land force becomes a red
herring. Ground attack aircraft pommel the Syrian border security
forces,
creating enough havoc to bring the Syrian Army and border forces to
full alert and move to repel invasion. This includes the southern
regions of the Syrian Air Force.
Israeli fighters then take on the Syrian Air Force, their AWACs
vectoring them to the attack, choosing the tactically efficient route
to utterly destroying the Iranian Air Force's ability to defend its
southern Air Space. This is critical to the strategy. In
two hours, the Syrian Air Force will be reduced to half, and the
Syrian Army will be poised at the border to repel a rapidly moving
Israeli Army movement no one has ever seen before. Well except
for the Hezbollah in the south of Lebanon, but they are all but dead
now.
By 9:30 am Lebanese time, News reports all over the world will be
talking about the new Israeli invasion of Lebanon, while Israeli jets
are skirting non-allied territory by flying up the gulf and up the
Mediterranean. The Met flights will be met by tankers off the
Lebanese coast, and mysteriously, supported by a U.S. Navy Carrier
Battle Group enforcing their own airspace there, happy to be of
assistance should the be needed while conducting their joint military
exercises with the Israelis. In the Gulf, a similar occurrence
might be taking place, the U.S. Carrier Battle Group there also
watching closely for Iranian shore batteries to even mimic a launch
while the CBG is "in town". Any launches will be met with extreme
prejudice, since the U.S. assumes all missiles launches near its CBG
are hostile in intent and reserves the right to take out any such
launchers as well. If this means the Iranians declare this an act
of war, so be it...they shouldn't be launching missiles near our
warships. Duh?
By 10:00 am the News hounds will be all aflame about the attack deep
into Lebanon, and the alarming movements (possibly noted) of Syrian
forces in southeastern Syria and just perhaps the news hound will
notice the
alarming pace northward by the Israeli Army, by now revealed to be a
huge, unprecedented attacking force.
However, we now know this is not the big battle. By the waning hours of
daylight, more waves of Israeli jets will vector toward refueling stops
before banking into their real targets, some twenty or so heavily
guarded and fortified nuclear weapons production sites, nuclear
reactors, and supporting machinery manufacturing sites throughout
Iran. Remarkably, there may be some misunderstood bombs going off
well before the Israeli fighters are noted incoming, and perhaps a
decade later it will be revealed that U.S. F-117 stealth fighters took
out much of the SAM defenses around a number of these sites early in
the dark hours before the Israelis triggered the alarms in Tehran
telling them the border action was a feint.
In any case, the U.S. will deplore the naked aggression of the Israelis
and make a few nasty comments about wishing to be informed and the
U.K.'s Tony Blair will insist the Israelis meet to answer questions on
over flight of U.K. ships in the Gulf and parts of Afghanistan or
Iraq. Meanwhile, British and U.S. air-to-air tankers will
secretly gas up the Israelis just prior to their banking into Iran to
take out their respective targets.
Targets
of Opportunity
By 7:00 pm CNN and Fox News will be broadcasting life shots of a
utterly destroyed center in the University of Iran, and MSNBC will be
interviewing wounded students crying that their
girlfriend/boyfriend/husband/wife/son/daughter were last seen on their
way to science classes where there is also a research reactor,
etc. Oh the humanity. Reports of numerous sites throughout
Iran will be coming in and it will be clear to the public then that
this was much bigger than a simple invasion of Lebanon. Tehran
will be furiously ranting, however, the Prime Minister will not be on
the air, hiding just in case his security bunker is a target.
By 8:00 pm it will be clear that the Israeli Army has stopped at the
northern border of Lebanon, and Beirut and other major cities are now
under Israeli martial law. Hezbollah will have been reduced to its
former self, a skulking snake in the grass, running from a real
military force in full regalia south to north throughout Lebanon.
It will be months before Israel withdraws. Hezbollah's
representation on the Lebanese cabinet no longer necessary...they are
no longer a valid organization in Lebanon. Other Shiite
representatives will be appointed, with an upcoming special election to
replace them with duly elected ministers.
Withdrawal
30 days later, Israel will have withdrawn most of its
forces, but at the request of the Lebanese Prime Minister, the Israelis
will join an extremely capable International Force to guard the the
northeastern border with Syria as well as reinstitute the border guard
between Lebanon and Israel.
[BRIEFING]
Conclusion
Obviously the fictional scenario is woefully geared toward Israeli
inspired propaganda. The intent is to show how well things could
go for Israelis granting that they applied the maximum force. And
why should they? As we indicated previously, this is more than
simply about military ego or border control. This is about race
survival. As Benjamin Netanyahu has said time and time again,
Israel, when faced with survival will do what is necessary. And in that
recent interview, he makes the point that he (and we assume at least
half of the Israelis) believe that when Ahmadejani says he will destroy
Israel and when the Israelis believe he is seriously near bringing to
bear nuclear weapons to do so, they will not only apply maximum force,
they will have planes on the tarmac loaded with nuclear weapons to
repel any foolish attempts to storm the Israeli border while the rest
of their forces are "out of pocket".
