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Last in a three part Briefing Series comparing Pakistan versus India from the military viewpoint, with research conducted in open sources online which include archives of printed sources such as periodicals, newsletters, official (public) reports, and newspapers.  Part I of this report detailed the Pakistani Military, Part II focused on India.  This third part in the series features an in-depth analysis of the two militaries, commenting on the strengths and weaknesses of each.
 
 

MILNET Briefing:
Pakistan vs India
        

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Part III
 

The Comparison of Pakistan versus India

This is armchair quarterbacking at its worst.  We realize 1) we are subject to mis-information at many levels, 2) none of the MILNET contributors has every fought a tank battle or engaged an Infantry Division.  So we are  offering a paper analysis rather than an experienced commander based analysis.  While our military strategy and study might be extremely well read in an academic sense, please take the analysis at face value.

Air Campaign

The Pakistani Air Force is outgunned at about a 3 or 4 to 1 disadvantage.  India has procured and trained for sometime using latest technology weaponry bought from China and the Soviet Union, including recent purchases from Russia (post collapse of the Soviet Union) of MiG-29 Fulcrum Air Superiority fighters.  None of the Pakistani Aircraft have the speed an maneuverability including the well liked but outclassed F-16s in the Pakistani inventory which in any case may be configured for ground attack.  Older Chinese interceptors in the Pakistani Air force are hopelessly outclassed however, can be thrown at the Indian Air Force as fodder overwhelming the targeting ability of the Indian Air Defense, thus allowing more capable fighter bombers in to deliver ordnance.

On the other hand, India has woefully under spent in the AEWC area, giving a huge advantage to Pakistan, opting for small fighter aircraft for patrol.  This strategy might work well since it is harder to take out AEWC that can move fast, but Pakistani's  newer technology, U.S. style HIGHCAP using E-2C and E-3A aircraft means a look down, multi-target detection, tracking and point-to-shoot capability that could turn out to be a key advantage in the air war, one that could eventually  contributes to higher attrition of Indian air units.

Both sides have enough recon and anti-radiation capability to mount a wild weasel approach, however, MILNET believes the Pakistani could only sustain one or two such sorties of aircraft before attrition would eliminate the effectiveness and therefore curtail further attempts.  Of course, it would only take one or two mistakes and India's Air Defense complex could failover.  However, the Pakistani AEWC capability may make up for this in their own territory or where they can adequately protect high, slow flying radar AEW and Command and Control aircraft.

Both sides maintain an adequate air defense but it is not clear that the air defense capabilities roll forward and back with tides of an extended engagement, allowing one or the other to blow past ground based air defenses.
However, of the two countries, India appears to have the depth in sheer numbers of aircraft and air-to-air missiles to mount air mobile defenses all along an attack vector.

Of the two, MILNET believes India has the capability of achieving an overwhelming Air Superiority in the combat zone, and if the war extends past several months, possibly achieving air superiority inland to Pakistan for some distance.  Attrition in Pakistani aircraft, if no major losses are incurred by the Indian Air Force, will quickly diminish an effective Pakistani Air Cover for advances or retreats, generating serious damage as the war rolls on.

Ground Campaign

The Pakistani Army is outgunned at about 2 to 3 to one in heavy armor, 2 to 1 in artillery and 4 to 1 in APC, self propelled artillery, MLRS style rocket launchers and even mortars.  However, the Pakistani guns are bigger and newer, so it is quite possible that with enough mobility and clever fighting, they can even the score quickly through attrition of Indian armor units.  Pakistan also appears to have heavily invested in anti-tank guns and ground fired missiles.

The Pakistani Army is not as well trained as the Indian Army but as a smaller force, has a lot better reaction time and a lot better individual unit autonomy.  This could allow the Pakistani Army to react better to that part of war given to field decisions and point reaction rather than HQ planning and HQ forced execution.  However, the Pakistani regime is not what anyone would call a democracy, and their force is not anything nearing a volunteer force.  The Indian Army, on the other hand, has a high number of volunteers.  This means career Army officers who are well rewarded and through the last two decades, well blooded on the battlefield.  Success has been well rewarded in the Indian military, whereas changing regimes in Pakistan make it difficult to see an officer corps well suited to risk taking, a necessary attribute in dealing with the changing winds of war.

The Indian Chain of Command's beauracracy can at times be stifling.  However, having trained considerably under this regime, the field officers know they have the trust and are savvy enough to realize that their instincts are good.  Indian combat vets are in position to direct new troops and both the Indian and Pakistani armies are combat proven at forces levels of two years ago.  Yet, we believe the Indian Army is better motivated and rewarded, and in current conditions believes they have been attacked, brining a huge morale factor into play.

The Indian supply and logistics chain is extremely capable if not slow to start.  The Pakistani supply chain is fast on their feet, but have limited depth, possibly a factor in the early withdrawal of Pakistan from the last war.

Using purely numbers one would say the Indian forces might be capable of rolling over Pakistani forces however, India may have trouble putting enough forces at point to pierce a Pakistan defense, depending on the terrain and the choice of battle line.  Therefore it would be expected that Pakistan would seize the initiative in a planned campaign, while falling back and defending a narrow entry given a surprise attack by India.

If Pakistan cannot gain superiority in the air, or at least counter Indian Air effectively, then the lose of Air Cover for Pakistani troops may mean Air-to-Ground tank busting will cause huge attrition in Pakistani forces visible to Indian Air.  However, Pakistani mobile SAM and shoulder launched SAMs may provide Indian air pounders with some incentive to move carefully below 10,000 feet.

The End Game

In today's saber rattling scenario, surprise would only be minutes long, and neither country would be able to take advantage of that factor.  In fact, with the current border facing units in place, it appears only a heavy initial blood-letting will occur before real strategic planning can take place, with a prolonged feint and stab tradeoff by either side until someone makes a tragic mistake.  That mistake, if made on the Pakistani side, may end the war quickly, while on the Indian side, might allow Pakistani troops to push through and win some territory but it will be difficult to hold.

In either case, with the long history of battles and border differences, any conclusion of the war will only set the lines for the next conflict.  There does not appear to be a means of settling dispute over Kashmir or other territory that will stand more than a few years time.

The Nuclear Card

Up to now we have ignored the nuclear option for either side of the battle.  This is because we believe that the U.S., Russia, U.K., and France will all make the rounds weekly if not daily, letting the two antagonists know that first use of a nuclear weapon will result in retaliation from  a coalition of the four.  The message will be (if it hasn't already been delivered),

"whomever uses a nuclear weapon on their neighbor can expect a response from a coalition of NATO, RUSSIA and perhaps others.  <name one of the four above> will certainly unilaterally launch a nuclear warhead at <name the capital> in response to either of India or Pakistan's first use of a nuclear weapon.  This is not a threat, it is a promise."
This is, of course, political talk carried on out of sight of the public and while the threat will be made in private only, there will be no uncertainty as to its validity.  Especially since there is a full set of alliances in effect, intertwined both economically and militarily, due to treaty and weapons deals in the past and in the future. We believe Mr. Bush and Mr. Putin alone can make the threat real and undeniable both are believable and have the intestinal fortitude to make the threat stand.

Along with the nuclear threat from outside, is a second threat which promises the end of the government who ordered that first strike.  Again supported by the nuclear four mentioned above, the government ordering that first strike will face public sentiment fanned by the nuclear four and backed up by their troops to depose and replace that government in very short order.

And third, the promise also bears a personal risk, the leadership will be threatened with the loss of their own life in very rapidly carried out military tribunals.

Having said all this, we believe either nation is capable of delivering a few nuclear weapons.  The number is probably less than ten, however, one will suffice.  We do not believe either capital is at risk, however, the vagaries of war must allow for possibility of a single aircraft making it through a set of defenses, especially in the furball of a fully involved air war near the capital.  Both sides have sufficient low flying, radar avoiding aircraft to make the trip, and certainly have the technology to arm artillery for that purpose as well.  There may be a nuclear tipped missile in the inventory of either country, but this speculation is unsupported by any public evidence.

In any case, the nuclear card ends the war quite quickly.  Neither side has enough weapons for a prolonged retaliation.  However inconceivable that a second launch might occur, we believe that the nuclear four mentioned earlier will certainly take nuclear action by that time.

The Terrorist Connection

What is to keep another conflict from erupting?  All conditions that fuel the conflict between Pakistan and India are controllable.  One area that might be operated upon is terrorism.  The current state of affairs is a direct result of terrorist activity.  Recall that the current tensions were created by Pakistani terrorists reaching deep into India and attacking, while in session, the Indian Parliment.   So in order to prevent this particular stimulus to war, we need to quickly look at the terrorists in the region.

A  line in the mountains of Khasmir separates India and Pakistan.  But more than this line has separated the two
nations over the centuries.  In fact, like much of Asia, the countrys' difficulties lie in religious and idealogical fervor
that some say will never be resolved.  It is not from want of violent attempts or peaceful attempts.  Today,
however, the two countries, nuclear armed -- which many say both supports and refutes the Non-Prolifeatoin
movement -- "...maybe it could have worked, but look here, it didn't -- and now it's too late..." -- are perched
upon a precipice that many say vie with the Arabs and Israelis for the next nuclear conflagaration.

The bitter struggle began well before their simultaneous national independence in 1947, however, it was this split
that is upper most in the minds of leaders of both countries.  Islamic leaders demanded the need to split the
northern provinces of India into a separate, independent nation as India was about to win her independence from
Britain.  Included finally in the negotiations, the Muslims were able to demark the Kashmir province as the
dividing line, this line of control between India and Pakistan. The result was the largest trans-migration seen in
world history as Hindus in the north crossed into the South to live India, and Muslims in the South crossed into
the North to live in Pakistan.  Unfortunately, Kashmir, as one of the "princely states" which had lived somewhat
autonomously under British Rule, now chaffed at the boundaries straddled by the Himilaya Valley in the South.

Decades of insurgency and border disputes have not led to any resolution and in 1974, India upped the anty by
setting off its first nuclear explosion.  Pakistan's expected response, embarkation on their own nuclear program
culminating in their own nuclear test in 1998 following India's second set of tests meant by the new
Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party to threaten Pakistan.

Kashmir has been a region full of trouble since 1989, with more than 26,000 lives lost to insurgency.  The region
is contested not only by India and Pakistan, but China as well.  An arroganat and increasingly more participatory
Chinese government may spell additional trouble for the Indian-Pakistani problems.  In fact, with all three nations
possessing nuclear weapons, some analysts think that this is where the first nuclear war will be fought (most
consider the U.S. use of nuclear weapons as not being nuclear war since only one side of the conflict had use of
the technology).

On August 9, 2001, India declared parts of the Himilaya Valley as a disturbed area, permitting new police
powers for Indian security forces in the area, ratcheing up the tension once again.  Home Minister Lal K. Advani
speaking to the Indian parliment,  "I wish to assure this august House that the government shall leave no stone
unturned in bringing back peace to Jammu and Kashmir."

On the same day as Advani's speech, a Pakistan-based militant group, Hezb-ul-Mujahedeen, bombed a military
truck near the town of Ramsoo, 100 miles north of Jammu, killing its driver.

Another militant separtist group, the All Parties Hurriyat Conference , threatened to renew its violent fight to
win Kashmir's independence from India.

Political parties are also well engrossed in the present conflict, with the oppostion parties, Opposition Congress
and  Bahujan Samaj Party demanding the resignation of Advani even as the minister place all of Kashmir except
the predominatly buddhist area of Ladakh under what amounts to martial law, allowing security forces to arrest
anyone without warrant in the "disturbed area".  Human rights activists say the region has been the site of the killing of at least
60,000 people with the government admitting to perhaps half that figure.

Terrorist groups in India and Pakistan include:

     Lashkar-e-Tayyaba - armed wing of the Pakistan-based religious organization, Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-
     Irshad (MDI)--a Sunni anti-US missionary organization formed in 1989. One of the three largest and
     best-trained groups fighting in Kashmir against India, it is not connected to a political party. The LT leader is
     MDI chief, Professor Hafiz Mohammed Saeed. This is the group claiming responsibility for attacking, while
     in session, the Indian Parliment on December 13,  2001, killing 14 people.  The attack led to India moving
     troops and equipment to the border of Pakistan prepartory to war.

     Jaish-e-Mohammed - Extremely militant and violent Isalmic, pro-Taliban group active in India and the
     Kashmir region. Jaish takes the battle to the people of India, however, attacking innocent targets deep inside
     India rather than focusing only on Kashmir. Jaish is suspected of aiding Lashkar-e-Tayyaba in the
     December 13, 2001 attack on the Indian Parliment.

     Harakat ul-Mujahidin ( HUM ) - Pakistanian terrorist group operating primarily in the Kashmir region
     between India and Pakistan - training grounds and a large number of supporters in Afghanistan's Islamic
     population.

     Sikh Terrorism - Sikh terrorism is sponsored by expatriate and Indian Sikh groups who want to carve
     out an independent Sikh state called Khalistan (Land of the Pure) from Indian territory.  Active groups
     include Babbar Khalsa , International Sikh Youth Federation, Dal Khalsa, Bhinderanwala Tiger
     Force, and the Saheed Khalsa Force.

     Jamaat ul-Fuqra - Islamic sect that seeks to purify Islam through violence. Led by Pakistani cleric
     Shaykh Mubarik Ali Gilani, who established the organization in the early 1980s. Gilani now resides in
     Pakistan, but most cells are located in North America and the Caribbean.  Members have purchased
     isolated rural compounds in North America to live communally, practice their faith, and insulate themselves
     from Western culture.

     Al-Jihad - While a anti-Egyptian Islamic Extremist group, has been known to have cells in and train in
     Pakistan.

     All Parties Hurriyat Conference - violently in favor of Kashmir's independence from India.

     Hezb-ul-Mujahedeen - Thought to be Pakistanian/Afghanistanian militants set on destruction of the Indian
     nation, extremely violent Islamic group claming various terrorist acts in 2000 and 2001
 
 

Detailed Summary Table - Indian and Pakistani Military
 

Type of Weapon System  India Pakistan Numeric Advantage  Capability Advantage Winner
Airspace          
Airspace Control 2 HAL Hs.748 AEW 4 E-2C, 4 E-3A Pakistan: 4 to 1 Pakistan:  AEWC much superior meaning better detection, tracking and point-to-shoot.  This could turn out to be key advantage in Pakistani Air Space.  Both should mount vigorous anti-AEW, the winner might change the air war. Pakistan
Air-to-Air
Long Range Air Attack
MiG-29 or
Mirage 2000
Mirage III 
or F-16
India: 4 to 1 India: Multiple targeting
Speed, low speed maneuver.  F-16 for ground attack role so it may not be a factor in early days of war. 
Pakistan may have taken delivery  of Mirage 2000, but not in enough numbers to offset huge numerical advantage
India
Air-to-Air
Mid-Range Attack
MiG-27 or
Mirage III or 2000
F-16 or Mirage or Vintage Chinese India: 3 to 1 India: Excellent diversity in med range AAM, guidance and tracking systems.  Data shows Pakistan has configured F-16 for ground attack role so it may not be a factor in early days of war. India
Air-to-Air
Furball
Any of the Indian MiGs, or Mirage 2000 Mirage or Chinese
or possible F-16
India:2,3 to 1 Any of the Indian fighters in air superiority role will out dogfight the Pakistani aircraft.  The F-16 if in air to air role, might do well if pilots trained for this role. Pakistan could throw enough Chinese built aircraft into the fray and make attrition a problem for India India
Ground Attack: 
Fixed Targets
Mirage or 
Jaguar or
Mirage or F-16,
Chinese 70s
Vintage Aircraft
India: 3 to 1 India; Infrared targeting, excellent jamming, chaff
and maneuverability
Pakistan: F-16s with Maverick are extremely effective however, total available rounds could be expended in first few waves. 
India
Ground Attack:
Tank Busting
Mig-29, 27, 23, 21 F-16, Mirage or Chinese 70s Vintage India: 2, 3 to 1 India:  MiG-29 and 27 have excellent avionics for tracking and attacking armor, with Soviet designed high velocity mutli-mach penetrators, HEAT and other anti-armor warheads. India
Battlefield          
Armor Battle:  Armoured Divisions 3 Armor Divisions, 
5 Independent
Armored Brigade
Equivalent to 10 Mechanized 
2 Armor Divisions, 
6 Independent
Armored Brigade
6 Independent Mechanized
India: 1.5, 2 to 1 Offsetting advantages if one overlooks sheer gun size and number of divisions  Older Pakistani tanks will be heavy in attrition and Air attacks may exacerbate this problem =
Tank Battles:
Mobilility, Balance
T-72, T-56 T-85, T-69s India: 2, 3 to 1 Pakistan equipment may have in edge depending on terrain.  Pakistani shell power (bigger guns) might be advantage if they can choose battles where bigger guns can be used or have a terrain advantage. Pakistani equipment newer, may have upgrades, Indian gear may be less well maintained. =
Fixed/Mobile
Artillery
75/24 Mtn, Yugo 76mm M-48, 105 mm IFG I/II, 105 mm M-56, 122 mm D-30, 130 mm M-46, 155 mm FH-77B 105/150/255 mm Self Propelled and Towed Howitzers. Also 85mm/122mm      CHINESE guns plus U.S.M-198 delivered under Brown Amendment India: slight numerical advantage Pakistani has bigger throw weight.  This is a fact we would expect Pakistan to take advantage of Pakistan
Attack Helos Mi-35, Mi-25
and Light gunships
20 AH-1 COBRA Gunships, Mi-8s, French Alloute IIIs, PUMAs, Mi-17s India: 3 to 1
Attack Helos
Pakistani:  U.S. Helo Attack Tactics and Training may offset Indian numerical advantage, heavier armored Soviet built helos.  Lack of Apache class helo in Indian Helo force may give Pakistan tank attack advantage =
Infantry vs. Infantry 32 Divisions 19 Divisions India; 1.7 to 1 India: Better trained, better equipped, but field command may rely too much on chain of command.  India has twice the size and number of mortars. India
Supply, Logistics High Ratio Medium Ratio India: 1.5 to 1 India:  Has more depth in supply and logistics setup runs right back to warehouse.  However, Pakistani logistics appears to react faster. India
Transport Trucks, APCs, Helos, Rail Trucks, APCs, Helos India: 2 to 1 India: May be able to mobilize and move troops further and faster enabling more mobile ground force India

 

 © Copyright, 2001, Michael Crawford, MILNET

Part I of this report detailed the Pakistani Military, Part II focused on the Indian Military.
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