India.

The breakup of the Soviet Union and the loss of its superpower patron43 created serious security concerns for India. New Delhi feared that Central Asian instability would mirror the chaos of the Caucasus. Border realignment, ethnic disputes, resurgent Islam, and civil war would directly affect the territorial integrity of Afghanistan, which, in domino fashion, would influence Pakistan, Iran and Kashmir. In such an environment drug trafficking,44 illegal arms, and crime syndicates flourish, threatening not only Central Asia but all its neighbors. Such a scenario would have inevitable consequences for India's national security.45 India is also alarmed at Pakistan's call for Central Asia as a strategic hinterland and its Islamic initiatives such as the ECO. As a consequence, India is seeking new security arrangements with the republics of Central Asia.46

The new security environment presents both challenges and opportunities for India to influence affairs within Central Asia. Pakistan's failure does not mean India's success. Central Asia's distrust of Pakistan's Islamic agenda does not make it pro-Indian. As a non-aligned, non-Islamic state, India rejected military alliances, security agreements, and cultural ties as tools for promoting stability in Central Asia. Instead, it focused its efforts on bilateral economic programs. India's special relationship with the Soviet Union provided New Delhi with existing economic links (e.g., a consulate in Tashkent) and a lively trade with the Central Asian republics. India offered many advantages to Central Asian authorities converting to a market economy: a large, urban, educated elite fluent in English; a functional Anglo-Saxon judicial system; industry and management based on Western lines; and an established and vibrant stock market.47

Indian economic programs focused on the two regional linchpins: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. India offered credits worth ten million dollars to Tashkent in 1992 and 1993, and in 1992 signed a treaty on "the principles of interstate relations and bilateral cooperation," promising cooperation in fighting terrorism, arms and drug trafficking and extremist ideologies.48 Specific investment projects included hotel construction in Tashkent, Samarkand, and Bukhara. In 1992 India signed a group of agreements with Almaty to develop its textile and hotel industries. India also offered Kazakhstan ten million dollars in credits in 1992 and 1993.49 An April 1992 Indo-Turkmen agreement promised cooperation in fields such as natural gas extraction, chemicals, agricultural products processing, hotel construction, and banking. In June 1994 India offered Turkmenistan a 10-year loan worth five million dollars.50 Little has been done with Kyrgyzstan and war-torn Tajikistan.

The gap between intent and capability also colors India's plans for Central Asia. The fact that India is not contiguous has hampered the development of trade. No overland routes exist between Central Asia and India. If built, India's access would depend on Pakistan and Afghanistan. Air transit is cost prohibitive. Also, India has insufficient capital for the massive investment needed to make a real impact. Indian investors, hampered by a lack of reliable banking facilities in Central Asia, have experienced difficulty in receiving payments and repatriating money.51

Regardless of its recent military buildup, India itself cannot provide security to the states of Central Asia; it must rely upon a (non-Islamic) proxy. Some Indian sources argue that ultimately only Russia (with whom India has an agreement on defense planning and cooperation) could act as a balancing force in Central Asia.52 Another option is China, with whom relations have improved since last year's surprise proposal to form a bilateral trade block to counter regional trade groupings and recent confidence-building measures.53 However, that option will fade rapidly if the China-Pakistan relationship develops.

Pakistan remains the main focus of India's interest, but Afghan instability and a threatened domino effect from civil war in Central Asia make efforts to promote regional peace and security an Indian national interest. India will politically support the region's secular regimes, for strategic denial of fundamentalist Islam in Central Asia will remain a prominent concern. New Delhi will continue to use economic and technical assistance as a policy tool and to enhance its own commercial interests.

44. According to P. Stobdan, "the phenomena of opium cultivation, narcotics trafficking and its related crimes and mafia politics are not only posing a threat to the Central Asian states themselves, but also to India. Central Asia is emerging as the world's largest opium producer. . . . Central Asia plus Afghanistan on one side, and Myanmar on the other, will make India most vulnerable to the narcotics trade, bringing with it a host of other social and political problems." P. Stobdan, "Central Asia: India's Strategic Approach," Strategic Analysis, Vol. XVIII, No. 6, September 1995, p. 749. (Back to text)

45. Ibid., p. 742. (Back to text)

46. New relations with Central Asia are a part of a larger realignment following the end of the Cold War, although Pakistan remains the immediate threat. India has improved relations with Iran, which in turn helped persuade Pakistan to drop a United Nations motion to censure India for its human rights record in Kashmir. Relations with the U.S. have improved since India opened refueling facilities to American military aircraft during the Gulf War; the recent U.S.-India Memorandum of Understanding includes armed forces joint exercises and training, visits between senior civilian officials for policy planning and joint research, and development projects. Russia is now more an economic than a political partner. Cash-strapped Kremlin officials have willingly sold equipment and spare parts; over 70 percent of India's military equipment comes from factories in the Former Soviet Union. Russia now supports a nuclear free zone in South Asia. China remains the long-term threat to India's regional ascendancy. China still occupies 12,000 square miles of Indian territory, and remains neutral on the Kashmir controversy, supporting a peaceful resolution under the framework of the Simla Agreement. China has established new agreements with Pakistan, Myanmar and Sri Lanka which Indian analysts view as encirclement to contain India. (Back to text)

47. Shekhar Gupta, India Redefines its Role, Adelphi Papers 293, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies/Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 58. He was actually talking about China, but the principle is the same. (Back to text)

48. Anita Singh, "India's Relations with Russia and Central Asia," International Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 1, 1995, p. 79. (Back to text)

49. Ibid., p. 80. (Back to text)

50. Ibid. (Back to text)

51. Ibid., p. 78. (Back to text)

52. Stobdan, "International aspects," p. 281. (Back to text)

53. These resulted from the September 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility. (Back to text)

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