Iraq continues to give non-proliferation groups ulcers.  Simply put, no one has any illusion that Suddam Hussein's regime in Iraq has put any limits on their development and manufacture of Weapons of Mass Destruction.  Given production rates of a decade ago, and the fact that there have not been on the ground inspectors since December of 1998, it is pretty well assured Iraq is only a few years from completing the development and fueling of a nuclear weapon.

Moreover the Iraqi biological and chemical weapons programs are most likely in full production today, producing toxins and agents for sale to anyone with the right targets in mind -- in essence, anyone who would like to deploy these weapons against what Iraq's Suddam Hussein feels are the true evils of our  world -- the countries U.S. and U.K., but also any other non-Islamic state that Iraq feels it has a grudge with.  With Suddam's and the terrorist's targets lining up so well, it is not hard to conclude that Iraq poses an immediate, clear and present danger to the security of the U.S. and the world.

This report provides details on the Nuclear, Biological and Chemical capabilities of Iraq, extrapolated from December 1998, using tidbits of information declassified and found in open source locations worldwide.  The report also makes use of anonymous reports of former officials both in government and out as well as those directly in position to observe the fiasco's of U.N. inspections in Iraq.

This report explores:

• The need for military action against Iraq
• The logic and urgency behind the choice of Iraq as a target
• Details the Iraq WMD programs; radiological, nuclear, chemical and biological
• The delivery systems available to Iraq

Why Do We Need To Use Our Military Anyway?

This question has been asked over and over and the answers have collected on two sides of the issue.  Some say
not only do we not need to go to war, we should never do so.  The other side of the issue says there are absolute
reasons to go to war and that when those reasons begin to pile up like weights on one side of a balance scale, they tip the balance to the point where we MUST go to war.  We will take the MUST scenario as our reasoning.

Once attacked, the reasons for going to war become pretty visible.  But even before 9/11 there were plenty of sound reasons to seek out and destroy terrorism.  But many in our country many have believed that terrorism was a small problem domestically and that overseas terrorism was someone else's problem.  After 9/11, only fools would believe we are safe at home in the U.S., only criminally insane leaders would consul waiting again and again for the onslaught of the terrorist.  The balance has tipped to taking the war to the terrorist.

To give some credit to those who fooled themselves into thinking that we were okay at home, remember that the last time we were threatened at home was Pearl Harbor.  We have enjoyed the benefits of a homeland free of strife for 60 years.  Unfortunately, one of the benefits of peace and tranquility is the practice of peaceful existence -- one soon forgets what it is to be truly threatened.  One forgets that the world is a VERY dangerous place still and despite the improvements over the decades since World War II.

On the other hand, there is a clear set of reasoning that has been ignored, a clear example of how wrong we have been.  There is one nation who has been fighting for her survival against these same kinds of terrorists for the entire life of that nation.  Our friends in Israel should have been an example to us of the ferocity and cruelty of the enemy as well as how NOT to try to appease them.

The Logic That Leads Us To Iraq

Former CIA Chief, James Woolsey ¹, on December 13, 2001, in a speech at a conference on Iraq and Terrorism, put forth the supposition that world leaders have no choice but to go after Iraq and to do it very soon.  His rationale was based upon these points, points that we also expand upon as we paraphrase Mr. Woolsey:

• Of all the terrorist threats out there, Iraq is the most urgent threat.  This is due to the constant WMD development efforts.  Even while under scrutiny, Iraq was most likely still heavily involved in development if not production of WMD.  UNSCOM inspector (and former intelligence officer during the Gulf War) Scott Ritter was adamant that Iraq was clearly playing musical chairs with much of the materials that would indicate the secret development efforts in the WMD arena.  And of course, it is even more likely that development has continued unhindered and at a breakneck pace since December 1998 when the direct scrutiny through inspections was halted.
• Other terrorist nations which we might pursue for their sponsorship and support of terrorism such as Sudan, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Iran, or even possibly North Korea are less urgent.  They aren't progressing quickly towards WMD.  Or in the case of Iran the regime is being challenged by popular dissatisfaction with the hard-line regimes.  For instance, the youth in Iran continually demonstrate against the restrictive puritan Islamic Fundamentalism not to mention rejection of the violent Jihad based movements of the extremely militant Islamic Terrorist.  Elements in the government of Iran are visibly fighting the Extremists in that government, making it unlikely that a threat from Iran will surface in the near term.  The only exception to Woolsey's analysis might be Korea, however, conditions in Korea while grim, do not lend themselves to a sudden new threat to the U.S and her allies.
• Of all the terrorist threats, Saddam Hussein is intractable and unlikely to go away on his own.  Again citing Iran, Woolsey's position is that things are changing in that county.  Similarly, the new government in Syria holds out hope.  Woolsey also hinted that Israel was on a track to make some big changes to the hiding places of Hamas, and therefore Syria will either become a target or assist Israel in herding Hamas into their Lebanon hideouts where Israel can focus its efforts to irradicate terrorism.
• The timing is right at the moment since Turkey is expressing great concern about the Northern Kurds.  With Suddam's control being all but completely removed due to the No Fly Zone in the North, Turkey has been facing and dealing with Kurdish migration and resulting local skirmishes and infighting between the refugees.  The timing is right because the Kurds appear amenable to help other anti-Suddam factions at the moment and after the 9/11 attacks on U.S. interests, Iraq's neighbors are also ready to eliminate a threat similar to Al Qaida in Suddam's terrorist sponsorship.  Recent reports of terrorist training camps in Iraq have come to the attention of Iraq's neighbors.
• Now is always better than later when faced with a foe who developing new weapons, especially when that foe is funding crash programs as we suspect Iraq is doing.
• Iraq is clearly seen as the premier source of WMD to terrorist groups in the near future, and the longer we wait, the more likely the sale will occur.  The longer we wait, the more development is completed, making what Iraq could sell that much more dangerous.  In the case of chemical and biological weapons, Iraq's own stockpile may reach a point where Suddam figures he has enough of his own stock, and now can begin selling off excess production.  This of course assumes he already hasn't reached that point.  The bottom line here is that the longer we wait, the higher the quantity, the better the quality, and the more deadly the weapons Saddam will have to sell.
• Of all the nations that could have produced the anthrax used to attack us through the U.S. Postal Service, Iraq is the most likely due to its track record in using WMD and the last three years of possible unfettered development.  Despite the possibilities of stolen U.S. or Russian strains of the Aimes strain, it is more likely, in Woolsey's estimation, that the Anthrax was planted in the U.S. by Iraqi sponsored terrorists and that the anthrax agent was not only created from samples provided in the past by the U.S., but used to develop a full production program in the last three years.

Another factor in our analysis -- the oil for food program and various other efforts to break humanitarian aid, while kind hearted in their humanitarian quest -- have not been used for the Iraqi people.  Children starve and the sick continue to die at alarming rates in Iraq, this despite billions in monies Iraq has earned through the programs they disputed and did not wish to use.  Where did these humanitarian funds go?  If not to those who needed them, then looking at Iraq's spending over the decade since the conclusion of the Gulf War presents the clear answer.  Building facilities and purchasing dual use equipment that can be used in weapons development, manufacture and production.

Iraq and Nuclear Weapons Program

Mr. Woolsey is joined in his opinions my many others, some of whom are today key members of President George W. Bush's cabinet and other advisors.  Looking through the material cited below, one will begin to understand who are the people in the U.S. who have a clear vision as to the danger Iraq presents.  Scott Ritter, a former U.N. inspector for UNSCOM, the agency of the U.N. responsible for the last effective inspections made in Iraq per the conditions of the Gulf War Treaty, has uniformly criticized U.S. lack of inaction and U.N. waffling in the case of Iraq.  Ritter has drawn criticism from the left, but staunch support from the right.  Names that crop up in this debate include the now Assistant Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz who has gone on record supporting Ritter's conclusions and critiques of the Clinton Administration.  Despite being politically incorrect at the time, both men stood up and said there is a danger in Iraq and the weak inspection activity and we commend them for that courage.

To begin.  There are two distinct nuclear weapons programs underway in Iraq.

The first is a relatively simple device designed to spread, explosively, large amounts of toxic waste over a large geographical area.  In this case, the toxic waste is nuclear in nature -- radioactive waste.  This is not to be confused with the more familiar and magnitudes greater destructive weapon, the nuclear detonating device.  A toxic waste bomb that throws toxic material away from its core is like a water balloon. It bursts and releases its cargo.  A toxic waste bomb could be filled with chemicals or biological agents and be used to disperse breathable agents or agents that could be absorbed in the skin.  For instance, nerve gas or a slurry containing hepatitis. The nuclear waste version of a toxic bomb (MILNET coined the term, "radioactive waste dispersal weapon" or RWDW) is much more deadly.   In the RWDW, the toxic material is radioactive nuclear waste material.  It can be breathed in or absorbed through the skin.  It can lie in place for many years just waiting for someone to come along and "pick it up" as they pass by.  It's like taking a nuclear power plant disaster, bottling it up and sending it along into your target's most populated area.  The radioactive waste can also be carried by the wind or work its way into the water table spreading the disaster far and wide.  Since nuclear waste is difficult to destroy, clean up can take generations.

In the case of Iraq, any nuclear waste will do and not all of the waste created by the Russian built reactor in Iraq disassembled before December 1998 is accounted for.  In addition, nuclear waste is available on the black market and Iraq could easily have a small plant up and producing waste since December of 1998.

The other nuclear weapons program, appears to have been aided by several European countries as well as designs and possible expert assistance from Pakistan.  This program, the effort to build a modern (enhanced yield, flying tamper design), relatively compact (25 inch diameter, less than 2000 pound device) nuclear detonating device would produce a weapon capable of strategic destructive yields (multi-kiloton, perhaps in the two to three digit kiloton range).  Make no mistake, this is the "big one", a high order nuclear explosive larger than that dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.   Such a device, if completed, could be carried by a SCUD II missile into any of Iraq's adjacent neighbors, and as was seen in the Gulf War, easily reach Iraq's favorite target, Israel.  As you will read later in this report, delivery systems are no problem for Iraq.

MILNET's conclusions are supported by the following evidence.

"...as noted by the Security Council in resolution 1284 (1999), there remain unresolved disarmament issues, including issues of key importance.  Moreover, the absence of inspectors, and the lack of continuity of knowledge since 1998, raises the question whether additional issues have arisen that must also be resolved." ²

In non-proliferation speak, the excerpt from the sixth  report from UNMOVIC above  simply means - No inspectors, no confidence.   They cannot rule out resumed development, and other evidence gathered indirectly by UNMOVIC points to crash programs in all three areas, nuclear, biological, and chemical.  Moreover, it is very likely that previous compliance to the Gulf War treaty and its prohibitions on weapons production, may now have become non-compliance, adding new issues to the already burgeoning list.

UNMOVIC is the agency within the U.N. infrastructure now responsible for verification of treaty conditions.  The sixth report from the organization makes it quite clear that the U.N. doesn't have a clue as to Iraq's compliance with the treaty obligations agreed to by Iraq in 1992.  UNMOVIC reports that they are now relying on commercial overhead imagery (satellite photos for the un-initiated) to try to scope out activity around suspected manufacturing sites.

More interesting however is that UNMOVIC believes Iran capable of constructing a nuclear weapon in weeks if fissile material were available.

Iraq-Watch ³ , a non governmental watchdog group says Iraq was on the verge of building a weapon nearly a decade ago, and that the Clinton administration not only knew of this readiness to construct, but took no action to intercept components in route and took no military steps to eliminate the facilities involved.

Below we list the observations of Iraq-watch,  U.N. analysts and others from the period from 1998 to December 2001.

• 1998:  U.N. Arms Inspectors (under the U.N. UNSCOM program) make their final attempt to inspect Iraqi WMD installations and are turned back.  U.N. withdraws its forces.  One of the incriminating pieces of evidence is an offer from Pakistan to help Iraq build a modern weapon, 25 inches in diameter, approximately 1300 pounds, and using modern, high yield designs including a "flying tamper".  No evidence of this device is uncovered but as the inspectors get closer and closer, Iraq becomes more and more resistant to the inspection regime and finally they are ejected, never to return.
• 1998:  Classified and commercially available overhead imagery shows renewed and increased activities at previous weapons development sites.  Later released reports show that waste from nuclear reactors built with the aid of the Russians prior to 1998 has been stockpiled for the development of a radiation dispersal weapon.
• 1999:  Revelations from a former head of the Iraqi Nuclear Program demonstrate worldwide apathy towards enforcement of non-proliferation led to an accelerated nuclear program in Iraq.  Previously disbanded teams are detected reformed and thought to be restarting the Iraqi nuclear program
• 1999:  Dual use equipment of the kind thought to be used in producing precisely machined parts for nuclear weapons production are detected with others thought to be on its way.  Iraq is also detected in the market for any types of nuclear waste materials not suitable for nuclear detonation but clearly suitable for radioactive waste dispersal weapons (RWDW).
• 1999:  Defector from Iraq claims a number of SCUD II missiles remain hidden in Iraq.
• 1999:  Bulgarian shipments are inspected and weapons grade nuclear material is found being smuggled into Iraq.  The number of previous unstopped shipments may have been enough to fully fuel at least three weapons.
• 1999:  The German company Siemens is accused of selling devices used in medical machinery that can be used as nuclear triggering devices.
• 2000:  Details of the Iraqi nuclear design are verified in the investigation of the trigger devices and the Iraqi "shopping list" which includes components needed for the flying tamper design.
• 2000:  Continued acquisition of "shopping list" items indicate a steady growth in production, no longer a focus on development.
• 2001:  Captured documents in Afghanistan may indicate that Iraq is selling either the components of or the designs for a radioactive waste dispersal weapon (RWDW).

Less than a 2000 lb gravity bomb, the Iraqi's nuclear design is based upon a new, lighter weapon design most likely stolen from a sophisticated weapons program, a program that Iraq is not thought to have had in 1998.

Today's design is very modern indeed.  Non-proliferation inspectors have documented the purchase of lithotripter medical machinery which just so happen to use high tech devices that can be used as part of the trigger devices used in nuclear weapons -- especially the type of newer, modern weapon Iraq is now working on.

This new weapon has dimensions that allow it to fit in the payload (warhead) section of a SCUD missile, and it is clear that Iraq has produced at least a handful of new SCUDs since December of 1998 (see Delivery below).  Including spare parts orders, Iraq asked for enough of the devices to complete three weapons.

The new weapon is twenty five inches in diameter and weighs in at around 1300 pounds.  The weapon uses a particular design element known as a "flying tamper" ³  .  Interestingly enough inspectors found documents detailing offers to help produce this particular weapon design from an interesting potential partner, Pakistan, a nation known to have developed this very type of weapon.

Of course a nuclear weapon requires nuclear material as well.  It has been thought that acquiring this fuel was the most difficult part of building such a bomb.  However, recent events show that it is becoming easier.  For example, Iraq Watch reports an incident that indicates just how Iraq could be taking delivery of the necessary material.

"United States officials report that on May 29th Bulgaria seized approximately a third of an ounce of weapons grade uranium at its border. The hot cargo, accompanied by documents in Russian, was concealed  in a lead container in a pump stowed in a car. A third of an ounce is not enough for a bomb (Iraq's design, for example, needs thirty-five pounds), but this seizure and others like it show that weapons-grade fuel is beginning to circulate in the black market." ³

And in fact, looking back at the number of similar shipments which weren't stopped, it is clear that enough material has crossed into Iraq to build up to three weapons.  Suddam's patient efforts at completing his shopping list seems to be paying off.

The U.S. report Non-proliferation: Threat and Response" states, "Retains scientists, engineers, and nuclear weapons design information; without fissile material, would need five or more years and significant foreign assistance to rebuild program and produce nuclear devices; less time would be needed if sufficient fissile material were acquired illicitly." ⁴

With the events over the last three years since inspections stopped, it appears the conditions cited in the 2001 report have been met:

• Iraq has acquired fissile material in quantities sufficient for one to three weapons
• Iraq has benefited from foreign assistance, especially in the area of modern weapons design sufficient to migrate their efforts into a nuclear device that could easily be carried by the SCUD II missile
• Iraq has had three years, more than sufficient for an accelerated program to assemble and ready a nuclear weapon.

Biological

Iraq-Watch lists the documents from UNMOVIC that detail the dual use items imported into Iraq that are critical in the development of biological weapons.  The lists contains such items as glove boxes, centrifuges, HEPA containment systems, anaerobic, dry boxes and growth systems such as fermenters, bioreactors, chemostats, continuous flow fermation systems and others.

When checking for dual use systems usage, non-proliferation experts look to see if purchases are accompanied by activities that demonstrate a remarked increase in non weapons production.  In the case of Iraq, purchases of the equipment  has had little or zero effect on the production of medicines or medical agents stockpiled or made available in commercial quantities.  In other words, the equipment, while clearly in use due to maintenance parts being requested and accompanied by "core" replacement material that indicates heavy use, has not been used to produce medicines or other dual use, non weapons related products.  Simply put, the only use identifiable would be for weapons research or production.

Also non-proliferation experts look at quantities of spare parts to see if the dual use equipment's "innocent" side are being planned for.  If spare parts in high failure components does not match the lethal components, then it is more likely the lethal intent is driving the purchases.  Of course a wise regime would simply camouflage the purchases by doing just that, buying the correct and matching sets of spares.  In the case of Iraq, the arrogance of Saddam Hussein is shown in that high volumes of the lethal components are being purchase with little effort made to camouflage by purchasing components that would keep the non lethal use of the machinery possible.  In Iraq's case, the "innocent" use of the dual use devices could not continue past six months to a year beyond their purchase, since the machinery would have failed due to lack of maintenance.  As a result, little dual use purchases pass the dual use test today -- there could be little if any innocent use of dual use devices in Iraq today.  When you combine the rational deduction that leads to this conclusion with the direct evidence of the health of the people of Iraq, and the ease of production of biological agents, it is not hard to agree that Iraq has not let the time since December 1998 go by without consequences.

Given the three years since 1998's cessation of inspections, UNMOVIC has determined that in all likelihood, Iraq has a major biological program  underway and has had sufficient time to stockpile battlefield quality and battlefield quantities.  However, U.N. leadership has not allowed the experts reporting to use such politically incorrect language.  UNMOVIC's public statements differ radically from those experts who have reported to the leadership in the U.N.

The U.S. document Non-proliferation: Threat and Response for 2001 says, "[Iraq] Admitted biological warfare effort in 1995, after four years of denial; claimed to have destroyed all agents but offered no proof."

"...Iraq delared reluctantly, in 1995, that it had produced approximately 30,000 liters of bulk biological agents and/or filled munitions. Iraq admitted that it had producd anthrax, botulinum toxins, and aflatoxins, and that it prepared biological agent-filled munitions, including missile warheads and aerial bombs. However, UNSCOM believed that Iraq had produced substantially greater amounts than it has admitted -- three to four times greater." ⁴

Chemical

Similar in nature to the investigations (non-inspection regime) being conducted in the area of biological weapons research and production, Iraq's chemical weapons program appears to also be blooming.    In nearly identical fashion to the logical approach taken to unmask Iraq's bio program, UNMOVIC now believes Iraq's chemical program is in full production of several agents that are battlefield ready and deliverable.

Dual use equipment purchases and installations, like that in the bio-weapons field, have not been followed by a marked increase in available non weapons products.  In fact, recent domestic requests for agricultural agents such as fertilizers and insecticides have continued to be denied by the Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture, leading investigators to believe that component agents are being exhausted by weapons manufacturing rather than production of domestic use agents for agricultural needs.  And like the biological investigation, overhead imagery indicates heavy staffing and traffic at suspected facilities.

All these indicators point to not only a well developed weapons program, but a highly active production program as well.

One former investigator, wishing to remain anonymous, has said, "...well if I needed to find a site to produce chemical or biological weapons in a pinch, I'd go to Iraq -- I could start manufacturing in hours."  With the external evidence collected so far, we can also assume that the former inspector might be able to walk in and purchase time on a fully operational production line.

The U.S. report, Non-proliferation: Threat and Response states "UNSCOM discovered evidence of VX persistent nerve agent in missile warheads in 1998, despite Iraqi denials for seven years that it had not weaponized VX. May have begun program reconstitution in absence of UN inspections and monitoring."

"...In 1999, Iraq may have begun installing or repairing dual-use equipment at these and other chemical warfare-related facilities. Previously, Iraq was known to have produced and stockpiled mustard, tabun, sarin, and VX, some of which likely remain hidden. It is likely that an additional quantity of varios precursor checmical also remains hidden..."

"...UNSCOM cited an exampel where Baghdad seized from inspectors a document discovered by UNSCOM inspectors, which indicated that Iraq had not consumed as many chemical munitions during the Iran-Iraq War as had been declared previously by Baghdad. This document suggests that Iraq may have an additional 6,000 chemical munitions hidden..." ⁴

The Delivery Systems

Iraq has also focused on delivery.  One of the easiest components to hide are the missiles needed to deliver a nuclear weapon.  Underground bunkers litter Iraq, and quite a few have never been inspected in parallel by arms inspectors, allowing Saddam Hussein to hide both weapons and missile components using the musical chairs approach to shuffle equipment around.  Again, Scott Ritter and U.S. Intelligence assets have documented this shuffle as U.N. inspectors moved from one site to another in serial fashion.  Indeed one of Ritter's (and UNSCOM Butler's) contentions is that the U.N. recipe for inspections was seriously flawed by not conducting multiple inspections as multiple suspect sites so as to prevent the musical chairs trick.

Again, we see the U.S. documenting the threat in it's annual report Non-Proliferation:  Threat and Response "Probably retains limited number of SCUD-variant missiles, launchers, and warheads capable of delivering biological and chemical agents. Retains significant missile production capability. Continues work on liquid- and solid- propellant SRBMs (150 kilometers) allowed by UNSCR 687; likely will use technical experience gained for fugure longer range missile development effort." With a SCUD II, Iraq threatens its neighbors and as proven in the Gulf War, will not hesitate to bring Israel into the fray by firing, unprovoked into Israeli cities.

Iraq is estimated as having a number of SCUD IIs hidden.  Between 8 and 15 of the missiles may already have been modified to accept the 25 inch nuclear payload design.  With the SCUD II range reaching to any of Iraq's neighbors with little effort, it is clear that if the estimate is correct, Saddam Hussein has the ability to deliver nuclear weapons in the region.

In fact, the diagrams in the U.S. report show that current Iraqi missile designs can reach as far as 300 km into Eastern Egypt, 875 km deep into Southern Saudi Arabia touching the northeastern border of Oman, and a similar distance reaching nearly the eastern border of Iran, and well past Georgia touching 300km into the southern tip of Russia. In the Northeast, Iraqi missiles reach out into the Mediterranean Sea, and more than bisects Turkey.

The countries encompassed in addition to those already mentioned are Jordan, Kuwait, Israel, Lebabon, the Island of Cyprus, Azerbijan, and a tiny portion of Azbekistan.

The major portion of the Persian Gulf is threatend by Iraq missiles, as is the northern half of the Red Sea, the eastern most 500km of the Met, as well as the facing 100 km of the Black Sea and Caspian Sea.

The U.S. report also states that Iraq has, "Land-launched anti-ship cruise missiles; air-launched tactical missiles; none have NBC warheads; stockpile likely is very limited." ⁴

Modifying aircraft to carry a 1300 pound nuclear weapon is trivial, as is the development of a tactical nuclear weapon using the primary of a more sophisticated multi-stage device the Pakistani devices represent. Therefore, it is possible that Iraq may have committed to a nuclear artillery shell ready to be fired by mobile artillery near the borders with its neighbors.

The Iraqis have experimented with the L-29 training aircraft, used as a rather large RPV that could easily be adapted into a nuclear, biological or chemical carrying platform.

The threat of further missile development has forced the U.S. to place Iraq on the embargo list, and most importantly to this discussion, on the "Missile Concern" list, which prohibits companies or organizations in the U.S. and U.S. exportees from shipping certain types of missile related cargos to countries where such cargos could be a serious risk to worldwide security. With Suddam's chief role as the leading Terrorist nation second only to the Taliban in Afghanistan, Iraq can use the common foot soldier to be a delivery system.  In the case of biologicals, he need only infect a dozen terrorist zealots and fly them into various capitals, let them sneeze and wheeze all over the airports for several weeks, and let them die in foreign hospitals.

The case for delivery of chemical weapons requires delivery systems.  With the track record of Iraq, it is clear Saddam has people who know how to build wide area dispersal units and he has no compunction to use these systems.  Clearly since he has used these weapons against his own people, he won't hesitate to attack the infidels that have dared to attack him.  Anyone participating in the Gulf War Alliance is at risk, as is, of course, Israel.

Altering SCUDs to carry chemical or biological weapons has already been documented in Iraq, and the effort to repeat that effort in the years since December of 1998 is a trivial undertaking, taking no more than a few months of unobserved effort.

Conclusions

MILNET's investigators, compiling various open source intelligence, interviews with leading non-proliferation experts, as well as sources within the U.N.'s UNSCOM and the current UNMOVIC organization, paint a distressing picture of the current capabilities of the Iraqi NBC weapons program.  The investigators cite the obvious threat of proliferation from Iraq to nations and terrorist groups with agendas that align with those of Iraq's Suddam Hussein.

And Iraq's neighbors continue to grow more nervous.  Saddam Hussein has continually expressed his desires to pay back those arabic speaking nations that joined the coalition during the Gulf.  With a massive weapons program in each of the NBC areas, it is just as clear that the Middle East once again is facing an Iraqi aggressor,  now clearly armed with special weapons.

The outcome of new Iraqi aggression almost certainly will be backed by these weapons and no one believes Hussein has the discipline or inclination to limit their use. With previous uses of such weapons within his own borders and quite possibly against Iran in the Iran Iraq war, it is clear he has no compunction against use of weapons of mass destruction.  The unprovoked attack on Israeli cities during the Gulf War makes it clear Suddam Hussein will menace anyone he feels he is justified in attacking even on a whim.  

It is just as clear that he has nothing to lose.  It is is not a concern of this tyrant that his people will rise against him unaided, because he has systematically eliminated any leadership in his country that could oppose him.  And the rest of the region, as well as countries targeted by Islamic extremists such as the U.S. and U.K. are clearly at risk.

Military action to eliminate production facilities and destroy stockpiles seems imminent given the current state of affairs.  Action to rid the world of the salesman also seems prudent and necessary as well.

Sources:

1  Former CIA Director, James Woolsey, CSPAN broadcast of "Terrorism and Iraq", December 13, 2001.

2  United Nations Security Council Report, S2001/833, "Sixth quarterly report of the Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission under paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999).  [UNMOVIC-S-2001-833.pdf]

3  Iraq Watch - Various reports on Iraq, the U.N. inspection teams, and other sources.  Please visit this unique and excellent web site at http://www.iraqwatch.org.

4  Non-Proliferation: Threat and Response - The U.S. Department of Defense, 2001.

Historical records via online research through various sources, including U.S. government web sites and the GOVBOT search tool.  And various folks who wish to remain anonymous, specifically through email interviews and one telephone interview with members of various armed forces, former government and U.N. officials/officers concerned with the increasing danger posed by Iraq.

Material from AP Newswire and MSNBC was used to verify as second sources many of the facts in this report, however, MILNET takes full responsibility for the report's accuracy and any errors in interpretation of those organization's online data.

Paul Wolfowitz's early and politically risky support of Scott Ritter is documented in congressional testimony before the House National Security Committee, September 16,  1998 and is available both on U.S. Congressional web sites as well as Iraq-Watch and is mirrored on MILNET.  We take some hope in the fact that Wolfowitz is Assistant to the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in the current George W. Bush's administration.

© Copyright 2001, Michael Crawford - MILNET
 

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