Russia.

According to the Primary Chronicle, the first Russian state was formed in 862 A.D. when inhabitants of the Dnepr' Valley begged transiting Varangians (Norsemen, or Vikings), led by Prince Rurik, to establish Kievan Rus'. "Our land is great and rich, but there is no order in it. Come to rule and reign over us."54 In its heart of hearts, this is the scenario Moscow envisions for Central Asia: incapable of ruling on their own, the penitent republics beg Moscow to reassert its control over the region. This has not happened, so a more aggressive program toward economic and political integration has been adopted.

When Russia formed the CIS in 1991, it appeared relieved to jettison the burden of subsidizing the Islamic fringes of the empire. With Russia's focus on economic collapse at home, loss of superpower status, and security issues in Europe, and burned by its involvement in Afghanistan, Central Asia was a backwater.55 Then, within one calendar month, the fall of Kabul, the coup in Dushanbe, and trips by Islamic leaders to Central Asia occurred. The threat loomed of significant Iranian and Turkish influence spreading throughout the region.

Russia took a hard look at the economic and security implications of its earlier dismissive attitude and formulated a foreign policy to bring Central Asia, if not back into the empire with a "gathering of the lands," then, at the very least, back into the fold. Moscow sought to maintain regional stability, prevent other regional powers from establishing hegemony, protect and expand its economic interests, protect ethnic Russians living in Central Asia (and prevent their migration back to an economically strapped federation), and stop the spread of Islamic fundamentalism (especially from Afghanistan via Tajikistan).

By 1995 Russia began to talk of creating an "economically and politically integrated association of states capable of claiming its proper place in the world community."56 Edict Number 940, issued on September 14, 1995, stated:

     our main vital interests in the spheres of economy, defense, security and the
     protection of the rights of Russians are concentrated on the territory of the CIS,
     and the safeguarding of those interests constitutes the basis of the country's
     national security.57  

The edict identified Russia's main tasks: to ensure political, military, and economic stability; to promote economically and politically stable CIS states friendly toward Russia; to consolidate Russia as the leading force in formulating a new system of interstate relations; and to boost integration processes within the CIS. It added, "when collaborating with third countries and international organizations, it is necessary to seek their agreement that this region is primarily a zone of Russian interests."58

Almost immediately after the USSR's break up, Moscow staked its claim as regional hegemon in Central Asia. Even after the division of Soviet assets59 and the creation of republican armed forces, the new states were incapable of ensuring their own territorial integrity and domestic security. In military affairs the Central Asian states remained dependent on Moscow. On May 15, 1992, a formal collective security agreement60 replaced Russia's original passive policy, which regarded Central Asia as a vast buffer zone, over which Moscow exerted a benign equivalent of the Monroe Doctrine--"We aren't going to get actively involved ourselves, but everyone else stay out." Moscow then followed up with bilateral defense treaties with each of the five Central Asian states. Under the new treaty, Russian Border Guard forces were responsible for patrolling Central Asia's external boundaries,61 while a coordinated CIS air defense system guarded the skies above. In March 1994 Moscow signed an additional 22 bilateral military agreements62 with Kazakhstan, to include Russian lease of the Baikonur Cosmodrome (for an initial period of 20 years with an option to extend a further 10 years) for $115 million annually (deducted from Almaty's debts to Moscow) and resolutions on the strategic nuclear forces temporarily deployed in Kazakhstan. Moscow also agreed to train 500 Kazakhstani officers per year at its various military academies.63 A January 1995 agreement gave Russia continued access to several missile test ranges, proving grounds, and military communications sites in Kazakhstan.64 Both nations also promised to cooperate on forming Joint Armed Forces, conducting joint planning for the training and use of troops, and providing weapons and military equipment.65

From the beginning the Central Asian states have had mixed feelings about the CIS alliance. On the one hand, Central Asian leaders recognize the consequences if Russia does not get involved. Faced with civil war in neighboring Tajikistan and Afghanistan, President Karimov of Uzbekistan has stated that he would "like to see the Russian Federation as a kind of 'guarantor of stability' in the region, or more simply put, as a guarantor of the survival of the administration that exists in Tashkent today."66 On the other hand, CIS members' suspicions and concerns about Russia's intentions to inherit the Soviet Union's ambitions are heightened by the rise of ultra- nationalists such as Zhirinovskii and the impressive showing of the Communists in recent elections.67 The example of the Warsaw Pact, which Russia frequently puts forward as a model for the CIS, makes Central Asian leaders uncomfortable, remembering as they do that Pact's "multinational response to attempts at political self-direction in Hungary and Czechoslovakia."68

On the surface the collective security agreement has maintained stability in Central Asia. Widescale civil war and ethnic separatism have not occurred in Central Asia, as they have in the Caucasus. Russian forces did reestablish a pro-Moscow government in Dushanbe. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan did send limited peacekeeping contingents to Tajikistan. Moscow continues to broker diplomatic efforts to end the crisis. Yet, deployment of Russian troops to Tajikistan fits Russia's long- term interests. To paraphrase Clausewitz, peacekeeping is the continuation of politics with other means. The forces preclude involvement by neighbors who wish to extend their own influence in the region. Introduction of Russian peacekeepers limits Western policy options and marginalizes the role of United Nations' peacekeeping overtures.69

Russia also seeks to protect and expand its economic position in Central Asia as part of a larger effort to revive its regional economic (and hence political) influence. Moscow's political leaders realize that a major source of funding for that revival lies just to its south. Russia lacks the investment capital or technology to compete for lucrative deals being cut by foreign consortiums for Central Asia's energy and mineral wealth. But it does possess access. All five Central Asian states are landlocked, and although Iran, Pakistan, India, China, and Turkey all promise transit routes in the future, Russia can offer access now.

As a consequence, Russia has actively inserted itself into foreign investment plans. Oil and natural gas can be exported through Iran, Russia or unstable areas in the Caucasus and Afghanistan. American investors (such as Chevron in Kazakhstan) are prohibited, for U.S. domestic political reasons, from using the southern route through Iran to export oil. Turkish environmental concerns are threatening supertanker transit through the Bosphorus. Caucasian pipelines pass through major areas of armed conflict. Recent proposals to pass thru Afghanistan to Pakistani terminals are equally precarious. The only immediate alternative left is Russia. Moscow has stymied construction of new pipelines across Turkey and is pushing use of existing pipelines transiting Russia, thereby giving her enormous leverage over pipeline flow and a greater percentage of revenues.

Russian coercion has been crude, but effective. Russia pressured Turkmenistan by cutting off gas exports to Europe and refusing to hand over $185 million in gas revenues earned in 1993.70 Russia also apparently bought Ashgabat's natural gas71 supply at low prices and resold it to Turkey at a 300 percent markup. In 1994, Russia halted coal payments to Kazakhstan and partly paralyzed the country by reducing its fuel supplies.72 Moscow reportedly demanded a 20-40 percent interest in Kazakhstani fields under exploration. That same year Moscow also blocked almost all of Kazakhstan's oil exports from May to August and forced its refineries to halt production.73 Russia refused to raise the 44 million barrel annual ceiling for Kazakhstani oil pumped through its pipeline network, forcing Chevron to reduce its daily production at Tengiz in half.74 Russia's "hard ball" approach won. In August 1994 Moscow doubled the volume of oil deliveries, in exchange for Kazakhstan handing over to Russia its export transit volume of one million tonnes of oil, which Russia then re-exported for hard currency. As a result, Kazakhstan's oil producers, left with no hard currency income themselves, were forced to assume high interest bank loans. Industry experts estimate Almaty will have to export at least 250,000 tonnes (through Russia) to pay off the loans--for which it will receive only $20 million.75 Until alternate transit routes can be developed, Kazakhstan and, to a lesser degree, Turkmenistan remain dependent upon Moscow to generate the energy revenues needed to break away from that dependency.

The creation of Central Asian currencies exemplifies Moscow's equally heavy-handed attempts at financial hegemony.76 The "rouble zone" created by Moscow for the CIS little resembled Central Asian visions of free trade and tariff-free borders. Moscow refused to surrender control of the rouble, excluded other CIS leaders from financial policy management, and, in November 1993, even demanded CIS states keep all their gold and hard currency reserves on deposit in Moscow. This provoked Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan that same month to follow Kyrgyzstan's May 1993 introduction of a national currency. Uzbekistan followed suit in June 1994. Even Tajikistan, which exists solely at Moscow's sufferance, has announced plans to introduce its own currency in 1996.

To stymie Moscow's efforts, the Central Asian states have exploited economic ties with other regional powers and created intra-regional institutions. For example, all five republics joined the ECO in 1992 and work with its Investment Development Bank. Almaty hosted the December 1995 "Conference on Asian Cooperation and Confidence-Building Measures," which was devoted to the questions of providing mutual guarantees for political independence, territorial integrity, and state security.77 In July 1994, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan agreed to establish their own Central Asian Bank of Cooperation and Development (in Almaty) to settle accounts between countries in hard currency or national currencies.78 They simultaneously formed an Interstate Council and the Association of Entrepreneurs of Central Asia.79 Presidents of the three states meet periodically to exchange views on harmonizing their economies to the year 2000.80

Russian security policy exploits the fate of the 8-10 million ethnic Russians who still live in Central Asia.81 Russia wants to safeguard them, but also keep them where they are. Many of these Russians feel stranded abroad and threatened by the rise of Islam, even though all the republics' governments support secularism. The Russians resent the loss of their privileged status in Soviet society and fear replacement (justly so) in positions of authority within business, academia, and government by titular nationalities. They protest having to learn the local language. Faced with growing anti-Russian discrimination, hundreds of thousands of ethnic Russians have returned to Russia (where no jobs or housing await them) or migrated to more ethnicly diverse republics such as Kazakhstan.82 Russia cannot afford their return and does not want to lose the hostages which might justify intervention. Moscow hoped to ease their fears by gaining dual citizenship for ethnic Russians in CIS countries, but only Turkmenistan has signed a treaty granting dual citizenship. Two 1995 documents defined the legal status of Russian citizens who are permanent residents of Kazakhstan (and vice versa) and agreed on simplified procedures for such people's "cross acquisition of citizenship" in the other state, but stopped short of dual citizenship.83

When Russian analysts today talk of "the Threat," they refer to the Islamic world. Moscow supports military action in Tajikistan to avoid a "domino effect" by which Central Asia and the Caucasus would fall under the influence of an "insidious faith" and the hegemony of their regional rivals, Turkey and Iran. Georgii Kunadze, the Russian Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs "with special responsibility for Central Asian issues" expressed a common attitude:

     Obviously, not one of the countries of Central Asia is capable without our help of
     protecting its own borders. . . . If we were to leave, we must be prepared for
     Islamic extremism, for the forces of instability in general, to pass through
     Tajikistan, enter Kyrgyzstan, and from there it is not far to Kazakhstan, before
     those forces are on the threshold of Russia.84  

Moscow's policy of "strategic denial" of the area to other powers, while forcefully integrating Central Asia's economy with that of the Russian Federation, has had short term success. But, as Deep Throat counseled during Watergate, "follow the money." Moscow lacks the huge amounts of capital to put such plans in action. It is a peer competitor with the Central Asian states for Western aid and investment funds. The Central Asian states have the right to bypass the CIS to join outside organizations such as the ECO and the freedom to seek alternate routes for their oil and natural gas. American myopia about a "trickle down" of resources to Central Asia through Moscow is giving way to greater flexibility toward involvement in the region and support of Central Asian states vis-a-vis Moscow. Finally, a key rival has appeared on the scene with a more vibrant economy, contiguous location, and desire to flex its own hegemonic muscles--the People's Republic of China.

55. R. Zaripov, in Komsomolskaya Pravda, noted, "Russia, which had gotten carried away with establishing ties with the West, clearly missed the moment at which the destruction of the 'Asian wall,' began. Evidently it did so not by chance but because it lacks a conception for relations with the Moslem world. . . . The activity of Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Kozyrev is confirmation that Russia wants to correct the mistake and shift its foreign-policy emphasis to the East." Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. XLIV, No. 19, June 10, 1991, p. 4. (Back to text)

56. Moscow, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, in Russian, September 23, 1995, FBIS-S0V-95-188, September 28, 1995, p. 19. The edict also introduced new provisions for a customs union, economic integration, common standards of international economic legislation, a payments union, integration of the defense industry, and a common capital market. (Back to text)

57. Ibid. (Back to text)

58. Ibid, p. 21. (Back to text)

59. A March 1992 agreement divided up the Caspian Flotilla among Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. (Back to text)

60. Under this agreement over 25,000 Russian troops are stationed in Tajikistan (which exists as a state at their sufferance). Peacekeeping forces in Tajikistan include the Russian 201st Motorized Rifle Division and an increasingly ethnic-Tajik "Russian" border guard force, supplemented by small numbers of Uzbek, Kazakhstani, and Kyrgyz forces and a small Tajik Army. (Back to text)

61. Within Central Asia, only Uzbekistan refused to sign the treaty on joint protection of the Commonwealth's external borders. Uzbek Foreign Minister Adbulaziz Komilov stated, "We are able to reliably monitor the 156-km border with Afghanistan with our own forces without involving foreign troops from other countries, primarily Russia." Nikolay Musiyenko, "Fearing Even a Hint about USSR," Moscow, PRAVDA, in Russian, February 22, 1996, p. 2, in FBIS-SOV-96-037, February 23, 1996, p. 51. (Back to text)

62. These include the Treaty on Military Cooperation, the Agreement on the Basic Principles and Terms of Use of the Baikonur Cosmodrome, the Treaty on the Furtherance of Integration and Economic Cooperation between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation, and the Agreement on the Strategic Nuclear Forces Temporarily Deployed on the Territory of Kazakhstan. (Back to text)

63. Dimitry Vertkin, "Prospects for Stability--The View from Kazakhstan," Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 6, No. 6, June 1994, p. 287. (Back to text)

64. Douglas Clarke, "Russia's Military Presence in the "'Near Abroad'," Transition, Vol. 1, No. 19, October 26, 1995, p. 8-9. (Back to text)

65. Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. XLVII, No. 3, February 15, 1995, p. 27. (Back to text)

66. Vitaly Portnikov, Nezavisimaya gazeta, May 20, 1992, in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. XLIV, No. 19, June 10, 1992, p. 2. (Back to text)

67. Mikhail Konarovsky, "Russia and the Emerging Geopolitical Order in Central Asia," in Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner, eds., The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and its Borderlands, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994, p. 235. (Back to text)

68. Martha Brill Olcott, "Sovereignty and the ūNear Abroad'," Orbis, Vol. 39, No. 3, Summer 1995, p. 359. She identifies Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan as the most cautious, while the dependency of a Warsaw Pact-style arrangement appeals to leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. (Back to text)

69. Jed Snyder, "Russian Security Interests on the Southern Periphery," Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 6, No. 12, December 1994, p. 551. (Back to text)

70. Steve LaVine, "Moscow Pressures its Neighbors to Share their Oil, Gas Revenues," Washington Post, March 18, 1994, p. A24. (Back to text)

71. Blank, Energy, Economics and Security in Central Asia: Russia and its Rivals, pp. 12-14. (Back to text)

72. LaVine, "Moscow Pressures its Neighbors," p. A24. (Back to text)

73. Blank, Energy, Economics and Security in Central Asia: Russia and its Rivals, pp. 12-13. (Back to text)

74. Snyder, p. 551. (Back to text)

75. INTERFAX, "Government Seeks Higher Oil Transit Quotas," in Russian, August 3, 1994, FBIS-SOV-94-151, August 5, 1994, p. 36-37. (Back to text)

76. Stephen Blank argues that the Central Asians did not flee the rouble zone, but rather Russia ousted them into a market-dominated system, thus giving Russia substantial control over their economies. Blank, Energy, Economics and Security in Central Asia: Russia and its Rivals, p. 9. See, also, Ilya Prizel, "The United States and a Resurgent Russia: A New Cold War or a Balance of Power Recast?," in Stephen Blank and Earl Tilford, eds., Does Russian Democracy Have a Future?" Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 1994, pp. 142-143. (Back to text)

77. Moscow ITAR-TASS in English, February 7, 1996, FBIS-SOV-96-027, February 8, 1996, p. 12. Fifteen states attended to include Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, China, Russia, India, Iran, and Pakistan. Observers from ten other Asian states, the United Nations, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) also attended. (Back to text)

78. When the CIS was created, the republics assumed that the so-called "rouble zone" would be similar to the European Economic Community with tariff-free borders, free movement of goods, and a common currency. But Russian leaders were unwilling to give up control of the rouble and excluded other CIS leaders from financial policy formation; instead, they responded to their own rising prices and budget deficit by printing more roubles. The republics did not help matters by demanding (and receiving) enormous quantities of roubles to cover their own economic expenses. The Central Asian states fell victim to currency- transfer and debt clearing mechanisms (that could take up to 6 months to execute), while having to honor contracts to sell resources to Moscow at old, pre-inflationary prices. The move to establish national currencies began only after Russia's surprise decision to remove all pre-1993 roubles from circulation in July 1993. This forced the cash-short republics, not issued the new roubles and used as dumping grounds for the defunct roubles, to use the now-worthless older bills. Concomitant termination of some artificially low price controls and unregulated subsidies caused inflation to skyrocket--in Kazakhstan by 2500 percent-- even as trade deficits with Moscow mushroomed. Moscow's demand (November 1993) that states remaining in the rouble zone keep all their gold and hard currency reserves on deposit in Russia, while subordinating their monetary policies to Moscow's, provoked their adoption of national currencies. Martha Brill Olcott, "The Myth of ūTsentral'naia Aziia'," Orbis, Vol. 38, No. 4, Fall 1994, pp. 555-558. Lynda Maillet, "New States Initiate New Currencies," Transition, Vol 1. No. 9, June 9, 1993, pp. 44-49, 56. (Back to text)

79. Yuriy Gallimov, "Aspiration to Integration," Delovoy Mir, in Russian, Moscow, January 17, 1996, in FBIS-SOV-96-018-S, January 26, 1996, p. 1. (Back to text)

80. "Uzbek, Kazakh, Kyrgyz Heads Discuss Economic Integration," Narodnoye Slovo, Tashkent, in Russian, January 13, 1996, in FBIS-SOV-96-010, January 16, 1996, p. 4. (Back to text)

81. The new Russian military doctrine pays special attentionto regional threats and the Near Abroad, with special focus on those elements which endangered the rights, freedom, and lawful interests of Russian citizens in foreign states. See also, Elizabeth Teague, "Russians Outside Russia and Russian Security Policy," in Leon Aron and Kenneth M. Jensen, eds, The Emergence of Russian Foreign Policy, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994, pp. 81-105. For a short synopsis of the Russian view, see "Plight of Russians in 'Near Abroad' Debated," TRUD, Moscow, in Russian, July 9, 1994, in FBIS-SOV-94-135, July 14, 1994, pp. 10-12. (Back to text)

82. Most ethnic Germans have emigrated directly to Germany. (Back to text)

83. Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. XLVII, No. 3, February 15, 1995, p. 27. (Back to text)

84. Cited by Peter Frank, Stability and Instability in Eastern Europe, Adelphi Paper 285, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies/Oxford University Press, February 1994, p. 9. (Back to text)

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