The Middle East - Politics Vs. Intelligence

Politics Vs. Intelligence
Mohamed Ibn Guadi

Since its creation, the CIA is one of the most vilified institution, criticized by both branches of the U.S. government as well as a plethora of critics outside the U.S.. Many forget that the CIA was created to avoid a new Pearl Harbor not counter the Soviet threat. Indeed, the U.S. military was confident it could defend against a sneak attack and a huge portion of a new DoD budget was set aside to do just that.

During the last few decades, the intelligence services were very often chastized for actions that many regarded as harmful to foreign policy. Many critics of the CIA thought the agency executed far too many covert operations abroad during the Cold war. Since September 11, much of the critical analysis indicates that perhaps the Intelligence Agency did not execute nearly enough covert action and certainly failed to provide actionable human intelligence collection.

Some critics might claim that eight years of the Clinton administration are responsible for the sclerosis of the information agencies and their apparent inability to collect critical information. However, this relatively short period does not explain the failure of the Intelligence Community's inability to prevent the attacks of September 11. Nor, for that matter, can eight months of the Bush administration be blamed.

Actually, if an institution must be blamed, it is certain that Congress is high on the list. In particular, the Church Committee ^₂, directed by the Democratic Senator of Idaho, Frank Church, which more or less destroyed the potential of the U.S. Intelligence Community to detect let alone counter external threats.

When Watergate gave rise to the inquiries on intelligence activities in the U.S., the CIA was already a pariah in the eyes of the public opinion. The doubt directed at the military establishment after Vietnam only served to reinforce the public distrust of government organizations. This resulted in public displays of distaste by American politicians and an almost fanatical attack on the U.S. Intelligence Community, many calling the Agency a "Rogue Elephant". This environment had a direct negative effect on the community's ability to conduct clandestine operations.

At the time, it appeared the purpose of intelligence critics was to put an end to clandestine activity abroad under the pretext that assassinations or covert activity against the enemy was not morally acceptable. This attitude was also abundnat prior to the U.S. entering World War II. "A gentlemen does not spy on his neighbors". This effort to extend some morality into a rather nasty world during the Seventies destroyed any capacity for necessary clandestine action for generations to come and thus torpedoed the goals that the agency had been given at its creation.

Because of the interference produced by the various inquiries into the U.S. Intelligence Community, the CIA, the DIA or the FBI became overly cautious in all their activities. They were more seized with a desire to look "squeaky clean" both in terms of operations and hiring, more sensitive to political concerns of Congress than focusing on work required to protect the National Security of the United States. Setting the moral watermark too high and pandering to an over sensitive Congress would eventually lead to suicide. Today, in our post 9/11 awareness, that policy basis was clearly deadly. Especially in a world where assassination and mass casualty terrorist attacks still remain a ubiquitous tool of political policy.

The Black years

It is unfortunate that it took 9/11 to force the Intelligence Community to review the high moral ground watermark for intelligence operations. Fortunately, some in the Intelligence Community understood the problem immediately. Following the 9/11 attacks, a high ranking CIA official, sent a classified message -- a DOSB (Directorate of Operations Stations and Bases) directive -- notifying all Agency analysts that any and all options would henceforth be considered against those enemies who were ready to sacrifice themselves in order to kill thousands.

However, in those black years decades before, and in spite of criticisms levied against the CIA or the FBI, little was done to improve intelligence capabilities until the mid 1970s. In 1975, Ronald Reagan, who had been a member of the Rockefeller commission on Intelligence, warned on several occasions of how dangerous aversion policies were to national security.

The investigations of the Church and Pike commissions had definite tragic consequences to intelligence agents. Richard Welch, who directed the CIA station in Athens in 1975, was assassinated in front of his house. Later investigation indicated that Welch was "outed" by Congressional staff's investigations and a book written about the CIA.

Of course, some in Congress were not happy with the conduct of the commissions. For instance, Barry Goldwater had refused to sign the final report. Many believed at the time that there was a very clear contradiction between the need for secrecy within the CIA and the requirements of the Congress. However, the Congressional attitude was fixed on its image, and Intelligence waned.

During the Carter administration, the CIA profited from new criticisms and in particular during the Iranian crisis. Stansfield Turner generated a top secret message to President Carter entitled "Iran Post mortem" wherein he detailed the failures of the intelligence agency to envision or detect the fall of the Shah of Iran.^{3 *}

For William Casey, the Iranian crisis and the Post Mortem were further proof that clandestine activities were even more necessary and justified. Once again Congress went rabidly after the Intelligence Community.

Of course, there was reasonable angst about CIA surveillance on American soil. However, the reality is that surveillance operations against American citizens were few and spread out over a twenty-eight year period. Moreover, the major part of these activities were sanctioned within the CIA, before a commission expressly prohibited the activities. The current FISA act places restrictions on conducting surveillance. That 1978 Act was later to be a factor in FBI malicious in pursuing leads that may have disclosed the 9/11 conspiracy.

In reading the Commission reports on the activities of the CIA, one could legitimately wonder whether the members of the Commissions knew who the real enemy was. None of the reports and analysis made public at the time did a thorough job of explaining the context in which the information gathering operated -- a context where the Soviet Union remained a constant threat. Contrary to the lack of rationale implied in the Church Committee reports it had been discovered that about 2000 people in the United States worked for communist governments in the Seventies AND the number had tripled from the figure estimated in the Sixties. U.S. counterintelligence was in deep trouble during these decades.

The intelligence agencies from a number of Communist countries, led by the Soviet Union, had produced an immense technological capacity for applying espionage against American industry. They were able to record thousands of private telephone conversations. Through these private conversations, Americans could be victims of blackmail and coerced into becoming agents for foreign governments. The fact that Americans could be spied on continuously by foreign agents did not seem to worry those spending their time blaming the U.S. Intelligence Community for trying to counter that immense effort with their own surveillance.

Public statements of former director of the FBI, Clarence M. Kelley and assistant director Ray Wannal revealed the fact that Soviet spies tried to bribe several members of the Congress during this period and it is believed that some may have been compromised. ⁴ When Orlando Letelier was assassinated in 1976 by an attack with the booby-trapped car in Washington D.C., investigators turned up an intact attaché case. Inside were documents proving Letelier had received enormous sums of money from Fidel Castro and that a part of this money was used to finance the free voyages of several members of the U.S. Congress. ⁵

Several extreme left leaning terror groups were operating in the United States at that time and in particular on college campuses across the nation. In 1968, 41 bombings were documented on university campuses in the U.S. Between 1969 and 1970 the number jumped to more than 200 bombs which were exploded on university campuses. The figure had grown to 3000 towards the end of the year 1970, a number which averaged about 8 bombs per day. In order to succeed in the fight against these acts, it was necessary to put in a clandestine means to bring the perpetrators to justice.

But public opinion driven by media, politics and perhaps an over-sensitivity to privacy issues made counterintelligence efforts by U.S. agents somehow seem evil. For instance, in the 1970s, a veteran FBI agent John Kearney was accused by the Department of Justice of having operated phone taps as well as opened mail for the subversive group the Weathermen. Congress took the position that the agent's actions were far more dangerous than that of the group and took "appropriate action". However, no government legal action was taken against Kearney, rather a lawsuit was the result. Later the suit was dropped and attempts to go after his supervisors began. Fortunately, an organization of former agents put together defense funds to help Kearney and his colleagues (a total of 12 were eventually targeted) fight the legal battles for perfectly legal and policy permitted activities. Congress meanwhile began the process of vilifying the intelligence community, and enacting draconian legislation, that took just over 35 years to fine tune into rational regulations. At the time however, the events were just another factor in shutting down effective domestic surveillance in the U.S.. ⁶

The need for black operations (Black Ops)

France has always chosen to respond to terrorism with long boring speeches rather than useful action. In fact the French response has always taken as a mark of weakness by the terrorists. Its policy was to allow terrorists a certain bit of freedom to operate in country. Take for instance the case of Abou Daoud, the chief of the terrorist group Palestinian Black September. The group essentially reduced to inactivity by DST (Directorate of Territorial Security) in Paris in January 1977. Although he was wanted by German and Israeli justice for financing the massacre of an Israeli team sent to the Munich Olympic Games as well as killing a German police officer, France allowed Daoud to leave France. In fact he was not only allowed to leave, he was driven through Paris in an official car to Orly airport where he was booked into a first class seat on Algerian airlines to any destination he chose.

The following year, the Hexagone [the French nickname for their country, as it is roughly shaped like a hexagon - MILNET] again let three terrorist murderers leave the country untouched. This lax approach to justice for terrorists was expensive for France. The Eighties will be remembered by bloody attacks all over the country, terrorists happily taking advantage of the French appeasement policy.

France had had a chance to get rid of some of the most dangerous terrorists as they passed through their country, yet passed on every one. This did not prevent France from suffering from their own terrorist experiences however, and history can clearly show the policies did not work. One man did try to change the ineffective practices, the director of the DGSE (General Directorate for External Security) in 1981. Pierre Marion was systematically prevented from acting against the terrorist organizations that its service had identified. This despite the fact that DSGE had been effective during their anti-terrorist activities in relation to the attacks on the Goldenberg restaurant on August 9, 1981.

A number of diplomats from Libya, Syria, Iraq and the the occupied territories were known to be providing logistical support to terrorists while in France. The DGSE had an exact knowledge their locations in the morning, midday and evening hours as well as the eventual locations for their meetings. As there was not any legal means to drive the terrorists out, Pierre Marion proposed to President Mitterrand that the DSGE physically eliminate them. Mitterrand categorically denied the request. In another instance, the DGSE was ready to attack a camp in Lebanon from where the DSGE was convinced terrorist attacks against France were originating. Once again, Mitterrand refused to give his agreement to clandestine operations. Clearly Marion found his ability to protect his country limited by Mitterrand's moral sensitivity.

In 1985, a series of attacks were linked to Issam Sartaoui, a moderate leader of the PLO. Sartaoui lived in France and had received numerous death threats from extremists dissatisfied with his relatively moderate stance, specifically the Abu Nidal group. Rifaat Al-Assad, the chief of the Syrian secret service, Master of terrorist in the Middle-East and brother of president Hafez Al Assad also maintained a villa located in Saint-Nom-la-Bretèche, close to Versailles. The government proposed that DSGE Chief Marion negotiate with Al-Assad. Marion reluctantly agreed to try and at the end of 5 hours of negotiation, Rifaat finally agreed to a compromise. The General promised Marion that the Abu Nidal group would not strike Sartaoui while he remained in France. In return for the agreement with Al-Assad, presumably Sartaoui agreed to curtail his activities while in France.

After the agreement, terrorist attacks in France slackened off somewhat. In February 1986 some in the government celebrated, thinking that they had escaped from the reprisals of the terrorists. But this same month, the attacks started up again. France's reprieve was short lived, and Sartaoui was granted only 18 months -- he was killed on a voyage to Portugal in 1983 -- having left French soil. Having rejected the advise of Pierre Marion, France continued down this path, step by step into the logic of weakness. ⁷

A modern example of more effective anti-terrorist operations were conducted prior to the actual start of the Afghanistan attack by the U.S. These were Clandestine operations at terrorist bases executed by American special forces in Afghanistan with the assistance of the Afghani Northern Alliance. The operations were carried out by the commando operation known as "Jawbreaker". As specified by Cofer Black, the former State Department's Coordinator of Counterterrorism, the mission was to be simple and quick -- "to find the Al Qaeda members and to kill them". ⁸

Proof of History

History has proved that the risks of conducting clandestine operations are far better than the risks if we do nothing. The militants of Islam are ready to die for a cause which they believe is right. Conventional overt military action can and will be used by governments in response, but the clandestine operations will be even more necessary. Terrorism remains effective because its authors operate on a plan where the murder of innocents is held up as a legitimate act of war.

"We will overcome, because we like death as much as you like life", is the kind of statement made by militants of Islam throughout the world. With such remarks, the physical elimination of the terrorists, and almost any cost, remains the only valid option.

* Robert Jervis, Consultant to the CIA during Stansfield Turner's term as DCI, the Carter Administration's Iran Post Mortem is said to have reported on this memorandum as well. The Iran Post Mortem itself is not available but referred to in several places, for instance in the Chris Mooney reference in 3 below. You will note that this article shows an interesting insight into internal CIA operations. We leave the reason for that insight to your imagination. We have been assured no classified information was released by this article.

- MILNET