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General Tommy Franks is said to be planning to do a "Desert Storm
II" and, according to a story published by the Washington Times, laying
out plans for the Invasion of Iraq. Competitor StratFor, cites the
article as a planned leak and then makes a point to contribute the leak
to a desire by the administration to allow U.S. President Bush to delay
an attack on Iraq while the Mideast problems in Israel continue to dominate
the World's attention. MILNET has a much different take on the Washington
Times Article.
Pentagon Thrashing Out Final War Plans
Citing continued refusal of Iraq to allow weapons inspections, the Pentagon has been building up their set of scenarios for an operation to directly attack Iraq. Since November of 2001, the U.S. government has laid out its reasoning -- ostensibly the dangers of Saddam's increasing stockpiles and dangerous development programs for nuclear and/or dirty bombs. Also in November, the U.S. government released information on the various options -- using U.S. troops only in a unilateral all out attack on Iraq, using indigenous dissidents such as Kurds and other elements in Iraq, and a modified coalition similar to that in Desert Storm.
The Washington Times report cites Franks as having briefed the direct attack scenario. While some details have emerged, it is clear that this is one of several scenarios and our sources indicate that Assistant Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz favors a campaign that relies on air power to place pressure on Saddam to "move out of the box". The idea of flushing Saddam stems from the fact that just about everyone in the Pentagon believes Saddam will never give up, and his removal will require physical capture.
The fact that Hussein has an excellent set of war bunkers deep underground complicates any contemplated attack on Iraq, because the end game almost always has to finish with U.S. troops going in to assault that bunker. Few believe Saddam will do as Hitler did, taking his own life in the last days of the attack on Berlin.
And of course, the sons of Saddam, Qadi in particular, make it even more difficult to end the hold the Baath party has on Iraq. The party would simply anoint one of the sons as the new leader.
Thus the final war plans must include rooting out the Baath party, Saddam's
sons, and then Saddam himself. This is a pretty tall order for any
planner looking at attacking Iraq. Thus the briefing given by Franks
is supposed to have indicated the use of some 500,000 troops.
Air War Plans
Back in November, it was clear that the use of air power would be considered the penultiment softening tool. With the success of air power strikes in Afghanistan, with special forces operators "phoning" in the attacks using GPS generated coordinates, it is now even more desirable to use pinpoint targeting from precision equipped aircraft.
Other Pentagon planners have continued to cite, since November, the need to use Air Power to reduce on the ground casualties -- not in the outer areas of Iraq, but as the U.S. closes in on the government and at last on Saddam's bunkers.
It is clear that attacks from the air will allow U.S. forces to eliminate resistance where targets are relatively independent from the populace. Precision guided weapons not withstanding, attacks on the infrastructure in Baghdad are a totally different matter. With Saddam's tendency to use his own people cruelly, placing hordes of civilians at key military facilities as a means to dissuade attacks for fear of killing the innocent.
However, JDAM's, GPS, and newly equipped avionics and fire control systems on key U.S. aircraft have upgraded the U.S. delivery ability significantly since Desert Storm, allowing attacks with, theoretically, less collateral damage. And new bunker buster bombs have moved out of test and development into production. Indeed some say production quantities of JDAMs and the bunker busters are one of the reasons for delays -- many were used in the attack on Afghanistan and for cave hunting.
Recent Iraqi modifications to their air defense infrastructure, including placement of geographically separate radar transmitters and receivers, may be an attempt to overcome the properties of stealth that makes is so easy for U.S. stealth fighter and bombers to sneak in and take out high strategic value targets early in an air campaign.
Other sources, however, scoff at that plan. U.S. tomahawk missiles
would be targeted at such radar sites that are already plotted on
the map of the country-- transmitters are made easy targets when "lit up"
for testing and/or for surveilling their target areas. Any sites
that have been clandestinely built and which have not been detected before
the battle, will most likely be targeted by "Wild Weasel" aircraft which
go in early to invoke radar lock-ons in order to locate SAM controlling
radar sites. The Wild Weasel can then fire an "anti-radiation" weapon
-- such as the Shrike Missile -- which not only home in on the radar, but
remember where it was even if the controllers shut it down to avoid attack.
Ground Attacks with Indigenous Forces
The Washington Times article cites other Pentagon sources as desiring the use of more ground troops and would include indigenous forces, similar to the U.S. "enrollment" of Northern Alliance soldiers as the spearhead of the Afghanistan campaign.
Unfortunately, our sources point out that while many anti-Saddam leaders in exile exthole their desire to go in and take out Saddam, it is not clear there are enough in number or well organized enough to threaten Saddam's army. Even with Air Power peppering tanks by using A-10s and air to ground missiles and precision guided bombs from other U.S. ground attack aircraft, the anti-Saddam forces would need a mobile, effective Army. Even the at times rag tag Northern Alliance in Afghanistan looked better than what the anti-Saddam force could cobble together in Iraq today.
But even assuming indigenous forces, the end game is the important matter.
It is highly doubtful that the the incredibly high stakes matter of the
capture of members of the Baath party as well Saddam and his sons would
be left to anyone else but U.S. forces. In fact, sources tell us
that there is a plan to put together a special capture team for each of
key individuals, acting almost like protection teams once the target is
found and taken into custody. This would also imply that the U.S.
might have plans for pursuing World Court trials for events during the
Gulf War.
Special Ops Scenarios
And clearly, the Washington Times report points out that, like our own sources, Pentagon officials are still drafting up various war plan scenarios. It is likely that Franks, being the most familiar with the direct ground campaign, would opt to draft this himself, perhaps invoking the memory of Stormin' Norman and his enthusiasm for the end run that so successfully cut off the head of the beast in record time.
But Franks allowed special forces operators to have their way in Afghanistan, differing from Schwartzkopf's reluctant use of special ops. This might indicate that Franks is thinking along the lines of using large ground assault forces to hold battle outside of Baghdad, and then use special ops to infiltrate and surgically remove or capture key individuals in the military campaign.
And contrary to Stratfor's analysis, MILNET believes the Washington
Times story is just another indicator of the seriousness of the U.S. planning
for war in Iraq. In fact, it looks more like information released
prior to George Bush Sr.'s release of U.S. troops into Iraq in Desert Storm.
By allowing a small peek "inside the Kimono", the Pentagon ensures Iraq
understands that planning is nearing the end point, and only action remains.
Basing and the Saudi Question
The Washington Times report also cites concerns in the Pentagon over the use of Saudi bases for strikes into Iraq. With recent Saudi related events indicating a memorable lack of support for the U.S., permission to launch attacks from Saudi bases might be denied by the Saud family. But the Times report indicates there are a number of bases now available besides those in Saudi Arabia. Indeed, MILNET has already commented on the effort to build and establish bases elsewhere, severing or at least lessening the U.S. dependence on Saudi Arabia for attacks.
The Washington Times article mentions a few of the bases that could be used against Iraq, "Turkey, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Oman", but fails to mention recent U.S. negotiations with countries to the North, such as bases in Armenia, Georgia, and even the southern-most tip of Russia which are also within the same distance as Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
Also important to remember is that U.S. carriers lying off the coast of Israel in the Mediterranean Sea are equally within striking distance when refueled in the skies over Jordan, a possibility that increasingly neutral Jordan might allow. Flights from the Persian Gulf also provide a second carrier group to operate in an Iraqi campaign. In fact, the fact U.S. carriers have scaled down outside Afghanistan provide fuel for this an Iraqi attack -- ships heading for home can re-arm, provide crew down time and then redeploy quietly into the Iraqi region.
Another factor the Times article discussed and keyed in on my Stratfor is the deployment of number like 500,000 U.S. troops. Stratfor's comments indicate it would many weeks to move that many forces into place. Unfortunately, those are numbers using resources used during Desert Storm's timeframe. While total troop strength in the Afghan region is estimated much lower than 500,000 men and women, the figure is also classified.
It is quite possible that the Pentagon has been carefully playing the
shell game with U.S. troops as they move CENTCOM headquarters and staging
facilities around. Anyone casually visiting U.S. Naval facilities
in Europe, U.S. and Asia, will notice a surprisingly lack of roll-on/roll-off
ships as well many of the heavy troop, munitions, and equipment carriers.
Not all these ships are sitting in the Arabian Sea off Afghanistan.
MILNET can easily guess where some of these ships may be stationed.
The forces needed may only be a few days away. In fact, by placing
small groups of protected forces in various ports in the region, no single
grouping would attract attention. However on orders to congregate
and prepare for battle against Iraq, it might only be days before the necessary
troops are in region. MILNET believes that the U.S. has taken advantage
of the Afghanistan war and subsequent troop movements associated with that
campaign. Much of what is needed could already be within days of
being ready for an attack.
When to Go
In the end, our competitor, Stratfor has missed the point entirely by applying shadowy and arcane politics to the release of information the Washington Times article represents to them. Our analysis concludes that the Pentagon is wrapping up the different scenarios, preparing for the final debate before Franks presents his plans to the DoD and the President. And as Washington Times reports and Stratfor does not, Cheney's trip was probably more successful then reported. For it is quite possible Cheney wasn't going to ask for help, but to indicate to governments in the region which bases we would be using. MILNET's theory is that Cheney found resistance in the Saudis, and recent events has forced the President to clearly spell out his plans and arguments to the Prince this week, in an effort to reverse that resistance.
For weeks, MILNET has been warning that the time draws near. Each successive event brings us closer, with the exception of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, nothing bodes well for Iraq's escape from U.S. intents to end Saddam's regime. In fact, while causing a short delay, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has made it clear that the U.S. will most likely have to take unilateral action. With another round of weapons inspections discussions with the U.N. coming in May, Iraq may hope to delay action 'til this summer. However, MILNET believes the U.S. is posing for a response to failed inspection negotiations to the be final trigger.
U.S. air campaign could easily kick off the Iraqi invasion, with several weeks of pounding on Iraqi positions, while U.S. troops move in from their already pre-deployed areas -- some arriving in days, some arriving in only a few weeks. MILNET estimates a full fighting force could be in region, ready to make the ground assault, within two weeks max. Reinforcements could begin to arrive from the U.S. in well timed and almost a leisurely pace.
Any indigenous forces, for what they are worth, could add only a little impact to the overall campaign, however, might be more important on the days after Saddam, the Baath party members, and Saddam's sons are no longer in the picture.
In MILNET's view, the most difficult political problem is the formation
of government after Baath and Saddam's followers are ousted.
Sources:
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