The Philippines and Vietnam: A Comparison and
Analysis
Image is linked from the Yahoo Backgrounder on Southeast
Asia
The Philippines and Vietnam: A Comparison and
Analysis
Image is linked from the Yahoo Backgrounder on Southeast
Asia
Early in 2002, and as an extension of the U.S. War on Terror, Phillipine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo requested help in ridding her country of insidious terrorists who had begun a hostage/ransom cycle which could not be broken by the Philippine military. Principally the Philippine President is asking for advisors and perhaps high tech aid and weapons, as well as the training to use them in the battle against their local insurgents.
There will be an enevitable comparison between the U.S. sending advisors into Vietnam in the late 1950s as well as the nearly disastrous aid given to South Korea during the Korean War.
In this case, the U.S. was invited to help in a country that has not already been polarized into a North and South - a huge difference between the Korean and Vietnamese conflicts. The Philippine President is not worried about an invasion, but is very concerned at the country's inability to shake off the repeating hostage taking and huge ransoms being paid out to the terrorists.
This analysis will look at the striking similarities between the entrance into the Vietnam conflict and the current decision to aid Philippine forces strike against terrorists. To ensure a complete briefing, we include background material on the Philippines and Vietnam, compare the two and then make a final analysis of the situation.
It is our contention that while the two situations appear similar on the surface, there are some rather remarkable differences that prevent the U.S. from "falling into" a major conflagration, and at the same time, make the effort extremely strategic and important.
And fnally readers will note that this analysis takes place some time after the "news worthy" event - the invitation and arrival of U.S. advisors. This is due to the MILNET policy for building complete briefings (to be distinguished from opinion or up to the minute news analysis pieces we generate) based upon not only online and public media information. Naturally it would be foolish to write as if the authors had first hand knowledge of events that occurred on the other side of the world while they were enjoying the rigors of High School. For the type of analysis this document represents, the authors include information gleaned harcopy research as well as interviews with protected sources "in the know", a number of whom served in Vietnam and Korea.
Philippines 
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map )
The Philippines, a long time participant in U.S. Foreign Policy, has emerged as a World trouble spot, much as each of the English colonies did as they too gained their Independence. Not remarkably, the Philippine's modern problems began right after the conclusion of World War II when in 1946 they received their independence.
What is remarkable about the nation is that it is composed of some 1000 islands and many diverse cultures that, for the most part live well together and where inter island migrations rarely produce violence. 90 percent of the islands' occupants are Christian Filipinos, but countered by large Muslim cultures on Mindanao and northern Luzon.
The Philippines became a U.S. protectorate when it was ceded to the U.S. after the Spanish American War in 1898. As a protectorate, the U.S. kept an economic and small military presence on the island. After Pearl Harbor, the U.S. military force projection could not maintain as long a reach as needed into the Pacific.
Having been seized by the Japanese during World War II, the island's people had essentially fled into the hills or suffered the fate of most of the peoples taken by the Japanese during the war -- death or cruel subservience. The government officials knuckled under to Japanese invasion and attempted to help shield the common Philippine citizen from the Japanese. A U.S. Major left behind as U.S. troops were finally thrown off the island, pinned on stars and led a guerilla effort that frustrated the Japanese and kept valuable resources tied up throughout the remainder of the war. The Filipinos, being an Asian race with a long history of conflict, were survivors, however and when McArthur returned to win back the Island from the Japanese, they came out fighting.
The Philippine Islands were a U.S. protectorate for only a short time following the war, with some thinking it would become a U.S. territory like Guam. In 1945 the country won its independence despite a weary people and U.S. concerns about security and trade. Predictably, the country quickly became home to both separatists and a particularly virulent socialist wing. The largest problem stemmed from resentment for those in the government during the war who were thought of as collaborators with Japanese. One of these was an economic minister responsible for rice production, who became the first elected President of the independent Philippines on July 1946.
Huk guerilla fighters, having learned their stealthy trade to perfection during the war, vowed to take out the collaborators, especially in central Luzon a pleasant island based on an agrarian life. Several administrations tried to cultivate the Huks over the years, but to no avail. Finally, with some 11,000 to 15,000 armed Huks impatient with the status quo, their rebellion spreading from Central Luzon to southern Tagalog, through northern Luzon, the Visayan Islands, and finally in Mindanao. This so called popular revolution withered in 1951, as Huk atrocities soon angered the general population and the Huks eventually dissolved into bandits, murdering and stealing becoming their way of life. By 1954, with the aid of U.S. advisors, the Huk's were finally marginalized to be ineffective, and the Huk rebellion squeaked to an end.
However, the contention over a territory called Sabah on the island of Borneo with Malaysia and Indonesia led to danger on the northeastern border. Anti Malayasian sentiment helped elect Ferdinand Marcos to office as President. After his re-election Marcos' popularity began to waiver and eventually in order to retain his position of power, he declared martial law. One of his chief rivals was Benigno Aquino, who was arrested and detained under the auspices of the Martial Law. Serving decades in Marcos' jails, he eventually was allowed to leave the Philippines to seek medical treatment in the U.S. Leading an opposition party from exile, Aquino continued to be a very popular figure and eventually decided he needed to return. He was assassinated by government troops as he was being escorted off the plane, marking the last days of Marco's regime. This eventually led to elections in which Aquino's wife Corazon was elected as President, and the Marcos induced dictatorship was ended.
Today the Philippines continues to be a hot bed of anti-American dissent fostered by the communist party as well as several groups intent upon turning the country upside down. Anti American sentiment has been stirred up by the communist separatists and several unfortunate U.S. military men's activities and today the U.S. presence is all but gone from the islands. Communist and terrorist activity have plagued the country in the last two decades as well as volcano that continues to bury the former site of Clark AFB in feet of soot and ash.
Late in 2001, 
President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, on the heels of U.S. attacks in Afghanistan, began
a quiet lobbying campaign to get U.S. troops to help her rid the islands
of the separatists and communists as well as some pretty lethal Islamic
extremists. Early in 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush agreed and
special forces teams moved in to begin training the Philippine Army in
counter terrorist techniques.
The following terrorist groups are active in the Philippines and provide a majority of the tension:
Vietnam 
( map )
In the late 1800s, France had occupied much of what is now Vietnam. As a French protectorate and colony, the people of Vietnam, already used to being conquered by several of their neighbors and influenced by China for centuries quickly adapted. By the 1900s few Vietnamese did not speak French. French culture mixed with Asian culture produced a remarkably interesting blend especially considering Thai spices and French cooking.
A mix of Buddhist religious tenets and Christian missionaries also created a unique sub-culture, with clashing French morality and Christian Puritanism. In the end, a raging wild side of Vietnam continued to clash with the secular side. The result was government graft and a large chasm between city life and the rural, with modern western ways clashing with the ox and cart lifestyles in the fields outside the cities.
Chinese communist influences created a wave of change moving from the North toward the South, and communist guerillas soon became a major threat to the French overseers and after a number of years of battling the insurgents the French government tired of the effort. Ho Chi Minh, a stern communist task master established a government in the North and in 1954 the French were on the run.
At the same time, the U.S., having recovered sufficiently from a near disaster in Korea, began efforts to shore up governments all over South East Asia, in the fear that Communist culture would sweep through Asia and threaten allies in the region.
By the early 1960s as the French were moving out of South Vietnam, the U.S. was moving in advisors. By the mid 1960s, the U.S. was fully involved in war and the considerable American military machine was drafting American boys and sending them to Vietnam at a prodigious rate. The conflict, balancing political forces dead in the middle of the Cold War, turned even more political as Russian and Chinese advisors helped the North Vietnamese irregulars (Viet Cong) and regular forces. The Viet Cong, a virulent guerilla force blended into the local villages North and South, becoming "part of the landscape" so to speak. Using tunnels and buried weapons caches, the guerillas could pop up just about anywhere ready to conduct effective fire fights. Even large cities such as the capital of the south, Saigon, were not immune. Infiltrators working with local children killed and maimed soldiers and civilians alike with bombs and other typical insurgent activities.
Meanwhile, in the outlying areas, the Viet Cong began getting supplies, then arms down the "Ho Chi Minh" trail, a network of routes leading from North Vietnam down into South Vietnam. U.S. ignored the trail for far too long and by the Tet Offensive in 1967, the amount of supplies and arms, as well as North Vietnam regular soldiers had become a critical mass, and led to decisive U.S. loses on the battlefield by a fairly well organized and overpowering force.
While the U.S. might not feel they lost this battle -- it by no means removed U.S. effectiveness on the field -- it was a political disaster of huge proportion and it spelled the end. The U.S. began an influx of troops and equipment to fight this newly armed foe and also began bombing across the border in an effort to bring the North Vietnamese to the bargaining table. However, political pressure at home became a larger enemy and when President Nixon took office, it was clear that the U.S. government had lost its stomach for the war.
A cease fire agreement in 1973 allowed the U.S. to fully withdraw, and in 1975, the North overran the South, bringing Vietnam together under one communist regime. For the next 10 years, Vietnam and its neighbors fell behind the Chinese section of the Iron Curtain or succumbed to insurgents and deadly political regimes. Finally in 1985, the curtain opened a little as Vietnam began to stabilize under its slightly softer communist regime.
Today Vietnam is slowly opening the door to western markets, in classic third world efforts beginning with textiles. Normalization of relations with the outside world has also begun, Vietnam's communist government softening even further in the light of the collapse of the Soviet Union. While a sensitive relationship exists between Vietnam and non-communist countries, it appears to be desirous of emerging onto the world's stage. Accordingly, non-communist overtures to improve relations continues with the hope of change.
Vietnam has complained of some terrorist activities in the last five
years. However, none of the groups seem to be well organized and
none have made it onto the U.S. terrorist lists.
A Comparison Between the Philippines and Vietnam
Anytime the U.S. moves advisors into help a country seeking military aid, the liberal media immediately pull out the dreaded Vietnam card, immediately comparing the country seeking aid with the tragic U.S. evolution in Vietnam.
In the case of the Philippines, the similarities are indeed striking. For the war fighter, the terrain has spectacular similarities. Temperatures and humidity are very close. Equatorial rain and weather are similar all over Southeast Asia and is no different in the Philippines. Dense jungle growth on certain portions of the large islands makes for ideal conditions for guerillas fighters to hide and indeed is part of an ever growing problem for the Philippine military.
But before we walk down the road to a full comparison, we need to make the point that, at present, no one is even hinting that U.S. troops will be battling it out in the Philippines. However, like Vietnam, the U.S. has advisors on the ground, with a reasonable group of troops to provide minimal force protection should the need arise. This seems quiet familiar to journalists from or journalists who have studied their predecessors in the Vietnam War. Therefore it shouldn't be a surprise to hear grumblings of the comparison beginning.
In the Philippine, the insurgents also appear to be using techniques
similar to the Viet Cong in Vietnam. They will terrify rural village
leaders into providing food and supplies as well as hideouts when necessary.
The Philippine terrorist can simply rip off a handkerchief covering his
face and become an instant villager, blending right in. A huge supply
of weapons has already made its way onto every island, with secret caches
available for the last twenty years.
The Military Picture
Like in Vietnam, the government of Philippines has lost control of the insurgents. In this case, however, the opportunity for Chinese resupply and regular troop reinforcements is much more difficult to imagine. Many miles of water separate the Chinese mainland and the northern most Philippines islands. This natural limitation on supply lines makes for a more secure situation in pursuing Philippine insurgents. There should be little chance of a "Tet Offensive" in the Philippines.
However, there is still the difficulty of the terrain and fighting in a region where the populace is caught in the middle. While the vast majority of city dwellers would welcome the end of the terrorists, the insurgents are there among them. And of course the rural situation is worse.
For the U.S., a prolonged and U.S. fed military campaign still has all the baggage of the Vietnam war, with difficult and long resupply from the Pacific forces in Japan and Hawaii, with Guam as a relay point. And without Clark AFB and any other local U.S. presence, at least for now, it is mainly an offshore based operation, requiring, much like Vietnam, establishing bases and staging grounds in country with the attendant force protection requirements.
In the case of armor, there is no comparison. No one expects that the Philippine terrorists are going to get supplied with heavy armor. Nor do they need it. Just as the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong were able to conduct effective battles without artillery support and armor prior to the Tet Offensive, the Philippine insurgents can fight a guerilla campaign on almost equal grounds with the well armed U.S. soldier.
However, the technological difference today between the U.S. soldier and his counterpart in the Vietnam is vast. The ability to call in precision strikes extremely close to the troops was a big advantage in Vietnam. Today with GPS in the hand of the soldier and on the tips of the bombs, the ability to quickly pound the hell out of a superior force with little or no collateral damage gives the U.S. a huge advantage. While helicopter gun ships like the Apache also are frighteningly effective, the insurgents do have a number of shoulder launched rockets that place helicopters at grave risk.
One other advantage for the Philippine Army and U.S. advisors is the fact that the insurgents appear to have been isolated in any sizable force on one or two Southern islands. This allows focus of forces that did not exist in Vietnam. This does not mean terrorist elements throughout Philippines won't make efforts to divert that focus. The U.S. must carefully think through force protection. Lessons from Lebanon and Riyadh not withstanding, the U.S. has increased its percentage of forces devoted to force protection dramatically. And with commanders clearly held to the fire for more than adequate force protection, it is clear that the risk of non battle loss of combatants would be reduced.
Then there is the Philippine Army. Like the South Vietnam regulars, the Philippine Army is made up of rugged individuals, loyal in the most part to their officers, and viscously inclined to the treatment of their enemy. Many have lost friends to both face to face battles as well as the more "sneaky" terrorist attacks off duty and in the cities. While pretty savvy about jungle warfare, probably more so than their American advisors in many situations, it can't hurt to receive some operational assistance from U.S. spec ops warriors steeped in decades of irregular warfare and terrorist pursuit.
And of course along with U.S. advisors comes U.S. toys. From high
tech communication to GPS, the Philippine soldiers trained in the new force
regime led by U.S. advisors will make them pretty effective at coordinated
jungle pursuit as well as urban assault operations -- both needed to route
out the Filipino terrorists.
The Political Background
The last 15 years in Philippine politics have been quite dramatic. From the overthrow of the Marcos regime to the rise of insurgents, the political atmosphere has been electric to say the least. A democratic government has had a long road to climb and at times has been at extreme risk.
The ouster of U.S. forces during this period was preceded by seemingly popular demonstrations. No longer seen as protectors but viewed as a unwelcome guests, U.S. leaders began a slow withdrawal of forces from the Philippines. Mother nature contributed with the effects of a major volcano eruption that left one American facility devastated and not worth cleanup. In the end, the Filipino demonstrators have gotten their way, with little U.S. presence other than port calls over the last few years.
However, treaty obligations still exist from prior to World War II and indeed from the terms of the Philippine independence. There is still a significant U.S. popularity in country, however, it doesn't appear as dramatic as anti-U.S. rhetoric in the political environment.
For this reason, each movement of advisors or force protection elements creates in outcry reminiscent of the days before the U.S. began to remove its forces from bases in the Philippines. So much so that the initial training forces had to be carefully inserted on exceedingly carefully drafted statements of purpose. Even so, ongoing protest indicates that any U.S. escalation and future troop movements will be greeted by a hostile element. It is not clear from publicly available information how large this element is. It is thought, however, that much of the protest is insurgent sponsored. However, without more accurate intelligence on the ground in the Philippines, it would seem foolish to take a position either way.
The risk, however, is that any escalation could be met with extreme
political repercussions against the current Filipino administration, with
the U.S. left in the position of propping up a suddenly unpopular regime
and the accompanying disastrous results. The disaster would have
pretty widespread effects. The proposition that U.S. intervention
and aid in the War On Terror in the Philippines could wind up destroying
the Philippine government might make other national leaders reconsider
their stance on the war against terrorists. For this reason, the
stakes are even higher than one might of thought. And for this reason,
the delicacy of U.S. troops activities and yes even individual behavior
is critical. Additionally, use of U.S. weapons, by U.S. or Philippine
regulars must be carefully controlled. Collateral damage will be
met with fierce political repercussions in the Philippines and eventually
back in the U.S. U.S. politicos have already experienced the backlash
of U.S. weapons use in Israel, and clearly the Philippine dissenters will
take full advantage of any civilian casualties near U.S. weapons use, regardless
of actual damage by those weapons. A case of deaths proven to be
as a result of newly imported U.S. weapons will raise holy hell and apply
extreme pressures against Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.
Strategic Considerations
The Philippines is in the heart of Southeast Asia, central to a number of hot spots. In fact, all the Asian countries listed in the MILNET Flashpoints from August 2001 can be seen surrounding the islands. From Indonesia (the largest accumulation of Muslims on the planet) and Malaysia to the West, to Taiwan and China in the North, the only major force reliable to the U.S. is one that so far has denied the right of its forces to act off its shores, Japan. Thus the Philippines is a strategic asset, not unlike Vietnam was considered in the late 1950s. To offset Chinese Hegemony in the region, the U.S. needs to counter anti-western sentiment. Thus the fight against terror offers the Philippine government and the U.S. alike the chance to show how our partnership can benefit not only the Filipino people but the region at large.
In fact, a successful Philippine operation can become the linch-pin to suppression of Terrorism and elimination of bases of terror in Indonesia and Malaysia. But only if we can do so with an outside perception of our concern and care to prevent civilian casualties. No only for simply political correctness but for long term and historical perceptions. The idea is to prevent incidences that will be used as ideological ammunition for the teachers of the next generation of terrorists.
Even as advisors, our troops must not be engaged with undisciplined
soldiers with out some means of control and upward reporting structure
that can intervene in a timely fashion to prevent occurrences like those
that occurred in Lebanon *1 in the 1980s. Clearly this
is in the best interest of all. But to make that possible, requires
substantial force commitment in lightning fast intervention operations.
Perhaps military planners can figure out a training and operational imperative
that can be used to trigger an intervention operation that reduces or for
all practical purpose eliminates the possibility of losing control of the
Filipino troops.
The Religious/Ethnic Factor
The difficulty in U.S. operations in the region arises from the percentage of Islamic Extremists fostering hatred toward the West in the huge Muslim population From the Filipino Moros of ancient Muslim heritage to vast Muslim settlements in Indonesia and Malaysia, there is a potential source of Islamic Terrorism that can be goaded by a call for Jihad by the Filipino terrorists -- no matter that the terrorists appear to be far more than happy to continue their hostage-ransom business proposition into posterity.
Fortunately, there is not a center of angry populace sparking violence in Indonesia that even approaches the conflagration surrounding Israel and the Palestinians. However, as a supporter of Israel, the perception of the U.S. does not open many avenues for cooperation in the Islamic circles of Southeast Asia. The other historical fact that clouds the issue is the migration pattern that positioned the large number of Muslims in the region in the first place. History show us that one of the effects of the ancient battle between Christians and Muslims before and throughout the Crusades resulted in mass migrations of Muslims escaping the Christian onslaught. The migration, of course, was East and typically as far East as possible, resulting in the population of Muslims in Malaysia, Indonesia and to a much lesser but still significant degree, the Philippines.
The Sulu Sea is surrounded today by Muslims of many different tribes and cultures, all sharing a decidedly and historical dislike for Christians. Thus, Islamic Extremists, in guise as freedom fighters in the Philippines have a built in a culture clash they can take advantage of. Similar to Pakistan and Afghanistan where the Mullahs preach anti-western hatred and the desirability of wanton disregard for life in the cause of the Jihad, the Filipino communist and extreme Islamic elements are, as we write this analysis, involved in identical activities.
Familiar to intelligence officers, the technique, called "rabble rousing" by southern U.S. police departments, essentially targets both the less fortunate as well as open minded students. Similar to techniques used by the Soviet KGB and GRU to recruit communist sympathizers during the cold war, the Islamic faith is being used to subvert followers is vast numbers to this creed of hatred. The targets, as we have all come to learn, are nations like the U.S. and the U.K. And it is not limited to just those two countries, all non Muslim nations fall onto the list as infidels.
While politically incorrect, this analysis remains correct and clearly spells out the dangers of participation in the War on Terror, especially in the case of even the smallest errors.
Thus, in an excess of caution, the U.S. must ensure that at any point
where our people our involved in any military operation with Filipino soldiers,
we must maintain the necessary control of events to prevent undisciplined
attacks that result in massacres of the unarmed noncombatants.
Summary
Thus when the liberal media, as it will invariably do, decides to push
hard on the comparison between the Philippines and Vietnam, be aware that
there is some truth in the comparison. The United States and
its allies in the War on Terror must be exceedingly careful in prosecuting
terrorists and in the case of the Philippines, must do so without any doubt
that we are aiding the Filipino Army do battle, and ensure control over
the use of any of our weapons brought to bear by U.S. or Filipino soldiers.
And like in Lebanon, we have to know that we have enough advisory strength,
respect in the ranks, and yes even including a standby intervention force,
to ensure that a repeat of the Christian slaughter of Muslims does not
take place on our watch.
© Copyright, 2002, Michael Crawford, MILNET
*1 During the Israeli occupation of Lebanon, U.S. forces
supported the Christian based government in Lebanon, providing both advisors
and on the ground troops as a barrier force as well as providing some small
amount of security to the emerging government. At one point in the extremely
dicey confrontation between several factions, Christian soldiers of Lebanon's
government massacred hundreds if not thousands of Muslims. This has become
a battle cry for many Palestinians whose brethren were amongst those fallen.
The U.S. and Israel, due to their support of the Christian government of
Lebanon, have been accussed of simply standing by and allowing the event
to take place. The fact that U.S. forces in region could not have reached
the scene in time nor were at any time cognizant of the events, nor sizeable
enough to prevent the event does not seem to matter -- the perception is
that we did nothing. There is irrefutable documentation that Islamic Extremists
use this perception as a basis for including the U.S. in the infatada against
Israel, as well as a general call for Jihad against all western "infidels".
For a first hand account of the U.S. senior military aid provided during
that time, we invite you to read Chapter VIII of Tom Clancey's non-fiction
collaboration with General Steiner, Shadow Warriors 1.
1 Shadow Warriors, Tom Clancey
and General Carl Steiner (retd), Copyright 2003, G.P. Putnam Sons, New
York, N.Y., Chapter VIII, pgs 227-264, ISBN 0-399-14783-7.
Sources
Sources used in the preparation of this report were:
