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Since the Taliban and Al-Qaida fled Afghanistan and the action there has changed from forcing a change in government to nation building, there has been much speculation on where both the Taliban and Al-Qaida leadership fled. Clearly the list has grown and facts are not readily available and theories seem to defy verification. MILNET takes a look at the popular theories, and make an attempt to quantify and qualify the reality of these theories.
Where Have Taliban and Al-Qaida Fled: An Update and Analysis
For the purposes of this analysis, we will assume that as we talk about fleeing Taliban and Al-Qaida, that both sets of leadership would probably move together or at least in directions similar to each other. And, in order to simplify the matter, we will use the Taliban group as the identifier for both, with the reader remaining cognizant of our simplification. However, the reader should be cautioned that there is no factual evidence to support this assumption and it is quite possible the two groups moved in different directions immediately upon the beginning of U.S. air and later ground operations in Afghanistan.
It is obvious to anyone looking at a map of the region, that are only a few directions anyone leaving Afghanistan might go. East or South into Pakistan and then India, or West into Iran and then many of the Arab states of Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia. There is North into the former southern states of the former Soviet Union (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan).
We will immediately remove North from our consideration for the purposes of simplification, however, the reader should note that despite the geographical difficulties of heading North, there are religious sanctuaries that might provide aid to those feeling from Afghanistan. However, U.S. surveillance has verified little movement in the northerly direction. Unless someone had built tunnels under mountains into the North out of Afghanistan, then it is a pretty good bet that few if any Taliban or Al-Qaida leaders fled in that direction.
The South, as you look at the map of Afghanistan, is covered as well as the West by the diagonal borders of Pakistan and for the purposes of this analysis, we will cover that direction as we cover East and Pakistan.
This leaves either the West or East routes out of Afghanistan which
give us concern.
East
The Eastern route out of Afghanistan is perhaps least likely when you look at the geography and the religious and cultural welcome facing fleeing Al-Qaida and Taliban. Geographically, Afghanistan is a country filled in the North with steep and nearly impassable mountain ranges. The southwest area, however, is lower in altitude and offer little geographical "resistance" to movement other than distance. The eastern path, however is nearly as difficult a challenge as the North. The effect of the U.S. campaign tended to sweep Taliban and any attendant Al-Qaida forces South and East as the campaign moved from the Northern Alliance areas toward Kabul, the capital. From there the "sweep" continued South as well as East following fleeing Taliban toward the Pakistani border.
One might ask, looking at the maps, why the Taliban would take a very difficult route to escape? The reasons could be that the southern tribes within Afghanistan were not that amenable and helpful to the Taliban. Another reason, which MILNET favors, is that the Taliban was spawned in Pakistan. The Taliban government was rooted both in Wahhabi extremist Muslim teachings in Pakistan, many being students of Islam who wished to build a government based on their extremist Islamic believes. Al Qaida, its leadership being supported by the Taliban and their root culture in Pakistan's Northwestern Muslim region, would also be welcome alone and most likely even more welcome when accompanied by Taliban leadership.
Given the activity at the Pakistani border at Tora Bora and the paths leading out of Afghanistan in the direction of Peshawar in Pakistan, it is clear that there was a large movement of Taliban into Pakistan. And while the Pakistani Army made attempts to close the border, it is also clear from open sources that the border was, even at the time and despite the request of the U.S., a very permeable border. The question then becomes, once across the border, where? Peshawar is a good place to look, as well as the areas between the border and Peshawar, and of course Northwest of the border at Tora Bora.
Media reports have continued to indicate not only welcome arms for the Taliban in northern Pakistan, but a thriving community there. Attempts to verify without being on the ground, naturally is impossible. However, protected sources indicate that the media reports are based upon some level of Taliban sympathy and support for those who fled Afghanistan. The public denials of the Pakistani government seem to match that governments inability to control and indeed inability to conduct meaningful searches of that region. Only a long analysis of the political-tribal nature of both Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as a study of the peoples can adequately paint the picture of why the Taliban could live and function within Pakistan while the government denies and demonstrates an inability to prove otherwise. Unfortunately that is out of scope for this analysis. Suffice to say that it rates quite high on our list of possibilities.
Once in Pakistan, there is a small possibility that a small group of Taliban (or Al Qaida) leadership might be able to work their way to the Pakistani ports on the Arabian Sea. Once there, travel to any state bordering the Gulf of Oman or further Northeast, the Persian Gulf, is almost trivial. Countries tend to be much easier to leave then enter, and Pakistan is no exception. Despite U.S. intelligence agencies watching, MILNET believes, due to statements from our protected sources, that once reaching the Arabian Sea ports, Taliban fleeing Pakistan would be "home free."
Further East of course, is India and few would believe the India-Pakistan
border would easily be penetrated by Taliban. Of course, if someone
were to make that journey successfully, once in India, it might be easy
to make transit South and then West into the Arabian Sea from India as
well as East towards the Far East and the China Sea.
West
Taliban movement within Afghanistan as the U.S/Northern Alliance campaign pushed South, could also have taken a right turn and head Southwest to cross the Iranian border. And while the Sunni Muslim extremists in Iran might not be great friends of the Wahhabi sect that is the root of the Taliban, there is ample evidence that Iran's extremist cleric segment of government still retains significant hold of power in Iran. This group has continually expressed support for Islamic Extremist principles and regularly has joined in calling for Jihad against Israel and their western allies. For this reason, MILNET believes that there is a reasonable possibility that Iran would allow escaping brother extremists to transit their country. There may even be locations within Iran which would tolerate the Taliban to be sheltered, at least for a short period of time.
Iran is also an important consideration in the escape scenario because of its Western border Iraq, and a possible path to country known for its support for the Wahhabi sect and that form of Islamic extremism, Saudi Arabia. Iranian intelligence and security services remain under the control of the radical Islamic extremists represented by the clerics and their segment of the government in Iran. And of course there may also be a possible route across the Iranian countryside to the Persian Gulf -- again making transit to any sympathetic nation only a matter of securing travel by ship.
Thus Iran becomes a route as well as a possible (however less likely) sanctuary for the fleeing Taliban. With financial support already documented, and the possibility of connections between Iraq, Iran and the Taliban intelligence services, it becomes even more possible that covert support for transit or sanctuary would be fostered by the Iranian clerics.
While MILNET would rate sanctuary in Iran much lower than sanctuary in Pakistan, the possibility is still quite possible and remains high in our estimation and that of our protected sources.
The possibility of Taliban transit across Iran, while much lower, does offer a final sanctuary of very high welcome at the end of the journey, despite the trek across Iraq or transit of the Persian Gulf.
Of the final locations, we have mentioned Saudi Arabia. Other
analysts have also considered Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, or even more incredible,
the Palestinian camps in the West Bank, Israel. However unlikely,
experience with terrorists and those granting them sanctuary from the 60s,
70s, and 80s indicate that none of these final locations can be ruled out.
We must not discount the effects and welcome in Arab States that in public
condemn terrorists and in private fund them in dozens of ways. And
just as incredible, some have begun funding the terrorists through public
displays of financial support.
Summarizing the Analysis
Once again MILNET offers one of its infamous tables to summarize our
analysis. The table below orders the escape paths, summarizes the
rational for that routes place in the order, as well as the final destinations
served by that route. In the case of the Western route, we also break
out the final destinations in groups that are most likely to least likely.
We do remind the reader of the previous paragraph...terrorists could and
have found their way across vast areas and differing cultures, so we cannot
rule out any of the locations indicated. The rating for final locations
indicates a possibility relative to all the final locations and includes
a rating for the route as well.
| Route | Transit Country |
|
|
|
| Nation |
|
|||
| East | Pakistan | The Taliban came from Pakistan, Al-Qaida has huge support of the people on the street in Pakistan, and the government of Pakistan does not appear to have control of the regions that one would expect the Taliban to find sanctuary (North of and possibly including Peshawar). | Pakistan | 49% |
| West | Iran/Iraq | While transiting both Iran and Iraq is a long journey, there is evidence both nations financially supported the Taliban and Al-Qaida and may continue to do so financially as well as permit transit. Saudi Arabia as a final destination is high on MILNET's list of possible sanctuary locations | Saudi Arabia | 26% |
| Iran | Despite the differences between Sunni Muslims and the Wahhabi sect which is the basis for the Taliban, MILNET believes the clerics of the Iranian government, via its control of intelligence and security in Iran, would find a place to provide safety for Taliban and Al-Qaida. | Iran | 8% | |
| Iran/Iraq/Syria | Transit through Iran and Iraq and then Syria is a long journey however the final destination of Saudi Arabia or Lebanon raises the probability of this path above that of the probability of the Taliban ending their escape in Syria. As mentioned above, Saudi Arabia constitutes an ideal place for the Taliban to find sanctuary. However, Al-Qaida may not fair as well, since Osama Bin Laden and his Lieutenants are wanted men in Saudi Arabia. Lebanon, however, seems to be a ideal place for any terrorist organization to make its home. |
|
5%
3% |
|
| Iran/Iraq | While Syria continues to support terrorism, there is the possibility that Syria would not like to invite U.S. and to a lesser degree Israeli attacks by physically supporting the Taliban or Al-Qaida. However, Syria is a fiercely independent nation and very close to its Arab neighbors in support of both terrorism and the Taliban, so they make the list as a possible sanctuary. | Syria | 2.5% | |
| Iran/Iraq/Jordan | While Jordan has tended to take a semi-neutral position on terrorism in private, it has signed a peace treaty with Israel. But the very nature of their private neutrality may mean the government might look the other way as Arabian terrorists transit their nation. The low probability results in the cooperative political position in the last few decades with both the U.S. and Israel. | West Bank, Israel | 1.4% | |
| Iran/Iraq/Syria | If the Taliban or Al-Qaida wanted to get to Israel, MILNET believes they are less likely to transit Syria than Jordan | West Bank, Israel | 1.1% | |
| Iran/Kuwait | If the Taliban wished to reach Saudi Arabia MILNET believes the route through Iraq would be a more likely route, and that because of Kuwait's cooperation with the U.S., including very close sharing of intelligence information, that this would make it more difficult to transit Kuwait. | Saudi Arabia | 1% | |
| Iran/Iraq | As cited earlier, MILNET believes that decades of Jordan's near neutral position against its Arab neighbors and terrorist, makes it less likely for Taliban to settle there. | Jordan | 1% | |
| Iran/Iraq/Jordan | If the Taliban wanted to get to Lebanon, MILNET believes it far easier to get their through Syria -- Syria is more likely to grant transit than Jordan. | Lebanon | .8% | |
| Iran/Iraq/Syria/
Lebanon |
While it might appear to be easier to move from Lebanon into Israel, transiting Israel to reach any of the Palestinian refugee camps would be extremely difficult, especially in the April, 2002 environment. | West Bank, Israel | .7% | |
| North | Any Northern
Nation |
There are few passable routes in the timeframe when Taliban or Al-Qaida might have been expected to be fleeing Afghanistan, and the nations to the North, former states in the Soviet Union, while have large Muslim populations, they do not wish to generate the ire of the U.S. or Russia, and also are fiercely independent. They typically have closed borders and certainly have little sympathy for Islam extremists or terrorists. | Any Northern
Nation |
.5% |
Sources:
© Copyright, 2002, Michael Crawford, MILNET
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