The Clinton Administration, the Nuclear Weapons Issue, and the U.S. Military Presence.

Domestic issues dominated the 1992 presidential election in the United States, but Democratic candidate Bill Clinton did address security concerns on the Korean peninsula on occasion. For example, he stated that he intended to retain an American military presence in the ROK to deter North Korean aggression.41 After his election, President Clinton visited Korea in July 1993. While there, he addressed the ROK's National Assembly and outlined his concept of a Pacific Community. One of the key components of this concept was the continuation of the U.S. military commitment in Asia. Concerning Korea, the President unequivocally stated that peace on the peninsula "remains a vital American interest," and that he would continue to station U.S. forces in the ROK "as long as the Korean people want and need them there."42 President Clinton has continued to pledge his firm intention to retain this presence throughout his first term, most recently when President Kim Young Sun visited Washington in July 1995. During this visit, Clinton restated his pledge that U.S. troops would remain as long as South Korea desired and that the alliance with South Korea was "stronger than ever."43

The retention of the military presence has been overshadowed in recent years by American concerns over the North Korean nuclear weapons program. While some differences remain between the executive and legislative branches as to how the United States should respond to this nuclear threat, the two branches appear to have reached a general consensus on retaining U.S. military forces in Korea for the foreseeable future. An examination of the North Korean nuclear weapons program is beyond the scope of this paper, but basic highlights are important to support the above contention that the U.S. military presence is likely to remain for several years.44

North Korea became a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985 but refused to sign the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) full-scope safeguards agreement even though obligated to do so under the provisions of the NPT. Concerns over the DPRK's refusal to allow IAEA inspections increased in 1989 when U.S. intelligence reports indicated the North Koreans were building what appeared to be a nuclear reactor and possibly a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant at the Yongbyon facility approximately 60 miles north of Pyongyang.45 If the DPRK developed the capability to extract plutonium, then it could possibly build nuclear weapons, a prospect neither the ROK, the United States, nor many other countries would welcome because of probable increased regional instability and proliferation pressures on other countries. North Korean officials have consistently denied that they have any intentions to develop a nuclear weapons capability, but these denials have not been accepted in Seoul or Washington.46

Some progress appeared to be made in resolving this issue on New Year's Eve 1991 when the two Koreas signed an agreement entitled the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. This agreement committed both countries not to "test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons."47 In January 1992, North Korea signed an agreement with the IAEA that provided for international inspections of its nuclear facilities. Between May 1992 and July 1993, the IAEA conducted seven ad hoc inspections of the DPRK's facilities.48 IAEA inspectors began to suspect during these inspections that North Korea had extracted more plutonium than the few grams they admitted to extracting for research purposes. To resolve these discrepancies, the IAEA requested access to two additional sites its inspectors believed were storage facilities for nuclear waste. The DPRK denied these buildings were waste sites but rather military warehouses, and, therefore, not subject to IAEA inspections.49

In March 1993, the U.N. Security Council voted 13-0 to adopt a resolution calling on the DPRK to allow IAEA inspectors access to the two suspected nuclear waste sites. North Korea refused to comply and shocked the international community on March 14 by announcing its intention to withdraw from the Non- Proliferation Treaty. This was the first instance in the history of the NPT where a signatory officially stated its plan to withdraw.50 By late May 1993, the United States and North Korea had agreed to a series of negotiations in the effort to resolve this dispute before the North actually withdrew from the NPT, scheduled for June 12. These negotiations in June and July 1993 were somewhat successful in that North Korea agreed to "suspend" its withdrawal from the NPT, but not in resolving the larger issue of the possibility that North Korea had a nuclear weapons program underway.51

Discussions continued between the United States and North Korea at the United Nations for the next several months, but without major success. Once again in May 1994, the North shocked the international community when it announced that it had begun to remove an estimated 8,000 spent fuel rods from one of its reactors in Yongbyon without IAEA inspectors being present as required by the NPT.52 In August, the United States and DPRK resumed high-level discussions in another effort to resolve the nuclear dispute. This time, more substantive arrangements were achieved. In a statement released at the end of the negotiations, the North Koreans agreed to replace their graphite-moderated reactors with light water reactors (LWRs). The latter are preferred by the United States and others because they produce less material which can be used to build nuclear weapons than the graphite reactors. In return, the United States pledged to help arrange for the acquisition of the LWRs and to assist in finding alternative energy sources for the DPRK. North Korea agreed to freeze the construction of additional reactors at Yongbyon while the LWRs are under construction, to forego reprocessing any more plutonium, and to seal what the IAEA suspected of being a reprocessing plant. Finally, the DPRK again stated it would remain in the NPT and allow the implementation of IAEA safeguards.53

The bilateral negotiations resumed during October 1994 in Geneva, and the two sides reached an agreement on October 21.54 This framework agreement basically called for a three-phased resolution of North Korea's nuclear program. In the first phase, which could take as long as 5 years, the DPRK pledged not to refuel its 5MW reactor at Yongbyon and to stop building the two larger reactors. The North Koreans also agreed to keep the 8,000 spent fuel rods in cooling ponds and to allow the IAEA to inspect them. In return, the United States and its allies indicated they would begin constructing two LWRs at a cost of approximately $4 billion, most of which the ROK and Japan would finance. While the LWRs are under construction, the United States will provide 50,000 metric tons of heavy oil for heating and electricity during the first year; this amount will increase to 500,000 metric tons per year thereafter until the LWRs come on-line. During the second phase, likely to begin in about 5 years, North Korea will allow IAEA inspections of the two suspected nuclear waste sites which should clarify how much plutonium the DPRK processed previously. The United States and its allies will complete work on the first LWR and bring it on-line. In the final phase, which will take several more years, the DPRK will dismantle all three of its graphite reactors as well as other facilities associated with reprocessing spent fuel. In return, the second LWR will be completed and brought on- line.55

The October 1994 framework agreement became controversial as soon as it was signed with several critics arguing that the United States had granted too many concessions without obtaining immediate inspections of the two suspected waste sites.56 More significantly for the purpose of this monograph, after the November congressional elections, several influential Republicans attacked this agreement. Senator Robert Dole, the new Majority Leader, stated shortly after the agreement was signed that "it was always possible to get an agreement when you give enough away." Subsequently, Senator Frank Murkowski, the chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on East Asia, criticized the agreement because it did not provide for the initial inspections of the suspected storage sites. Senator Larry Pressler has also been critical, charging that this agreement established a bad precedent for countries such as Iran which may in the future prohibit IAEA inspections unless the United States and others provide new power plants.57

Administration officials have responded to these criticisms in defense of the framework agreement.58 The important point is that congressional criticism now is focusing more on the nuclear weapons issue on the Korean peninsula than on U.S. military forces in the ROK. In fact, until the nuclear problem is finally completely resolved, it is unlikely that the military presence issue will be the subject of serious debate between the executive and legislative branches because neither wants to send a signal to North Korea which both Koreas could interpret as a diminution of U.S. resolve.

One final problem associated with the nuclear issue deserves attention. Both the United States and South Korea intended for the ROK to provide the LWRs to the DPRK, but North Korea expressed reluctance to have the ROK play this role for a variety of obvious reasons. United States and North Korean negotiators met in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia during June 1995 to attempt to find a resolution. In a statement released at the end of these discussions, the two countries agreed that the LWRs should be an "advanced version of U.S. origin, design and technology currently under production." While this is somewhat ambiguous, South Korea produces LWRs based on an American design, and the Korea Energy Development Organization (KEDO), a joint entity established to oversee the LWR project, will select the primary contractor which will most likely be South Korea's Korea Electric Power Corporation. KEDO is comprised primarily of American, South Korean, and Japanese representatives; North Korea is not a member.59 If there are further problems associated with the LWRs, this would probably stiffen U.S. resolve to continue taking a hard-line stance with North Korea.

The Clinton administration has continued the evolution of U.S. policy on the military presence in East Asia, in general, and the Republic of Korea, in specific, begun during the Bush administration. In February 1995, the Department of Defense published United States Security Strategy for the East Asian- Pacific Region which is a follow-on to the earlier 1990 Strategic Framework Toward the 21st Century.60 This report identifies continued political stability and economic growth and development in East Asia as vital U.S. national security objectives. To protect these vital interests, the United States must remain engaged in the region politically, economically, and militarily.61 This report is basically a practical example of the enlargement strategy which the Clinton administration initiated in 1993.

In the military context, the United States intends to maintain approximately 100,000 forces in East Asia. These forward-deployed forces contribute to a flexible and rapid crises response capability, discourage the possible emergence of a regional hegemon, enhance U.S. capabilities to influence issues in the region, reduce the time and distance problems for the deployment of military units, and demonstrate U.S. commitment to the security of friends and allies.62 Because of the conventional and nuclear threats emanating from Pyongyang, the 2d Infantry Division, its support units, and a USAF combat air wing will remain in the ROK for the foreseeable future. The modest drawdown planned in 1990 has been "permanently halted," and major modernization programs are planned for the units remaining, as well as substantial prepositioning of additional equipment. Deterring future North Korean aggression continues as the highest priority by "making it unmistakably clear that the United States would automatically and immediately be involved in any such conflict."63

However, the Pentagon report does commit the United States to continuing the process begun earlier of shifting the primary responsibility for the ROK's defense to its ally. To this end, the combined ground component commander is now a South Korean four-star general rather than an American, and the transfer of peacetime operational control of ROK forces to South Korea took place in December 1994. The ROK also agreed to increase its economic support for U.S. forces to $300 million in FY 1995 and to continue to provide rent-free bases. This represents a $20 million increase from the previous agreement on burden sharing.64

In comparison with earlier periods during the Nixon, Carter, and Bush administrations, the Congress has not criticized the 1995 troop proposal. This can be explained in part because most congressmen seemed to accept that the U.S. military presence should remain in South Korea particularly as long as the DPRK's conventional and nuclear threats remain as serious as they are at present. This situation is exacerbated to a certain extent because the succession process from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il in North Korea remains incomplete. A final factor is that both the executive and legislative branches are aware that North Korea has made substantial efforts to drive a wedge between the United States and ROK. These efforts are apparent in the bilateral negotiations between North Korea and the United States addressing the nuclear weapons issue, a process in which the South Koreans have not been directly involved. Another example is the DPRK's attempt to replace the 1953 Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty, again excluding South Korea from this process.

The Clinton administration is certainly cognizant of these North Korean initiatives and their ulterior motives. Its diplomats have worked hard to ensure that its South Korean ally is not marginalized in these negotiations. Both branches of government seem to recognize that the U.S. military presence should remain in South Korea to protect U.S. vital national security interests in a period of uncertainty on the Korean peninsula. While disputes over the administration's counterproliferation policy continue, the troop issue is not part of the current debate.65 Whether this support and cooperation will continue as the United States tries to implement its post-Cold War strategy in East Asia remains to be seen, particularly if isolationist sentiment increases in the Congress in the next few years and partisan politics become even more counterproductive. The invitation to struggle between the executive and legislative branches continues to be a political reality. Nonetheless, in the mid 1990s, there appears to be greater agreement on the importance of the American military forces deployed in support of the ROK than in several years.

Notes:
41. IHT, November 5, 1992, p. 1. (Back to text)

42. NYT, July 11, 1993, p. 6. (Back to text)

43. Foreign Broadcast Information Service East Asia (hereafter FBIS-EAS) Daily Report, July 28, 1995, p. 38. (Back to text)

44. For a detailed analysis of North Korea's nuclear weapons program, see William E. Berry, Jr., North Korea's Nuclear Program: The Clinton Administration's Response, USAF Academy, CO: Institute for National Security Studies Occasional Paper 3, March 1995. (Back to text)

45. The Washington Post, July 29, 1989, p. 9, and NYT, October 25, 1989, p. 9. (Back to text)

46. Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, "North Korea's Nuclear Program," in Young Whan Kihl, ed., Korea and the World Beyond the Cold War, pp. 235-236. (Back to text)

47. For a copy of this agreement, see Young Whan Kihl, ed., Korea and the World Beyond the Cold War, Appendix C, pp. 347-348. (Back to text)

48. IHT, January 31, 1992, p. 4, and Kongdan Oh and Ralph Hassig, "North Korea's Nuclear Program," pp. 237-238. (Back to text)

49. Ibid., pp. 238-239; and Larry Nitesch, "North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program," CRS Issue Brief, Congressional Research Service, May 2, 1994, p. 2. (Back to text)

50. IHT, March 12, 1993, p. 6, and March 13-14, 1993, p. 1. Article X.1 of the NPT requires 90 days' notice before a signatory country can withdraw from the NPT. (Back to text)

51. For a copy of the Joint Statement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America, dated June 11, 1993, see The U.S.-Korea Review, vol II, no. 1, July-August 1993, p. 6. (Back to text)

52. The Washington Post, May 15, 1994, p. 29. For North Korea's justification for this action, see FBIS-EAS, May 16, 1994, pp. 8-10, and May 23, 1994, pp. 16-17. (Back to text)

53. FBIS-EAS, August 16, 1994, p. 32. (Back to text)

54. "Agreed Framework Between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America," October 21, 1994, is found in FBIS-EAS, October 24, 1994, pp. 34-35. The following specifics are taken from this document. (Back to text)

55. NYT, October 21, 1994, p. 4. (Back to text)

56. See William Safire in the NYT, October 25, 1994, p. 11, and FEER, October 27, 1994, pp. 14-15, and November 3, 1994, p. 5. (Back to text)

57. NYT, November 24, 1994, p. 1, and December 2, 1994, p. 7. (Back to text)

58. See Robert Gallucci's comments in NYT, December 2, 1994, p. 7. Gallucci was the senior U.S. negotiator in the framework discussions. (Back to text)

59. The joint statement is found in FBIS-EAS, June 13, 1995, p. 26-7. See also NYT, June 13, 1995, p. 4. (Back to text)

60. "United States Security Strategy for East Asia-Pacific Region," USDP/ISA/AP, Washington, DC: The Pentagon, February 1995. (Back to text)

61. Ibid., pp. 7 and 9. (Back to text)

62. Ibid., p. 23. (Back to text)

63. Ibid., pp. 25-26. (Back to text)

64. Ibid., pp. 27-28. (Back to text)

65. There is a debate ongoing in the literature concerning the 1995 Pentagon report. In support, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "The Case for Deep Engagement." In opposition are Chalmers Johnson and E. B. Keehn, "The Pentagon's Ossified Strategy." Both are found in Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, no. 4, July/August 1995, pp. 90-114. (Back to text)

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