Proliferation News: 3 February 2005
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
For past stories and further proliferation resources, visit: www.CarnegieEndowment.org/npp
Wednesday, February 2
SUMMARY: With luck, Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons could be
delayed through a combination of Iranian technical difficulties, U.S.
military action, and European diplomacy. However, neither delay nor
regime change would remove the causes of proliferation pressures in
Iran. Iran needs to be assured that the U.S. will respect its autonomy
if it ceases nuclear weapons development, while Iran's neighbors need
to be reassured that Tehran will respect their interests. Arab
governments are reluctant to join in a regional security dialogue in
part because of Washington's double standard regarding Israel's nuclear
arsenal and treatment of Palestinians. To mobilize all of the
international actors opposing Iranian nuclear development, the U.S.
must recognize that Iranian proliferation, Persian Gulf security, the
U.S. role in the Middle East, Israel's nuclear status, and
Palestinian-Israeli relations are all linked and cannot be resolved
without a more balanced U.S. stance.
Thursdsay, February 3
The Bush administration's claim this week that North Korea appears to
have been the supplier of converted uranium to Libya is based on
evidence that could just as easily point to Pakistan, a key U.S. ally,
as the source, according to analysts and officials familiar with the
data.
Two senior staff members on the National Security Council have toured
China, Japan and South Korea in recent days to brief top officials that
U.S. scientific tests strongly suggest North Korea provided Libya with
uranium hexafluoride gas, which can be processed into material for a
nuclear weapon. Their trip came as U.S. officials are trying to build a
united front with key allies if, as expected, North Korea soon agrees
to restart six-nation talks on its nuclear programs.
Tests Said to Tie Deal on Uranium to North Korea
(David E. Sanger and WIlliam J. Broad, New York Times)
Wednesday, February 2
Scientific tests have led American intelligence agencies and government
scientists to conclude with near certainty that North Korea sold
processed uranium to Libya, bolstering earlier indications that the
reclusive state exported sensitive fuel for atomic weapons, according
to officials with access to the intelligence.
The determination, which has circulated among senior government
officials in recent weeks, has touched off a hunt to determine if North
Korea has also sold uranium to other countries, including Iran and
Syria. So far, there is no evidence that such additional transactions
took place.
Nonetheless, the conclusion about Libya, which is contained in a
classified briefing that has been described to The New York Times,
could alter Washington's debate about the assessment of the North
Korean nuclear threat. In the past, some administration officials have
argued that there is time to find a diplomatic solution because there
was no evidence that the government of Kim Jung Il was spreading its
atomic technology abroad.
Thursday, February 3
ELEANOR HALL: So is President Bush signalling a shift in his foreign
policy or more of the same? And what will his renewed focus on domestic
issues mean for the US economy? To discuss these issues, I spoke to two
Washington analysts with quite different perspectives on the
President's address.
Joseph Cirincione is a foreign policy specialist at the Carnegie
Endowment in Washington. He's also a former National Security Adviser
to the Democrat leader in the US House of Representatives.
Balbina Hwang is the policy analyst on this year's State of the Union
Address for the conservative think tank, the Heritage Foundation. And
she's also a lecturer on International Relations and Political Economy
at Georgetown University in Washington.
Bush's Softer Tone Toward N. Korea Welcomed
(Soo-Jeong Lee, Associated Press)
Thursday, February 3
South Korea on Thursday welcomed President Bush's softened tone toward
North Korea, hoping it would help the communist North return to talks
aimed at ending its nuclear weapons programs.
Bush only briefly mentioned North Korea late Wednesday during his State
of the Union address, broadcast early Thursday in Asia, saying
Washington was "working closely with governments in Asia to convince
North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions."
That was a stark contrast to his speech three years ago, when he
branded North Korea part of an "axis of evil" with Iran and Iraq.
Thursday, February 3
A senior legislator called yesterday for Ukraine's prosecutor general
to investigate alleged sales of nuclear-capable cruise missiles to Iran
and China in violation of international nonproliferation treaties.
The appeal, by Hrihory Omelchenko, follows allegations he made in a
letter to new President Viktor Yushchenko. Omelchenko is a Parliament
member allied with Prime Minister-designate Yulia Tymoshenko and is a
reserve colonel in the intelligence service.
January/February 2005
Capping the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium
for nuclear weapons has long been a goal of the international nuclear
nonproliferation agenda because it has been seen as putting a
real-world limit on the potential for any nuclear weapons buildup.
During the last decade, this goal has, at times, appeared close to
being realized.
Negotiation of a verifiable fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) was
one of the central principles and objectives that helped achieve the
indefinite extension of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) at
the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, and it was again endorsed by
states-parties at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. The five
nuclear-weapon states have also contributed to this effort as they are
all understood to have ceased fissile material production for weapons
purposes.
Yet, for the last few years, negotiation of such a treaty has been
blocked by the failure of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to agree
on its broader work program. Recently, China, the United States, and
other countries have advanced proposals that could provide momentum to
move the process of negotiating an FMCT forward. Before diplomats reach
that stage, however, a new potential obstacle looms: ensuring that the
negotiating mandate still has consensus.\