This report will take a systematic approach to documenting the events leading up to the bombing of the two Japanese cities.
The War in 1945
In early 1945, the U.S. was waging an almost solitary war against Japan in the Pacific. The U.S. released fire bombs into cities, and used an early version of Napalm, similar to that used in Dresden. However, the Japanese continued to refuse to surrender. Clearly the Japanese were to be believed. As victories mounted, President Harry S. Truman began to look ahead to the time when the U.S. must make the attack on Japan itself. After a lengthy discussion with his top military advisor, Truman set in motion the analysis of the "end game" for Japan. Admiral Leahy, the President's Chief of Staff told his subordinates,
"He wants an estimate of the time and the losses that will result from an effort to defeat Japan by isolation, blockade, and bombardment by sea and air forces. It is his intention to make his decision on the campaign with the purpose of economizing to the maximum extent possible in the loss of American lives. Economy in the use of time and money cost is comparatively unimportant." 1This set into motion a series of studies and estimates on the losses expected both in U.S. and Japanese casualties. Tasked were Joint Planning Staff and the Joint War Plans Committee 1. The attack plan proposed an invasion of the island of Kyushu on November 15, 1945.
Early planning figures had estimated some 100,000 to 150,000
Japanese
troops in some three divisions. U.S. casualties expected was
under
100,000 and a predicted death toll of U.S. servicemen at under 50,000.
New Intelligence
By late June to early July 1945, however, Truman was apprised of intelligence that showed a total of six divisions of Japanese regulars on Kyushu, the island where U.S. planners hoped to attack. Some 375,000 soldiers comprised these six divisions. As the intelligence community went about confirming these figures, four more divisions were discovered and by the end of July as Truman was leaving for the Postdam conference, the count rose to eleven as a new division was moved in from Honshu. 1 Clearly the Japanese were preparing for a huge final battle for their homeland. Rhetoric included the usual "fight to the last man" tirade that Japan had been using throughout the Pacific campaign. Unfortunately, in many cases the rhetoric had been matched by deed, with Japanese divisions surrendering only with a handful of men and nearly every surviving officer committing suicide before being captured.
The headquarters on Formosa had been moved to southern Kyushu and radio intercepts were decoded using secret U.S. held Japanese encryption codes. These intercepts confirmed a new headquarters on southern Kyushu, further confirming the strength of forces defending. By August 1 of 1945, two more divisions were en route, according to the intercepts and ship movements, boarding schedules and arrival dates all confirmed that not only were the forces building quickly but that perhaps the attack in November would be too late. The confirmation that a total of 13 divisions were being tasked with the protection of Kyushu and the troop number now expaning to over 500,000 troops left little hope for a quick or low casualty campaign.
Marshall's planners were pretty upset by these figures,
"There is a strong likelihood that additional major units will enter the area before target date ...we are engaged in a race against time by which the ratio of attack effort vis-a-vis defense capacity is perilously balanced." 1The plan had been to attack with overwhelming odds so even if the U.S. forces could not overrun the Japanese defenses, then at least any resistance would be overcome quickly and with low American loss of life. The original estimate for the number of U.S. casualties was thought to be less than 140,000 (under 50,000 dead). Clearly that possibility was out of the question when faced with the new troop figures.
Further, earlier intelligence had predicted a cutoff of Japanese reinforcements due to the conventional bombing and cut supply lines from the rest of the Pacific. No Japanese troops would be returning home. The fact that some half a million troops remained in the islands was clearly a surprise and called to question the accuracy of other intelligence figures.
To wage a battle against such forces would require marshaling two to three times the invasion force originally planned. The time involved would mean tens of thousands of U.S. soldiers would be spent holding the line while the invasion force was further reinforced.
With the number in southern Kyushu now better than that estimated for the defense of the entire island, the planners now realized that even with an expanded invasion force, the amount of time and effort to clear the Japanese combatants would also expend even more American lives. Estimates now jumped into hundreds of thousands of U.S. lives to be forfeited in the campaign. In Potsdam, Marshall told Truman that it might cost up to 250,000 American lives to complete the invasion. By August 2, 1945, it was clear that 250,000 casualties, with some 50,000 to 75,000 of these killed was a low number. Truman was not surpassingly grim at the prospects.
Moreover, even if U.S. troops managed to keep the Pacific theatre
kill
ratio of 22 Japanese to 1 American and only lost 50,000 U.S.
servicemen,
this would mean the entire Japanese defense force was at risk, plus any
militia and irregular combatants. Estimates of 300,000 Japanese
killed
on the initial invasion alone were becoming realistic. Combined
with
U.S. losses, the total death toll for both sides looked to be in the
500,000
range, if the war were brought to conclusion in 6 months. If it
took
longer, the toll would climb dramatically for U.S. troops. In the
short term, Truman was looking at some 50,000 U.S. troop deaths at a
minimum
even if the invasion went well. His advisors were not predicting
the campaign would go well, espeically when intercepts started showing
more and more troops were being marshaled in southern Kyushu.
The Decision
Prior to leaving for Potsdam in late July of 1945, Truman ordered Secreatary of War Stimson to arrange for the deployment of the weapon during the Potsdam meeting. Truman reserved the right to call it off, but Stimson warned him that communications were such that by July 31, there might not be a chance to call off the mission. The necessity to save nearly 50,000 U.S. lives was clearly on the President's mind, as the new estimates were not available before he left.
When compared to McArthur's campaign casualties figures (Philippines, Okinawa, and Iwo Jima) which were in the range of 133,000 lost and the fact McArthur's men had faced smaller numbers of Japanese then were being estimated in the south alone, Truman could not have thought the invasion of Japan would yield less U.S. casualties.
The military commander, General Spratz, was given instructions to deploy the weapon on August 3, or as soon thereafter as weather permitted. This set in motion the transport of the two nuclear weapons to their bases. One was delivered by the U.S.S. Indianapolis which was sunk AFTER having delivered the weapon to its base.
While the weapons were being delivered to their air bases, Truman met with his advisors while in Potsdam and conferred. The decision to continue to go forward was confirmed based upon the latest intelligence and no countermanding order was given by August 1. Realistically this was the last chance to call the bombing off.
When on August 2, Secretary Stimson requested the approval of the final draft of the announcement language for the use of the atomic bomb, Truman approved the draft and then stated in writing he wanted the statement to be released as soon as possible after the weapon was used, and confirmed that the weapon was to be used as soon as it was ready. Truman's reply to Stimson, then, was the final confirmation of the go-ahead.
Thus the rationale for using the weapon was clearly decided before Potsdam and based upon the intelligence figures prior to the nearly 500,000 Japanese troop figure. The new intelligence received while at Potsdam only served to stiffen Truman's resolve. The advisors and Truman's stated rationale was:
"...in the hope of (1) avoiding the need for an invasion with resulting casualties that by any standard would be of intimidating proportions, (2) minimizing the USSR's postwar leverage, and (3) not having to confront debate over concessions on the terms of unconditional surrender--was the driving force in the minds of the US leadership team before Potsdam, and before the acquisition of intelligence showing much-larger-than- expected Japanese forces on Kyushu."The fact that Truman was looking ahead at postwar dealings with the Soviet Union was an intelligent and rational piece of reasoning, one that a wartime President should have made regardless of the type of weapon being used. And while there was no evidence that the Germans had given the Japanese enough information for their own nuclear program, it is clear that their desire for the newest and best weapons could put them on the track to nuclear weapons. A decade later, the ease in which U.S. security was breached by the Soviet Union made it clear the nuclear secrets would not remain secrets for long. Truman's choices were few and he clearly chose the quickest route to ending the war on basis of balancing U.S. and Japanese lives as well as the unknown conditions the next six to twelve months would bring.
The Bombings
On August 6, 1945, the first weapon was deployed over Hiroshima, an air burst at 2000 ft. The weapon yielded approximately 12.5 KT, killing approximately 100,000 people within 30 days, and up to 140,000 over the course of the year after the blast (prolonged effects of radiation induced cancers and long term radiation sickness). Those near the blast who received radiation and flash burns were mostly dead within 60 days. Only a few of these survived. Long term effects were unknown at the time, however, for several decades the long term effects did not present themselves.
The bomb's shockwave took down all but a handful of buildings within 1.5 miles of ground zero. While the Hiroshima weapon was the smaller of the two atomic weapons dropped, the blast was reflected by the nearby mountains and thus nearly doubled the blast damage as a second pulse of shockwave rocked the city. Major architectural damage was inflicted on buildings up to 3 miles resulting in the buildings collapsing on their own or their being razed. Severe but repairable damage was found up to 12 miles (broken glass at 12 miles). Secondary fires burned for days, consuming an area 4 miles in radius from ground zero.
For two days, U.S. officials spoke directly with representatives of Japan, pleading for their surrender. However, the Japanese released public statement after public statement repeating the "we will fight to the last man" message. Negotiators made direct appeals to their counterparts, however reported back no movement on the part of the Japanese. Truman then authorized the second weapon deployment.
The second weapon was dropped on August 9, 1945, on the city of Nagasaki. This was an air burst of 20 KT at approximately 1800 feet, killing some 70,000 people by the end of the year. The architectural damage far exceeded Hiroshima, with the steel buildings of Nagasaki's steel plant and torpedo manufacturing facilities being laid down in the direction away from the blast. Some 50,000 buildings were destroyed or seriously damaged beyond repair. Plant life at an elevation of up to 8000 feet were scorched on the surrounding hills. What the blast damage did not destroy, secondary fires consumed much like the fires in Hiroshima.
Negotiators pointed out to the Japanese that similar damage could also lay bare Japanese treasured sites and its capital, including the Emperor's palace. Finally, the Japanese agreed to negotiate a surrender. The U.S. set the terms and at the last moment, decided to allow the Japanese to form a constitutional monarchy. However the U.S. occupoied the country for a decade while it rebuilt.
In the last 15 years, there have been claims that the lifetimes of survivors has been cut short -- i.e. they are dying at a younger age than people in Japan who were not near the blast. MILNET is not able to draw a conclusion as to the veracity of the claims, however, it is not an unreasonable conclusion given that anyone within reach of the fallout or radiation pulse might have genetic or long term damage to their bodies.
For further information on the effects of the bombings, we recommend
The
Manhattan Project Engineers online material and A-Bomb
Museum online, specifically the pictures in Record
of A-Bomb disaster.
The Controversy
Several decades after the conclusion of the war, a wave of anti-war sentiment fueled academia into protests against U.S. war policies and naturally turned to look back at the bombings. In rhetoric void of the necessities of the World War II crisis, passionate denigration of Truman and his advisors became popular, thus giving rise to further decades of proposed guilt over the "heinous act". Revisionist history began to paint Truman and his advisors as evil, hateful men who made their life's success over the bodies of burnt Japanese victims.
Revisionist also have attempted to build a case that Japan was "looking for a way to surrender." Factual accounts by the people attempting to negotiate the surrender don't seem to carry much weight with the revisionists, especially when the people involved in negotiations categorically deny the Japanese even hinted at the possibility of surrender until the Nagasaki blast. Within 2 hours of Nagasaki, these same negotiators found themselves extremely busy working out the details of a surrender.
Calls for reparations for the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have been made, and the calls are repeated annually in August. Today it is not hard to find people who believe Truman was a war criminal and that reparations are a logical apology for his actions. Recent years have seen the more radical calling for Truman to be classified as a war criminal.
The controversy centers on the rationale used and the timing of the use of the weapons. Pseudo scholars attempt to draw conclusions pointing to this imagined evil. However, the truth is simple. At a time of war, the U.S. President balanced the military, political, and domestic pressures to end the war and chose to use the weapons. As horrendous the effects, all those claiming the evil seem to forget that all war produces similar unpleasant deaths and horrible wounds.
The use of the atomic bombs ended the war with Japan in days, instead of months. Attempting to figure out how many lives were saved or not saved by their use or hysterically pointing at the horrible deaths is dramatic but irrelevant. The bombing of Dresden, an ultimately necessary act of war was far more viscous and horrid. The corpses in V-1 and V-2 attacked London were as brutally frightening as those in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Yet the reparations supporters focus on the evil of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, NOT the evils of World War II itself, nor the evils of the Japanese invader. Whenever the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor is mentioned, revisionists completely lose their rationale and claim the U.S. deserved the attack. Not too surprisingly, barely two weeks after the Terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and U.S. Pentagon in September 2001, these same revisionists began to point to U.S.policy in the middle east and try to blame the U.S. saying America deserved to be attacked.
While no nation is expected to use a nuclear weapon against a city again, there may well be a case where a nuclear weapon will be used and politically accepted. An example would be in air defense in the outer atmosphere, or perhaps a weapon that penetrates underground and then explodes, crushing a deep underground bunker. It is not the weapon that chills all who contemplate its use, but the effects of the weapon. However, anti-nuke protesters say all nuclear weapons use is prohibited without rationale discussion of the effects. This irrational fear is indicative of the irrational claims.
The hysterical call for total abandonment of nuclear weapons is a non-starter, since if only one nation has one such weapon, then any nation wishing to protect itself must too have at least one weapon. There is no indication that in the next 100 years there will be zero nuclear weapons unless some other force is found which surpasses its power and horror.
As recent efforts to reduce the two largest national stockpiles
(U.S.
and Russia) progress, it is clear the number of weapons will be
reduced.
No one except a few idealists believe the number will ever be small
enough
to remove the danger of their use, and certainly EVERY emerging nation
with the necessary financial and manufacuring resources has flirted
with
or is currently in development of nuclear weapons. The fact that
nations under the most severe monitoring regimes still attempt to build
these weapons and the dangers of proliferation to the hands of
terrorists
clearly indicates that a minimum number of nuclear weapons must be kept
in order to deter their against the U.S. by any nation. Sadly, no
deterrence will prevent the use of a nuclear weapon by terrorists.
Sources: