China.

China finds itself no longer bordered by a superpower with a rival brand of Marxism, but by a bevy of small unstable states open to influence by China's rivals and a new competing ideology: Islam. The disintegration of Tajikistan and growing unrest in the Fergana Valley--with direct geographical access to China's Muslim outreaches--have magnified China's concerns. How China manages its relations with Central Asia will have profound significance for security within China, as well as its future relations with regional rivals, the Middle East, and South Asia.85

China's worst nightmare is that unrest in Central Asia will spill over into the Xinjiang-Uigher Autonomous Region86 (XUAR, formerly known as Eastern or Chinese Turkestan). With 530,000 square kilometers, the XUAR comprises one sixth of the People's Republic of China, but has only a population of 15 million, of whom over 60 percent are Muslim.87 Beijing has systematically resettled more than six million Han Chinese to the XUAR, diluting the titular population so that Uighurs (ethnic Kazakhs) now constitute just less than half of the XUAR population,88 but the area remains a tinderbox.

The Chinese leadership dreads that ethno-nationalism alone (or in combination with resurgent Islam) could destabilize China's northwest provinces (Gansu and Qinghai) and autonomous regions (Ningxia, Xinjiang, and Tibet). These areas are of considerable strategic importance as they house China's principal nuclear testing and missile launching sites and much of its "gulag archipelago."89 The XUAR holds vast natural resources necessary to fuel China's modernization, to include unexploited petroleum reserves in the Tarim Basin (sufficient to free Beijing from future dependence on Middle East petroleum) and large deposits of natural gas, iron, and coal.90

China has sought to control the area with a combination of carrots and sticks. As controls over the Muslim majority relaxed in the 1980s, mosques reopened and a communist government openly anti-religious, but willing to make concessions to coopt local minorities, tolerated Muslim religious practices. Nevertheless, unrest fermented again at the end of the 1980s with a series of incidents in December 1986, June 1988, May 1989, and April 1990 which resulted in Muslims' deaths at the hands of authorities quick to suppress "local nationalism."91

Islamic groups in Central Asia fueled Chinese fears. In the early days of Central Asian independence exiled Uighurs in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan pressed for the national liberation of the XUAR. However, Chinese anxiety over Central Asian collusion diminished as Beijing realized that the leaders of the new republics did not support the separatist movements.92 "Free Uighuristan" parties (formed in the early 1990s in Bishkek and Almaty) calling for a "new Turkestan" linking Turkic-speakers in the XUAR and Central Asia were both suppressed by Central Asian authorities. Nevertheless, the threat of ethno-nationalism and Islamic resurgence in Central Asia remains a core element of Chinese policy in the region.

Chinese policy in Central Asia is designed to maintain political stability through economic development. China borders Central Asia and has the transportation links in place to provide the access Central Asians so desperately want. It has also embarked on an ambitious program of rail and pipeline construction which would go a long way toward freeing Central Asia from dependency on Russia. A new rail line completed in June 1992 links Almaty and Urumchi, and from there 3,000 miles on to the coastal port of Shanghai.93 The October 1990 opening of the Trans-Eurasian Railroad through Central Asia has resulted in "dramatic surges" in the movement of people, goods, and hard currency.94 During an April 1994 visit to Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, China's premier Li Peng reached an agreement with Turkmenistan's President Niyazov to conduct feasibility studies for a new railroad across Central Asia and a $20 billion pipeline that would carry Central Asian oil to China. Once completed, this transcontinental route would have consequences conceivably comparable to the impact of the advent of the Suez and Panama canals.95

China hopes to use Central Asian markets as a catalyst to fuel a new prosperity zone in Xinjiang for foreign investment (especially by Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Japan) and revive the Silk Route, pushing Chinese economic interests beyond Central Asia to the Persian Gulf and even to European markets. Beijing expects economic growth in Xinjiang and Central Asia to strengthen the secular-minded governments of Central Asia against those groups which favor Islamic rule and prevent the republics from returning to dependence on Russia.96

     By the beginning of the 1990s . . . China could offer major trade opportunities as
     well as modest amounts of capital and technology to the economically weak Central
     Asian republics. By doing this, China is strengthening the republics' economies
     and responding to what Central Asian leaders consider their most basic need. It is
     not cultural, linguistic, or religious 'aid' that Central Asian elites crave, it
     is economic development. The Chinese clearly agree that economic development
     offers the best chance of limiting future ethnic and religious conflict97  

To accomplish this, China has enacted a series of reforms to boost Xinjiang's (and by consequence Central Asia's) economic takeoff. Western attention on Guangdong and Hong Kong ignored the fact that Xinjiang placed first nationwide in terms of real income growth in the period 1985-91. In 1992 Beijing granted Urumchi (Xinjiang's capital) the same right to conduct preferential trade policies as the coastal regions. Eight "ports" (rivers, airports and railheads) are now open, and Yining, Taching, and Bole have been approved as "border open cities." This boom coincides with the breakup of Russia's political and economic ties with South Asia (India) and Southeast Asia (especially Vietnam). As a consequence, China now wields more influence across its western and southern tier than at any time since the 18th century.98 China quickly moved to establish ties with the new republics. Kazakhstan and China signed agreements in February 1992 in the areas of trade, scientific and technological cooperation, communications and transport, personnel exchanges, and the establishment of a joint committee for the development of further ties. China also extended credits equivalent to $5.7 million to Kyrgyzstan and pushed exports of food, clothing, electronics, and other consumer goods. Even war-torn Tajikistan received $5 million in yuan credits to buy Chinese food and consumer goods, plus $500,000 worth of food and humanitarian aid. Dushanbe and Beijing also signed ten cooperative agreements for future economic projects such as joint ventures in the textile industry.99

The breakup of the Soviet Union and the sharp decline of the Russian military offer China its best military position in a century and a breathing space to reevaluate its military doctrine,100 manning levels, and modernization pro- grams.101 With the independence of the Central Asian republics, the forward basing of the Soviet Army and border guard forces antagonistic to China's interests have been replaced by weak Central Asian indigenous forces, a strategic buffer zone, and Russian and Central Asian border guards engaged in operations to suppress Islamic fundamentalism and prevent ethno-nationalistic border changes, all of which work to the benefit of Beijing.

The success of its economic reforms has also provided China the opportunity to purchase huge quantities of advanced weapons systems from cash-strapped Russia such as the Su-27 fighter aircraft and S-300 high altitude air defence missile system. Jane's Defense Weekly estimates that purchases in 1992-93 alone may have totaled five billion dollars.102 With Central Asia a military backwater and with her back "covered," China's military now looks toward using the fruits of this new economic power to exert its influence outside its borders, especially in southeast Asia.103

Stability in Central Asia is essential to Beijing's continued economic growth because China has shifted from an exporter to an importer of crude oil. Advent of the "China Century" depends on stable energy resources, domestic stability, and positive economic growth. It is estimated that China will have to import 100 million tons of crude by 2010 unless it finds new sources.104 China's new, weak Central Asian neighbors are the potential, new "Kuwaits" of the 21st century. If the Chinese build a pipeline (over Russian resistance), Central Asia's importance to China will shift immeasurably in the next century, as will Chinese military attitudes towards safeguarding their strategic oil reserves.

China's relations with Central Asia are not without sore spots. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan contain thousands of square miles stolen by the tsars in the 1880s, which China has refrained from reclaiming (as opposed to the Spratlys). An April 1995 agreement provided confidence-building measures to lessen tensions over existing borders between China, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Water rights and environmental issues also exist. For example, in January 1993 Kazakhstan and China agreed to build a water conservancy works over the Horgos River along their border, to address hydropower, flood control, and navigation interests.105 Alteration of the river flow affects both signatories and Uzbekistan, located downstream on the river. Additionally, in August 1992 China broached Kyrgyzstan with the possibility of exploiting four rivers whose waters are shared by the XUAR and Kyrgyzstan.106 China's 20 years of nuclear weapons testing in the Turfan-Kuerla region (the most recent test at Lop Nor in June 1996) have produced serious environmental consequences, to include contamination of China's third largest lake, Lake Bositeng.107 Continued above-ground testing exacerbates tensions with the population within the XUAR. Kazakhstani concern, both public and private, over the impact of radiation drifting into Kazakhstan has also been quite vocal.108

Chinese concerns about Central Asian domestic stability are matched by similar Central Asian concerns about China. As Graham Fuller has noted,

     there is no reason to believe that China will remain immune to the forces of
     breakup that have affected nearly all post-Communist empires and multi-ethnic
     groups. . . . Few Muslim minorities ever remain happily contained within another
     state and culture, especially a Communist  one. The model of political
     independence lies just over the border in former Soviet Central Asia.109  

China is undergoing a rapid economic and social transformation, heightened by inflation; environmental degradation; depletion of finite energy resources; a potential succession crisis following the death of Deng; the increased political influence of the People's Liberation Army (PLA); a weakened center; and economic inequality among the provinces.

China's economic and political transformation will have mixed consequences for Central Asia. At the present they can play the "China card" to thwart dependence on Moscow. In the short term Russia and China share a common interest in deterring ethno- nationalism and resurgent Islam in the region, but each for contradictory goals.110 Moscow and Beijing will collaborate to maintain political stability even as each jockeys to increase its economic hold over the region. But, if Russia's decline continues unabated, in the long run, the Central Asian states risk simply changing masters. They must counterbalance Russia and China with other economic powerhouses from Asia (such as Japan or South Korea), the United States, the Middle East and Europe.

86. The history of this province, so distant from Beijing, mirrors the chaos in Moscow's borderlands during this century. During the early Soviet period, the Red Army exploited local revolts to gain control of the region. In 1933, 1944, and 1946, the Soviets tried to establish an "independent" Kazakh-Uighur East Turkestan Republic. Thousands of Kazakhs fled to the XUAR following the suppression the Basmachi Revolt and Stalinist collectivization. In return, following a mass revolt in 1962 and the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, the People's Liberation Army halted cross border transit from the XUAR into Kazakhstan only after up to 70,000 Uighurs had fled. (Back to text)

87. Muslims make up approximately 60 percent of the population; they comprise Uighurs (about 47 percent), Hui, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Tatars. See Dru Gladney, "The Muslim Face of China," Current History, Vol. 92, No. 575, September 1993, pp. 275-280. (Back to text)

88. Approximately 38 percent Han, 48 percent Uighur, 7 percent Kazakh, 1 percent Kyrgyz and 1 percent Mongols. (Back to text)

89. J. Richard Walsh, "China and the New Geopolitics of Central Asia," Asian Survey, Vol. XXXIII, No. 3, March 1993, p. 274. (Back to text)

90. Harris, p. 116. (Back to text)

91. Gladney, pp. 278-279. (Back to text)

92. Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, Karimov of Uzbekistan, and Niyazov of Turkmenistan were all former Party Chiefs; even Akayev of Kyrgyzstan had served as a junior party functionary. Rakhmanov of Tajikistan was installed by the Russians in 1992. (Back to text)

93. Ross H. Munro, "China's Waxing Spheres of Influence," Orbis, Vol. 38, No. 4, Fall 1994, p. 601. (Back to text)

94. Gladney, p. 278. (Back to text)

95. Munro, pp. 603-604. (Back to text)

96. Harris,p. 123. (Back to text)

97. Munro, p. 600. (Back to text)

98. Ibid., pp. 586-587. (Back to text)

99. Ibid., pp. 602-603. (Back to text)

100. See Valentin Shishlevskiy, "China's Defense Policy: Redefining Security Interests and Rewriting Military Doctrine," Asian Defense Journal, No. 108/10/94, February 1995, pp. 30-33. With war unlikely in the next 10-20 years in the minds of Chinese strategists, the only threats they perceive are those of local military conflicts prompted by political stability and over territory disputes. China also claims its right to economically advantageous "living space" within "strategic borders," which do not necessarily coincide with state borders. "Strategic borders," they contend, should be extended in relation to the state's economic and military needs. (Back to text)

101. Russian and Chinese leaders have not only engaged in serious "fence-mending," but have agreed (in principle) to move the fence itself by creating a 100 meter-wide demilitarized zone the entire length of the Sino-Russian border. Swaran Singh, "China's Post-Cold War National Security Doctrine," Strategic Analysis, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, April 1995, p. 49. The two countries also declared that they no longer view each other as a "threat," and have initiated a series of confidence-building measures such as military visits and port calls. Shishlevskiy, p. 31. (Back to text)

102. Singh, p. 50. (Back to text)

103. For example, its claim to sovereignty over three million square kilometers of maritime territory by extending its 320 kilometer Exclusive Economic Zone out 1600 kilometers to include the entire Spratly chain (and its potential oil wealth). (Back to text)

104. Singh, p. 56. (Back to text)

105. See Gregory Gleason, "The Struggle for Control over Water in Central Asia: Republican Sovereignty and Collective Action," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Report on the USSR, Vol. 3, No. 25, June 21, 1991, pp. 11-17. Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. XLV, No. 1, February 3, 1993, p. 7. He argues that the "feud" between the presidents of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan dates back to a 1989 dispute over the division of irrigation water between the Isfara District of Tajikistan and the Batken district of Kyrgyzstan. (Back to text)

106. Munro, p. 602. (Back to text)

107. Harris, p. 117. (Back to text)

108. FBIS-SOV-95-162, August 22, 1995, p. 67. Kazakhstani demonstrators protested the August test outside the Chinese embassy in Almaty. Activists of "Attan," the People's Center for the Elimination of Nuclear Ranges, demanded an end to nuclear testing and the closure of the Chinese range at Lop Nor. Japan, Australia, and Kazakhstan have strongly criticized China for its continuing underground test program which is to continue into 1996. For example, New York Times, "Chinese conduct nuclear bomb test," May 16, 1995, p. 13, for protests against a 15 May test. (Back to text)

109. Graham Fuller, "Central Asia: The Quest for Identity," Current History, Vol. 93, No. 582, April 1994, pp. 148-149. (Back to text)

110. At a 1992 meeting the Russian Foreign Minister noted, "Central Asia should remain a CIS sphere of influence, and not a sphere of extremist forces, and in particular, of Islamic fundamentalism." The Chinese Foreign Minister replied that Russia and China "have common interests in preserving stability in the Central Asian region," and that Chinese policy toward Central Asia would take into account the close ties that had been established over time between Russia and the region. ITAR-TASS World Service, in Russian, November 25, 1992, FBIS-SOV- 229-95, November 27, 1992, p. 9. (Back to text)

Return to Table of Contents

milnet@milnet.com