A MILNET ANALYSIS
A leading Independent Defense & Intelligence Web-based information source in the United States

Bookmark www.milnet.com     Contact milnet@milnet.com

_____________________________________________________________________________________

CAUTION:  MILNET is in Nay-Sayer mode.  In keeping with the last briefing, It's Tough Being The Leader, MILNET presents first of perhaps many scenarios that we hope U.S. leaders can consciously avoid or perhaps execute in such a manner as to escape the nasty effects postulated...
 

Avoid Turning Pakistan Into Another Iran

Most of MILNET contributors as well as those we have interviewed on the subject of our relations with the Middle East agree, the United States need to be more careful "who we get in bed with" (to use the least politically correct phrase we can muster without resorting to profanity).

Well in one case (and to carry this metaphor just a little further), we've already thrown the sheets back and made the leap.  The bed, of course is a metaphor for our budding relationship with Pakistan.  President Pervez Musharraf, while attempting to do his best to hold the dicey position between hardliners in his country, Islamic Extremists surrounding him (of both Sunni and Shiite persuasion) and the rest of the world who are not prone to Islamic Extremism, is not exactly our best bed-fellow.

A dictator to be sure, and a military dictator at most times, Musharraf is making promises to all sides faster than a really good Blackjack dealer flailing cards in Vegas (having switched metaphors, we will now dazzle you with our brilliance).  In fact, Musharraf has demonstrated that his government and its policies are so shotgun like that he has the dubious honor of being liked by few and pretty much hated by all.  And naturally, we seem to be his biggest booster.  Oops!!!
 

Entering the Deep Dark

Here is the worst case scenario for U.S. leadership -- one we hope can be avoided.  Perhaps knowing IS half the battle and a word to the wise will be helpful.  Sensing that a few clichés may have made you ready to click the close button, we hurriedly continue with our story.

As the U.S. and allies continue to chase Taliban and Al-Qaida across craggy mountain tops and in and out of caves a bear would reject out of principle, we are basically herding them into Pakistan.  Pakistan, where the intelligence organization is known to have bred and nurtured the Taliban if not Al-Qaida (need a top secret clearance to see that info we assume).  Where nearly a third of Al-Qaida and Taliban are thought to have fled in the first weeks of the Afghan rescue operation.  Pakistan where perhaps O.B.L. ran to die waiting for kidney dialysis.

Pakistan where at any moment a significant percentage of the population is being taught to hate all things western and can take to the streets in popular revolt against the "western puppet" Musharraf.  Where woman are only a little better off right now than in Taliban land.  Pakistan where Musharraf makes interesting efforts (resembling "rounding up all the usual suspects"*2) to eliminate terrorists bent on reducing India to a molten slag.

Let's look at the parallels between Musharraf and the Shah of Iran - taking our view from the man on the street in Pakistan.


History Repeats Itself

And interesting theme of the recent SpyCruisetm adventure, was the fact that we have much to learn from history.  In fact, history tends to repeat itself because we never seem to learn its lessons and make the same mistakes.  To give George W. credit, he surrounded himself with many civilian and military leaders who have "been there, done that," and perhaps lived to regret it.  So one would assume they can consul him to avoid the pitfalls of history.  And if DCI Tenet is correct and our intelligence guys are still in OJT*2, then its time to head for the bunkers!  If history were to repeat  itself in this case, we could easily wind up with another few items in listing of the worst case scenario:


Avoiding the Deep Dark

The dark scenario can be avoided.  Do not chase Al Qaida and Taliban into Pakistan.  Chase them out -- Here's how:

  1. Put off any attack on Iraq.  If this means yanking Spec Ops out of Iraq, do it.
  2. Pull the division of U.S. troops out of the Balkans.
  3. Slice and dice U.S. divisions everywhere until you have a REALLY BIG FORCE overseas in position to drop just inside the Pakistani border
  4. Quickly frog march the Philippine Army on top of Abu Sayyaff and eliminate them in 30 days, and make forces in action there available.  If this takes thousands of troops so be it.  We shouldn't have gone in there unless we meant to go in quick and get out just as quick.  If we aren't successful in 30 days, screw it, pull out and tip our hat to the Philippine government and say, "Sorry, you're on your own."  We've done it before, we can do it again.
  5. Take all forces available (rapid turn around the U.S.S. Teddy Roosevelt and let's keep three if not four carriers battle groups in the Gulf for awhile).
  6. Line up inside the Pakistani border and march toward Afghan cities, bombing ahead and clearing up behind until we eliminate any of the remaining Taliban and Al-Qaida members.  Make the Taliban and Al Qaida leftovers wind up between places we hold NOT dispersing into the netherlands of a country side (Pakistan)  happy to see them and which will great them with open arms as heroes returning home from fighting the great evil.  (the U.S.).
  7. If you use Afghanis, have a spec ops team with each element.  Ditto for Pakistanis.  Any debate on whether a prisoner is Al Qiada, Taliban or Pakistani national is satisfied by the spec ops commander and his .45.
  8. DO NOT, repeat, DO NOT pursue into Taliban and Al Qaida into Pakistan -- this will only serve up Musharraf as breakfast for the Pakistani version of the Ayatollah Khomeni..
Unfortunately, it may already be too late.  Somewhere in the Pentagon, some war planners are looking at the map with dismay.  It looks like a river's flood plain, with nothing but tributaries that get more and more complex and finally dump into the ocean via a thousand little slivers.  The ocean in this case is Pakistan, a wilderness of anti-American sentiment that would take twice as many troops for force protection than we have total.  Little markers show movement of forces unkindly to the U.S. -- and they are already flooding down the tributaries, headed for the relief of their ocean homes.  See, yet another fun filled metaphor.

* 1 = Thanks to Alan Simpson for reminding us of that excellent line from Casablanca and of course the excellent modern film The Usual Suspects.

 * 2 = On the Job Training - In response to a question during  Congressional testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,  DCI Tenet stated (interestingly the question and answers are not available, there is no copy online -- MILNET has the CSPAN video though!) that the CIA as well as other U.S. Intelligence agencies have been plagued by a lack of experience in their field agents.  Conservative issues pundits like to say this is because of liberal administration effects on tasking and the political correctness efforts of the Clinton administration.  MILNET has learned through interviews with former FBI and CIA officials (agents, officers and managers) that in some cases the "castration of the CIA" by Congress over the years has had an extremely negative effect on the U.S. Intelligence Community.  On one hand, MILNET doesn't believe knitting diversity quilts is proper CIA tasking for fighting anyone other than congressional critics of the "bad boy" culture of the CIA.  But on the other hand, we  know of at least one very experienced agent  who packed it in at that ridiculous and childish exercise.  There were probably more than a few exiting for that and similar  reasons. But the more ominous reasons are probably more accurate.  Our experienced agents and a few too many handlers were taken out by our adversaries or  voluntarily left government work -- who wants to be the target of Soviet/ Russian network sweeps.  In other words, Ames and Hanssen probably have a lot to do with our having few experienced field agents.   But clearly if Tenet is to be believed, his guys and gals are being led by a few experienced managers and there is little or no experience in the field.  If you guys in the field are reading this, don't blame me, I didn't make this up, its in Tenet's answer to a question from the Committee , surely you can figure out how to get a copy of the tape from CSPAN/CSPAN2 -- I'm keeping mine thank you very much.

© Copyright, 2002, Michael Crawford, MILNET

____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
 

distributed worldwide by AFI Research afi@supanet.com