MILNET:

MILNET Brief
The China Threat, 3/21/2005, Updated 4/5/2008

"For years, Chinese arms sales to "rogue states" have been one of the most contentious issues in Sino-U.S. relations. China has been accused of selling nuclear technology to Pakistan and Iran; missile technology to Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, and Libya; materials used to make chemical weapons to Iran; and advanced communications equipment to Iraq, North Korea, and the Taliban when they ruled Afghanistan."

- China and Terrorism, Council on Foreign Relations - Terrorism Q & A, 09/01/2004.

^{Updates

MILNET: China Page}

This briefing will focus on the Chinese threat, post cold war. The major topics of discussion are:

Indicators
The Chinese Strategic Threat to the Asian Theater

Air Force
Navy
Missiles
Army

Chinese Nuclear Threat

Nuclear, Biologcal and Chemical
Proliferation

China and Terrorism
Chinese Military Future
Conclusions

The topics are somewhat prioritized by seriousness of the threat, however, the reader should note that the Chinese threat is not imminent -- that is -- current indicators don't propose a threat in the next few weeks. However, medium to long term, the threat grows rapidly. This is due to indicators of Chinese infrastructure growth.

Indicators

One of the things contributing to this growing threat is liberalism in the world. In the naive mindset of a world which does not recognize history or look at activities with a suspicious eye, the Chinese are simply "mellowing". Nothing could be further from the truth. In the "I want peace at any cost" mindset, the Chinese are simply coming into the World Community. Again, nothing could be further from the truth.

For instance, one of the world's most liberal organizations is the International Olympic Committee. Prior to World War II, the IOC gave huge funding to Germany to help it prepare for the Olympics in Munich, with Adolf Hitler opening the Olympics as one of his most important propaganda coups, all with the arrogant approval of the IOC.

In the 21st century, the IOC is at it again. With the Olympics being held in Beijing in 2008, the world has turned a blind eye to the effects of opening markets to China for the purpose of building Olympic venues. Industrialists have been alarmed by the fact that sources of reconditioned, remanufactured and new pourings of steel have become unavailable in the marketplace. The IOC funding and China's own funding have essentially dried up both steel and concrete supplies and that condition will persist until 2008.

Analysts have begun looking at the supply demand from China and alarmed by the numbers. China is importing far more than any two Olympic events. Some liberal minded claim this is simply because China and in particular Beijing, needs a world class upgrade to the city and the region surrounding it in order to provide for the Olympics. The truth however is that Beijing won the bidding based upon its current infrastructure plus minor upgrades. In fact, it was felt Beijing, a thriving and fairly modern city, would take less upgrades than Athens. So what then is the concrete and steel being used for? The rightfully paranoid who watch for such indicators are scared nearly witless. Indeed, what could China be building if concrete and steel?

Of course one of the more benign explanations could simply be the impending Chinese power crisis -- the PRC is in dire straights looking forward. Their population growth, even under rigid single child controls enforced upon all but the upper class, have created a pending power crisis. Many believe China is embarked on the largest and most ambitious power infrastructure upgrade ever seen in the world. ¹⁶

In the last three decades, China has moved from funding basic infrastructure to a new focus on high technology facilities. From advancements in nuclear power, with secrets stolen from arrogant and security lax U.S., European, and Russian scientists and facilities, the Chinese have plundered the world's top technology in areas such as fiber optics, miniature electronics and quite expectedly, nuclear physics. ^27,,28

As CI Centre's counterintelligence professors have been telling us for a decade, China has been extremely capable at espionage. Engaging U.S. scientists for instance, has been child's play. The FBI's Counterterrorism efforts in U.S. industry, have been, frankly, dismal despite successes we will probably never hear about. The result has been a hemorrhage of information, perhaps some of which has been abetted by U.S. investments in China. Greed has overcome rational caution, and that has resulted in lessening of trade restrictions and indeed a flow of funds through various seemingly innocent as well as clearly nefarious means.

In the mid 1990s, it was discovered that so called industrialists and entrepreneurs were attempting to sway U.S. elections by application of illegal election donations from organizations reportedly headquartered in Indonesia, but whose real sources appeared to be China. In that case, the application of funds through a now infamous John Lee who has long since disappeared. In another case, illegal campaign donations from buddhist monks of the Hsi Lai Buddhist Temple raised a few eyebrows. Is that paranoia or anti-Asian prejudice. Perhaps. Or is it rational concern about an all out effort to keep in power a government which not only turned a blind eye to Chinese infiltration of high tech, as well as lax export regulations? During the 2004 U.S. election campaign, questions once again looked back at "China-Gate", this time with connections between Senator John Kerry and donations from China. ¹⁷

Another important indicator is the efforts by China to cover their steps. Masking building under the auspices of creating Olympics venues is not the first transparent attempt. Propaganda efforts include using China government sponsored news reports naively published and repeated the world around. Take for instance a clear propaganda piece published in ChinaDaily that claims China has made a "...conscious shift of diplomatic emphasis from crisis treatment to crisis prevention" ², an euphemism for moving from sponsoring terrorism to appearing to be helpful. CNN happily reported on the Chinese response to U.S. intelligence analysts sounding the alarm, giving the Chinese foreign minister not only a forum to speak but presenting the minister's propaganda with a reasonable voice and supporting the Chinese viewpoint. ³

Unfortunately, the propaganda chiefs in China know their business much better than western equivalents, who are too superior to have to stoop to such tactics. The result of western arrogance is the loss of ability to sway world opinions effectively, with the ultimate outcome pointing to marginalization of U.S. and European messages.

China Daily, incidentally, recently hit the top twenty searchers of MILNET -- typically a status for search engines like Google or Yahoo that account for 20% of the nearly half a million hits on MILNET per month. Typically when a single non search entity has that large an impact on the site, this indicates an effort to download the entire site. We have seen this occur before, from sites in Russia, Bosnian, and several Middle East organizations funded by government Intelligence Agencies.

China's Military Budget
(Source: U.S. DoD Estimate ²¹)

Updates:

April, 2008: An article from UPI's Asia Online says that China's DF-31 and PL-2 missile batteries are now fully armed and in business. Essentially China's PLA Second Artillery will be receiving newly redesigned and more accurate nuclar warheads, as well as refurbising and upgrading the DF-5 and DF-5a missiles. The typical brigade fields nine units. With some three DF-5/DF-5A brigades, four DF-4 brigades (upgrading to DF-31A) produces a conservative estimate of 63 ICBMs and long range nuclear missiles. With multiple warheads counts inlcluded this means some 135 warheads fielded, not including some 18 to 27 DF-4 warheads. This brings the overall Chinese delivery capability to between 153 to 162 very capable nuclear warheads. In addition, the article says, China's submarine forces field two Type 094 SSBN (ballsitic missile nuclear submarines) each capable of some 36 missiles or 72 total for the Chinese JL-2 long range SLBM and an additional 12 JL-1A IRBMs on antoher submarine, brings the sea-based nuclear warhead count to 84 and the total Chinese warhead count up to 246 worst case. A new generation of SSBN will carry 24 SLBMs and several are in production now. The DF-5 can carry a megaton yield class weapon, and the DF-31A carries Mutiple Independent Reentry Vehicles (MIRV) armed with up to 3 to 6 actual weapons plus decoys, the yield of each weapon estimated at 100KT. ³³

March, 2008: A recent article from the Strategy Center on the Chinese exhibits at the International Defense Exhibtion (IDEX) shows an alarming jump in the number of new vehicles as well as reaffirms some earlier leaks on new Chinese weapons. Also included is an 800 troop LPD that can also launch up to for largfe hovercraft assault vehicles, ideal for an attack on Taiwan or anywrhere in the China Sea. See the Q1-08 New Weapons MILNET briefing for more information.

2008: U.S. Department of Defense 2008 Assessment: Military Power of the People's Republic of China (PDF: 30MB)

5/2005: Controversy over the delicate balance in military to military relations between U.S. and PRC military, led the CRS to publish a report detaling the issues and a rather long chronology of mil-to-mil affairs. Like many CRS reports, this one does not necessarily draw any conclusions, leaving much up to the interpretation of the reader. It does however, do a fine job of pointing out how treacherous the ground being walked upon really is. A must read for those concerned with the U.S. relationship with China. ³¹

4/20/2005: Several reports have emerged suggesting that China is expanding his reach all the way into the Americas -- A recent report from the Congressional Service indicates that China is looking at certain countries in Latin America "to gain greater access to needed resources -- such as oil, copper, and iron...additional goal is to isolate Taiwan by luring the 12 Latin American and Caribbean nations still maintaining diplomatic relations with Taiwan to shift their diplomatic rcognition to China." ³⁰

3/23/2005: China is putting pressure on Australia to refute or at least modify its treaty with the United States that pro vide for reciprocal aid in time of war, a treaty that was invoked by Australia the day after 9/11 in 2001. Australia has rejected the call and offered strong support, the Australian foreign ministry saying they had no intention of amending any facet of the treaty with America.

3/14/2005: Mainland China 's Assembly passed a motion (2000 to 2) that would make it illegal for Taiwan to declare its independence. The law, which is interpreted by many to just be another form of saber rattling, provides for a legal basis (as if the dictatorship required a legal basis) for taking military action against Taiwan should they actually declare their independence. Taiwan of course, made loud noises of protest, but at the same time can do nothing. The U.S., Taiwan's chief ally in the region condemmed the PRC move, however, also does not have much else they can do. Perhaps the movement of a carrier into the region could show support for Taiwan, however, the PRC might believe this provocative and further escalate a new source of tension.

The Chinese Threat to the Asian Theater

The entire area touched by the Indian Ocean and South China Sea have felt the effects of Chinese threat for centuries. Modern times have not brought an improvement. Taiwan, once a part of an outlying province of China, now finds itself struggling to remain independent, looking at Hong Kong with a suspicious eye now that the small island in the Formosa Strait has become the property of mainland China. Indeed, the treaty with the U.S. for protection of Taiwan is the most contentious treaty for the U.S. in its long history, and may, someday, draw America into a real shooting war with the mainland when the Chinese finally tire of the charade called the Republic of China. Note too that the impact on the world's electronics industry of a lost Taiwan would be worse than a successful bombing of the world's financial markets. Recent moves by mainland China have fostered anger and increased mistrust from the government on Taiwan, threatening once again to escalate toward actual physical conflict. ¹⁷

Chinese Air Force (PLANAF)

The Chinese Air Force Fields 3200 - 4300 combat aircraft (range due to possible purchases and retirement activities)

#	Designation	Mission
Fighters
1900	J-6/MiG-19	Air Superiority, ground attack, recon, trainer
720	J-7/MiG-21	Air Superiority, ground attack, recon, trainer
222	J-8 I/II/III
55	J-11/Su-27SK
440	Q-5 (MiG-19)	Air Superiority, ground attack, recon, trainer (20-40 may be in nuclear role with range of 400km)
Bombers
307	H-5/II-28	ex-Soviet licensed bomber
142	H-6/Tu-16	ex-Soviet licensed bomber (some may have been converted to air-to-air refueling tankers), also estimated that 120 of these can carry nuclear gravity bombswith a combat radius of 1,800 km to 3,100 km, 20 are used in Naval maritime operations
Transport
10	II-76	Transport
-	Y-5/An-2	Transport
-	Y-7/An-24	Transport
-	Y-8/An-12	Transport (some may have been converted to air-to-air refueling tankers)
Special Mission Aircraft
-	Y-8
-	A-50
Future Production
-	J-8	Production?
-	JH-7	Could possibly be used in nuclear role but it it is not thought to be deployed in that manner
300?	J-10	In Production? (also known as F-10?)
-	Su-27	Production ?
24	Su-30	Production ? ex-Soviet Flanker ($1billion)
30-60	Su-30MK	Purchase plans

Source: China's Military Capabilities, Frank W Moore, IDDS Research Analyst, June 2000 ¹⁸, U.S. DoD report, Chinese Military Power, 2003 ¹⁹, and U.S. DoD report, Chinese Military Power, 2004 ²¹

Chinese Naval Forces (PLANAV)

#	Designation	Mission
Submarines
38	Romeo	Diesel - All that remains of 73 ex-Soviet built specifically for the Chinese, ASW, but well outclassed by China's neighbros, one fitted with YJ-1 anti-ship missile, must surface to launch.
-	Ming (Type 035)	Diesel - Similiar to Romeos, but newer construction
	Song (Type 039)	Diesel - Larger than Ming, more streamlined hull, may be fitted with C-801 or C-802 anti-ship missile - uses skewed propeller, has been refitted to carry YJ-82 cruise missile
4	Kilo	Ex-Soviet diesel submarine, capable of SLBM launch
8	Kilo 636	Advanced Russian model, planned purchase with 3M-54E Novator Alpha ASCM, wire guided test-71ME and 53-65KE homing torpedos
-	Amur	Purchase possibilty (new Russian Sub design)
5	Han (Type 091)	Indigneous design and built nuclear submarine, capable of SLBM launch (JL-1 see missiles below)
-	Type 093	Indigenous, similar in design to Russian Viktor III class (circa 1978) (JL-1 see missiles below) armed with wire guided and wake homing torpedos.
1	Xia (Type 092)	Indigenous Nuclear Submarine, fielding JL-7 SLBM, 12 Ju Lang-1 (JL-1 or CSS-NX-3) SLBMs with a single 200-300 kt warhead and a range of 1,700 km. Never delpoyed outside of regional waters.
4-6	Type 094	Indigenous Nuclear Submarine, which will carry 16 JL-2 missiles, capable of carrying up to six warheads per missile (probably MRVs that are not independently targetable and a range of 8000 km).
Carriers
1	Kiev	Ex-Soviet Big Gun Armed Aircraft Carrier
Destroyers
-	Sovremenny	ex-Soviet Destroyers,m deploys 8 SS-N-22 Sunburn supersonic sea-skimming ASM and SA-N-7 Gadfly naval surface-to-air missile.
2	Sovremenny	Planned Purchase from Russia
4	Luhai	Indigenous 6000 ton destroyer
2	Luhu	Indigneous 4000 ton destroyer - 8 C-802 ASMs, a domestically built Crotale SAM launcher ASW torpedoes and mortars, and many guns, 2 Harbin Zhi-9A helicopters, which are used for ASW and anti-ship missions
15	Luda I/II	Indigenous 3700 ton destroyer fielding 6 C-201 ASMs, ASW torpedoes and mortars, and a heavy gun armament (130 mm and 37 mm gun turrets)( on Luda II aft 130 mm and 37mm replaced with helo pad and hanger) Two of the class have French Crotale launcher
1	Luda III	Indigenous 3700 ton destroyer fielding 6 C-801 ASMs, ASW torpedoes and mortars, and a heavy gun armament
Frigates
6	Jaingwai	Indigenous 2250 ton ASW Frigate, C-802 ASMs, a domestically built Crotale SAM launcher ASW torpedoes and mortars, and many guns, 1 French Dauphin helicopters, which is used for ASW and anti-ship missions
27	Jianghu I	Indigneous 1700 ton ASW Frigate, 4 C-201 ASMs, 2-4 100 mm guns, plus varying numbers of lighter caliber guns
1	Jianghu II	Same as Jianghu I but replaces aft armaments with helo pad and hanger
3	Jianghu III/IV	Same as Jianghu I but replaces missiles with 8 C-801 or C-802 ASMs
Amphibious Assault
46	-	Amphibious assault - 42 are under 2000 tons, none larger than 4800 tons (3 under construction)
3	-	ex U.S. Navy LSTs (circa 1942-1943)

Source: China's Military Capabilities, Frank W Moore, IDDS Research Analyst, June 2000 ¹⁸and U.S. DoD report, Chinese Military Power ¹⁹

Missile Threat

#	Designation	Mission
Conventional (450, up to 75 new per year, DoD Estimated 500 in 2004 ²¹)
-	DF-11/M-11	Dong Feng, SRBM, 300 km range, a few may be capable of nuclear payload
-	DF-15/M-9	SRBM. 600 km range, a few may be capable of nuclear payload
Nuclear
-	DF-3A/CSS-2	MRBM 2800 km range, semi-mobile, liquid fueled, slowly being phased out
20	DF-4	LRBM 4800 km range, liquid fuel, fixed site (CSS-3?)
20	DF-5	LRBM 13,000 km, liquid fuel, deployed in 1981 (CSS-4?)
-	DF-31	LRBM, 8000 km range, probably now in full production, testing in 1999 and 2000.
48	DF-21/CSS-5	MRBM 1800 km range, solid fuel on mobile launchers
-	JL-1/CSS-NX-3	SLBM based upon DF-21, approximate range of 1000-1800 km
-	JL-2	SLBM with six warheads (possibly independently targetable MIRV)
20	CSS-4 Mod 2	SRBM (13,000 km range, liquid fueled) (see DF-5)
-	CSS-6	SRBM (600 km rnage) (see DF-15) solid rocket road mobile
-	CSS-7	SRBM (300 km range) (see DF-11) solid rocket, road mobile

Source: China's Military Capabilities, Frank W Moore, IDDS Research Analyst, June 2000 ¹⁸and U.S. DoD report, Chinese Military Power ¹⁹Bolded Missile types are thought to be replacing older missiles and will pose a major threat with four to five years (i.e. in 2005 to 2007 timeframe)
The chart above does not include a vast number of ex-Soviet SAMs purchased in the last four decades, including an estimated $500 million used to purchase SA-20 SAMS in 2003. ²¹

Chinese Army (1.8 million ground forces)
(7 military regions with 27 military districts. Within the 7 military regions lie 21 Group Armies, each containing about 60,000 personnel. The Group Armies contain among them 44 infantry divisions, 13 infantry brigades, 10 armored divisions, 12 armored brigades, 5 artillery divisions, 20 artillery brigades, and 7 helicopter regiments)

#	Designation	Mission
Main Battle Tanks (10,000)
-	T-54/T-55	ex-Soviet
6,000	T-59	Chinese produced (approximately 8000 built in 1960s, some may be phased out of service already)
-	T-69	Chinese produced
-	T-79	Chinese produced
-	T-80	Chinese produced, 1980s technology with computerized fire-control system, a laser range-finder, a gun stabilizer, better suspension and power plant, and night-fighting equipment.
-	T-85 I/II/III	Chinese produced in 1990s, adds to the T-80 design an automatic loading system, which reduces the crew to from 4 to 3
-	T-90 I/II	Resembles the Russian T-72 and is believed to be similar in performance, may not yet be in full production
-	Type 96	1500 expected to have been deployed by end of 2005
Light Tanks (2000)
-	Type 62	Scaled down Soviet T-59
-	Type 63	Based on Soviet amphibious PT-76

The Chinese Nuclear Threat

According to the annual report on acquisition of WMD technology produced by the DoD for the U.S. Congress,:

"Chinese entities continued to work with Pakistan and Iran on ballistic missile-related projects during the second half of 2003. Chinese entity assistance has helped Pakistan move toward domestic serial production of solid-propellant SRBMs and has supported Pakistan's development of solid-propellant MRBMs. Chinese-entity ballistic missile-related assistance helped Iran move toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of ballistic missiles. In addition, firms in China provided dual-use missile-related items, raw materials, and/or assistance to several other countries of proliferation concern-such as Iran, Libya, and North Korea.

The United States imposed sanctions on a number of Chinese entities during the reporting period, including the China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) and the China Precision Machinery Import/Export Corporation (CPMIEC)." ⁸

The report is produced using declassified information gleaned by the Defense Intelligence Agency and provides a good look at what U.S. intelligence analysts find concerning -- specifically that while China is making moves to appear helpful and promising to join various non-proliferation regimes, the country continues to be a WMD proliferation.

In the 2001 DoD Report (the 2003 report was not released due to Congress allowing, that at a time of war, the DoD need not produce the declassified, professionally produced version), China's proliferation challenges had not been met by that nation:

"China is qualitatively improving its nuclear arsenal through a modernization program and, by 2015, China likely will have tons tens of missiles capable of reaching the United States...is is expanding its SRMB force, which it likely views as an important tool for military and politically influence in the region. It also is improving its ICBM capability by developing two road-mobile solid-propellant ICBMs and a new submarine launched missiles (SLBM).

"...funding for China's NBC and missile programs will likely increase gradually...total military funding levels are expected to average between $55 billion and $70 billion (1998 dollars) annually between 2000 and 2004."

China currently has over 100 nuclear warheads and is increasing the size, accuracy, and survivability of its nuclear missile forces. It is likely that the number of deployed Chinese theater and strategic systems will increase in the next several years.

"...China currently is not believed to be producing fissile material for nuclear weapons, but has a stockpile of fissile material sufficient to improve or increase its weapons inventory

"...Thus, China's stated doctrine reportedly calls for a survivable long-range missile force that can hold a significant portion of the U.S. population at risk in a retaliatory strike. As China's strategic forces and doctrine further evolve, Beijing will continue to develop and deploy more modern ICBMs and SLBMs."

"...China currently has about 20 CSS-4 ICBMs with a range of over 13,000 kilometers, which can reach the United States [and Europe - MILNET]. Some of its ongoing missile modernization programs likely will increase the number of Chinese warheads aimed at the United States...China has conducted successful flight tests of the DF-31 ICBM in 1999 and 2000; this missile is estimated to have a range of about 8,000 kilometers [sufficient to strike Europe and Alaska - MILNET]" ⁹

A search for evidence of China changing this course of development since the 2001 report has proven fruitless. Indeed, MILNET sources in the intelligence community continue to stress that China has not pulled back from any of the strategic threat producing developments and instead have increased funding and activity. China remains one of the main U.S. focuses seconded only by a focus on the War on Terror.

Moreover, the 2004 report from the U.S. DoD states:

"The PLA is focused on developing a variety of credible military options to deter moves by Taiwan toward permanent separation or, if required, to comple by force the integration of Taiwan under mainland authority. A second set of objectives, though no less important, includes capabilities to deter, delay, or disrupt third-party intervention in a cross-Strait military crisis."

"...the PLA's determined focus on preparing for conflict in Taiwan Strait -- to include accelerated deployments of short-range ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan -- casts a cloud over Beijing's declared policy of seeking "peaceful reunification" under the "one country, two sysetms" model." ²¹

With the recent Chinese Assembly act which prohibits sessation by Taiwan ¹⁷, it is abundantly clear that China is not about to take military action off the table.

Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons

From the U.S. Department of Defense report, "Proliferation: Threat and Response, 2001" ⁸ we have the following tables of the WMD Threat from China:

Click to enlarge

Proliferation

China is, in the eyes of non-proliferation experts, the worst proliferator of nuclear and missile technology in the world. It's products go to rogue states, which in turn trade amongst other nations at will. While China claims to be modifying their policies in this regard, they have not refrained as of March 2005. The facts from the 2001 DoD report remain the same, with only some small concessions made by Pakistan as U.S.-Pakistani relations have led to a reduction in NBC weapons transfers between Pakistan and China. Another new development has been that Libya has sworn off its nuclear weapons program however it is not clear if that country will no longer receive dual use technology to bolster a "peaceful" use of nuclear power. Iran and North Korea, however, remain steady and happy customers of all Chinese products of mass destruction as well as conventional arms.

In judging the last two decades, it is clear that the Chinese-Pakistani combination has proliferated NBC more than any other combination except combing that of Russia, and with a focus on nuclear technology, the China and Pakistan have proliferated to the most dangerous countries in the world, only seconded by Russia and its former self, the Soviet Union. Russian continues to supply Iran however, and may overtake the Chinese-Pakistani combo in this decade.

According to Shirley Kan of the Congressional Reporting Service ²⁹, both the Clinton and the succeeding Bush administrations have placed sanctions on various entities within China for their proliferation activities, and the U.S. remains focused on the Chinese proliferation problem.

Chinese Military Future

Some analysts have looked at Chinese conventional forces and waved a hand at the possible threat with derision. Naturally, those interested in making money in China and their supporters in government have latched onto that type of analysis with glee. Unfortunately these analysts use highly conservative estimates and just as unfortunately, base their analysis on publicly available figures. However, for the last three decades, U.S. military officers with access to classified analysis have sounded the warning, in somce cases in publicly available white papers (several mirrored on MILNET and listed in the Source section at the end of this briefing).

A more rationale analysis was performed by the Public in Interest News Report, which said, "China stands to be a major power force in Asia. Though currently a relatively weak country, China is on a fast track toward economic modernization as its economy continues to rapidly grow. If China is able to continue its economic modernization program without any major obstructions, it will become the richest and most powerful state in the world -- at least from a statistical point of view -- surpassing even the projected economic and military power of the United States." ⁴

A anonymous MILNET source confirms that China is building more than basic infrastructure and their increase in military budget is going toward weapons systems that can and will threaten its neighbors as well as present clear and present danger to U.S. forces traversing or residing in theater and far beyond the publicly available reports. The notion is also supported by various analysts sounding the alarm, however if difficult to confirm.

In various white papers (see footnote 5 for an example), U.S. military officers clearly spelled out how China is modernizing their forces. In fact, the Chinese started their revamping of their military long before Rumsfeld realized the U.S. military was still preparing for a war that wasn't to come -- the war against Russian invasion of Europe.

In the 2000 annual report to Congress on Chinese Military Power the U.S. Department of Defense states,

"China’s grand strategy aims for comprehensively developing national power so that Beijing can achieve its long-term national goals...Beijing’s strategy also prioritizes addresses the development of military power as a secondary complement to policies of reform and opening up for ensuring that China’s economic power will rise; for protecting important national interests; and, for supporting a policy of eventually playing the role of a great power and perhaps emerging as the preeminent power in Asia...the senior leadership elite reaffirmed its priority emphasis on economic growth, scientific and technological development" ⁴

The 2003 and 2004 report echo this conclusions as well as an increasingly more alarming trend toward increased rate of modernization as well as movement to focus attack capability toward Taiwan and the Strait. ^19,21
Also it is clear that China is moving faster than many believe they could, perhaps owing to their unique ability to focus. In 1996, Dr. Bates Gill and Lt. Colonel Lonnie Henley at the U.S. Army War College were pretty sure that China would remain a decade behind the U.S. its attempt to Revolutionize its Military Affairs (RMA) ⁶. More recent analysis shows China is less than ten years behind, and progress is increasing. World aid from various sources is perhaps inadvertently, helping the Chines in their overall goal of becoming both an economic and military giant in the world.

The think tank, The Council on Foreign Relations clearly believes China's military threat is far from abating:

"For years, Chinese arms sales to "rogue states" have been one of the most contentious issues in Sino-U.S. relations. China has been accused of selling nuclear technology to Pakistan and Iran; missile technology to Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, and Libya; materials used to make chemical weapons to Iran; and advanced communications equipment to Iraq, North Korea, and the Taliban when they ruled Afghanistan. Such arms exports earn money, experts say, and they strengthen ties to important regional actors such as Pakistan and Iran. Although the Chinese have made some progress on controlling their exports, their systems do not yet meet international standards."
"Chinese companies did supply advanced communications equipment to Afghanistan—although most experts say that such projects halted after September 11. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has also noted that Chinese-made weapons had been found in caves occupied by pro-Taliban forces. But it's still not clear how and when the weapons got there, especially because arms dealing has been going on for decades in Afghanistan."
"Pakistan was China's oldest and most stable ally. China was Pakistan's largest supplier of weapons, and it allegedly provided technology and materials for Pakistan's nuclear weapons program in the early 1990s. Most analysts say that since the attacks, China has been worried by the speed with which Pakistan—shunned by the West after testing its first nuclear weapon in 1998—has swung behind America, in return for which America has lifted sanctions and offered billions of dollars in aid and debt rescheduling. The Pakistani leader, General Pervez Musharraf, has already visited China twice since the attacks, assuring his Chinese counterpart, Jiang Zemin, that "the cornerstone of Pakistan's foreign policy is its close association and relationship with China." ¹

MILNET Contributor Alan Simpson is also worried about China, dubbing the nation the Sleeping Dragon in his article, Beware The Dragon Awakes . He states, "Half a world away the Peoples Republic of China is quietly building towards the long predicted war with the United States. There are no parades, no cigar smoking despot firing a rifle into the air. Just quiet preparations, with deadly precision....For many years the window of conflict has been considered by some to be between 2010 and 2025, the closer to 2025 the better the chances of China winning the war." ⁷

As a weapons supplier, China continues to provide advanced weaponry to the world -- as the 2003 unclassified CIA report Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31, (December 2003) states,

"Advanced Conventional Weapons. During 2003, China remained a primary supplier of advanced conventional weapons to Pakistan, Sudan, and Iran. Islamabad also continued to negotiate with Beijing for China to build frigates for Pakistan's Navy and to cooperate in developing the FC-1 fighter aircraft." ⁸

China continues to use the propoganda channel to create the image that they are reducing their rogue nation status, surprising many analysts with a white paper on conventional arms exports which extols the naton's efforts to both license and register sales with the U.N. and stating that the PRC has reduced arms sales to a level well below the usual western exporters such as the U.S., U.K., and Russia. ¹¹

However, the Canadian Intelligence service concluded in 2003 that

"China continues to supply advanced conventional weapons, including fighter aircraft, to several countries. While China is not a major player in the international arms market, its proliferation activities are nonetheless troubling. Its sales contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to destabilizing “rogue” regimes, and China sells considerable amounts of dual-use technology." ¹³

China and Terrorism

China's role in terrorism is unclear in the public eye. U.S. and European intelligence analysts have so far kept most of their recent analysis close to chest. The Chinese themselves have released some information, obstensibly to find a common ground with western intelligence services and perhaps to deflect from other human rights abuses as the PRC attempts to demonstrate a less harsh side and hopes to reenter the world community of nations.

The most virulent and active terrorist group in China appears to be the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, a mainly muslm populated separtist group from the Xinjaing province. Supposedly the ETIM gives the PRC no end of misery and are essentially made up of the Uighur minority group living mostly in the province. According to the PRC, they can be blamed for 200 violent incidents between 1990 and 2001. ¹ The Chinese also claim the group has a large percentage of its finances sourced from al-Qaeda as part of that international groups fomenting and support of like minded terrorists, as well has received trainig in al-Qaeda camps in Afhanistan prior to the U.S. ouster of the Taliban.

Some pubic analysis appears to be enlightened. For instance, according to the Council on Foreign Relations in its Terrorism Q & A on China ¹, the Chinese:

"Chinese President Jiang Zemin called President Bush the day after 9/11 ...expressed his condolences."
"Chinese counterterrorism experts have met with U.S. officials to share intelligence on the Taliban and Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda terrorist network."
However, China has "firmly opposed broadening the war on terrorism to Iraq"
"On the military front, Beijing has shared some intelligence with the United States and, in what some experts call the clearest sign of support for the U.S.-led efforts, taken the noteworthy step of letting a U.S. aircraft carrier stop in Hong Kong in November 2001 on its way to the war in Afghanistan."
"China wants the world to see its campaign against Islamic separatists in Xinjiang province—which borders on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia and has a mostly Muslim population—as part of the global war on terrorism."
"Chinese officials blame Muslim militants from the Uighur minority group for more than 200 violent incidents between 1990 and 2001. China accuses Uighur separatists in Xinjiang province of receiving financial and material aid from al-Qaeda in their struggle to establish an independent state."
"China’s government says that it has recently arrested more than 100 Chinese terrorists who were trained in Afghan camps, and the Bush administration seemed to give more credence to China’s charges in August 2002 by adding the East Turkestan Islamic Movement—which China accuses of having close ties to al-Qaeda—to the U.S. list of foreign terrorist organizations."
"In 1996, Beijing helped set up a regional diplomatic grouping called the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), with members including China, Russia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. The SCO seeks to increase trade relations and foster cooperation against "terrorism, extremism, and separatism."

A recent alert in the U.S. dealing with Chinese-Muslim terrorists supposedly attempting to smuggle a dirty bomb into Boston, Massachusetts has attracted much media attention ¹⁰. This will serve to help China's position that they have home grown terrorists, rather than perhaps a more truthful answer -- al-Qaeda is recruiting non middle eastern radicals, focusing on asian and Caucasians since they tend to travel freely in Europe and the American hemisphere.

.

Conclusions:

While China's public statements and indeed some of their more recent public actions appear to indicate a softening of their threatening posture to the region around them and indeed to the entire world, their unpublicized activities and indeed their continued support for older programs indicates that the nation remains a large threat to the world. In fact, it is the assessment of MILNET and other analysts that there remains a Cold War intensity with respect to strategic weapons systems, and rather than a lessening of tensions in the region, China appears to speak softly and carry a rather large nuclear, biological, and chemical stick that could and will be used against its foes should it feel threatened or see a weakness that can be exploited.

China publicly states it has its own terrorism problem with Muslim terrorists living and active in country, and proports to be active in the War on Terrorism. While there has been some cooperation in that respect, it is not clear that this is either a long term commitment or anything more than public relations. Only time will tell.

Chinese economic growth will be a harbinger of Chinese military growth as the nation shows no sign of lowering the percentage of GNP devoted to military spending and in fact the amount has increased in the last five years and shows no sign of lessening. An approach to limiting Chinese Military spending would be to simply focus on keeping Chinese economic growth in check, thereby limiting the overall GNP with a resulting limit on increases in actual monies available for military spending.

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