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Iranian Progress Toward
Developing Nuclear Weapons
July 28, 2004, Updated 06/17/2007
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| TimeFrame |
Event |
Analysis |
| 1967 |
Shah of Iran institutes exploratory
research
into indigneous production of weapons grade fissile materials.
Small research reactor purchased from the U.S. and brought online at
the Tehran University |
The Shah of Iran was increasingly
worried about
Iraq and Israel, both hostile and well known as also exploring nuclear
capability. 1 |
| 1970 |
Iran signs the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty |
The move is cited by U.S. officials
as an
example of how peaceful dissemination of nuclear technology can and
should take place. This niavite is mourned by non-proliferation
experts and will come back to haunt the western world. |
| 1979 |
Islamic Revolution Halts all NBC
research |
While other international relations
effects of
the revolution in Iran were deemed disastrous, perhaps this was a
temporary silver lining in the cloud for diplomats and
non-proliferation experts. This was short lived however, as only
a decade later the programs were back on again. |
| 1984-1988 |
Iran acquires SCUD-B Missiles from
Libya and/or
North Korea. Nearly 100 fired at Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war, but
armed with only conventional warheads. Also fired 10 Chinese Silkworm cruise missiles one hitting U.S. flagged tanker in Persian Gulf another striking in Kuwait. |
Capable of delivering a prototype
nuclear weapon
300 kilometers. The Iranian Defense Miniistry also began its own indigenous missile development program as well as acquired Chinese SA-2 equivalent missiles (100 km range) and SCUD Cs from North Korea (200 km range). |
| 1988 |
Major loss in the Iran-Iraq War, led
to Hashemi
Rafsanjani's covert pledge to never allow Iran to be the victim again,
some believe aiding in his election as the President in 1989. |
While Iran's so called moderate
government
postures to win favor in Europe and other western capitals, their
actions clandestinely prove otherwise. One intelligence
analyst from AFI claims Iran is the world's leading terrorist exporter
and will also stop at nothing to a)develop NBC weapons capabilities,
and b) use the technologies to futher their power base in the Middle
East. MILNET believes this analysis is on the mark, with further
evidence of this Iranian mindset shown througout this document.
Included are eyewitness reports from covert operators who found
themselves targets or near targets of Iranian covert operations to gain
knowledge and material on the open and black markets. |
| 1988-1996 |
Iran agrees to purchase and begins
to take
delivery of portions of a research reactor that could easily be used as
a training reactor for a plutonium (weapons grade) production
facility. (purchase in 1990 from China). China also sells Iran an
electromagnetic isotope
separation unit which can be used to generate enriched uranium for
weapons grade material. |
Documented
publicly in 1996, however it is
thought that classified intelligence data shows purchases and delievery
of equipment began in the late 1980s. Intelligence analysts cite
confirmed dual and single use purchases thorughout the period. Several anonymous sources in the Intelligence community indicate covert sanctions or clandestine pressure brought to bear by western intelligence agencies against the suppliers in nations "friendly" to U.S. and its allies. Some of these companies are in allied nations as well. Cited are France,Germany as well as China and a number of the former nations of the Soviet Union. |
| 1994 |
Iran signs purchase agreement with China and U.S. President Clinton enacts an oil embargo against Iran as a sanction. | |
| 1995 |
Iran signs cotnract with Russian for
completion
of Bushehr reactors. |
U.S. Diplomatic response pledges to
add
commercial sanctions to anyone supplying Iran. Few sanctions
follow however, and none against Russia. |
| 1996 |
Adds more Chinese and North Korean
missiles to
the Iranian ballistic missile inventory, including SCUD-C and CSS-8
(modified Chinese SA-2) Also has continued to purchase more capable cruise missiles |
An
open secret 2 were the plans announced and
presumably carried through
to acquire North Korean NoDong missiles which could reach Saudi Arabia,
Israel, or Turkey. Also exposed to the current SCUD-B and SCUD-C
missiles are Afghansitan, Bahrain, India, Iraq,Kuwait, Pakistan, Qatar,
Syria, United Arab Emirates and the Southern Asian nations of the
former Soviet Union. The U.S. publicly available analysis indicates that the Iranians, in 1996, also fielded a number of SU-24 bombers capable of delivering nuclear weapons. |
| 1997 |
U.S. Intelligence indicates with a
very high
confidence 3 , confirmed by several allied nations,
that Iran has
increased funding and effort in their NBC programs as well as made
progress in missile programs. |
Rather than respond with full
denials to U.S.
revleations of hard evidence of the Iranian program, the government has
admitted to existence of equipment choosing deception -- "it's all for
peaceful energy research". The rationale used is that Iran would
rather sell its own non-nuclear energy resources, thus gain revenue,
and use nuclear energy to sustain their modest domestic energy
needs. Meanwhile the technology purchases and builds continue to
point to more than is necessary, and defying the dual use paradigm by
magnitudes. |
| 1998 |
Intelligence Community sources 1
indicate the U.S. and its allies have pressured the Ukrainian
manufacturer of steam turbines, Turboatom to renig on their contract
with Iran. |
This appears to be a waste of time,
since steam
turbines are a necessary development for a peaceful use of nuclear
power, the focus and energy should be on more nefarious items.
Some analysts believe the semi-public revealation may be a cover for
other equipmetn that was being shipped through Turboatom, thus stopping
the turbine shipments may have also severed a clandestine equipment
pipeline. This cannot be confirmed, however. |
| 1999 |
The U.S. finally imposes commercial sanctions against companies in Russia. | Sanctions against Russa itself do not take place leaving many to wonder how effective commercial sanctions against Russian companies will be without a sanction against the country itself. Part of the problem, most analysts believe, is that U.N. sanctions are extremely difficult if not impossible to levy against a permanent member of the U.N. security council, so the U.S. cannot take any Russian sanctions to the next step. |
| 2000 |
The Wisconsin Project publishes an
excellent chronology
4 of
the Iranian Nuclear program after several media outlets cite CIA
information on Iranian progress. Slow progress by the Russian
contractors on the Bushehr complex. |
Some believe Russia is succumbing to
pressure
from the world community and is dragging their feet. But slow
progress is still progress and members of the intelligence community
continue to forecast a nuclear weapon by 2002. |
| March 2001 |
MILNET and AFI publish articles on
the threat
posed by Iran, including not only terrorist activities and support but
the ongoing nuclear program. The U.S. Government and media
outlets also charge Iran with harboring terrorists and continuing to
build a nuclear program. |
Iran's
denial continue to fit the pattern of deception expected. As 2002
looms closer, the Intelligence Community does not alter its estimates
for a nuclear weapon by 2002. |
| 1/29/2002 |
U.S. President Bush names Iran as
part of the
'Axis of Evil' in the State
of the Union Address. Iran denies they support terrorism and
say they do not participate in nuclear weapons trade or development. |
The denials are again, part of the
pattern
against increasing worldwide pressure to own up to their nuclear
program. The President's speech clearly puts pressure on Iran,
Iraq, and North Korea. MILNET publishes an article citing hopes
diplomatic pressure will prevent Iran and North Korea from testing
their first device, and indeed to abandon their programs. MILNET
is pessimistic, however. |
| 12/13/2002 |
CNN Splashes 5
commercial
satellite photo of Iranian nuclear facility and cites U.S. spy
satellite photos
that reveal the site is more than it seems. IAEA demands Iran
reveal the purpose of their nuclear facilities, Iran denies existence. |
U.S. Intelligence analysts and
several anonymous
sources confirm that the Iranian facility has far more traffic in
military weapons researchers than a peaceful energy facility should
host. Clearly something sinister is going on at the site. Iran's denials fit the pattern of deception expected. MILNET and AFI had earlier published articles on the Iranian threat repudiating the denials. |
| 2/9/2003 |
Iran
finally reveals the existence of their nuclear sites and invites in
IAEA, and the follow up report from the IAEA demands more details,
clearly indicating the IAEA has found the evidence that traces of
weapons grade material has been found. Iran refuses. |
U.S. diplomacy may manage to tame
the beast,
however while MILNET hopes
along with most others that diplomacy will succeed, history has shown
that rogue nations tend to use diplomacy as cover while they complete
their work. MILNET believes Iran will be the next nation to test
a
nuclear weapon, if not beaten to the punch by North Korea. Iran's program is thought to be further ahead than North Korea's program, however no clear evidence of fissile material in place prevents the Intelligence Community for confirming either country has a testable weapon. Most analysts will say, however, "Any time Now". |
| 3/17/2003 |
Time magazine 7 splashes
photos taken from their own sources that show the Iranian
facilities and warns that the U.S. may find itself embroiled in another
conflict shortly. (photo is linked to the Time Magazine article and may
get unlinked if Time moves or deletes the image). |
Media
hype and political agendas aside, it is clear everyone must take notice
of the Iranian refusal to reveal their program. Their continued
refusal indicates the secrecy and progress in the program. As the
program gets closer to the completion of a test device, MILNET believes
the dialog will get shriller and the denials eventually to cease, the
refusal to accept or deny being the indicator the weapon(s) are ready. |
| June 2004 |
All
media outlets report on the ElBadarai (IAEA chairman) report 10
that cites
Iran may already have all the ingredients to test a nuclear
weapon. Traces of weapons grade material continue to be found and
the possible sites for weapons grade material manufacture continue to
be overly busy. |
MILNET
concurs with media hysteria in this case, having predicted this from as
early as 1996 and tracked the progress since then. MILNET believes Iran is waiting for the appropriate moment to conduct its test, already having constructed one or more devices. Sources which wish to remain anonymous are split 50-50 on whether the device is actually ready for test. This is a state of affiars very similar to the months leading up to the first test of a device by India. |
| June 2004 |
Federation of American Scientists 9
continues to
support the claims that Iran's nuclear program is sufficient to build
nuclear weapons |
The FAS is perhaps a notorius
anti-U.S.
Government operation when it comes to things nuclear or any sort of
weapon for that matter, making their analysis appear very much
independent of U.S. political interests.. Their site has an
excellent review of the Iranian nuclear puzzle at: http://fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/nuke/
. Their analysis includes the statement: "It is generally believed that Iran's efforts are focused on uranium enrichment, though there are some indications of work on a parallel plutonium effort. Iran claims it is trying to establish a complete nuclear fuel cycle to support a civilian energy program, but this same fuel cycle would be applicable to a nuclear weapons development program. Iran appears to have spread their nuclear activities around a number of sites to reduce the risk of detection or attack." - Federation of American Scientists, Iran Nuclear Weapons, Recent DevelopmentsAlso, MILNET's sources indicate the weapon is built and awaiting the "right moment" to be tested. |
| July 2004 | Iranian Scientists break seals on
centrifuges
that can be used to create weapons grade material |
AP's
George Jahn reports
the IAEA was notified by Iran that it's voluntary lock up of
centrifuges has been lifted and the seals were confirmed broken, only
one month after IAEA demands answers to questions on traces of weapons
grade material found. Irritating the non-proliferation commmunity
is the fact that the IAEA has known for several weeks that the seals
have been broken and the facts were leaked -- the IAEA did NOT report
the incident to the public. Moreover, a state run TV agency was
told the centrifuges had been put back into operation on June 29.
It is not clear from the article how long reporters at AP have
known. The Telegraph
in
the U.K. voiced the opinion that Iran may believe they can take
advantage of the U.S. due to the government being paralyzed by the
election campaign. |
| July 2004 |
Iranian scientists attempting to buy
deuterium
gas |
AP
reports
U.N. diplomats have reported that Iran is attempting to buy deuterium
gas, a substance that is used to boost the yield of nuclear weapons. |
| Sep 2004 |
Iran says they have started to
prepare 37 tonnes
of raw uranium for processing in centrigures |
CNN Reports that Gholamreza Aghazadeh, the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organisation, told reporters in Vienna Tuesday that Iran had begun converting 37 tonnes of raw uranium into fuel for nuclear centrifuges, Reuters reported. One nuclear expert told the news agency that, if enriched, that would be enough material for five nuclear weapons. |
| March 2005 |
Iran Admits Nuclear Facility is
Underground |
The
admission concerns the Natanz facilities and includes centrifures which
are used to process uranium by separting U-238 from precursor U-235, a
necessary step toward creating fissile material for a nuclear weapon.
Yet, Iranian government officials still claim they are not enriching
fuel, directly contradicting their own admissions. |
| May 2005 |
Several reports
indicate the
negotiations with EU representatives are not going well, and
indications are that Iran continues to process materials destined to
aid them in building their first nuclear weapon. |
Some intelligence
sources
indicate that all the while the EU negotiators having been "working
with top officials" in Iran, their weapons and missile programs have
not slackened on bit. |
| May 2005 |
British Prime Minister Tony Blair
states Iran
should be called before the U.N Security Council and explain evidence
that points to their nuclear weapon program as well as their
continued enrichment programs 22 |
Clearly Blair is preparing the way
for tougher
action as Iran rthumbs its nose at European negotiators. |
| May 2005 |
Iranian Parliment votes to continue
enrichment
program all the while still declaring Iranian nuclear program is
strictly for peaceful purposes. 23 |
Many analysts are now looking at
Israel and the
U.S. to begin making preparations for direct action against the known
and suspected nuclear facilities. |
| June 2005 |
Ahighly confidential
International Atomic Energy Agency report states that Iran has been
working with laboratory samples of Plutonium as early as November of
2003, nearly a year earlier than previously thought. |
The revealation
changse the
geometry for analysts attempting to put together the puzzle of the
Iranian nuclear weapons program, dramatically chaniging how soon the
nation could arrive at the ability to build and test a weapon.
With Iran continuing to play the yes, no game in terms of negotiations
with various parties all over the world, and its continuing denial and
deception about a weapons program, this news is a quite a blow to
non-proliferation experts. |
| June 2005 |
Iran's President
Elect Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad says Iran will continue its "peaceful" nuclear program 25 |
With no rationale
reason for a
nuclear program and processes on going that are extremely useful for a
weapons program, the claim of a peaceful program is hardly
believeable. Worse, the hard-liner victory in the Iranian
election inidcates any further diplomacy will fail. Hopes that a
more moderate Iran will cease its weapon program have vanished with the
election. MILNET's opinion is that something other than
diplomatic efforts will be required to prevent Iran from becoming a
nuclear nation. The clock is ticking til the first Iranian
nuclear test. |
| October 2006 |
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert
warned on Thursday that
Iran would have "a price to pay" if it doesn't back down from its
nuclear ambitions, hinting broadly that Israel might be forced to take
action." according to an AP News story. 26 |
The warning comes after a year of
Iranian provocation by Iranian President Ahmadinejad who
is quoted as saying Iran will "...destroy Iran" and refusing to halt
the Iranian nuclear program leading to the production of weapons grade
nuclear material. MILNET has been warning that Israel will be
"boxed in a corner" for over two years now, and it is clear that Israel
is finally admitting publicly what others have been saying
quietly. See the Daniel Project
final report by Louis Rene Beres, et all. |
| November 2006 |
Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad says Iran will have "completed its fuel cycle" by
February-March of 2007, and brags about bringing thousands of
centrifuges online. And then goes on to say the world accepts an
nuclear Iran. 29
. The IAEA report lists several issues with the Iranian program, specificallyo the enrichment facilities at Natanz:
|
Remarkably, the comments occur
with tepid response from all quarters, as if everyone is convinced
there is nothing to be done -- who knows how to stop the
Iranians? This is doubly dangerous, for MILNET believes [OPINION]
that Israel, while watching the tepid response, will decide it is up to
them to do something about the problem, and their solutions will be
both dramatic, swift, and deadly. |
| February-March 2007 |
The IAEA reported
that the Iranian Centrifuge facitlity at Natanz has completed
the 164 unit cascade, adding to the 10 and 24 unit cascades in the
Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant that already existed. The 164 unit
cascade is at the production EFP and in which the first 18 will be
tested shortly. The current enrichment quality is at 4.2% U-235
proving the design efficiency of the facility. Iran continues to
deny remote monitoring of the 3000 machine hall but pledges to allow
frequent inspector visits. Iran also stated that once the hall reaches
500 machines, all monitoring will cease. 34, 35 |
The hall, which is supposed to
eventually consist of some 3000 machines, is clearly aimed at
production of large quantities of highly enriched uranium. Iran's
current enrichment quality is only one pass through the cascades away
from becoming weapons grade material ensuring that at anytime they wish
to manufacture weapons grade material, they are only weeks away from
doing so. The IAEA report, naturally, as their operation remains
totally dependent upon public inspection regimes, ignorant of any
clandestine facilities. The refusal to allow inspections and
monitoring of the EFP facility once the count of machines reaches 500
would only be necessary because at that point, the amount of material
produced and which could be diverted is in the classic weapons
production regime and therefore would be secret. |
| March 2007 |
Iran has refused to cease their
Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant experiments and continued with building the
production EFP facility. The U.N., on March 23, 2007, approved
new, tougher sanctions against Iran, despite Iran's warning that such
sanctions would be illegal and therefore they would be forced
themselves to go "illegal", which implies they will begin to defy the
terms of the NPT and cease cooperation with the IAEA. 35, 36, 37, 38 |
Some analysts (including MILNET)
assume going illegal also means that Iran's statement is the first
public acknowledgement that they will start a weapons program.
Typically nations do not admit to such a program until it is well
underway. MILNET assumes the Israelis may find this announcement
by the Iranians as the trigger for final planning on a direct strike
against nuclear and conventional forces of Iran. |
| April 2007 |
The IAEA reports that Iran's
publicly visible (as inspected by the IAEA) uranium enrichment capacity
has doubled since their last look in March, now operating some 164
separation centrifuges in the gallery they hope to have 3000 such
devices in operation. 39 |
And with incredible naivite, the
IAEA also says that this is not enough capacity to create a bomb in the
near term. As usual, the IAEA, because they are shown any bomb
program discount the ability for the Iranians to hide or operate
centrifuges. Incredibly, they also claim that just because the
enrichment process to date is low in enrichment quality (4% or
thereabouts), that this also means it could still be a decade before
bomb material is produced. This is EXACTLY the logic used with
North Korea, yet they surprised everyone by developing a weapons some
five years before the most aggressive estimates. Clearly the IAEA
has learned nothing from their own dismal track record. |
| September 2007 |
Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is reported by the Associated Press 42
as having stated that Iran now has 3,000 uranium enrichment
centrifuges. The AP story also cites the IAEA 's lower figure of
2,000. |
If we've learned anything from listening to the
IAEA, it is that they really don't have a clue. Their statement
that the number is more like 2000 may be correct, however, next week,
it wouldn't be surprising to hear that they underestimated...and
clearly despite Iran's claim to be cooperating, the key point here is
that the IAEA HAS NOT SEEN the entire enrichment hall at Natanz.
This type of pussy-footing around is exactly what creates the "oops, we
were mistaken" reporting that the IAEA is now infamous for. Look
for Iran to cease cooperation with the IAEA, AGAIN, when news rounds of
sanction are imposed. Then of course, the IAEA count will be
worthless. It should also be noted that Iran may be telling the
truth on their count for the simple reason that they have another 1000
centrifuges elsewhere -- in a location not subject to IAEA monitoring
or indeed outside the knowledge of public sources. Now that is an OOPS. |
| June 2008 |
A Washington Post article cites a report which indicates that Pakistani nuclear proliferaor A.Q. Kahn may have sold Iran the design for a so called "compact" nuclear weapon -- a higher technology nuke that weighs less and is smaller -- ideal for mounting in a ballistic missile nosecone. The information comes from drawings discovered in the investigation in 2006 of Swiss businessmen Maroc, Urs, and Friedrich Tinner who identified by the U.S., U.K and IAEA investigators as black market smugglers of nuclear secrets. 40 | The report is being cited by David Albright a
"prominent nuclear weapons expert who spent four years researching the
smuggling network." The blueprints allegedly "offered
instructions for building a compact device...The lethality of the
device would be little enhanced, but its smaller size might allow
delivery by ballistic missile." Albright is also a former IAEA
inspector according to the Washington Post article. 40 High tech nuclear weapons use various methods to enhance the explosive power -- for instance by squirting key chemicals into the blooming detonation to better "burn" the nuclear material and thus convert more of its mass into energy. Also construction details can ensure less of the nuclear material is blown away from the hot center of the nuclear reaction, thus keeping more nuclear "fuel" close by to participate in further mass conversion. Thus a smaller weapon can produce the same nuclear yield with less overall heavy and bulky weapons grade material. The release of this information some two years after its discovery may indicate an increase in U.S. support for stiffer sanctions. At the same time, the U.K. announced it would be supporting much more stringent sanctions against Iran, beginning with a ban on business with Iran's largest bank. |
| July 2008 |
An Associated Press article 41
reports that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has stated that Iran
now posesses 6,000 uranium enrichment centrifuges. The statement
was made in a speech to university professors in the city of Mashhad,
Iran. Earlier IAEA reports said bak in April of 2008 that
attaining a number of 6,000 was plausible by summer, making it quite
likely that the Ahmadinejad statement something more than a macho boast. The number is troubling because in February of 2008, Iranian officials confirmed they had begun installing IR-2 centrifuges that churn out enriched material at a rate more than double that of Iran's earlier centrifuges. Iran has stated their intent to move to full rate production using some 54,000 centrifuges. |
If you assume Iran can add 3,000 new centrifuges
every quarter, they will have an additional 6,000 by years end.
This puts enough centrifuges in place to produce a weapon in LESS than
18 months as ealier thought possible. Once again, the predictors
who have not been alarmed by Iran's "peaceful" nuclear program are
showing signs of embrassment. Unfortunately, OOPS is not a good
thing to hear from the IAEA or the U.S. Congress when it comes to
Iran's nuclear program. |