 MILNET Brief An Intelligence Briefing by Mohamed Ibn Guadi "... the NIE does not have the same significance as say, Moses' tablets containing the Ten Commandments. Quite the contrary, the NIE is what we could call "best guess" material." - Frederick J. Chiaventone |
Mohamad Ibn Guadi found another excellent
article in his areas of interest. In this case, Frederick J.
Chiaventone has taken a look at the recent controversy over a National
Intelligence Estimate on Iraq. The article is well worth reading,
and highly recommended, providing us with a viewpoint that the
mainstream media is unlikely to appreciate, let alone publish.
- MILNET
- MILNET
Intelligence Matters
October 4, 2004
By Frederick J. Chiaventone
Insight Mag
Lest anyone tell you differently, intelligence does matter. But in the case in question we're not talking of the native intelligence of a human being but rather the more obscure and oftimes tentative intelligence of nations.
There has been a great outburst on the parts of senior Democratic officials, as well as a number of news commentators, over President Bush's recent comments on the National intelligence Estimate on Iraq.
When questioned on the report issued by the National Intelligence Council, the President noted only that the intelligence community was cautious, predicting either a fair outlook for Iraq or a poor one. "The CIA laid out several scenarios," the President said on Sept. 21. "It said that life could by lousy. Life could be okay. Life could be better. And they were just guessing as to what the conditions might be like."
His comments were, I think, cautious, reasonable, and understandable.
Democratic senators and congressmen - as well as certain news organizations - immediately lashed out at the President for minimizing the considered analysis of intelligence professionals in favor of predicting a "rosy" outcome in Iraq.
One's immediate reaction to such nonsensical puffery should be "Huh?"'
A couple of things should be understood from the outset.
First, the National Intelligence Estimate, or NIE, is prepared by the National Intelligence Council, a group of senior officials. The NIE is supposed to provide long-term strategic thinking for the entire U.S. intelligence community. The document in question this time was approved by acting CIA Director John McLaughlin and the leaders of the other intelligence agencies.
Second, the NIE does not have the same significance as say, Moses' tablets containing the Ten Commandments. Quite the contrary, the NIE is what we could call "best guess" material. The President's critics recoil at that word and insist that it is "an estimate" as opposed to a guess, but that is exactly what this material is - best guess.
It is neither gospel nor irrefutable. It is based on intelligence input from our operatives world-wide, distilled by our analysts here in the United States. Unfortunately, while our signal intelligence (including intercepts of radio and computer interface for example) is quite good, our human intelligence (read: agents, or, if you prefer, spies) is shaky at best.
Despite what some of the loudest voices will try to have you believe about the validity of the NIE, these same people would have to admit that in the two most significant instances of intelligence analysis in the recent past - the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center, and the presence of Nuclear, Biological, Chemical weapons is Iraq - the Intelligence professionals were wrong dead wrong. In one case catastrophically so.
Many of the critics of President Bush's wary view of the National Intelligence Estimate were terribly wrong when they predicted massive U.S. casualties in both the first and second wars against Iraq. They also participated eagerly in the dismantling and dilution in the 1990s of many of our intelligence assets. Again they were terribly wrong.
So the question remains" So what if the President is skeptical of the current NIE? Has he not sufficient reason to be less than sanguine about the product? If you were vitally dependent upon someone to give you good investment advice and they had twice given you catastrophically bad information would you not be somewhat wary of their subsequent "predictions?"
The partisan sniping and political grandstanding is not unexpected, but I would rather that the President of the United States remain a cautious consumer of intelligence data that in the past has all too often been dangerously flawed at best.
Frederick J. Chiaventone - award-winning novelist and screenwriter - is a retired Army officer who taught counter-terrorism at the U.S. Army's Command & General Staff College.
email the author : chiaventone@earthlink.net
October 4, 2004
By Frederick J. Chiaventone
Insight Mag
Lest anyone tell you differently, intelligence does matter. But in the case in question we're not talking of the native intelligence of a human being but rather the more obscure and oftimes tentative intelligence of nations.
There has been a great outburst on the parts of senior Democratic officials, as well as a number of news commentators, over President Bush's recent comments on the National intelligence Estimate on Iraq.
When questioned on the report issued by the National Intelligence Council, the President noted only that the intelligence community was cautious, predicting either a fair outlook for Iraq or a poor one. "The CIA laid out several scenarios," the President said on Sept. 21. "It said that life could by lousy. Life could be okay. Life could be better. And they were just guessing as to what the conditions might be like."
His comments were, I think, cautious, reasonable, and understandable.
Democratic senators and congressmen - as well as certain news organizations - immediately lashed out at the President for minimizing the considered analysis of intelligence professionals in favor of predicting a "rosy" outcome in Iraq.
One's immediate reaction to such nonsensical puffery should be "Huh?"'
A couple of things should be understood from the outset.
First, the National Intelligence Estimate, or NIE, is prepared by the National Intelligence Council, a group of senior officials. The NIE is supposed to provide long-term strategic thinking for the entire U.S. intelligence community. The document in question this time was approved by acting CIA Director John McLaughlin and the leaders of the other intelligence agencies.
Second, the NIE does not have the same significance as say, Moses' tablets containing the Ten Commandments. Quite the contrary, the NIE is what we could call "best guess" material. The President's critics recoil at that word and insist that it is "an estimate" as opposed to a guess, but that is exactly what this material is - best guess.
It is neither gospel nor irrefutable. It is based on intelligence input from our operatives world-wide, distilled by our analysts here in the United States. Unfortunately, while our signal intelligence (including intercepts of radio and computer interface for example) is quite good, our human intelligence (read: agents, or, if you prefer, spies) is shaky at best.
Despite what some of the loudest voices will try to have you believe about the validity of the NIE, these same people would have to admit that in the two most significant instances of intelligence analysis in the recent past - the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center, and the presence of Nuclear, Biological, Chemical weapons is Iraq - the Intelligence professionals were wrong dead wrong. In one case catastrophically so.
Many of the critics of President Bush's wary view of the National Intelligence Estimate were terribly wrong when they predicted massive U.S. casualties in both the first and second wars against Iraq. They also participated eagerly in the dismantling and dilution in the 1990s of many of our intelligence assets. Again they were terribly wrong.
So the question remains" So what if the President is skeptical of the current NIE? Has he not sufficient reason to be less than sanguine about the product? If you were vitally dependent upon someone to give you good investment advice and they had twice given you catastrophically bad information would you not be somewhat wary of their subsequent "predictions?"
The partisan sniping and political grandstanding is not unexpected, but I would rather that the President of the United States remain a cautious consumer of intelligence data that in the past has all too often been dangerously flawed at best.
Frederick J. Chiaventone - award-winning novelist and screenwriter - is a retired Army officer who taught counter-terrorism at the U.S. Army's Command & General Staff College.
email the author : chiaventone@earthlink.net
Reprinted with permission of the Author