The Reagan and Bush Efforts to Restore U.S. Credibility.

The Carter policies on the troop issue and human rights violations in Korea contributed to a deterioration in the bilateral relationship to one of its lowest levels since the end of the Korean war. When Ronald Reagan became president, he made it clear that he opposed any U.S. force reduction from Korea. In his view, a withdrawal would impede progress in achieving important American political and security interests. He was particularly concerned that the abrogation of the U.S. security treaty with Taiwan would adversely affect U.S. credibility in East Asia. As a result, Chun Doo Hwan, who succeeded Park after the latter's assassination in late 1979, was one of the first foreign leaders to visit Reagan in February 1981. In a joint communique;, Reagan stated that the United States "had no plans to withdraw U.S. ground forces from the Korean peninsula."27 The American President reiterated this pledge on his trip to the ROK in 1983 and during Chun's second visit to the United States in 1985.28 On many political issues, the Reagan administration preferred to conduct what was described as "quiet diplomacy" to influence other countries in contrast with Carter's more direct approach, and this change of emphasis became apparent in the warmer official relations between the United States and South Korea.29

While the troop withdrawal issue remained muted during most of the Reagan administration at least in part because of executive-legislative agreement on policy choices, this issue resurfaced during the presidency of George Bush. In June 1989, three senators introduced legislation that would have reduced the U.S. ground force presence by 10,000 soldiers over the next 3 years. They were frustrated by budgetary factors in the United States and a changing threat perception in Northeast Asia as the Cold War concluded. Pentagon studies in 1989 estimated the U.S. costs of maintaining troops in South Korea at $2.6 billion per year.30 Although this legislation never came to fruition, it did identify two issues which continue to convince many Americans that the U.S. forces should be further reduced or withdrawn completely: economic factors in the United States, specifically the need to reduce the budget deficit, and a more benign threat environment after the Cold War.

Roh Tae Woo, who was elected president in December 1987, challenged the basic premises of the three senators who introduced this legislation. He argued that increasing North Korean unpredictability required the continuation of the U.S. presence if stability were to be continued. His foreign minister stated that a reduction of American military forces should occur only after the DPRK reduced its forward based forces just north of the 38th parallel.31 Vice President Dan Quayle visited South Korea in September 1989 and attempted to put the issue to rest, at least temporarily. He indicated that the Bush administration would oppose any legislative efforts to force a withdrawal.32

The important point here is that the debate in the United States was focusing more on domestic economic factors and a changing threat perception. It is only normal that these issues should receive increased emphasis; however, from the Korean perspective, the precedents set by Nixon and Carter once again became concerns. While the South Koreans opposed both the withdrawal plans in the early and late 1970s on their merits, they also were highly offended that neither administration consulted with them before announcing its policy decision. During Bush's visit to Seoul in January 1992, he made a pledge similar to that given by his vice president in 1989. He pledged that the United States would keep its military forces on the Korean peninsula "as long as there is a need and we are welcome."33

In 1990, the Department of Defense published a document entitled A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the 21st Century.34 This study attempted to respond to the changing international environment after the end of the Cold War and to take into account increasing economic pressures in the United States to reduce the defense budget. In so doing, its authors tried to define U.S. national objectives in Asia and the force structures required to protect and foster these objectives. Regarding the Korean peninsula, it described the border between the two Koreas "as one of the world's potential military flashpoints" and set forth three bilateral security objectives. The first was to deter North Korean aggression or defeat this aggression if deterrence failed. Second, to reduce political and military tensions on the peninsula and to encourage the initiation of confidence-building measures. Third, to begin the transition of U.S. forces in the ROK from a leading to a supporting role.35

As part of this important transition, the Pentagon envisioned a three-phased restructuring of American forces. In the first phase, estimated to take between 1 and 3 years, the United States pledged to reduce its forces by approximately 7,000 personnelþ2,000 from the Air Force and 5,000 support troops from the Army.36 In phase two, between 3 and 5 years, the United States and South Korea would review the threat and consider reducing the force structure of the 2d Infantry Division. In the third phase, between 5 and 10 years, the two allies agreed to consult with each other based on the progress made during the first two phases. As the Koreans proceeded to take the lead role in providing for their own defense, the rationale was that fewer American military forces would be required.

The Pentagon study also addressed burden sharing, an indication of the congressional concerns as evidenced by the legislative initiative in June 1989 to bring 10,000 soldiers back to the United States This study called for the ROK to assume additional costs for the salaries of Korean workers on the U.S. bases and to pay for the construction of new facilities.37

The proposed reduction in U.S. forces and demands for increased Korean burden sharing were not new topics of discussion. As in previous cases when the United States announced proposed changes in its force structure, there was some negative reaction in Seoul when the Pentagon proposals were announced. Some officials questioned whether the timing was right based on the leadership succession which was then underway in the DPRK as Kim Il Sung continued his efforts to pass on political control to his son, Kim Jong Il. Others argued that the ROK already shared enough of the burden in supporting the American military presence.38

Nonetheless, the Korean response to the Pentagon study and subsequent events was much less vitriolic than was the case with the Nixon and Carter reduction plans. Part of this change in response is attributable to increased Korean confidence in its capabilities, as well as an appreciation of the changes which had occurred in the threat environment. Part was also influenced by improved consultations between the two allies on national security issues. As an example, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney went to Seoul in November 1991 to participate in the annual Security Consultative Meeting (SCM). The United States and South Korea established the SCM in the early 1970s to coordinate important security issues. At the November meeting after discussions with his Korean counterpart, Secretary Cheney announced that the United States would suspend its planned force reductions, announced in the 1990 Pentagon study, "until the dangers and uncertainties of the North Korean nuclear program have been thoroughly addressed." Cheney's statement on suspending further force reductions was important because the U.S. Air Force had begun to remove its personnel and equipment from three air bases. The two sides had agreed to redesignate these facilities as collocated operating bases which meant that the USAF would have access to these bases in a crisis, but there would not be a peacetime American presence.39 Cheney and the Koreans also reached an agreement on burden sharing through 1995. The ROK announced it would increase its support from approximately $150 million in 1991 to $180 million in 1992. By 1995, they agreed to pay about $280 million.40 The most important point was that the Secretary of Defense consulted with his counterparts and responded to Korean concerns without the acrimony associated with the Nixon and Carter initiatives.

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Notes:
27. Joint Communique, February 2, 1981, Department of State Bulletin 81, no. 2048, March 1981, p. 14. For additional coverage of the Chun visit, see FEER, February 6-12, 1981, p. 18. (Back to text)

28. FEER, November 24, 1983 and FEER, May 16, 1995, pp. 46-9. See also the International Herald Tribune (hereafter IHT), April 29, 1985, p. 4. (Back to text)

29. New York Times (hereafter NYT), June 18, 1987, p. 10, and June 19, 1987, p. 8. (Back to text)

30. Baltimore Sun, June 23, 1989, p. 2. (Back to text)

31. For Roh Tae Woo's comments, see NYT, June 29, 1989, p. 9. For Foreign Minister Choi Ho Joong, see the The Washington Post, July 25, 1989, p. 18. (Back to text)

32. The Washington Post, September 21, 1989, p. 42. (Back to text)

33. IHT, January 6, 1992, p. 1. (Back to text)

34. A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the 21st Century, an undated Department of Defense Publication. For press coverage on the release, see NYT, February 1, 1990, p. 15. (Back to text)

35. Ibid., pp. 6 and 15. (Back to text)

36. Ibid., p. 16. The call for a 7,000 force reduction brought this proposal into line with the 1989 Nunn-Warner Resolution. (Back to text)

37. Ibid., p. 17. (Back to text)

38. NYT, February 15, 1990, p. 10 and The Washington Post, February 16, 1990, p. 25. (Back to text)

39. IHT, November 22, 1991, p. 1 and FEER, December 5, 1991, p. 28. For details on the collocated operating bases, see Korea and World Affairs, vol. 14, no. 1, Spring 1990, pp. 196-7. (Back to text)

40. IHT, September 28-29, 1991, p. 2. (Back to text)

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