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Under the current arrangement, the Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) is three layers removed from the DCI, having between them the Executive Director of the CIA and the DDCI. Even though the DDO can, presumably, see the DCI whenever necessary, this distancing is too great.
. .The observation about the DO being the place that most often lands the DCI in trouble rings very true. It should be made into a separate service and brought under the DCI's direct control. This single Clandestine Service (CS) should include those components of the Defense HUMINT Service (DHS) that undertake clandestine collection as well. We do not believe that this division is of utility in terms of collection. We are especially concerned that the Defense Department is unlikely to give DHS the kind of authorities, attention, resources and career development incentives that it will need to become a truly capable clandestine human collection enterprise. Just as intelligence struggled for years to be recognized as a career speciality within the armed forces, DHS faces the same challenge.
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Clandestine collection entails many more risks than the technical collection disciplines. Therefore, how and when it is used must be highly selective, responding to carefully screened and highest priority requirements.
Clandestine collection is also a difficult capability to use. It cannot be kept "on the shelf" and called out whenever needed. There must be some minimal ongoing capability that can be expanded in response to consumer needs. This has become increasingly difficult for the DO as the State Department, in response to budget stringencies, has scaled back its posts overseas, which provide the main base for clandestine collection. Former DCI Woolsey noted that U.S. intelligence was going from "global presence" to "global reach." This scaled back status makes it much more difficult for clandestine services to respond to unanticipated collection requirements.
Having accepted the necessity for maintaining and, on occasion, using covert action, we also recognize that these operations require the most careful management, expertise and coordination. As one witness at an IC21 staff panel observed, these are the operations that inevitably land the DCI in trouble. This tendency can be minimized if careful attention is paid to the command and control of clandestine operations.
Under the current arrangement, the Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) is three layers removed from the DCI, having between them the Executive Director of the CIA and the DDCI. Even though the DDO can, presumably, see the DCI whenever necessary, this distancing is too great.
The observation about the DO being the place that most often lands the DCI in trouble rings very true. It should be made into a separate service and brought under the DCI's direct control. This single Clandestine Service (CS) should include those components of the Defense HUMINT Service (DHS) that undertake clandestine collection as well. We do not believe that this division is of utility in terms of collection. We are especially concerned that the Defense Department is unlikely to give DHS the kind of authorities, attention, resources and career development incentives that it will need to become a truly capable clandestine human collection enterprise. Just as intelligence struggled for years to be recognized as a career speciality within the armed forces, DHS faces the same challenge.
We believe that these two entities should be consolidated into one CS under the operational control of the DCI. This is not meant to preclude the Service Intelligence Chiefs from carrying out those clandestine collection activities specifically related to the tactical needs of their Military Departmental customers or field commanders.
While this study stands on its own, its observations and conclusions are compatible with the other IC21 studies. Moreover, when looked at in the context of the Committee's examination of the Intelligence Community (IC) as a whole, the following findings and recommendations have been extracted from this study for inclusion in legislative proposals to reorganize and better direct the IC in the future:
Findings
Clandestine collection must be focused principally on select, high priority national and military requirements.
Yet, it is necessary to have at least a minimal clandestine presence in most countries (a "global presence") so as to maintain a broader base-line contingency capability and to respond to transnational collection requirements.
Clandestine operations require an extraordinarily high level of management attention, expertise and coordination.
For intelligence collection tasking and requirements purposes, the Clandestine Service should respond to the regular community-wide collection management process.
The Clandestine Service should be managed by a Director who is a career intelligence professional.
The Clandestine Service should have a two-star professional military intelligence officer as a Deputy Director responsible for support to the military and for coordination, as appropriate, with the military services, regional commanders and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
The Clandestine Service should have organic to it the administrative and technical support mechanisms that are critical to its unique functions and essential to its success.
The personnel system should ensure the recruitment of highly qualified junior employees, the development of talented clandestine operators and managers, and the aggressive removal of marginal and unsuitable employees.
The military cadre of the Clandestine Service should consist of military clandestine operations officers having a viable military career track within that specialization and of the same high professional and personal qualifications as the civilian cadre.
The DCI needs to reaffirm and reiterate throughout the IC, his designation of the Clandestine Service's role to lead the IC in its conduct of foreign clandestine operations, i.e., espionage, counterespionage, covert action and related intelligence liaison activities abroad.
The Clandestine Service Chief of Station should act as the US government's on-site focal point for the deconfliction of all intelligence and law enforcement activities abroad with an appeals process functioning through the Ambassador and/or a Washington-based interagency mechanism.