From the Original Document at the Air Force Air University
http://tuvok.au.af.mil/au/database/projects/ay1995/acsc/95-002/chap5/wmd.html
Chapter 5: Challenges to Stability
Overview
/ Theater WMD Potential / Operational Weapons
/ Russia's Role / China and North Korea
The proliferation of WMDs and associated ballistic missile technology is a serious concern
Few issues have more serious and far-reaching implications for global and regional security than the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Many factors have spurred such proliferation. The collapse of the Soviet Union jarred long-standing alliances and encouraged an increasing number of states to further bolster their own military capabilities by developing WMD. This dissolution has caused concern over the possible spread of high technology or scientists to the Third World. Many national leaders seek the prestige they believe possession of WMD conveys. Some wish to dominate their neighbors, others merely seek to offset a hostile neighbor's threatening capabilities. Finally, some view these weapons as a compelling psychological deterrent.
Controlling proliferation in the future will involve deciphering the webs of suppliers, middlemen, and end users; distinguishing between legitimate and illicit purposes, particularly for dual-use technology; and helping interdict the flow of material and technology to potential proliferating countries. These tasks will not be easy. As international awareness of the problem increases, countries are becoming more clever, devising networks of front companies and suppliers to frustrate export controls.
Eight of the nineteen USCENTCOM AOR nations, and several peripheral countries, have or may be developing nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, as well as ballistic missile delivery systems. Iran and Iraq, for example, have the basic technology to eventually develop nuclear weapons. Libya, Iran, and Iraq have stockpiled chemical weapons, and, although Iraq's CW arsenal is currently being dismantled, it will be difficult to prevent Baghdad from reacquiring such a capability. A disturbing pattern of biological weapons development is following closely on the heels of chemical weapons development; a special concern since biological agents could rival the lethality of a nuclear attack.
More than a dozen countries have operational ballistic missiles and more have programs to develop them. Iraq's employment of ballistic missiles as weapons of terror against superior coalition forces during the Gulf War piqued the interest of several nations. Unlike the conventional arms bazaar, there is no open market for nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Instead, states often seek to build such an infrastructure under the guise of a civilian program. Establishing certain commercial enterprises often enables a nation to legally import so-called "dual-use" technology and equipment, while providing the option of covertly pursuing WMD, making detection of such efforts extremely difficult. Foreign scientists, engineers, and technicians are often sought to bring much needed skill and experience to a fledgling WMD project. Many nations send students abroad who receive advanced training and education then return to support emerging WMD development programs. The possibility that a country could purchase, outright, nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons cannot be discounted.
The collapse of the Soviet Union has raised new opportunities for determined nations to gain access to sensitive technology and material. In light of its financially strapped defense industries, Russia's growing dealings with China and Iran are of concern regarding proliferation. Specifically, China continues to obtain missile technology from Russia and Ukraine. This is of special concern since it raises the possibility that China could, in turn, pass more advanced technology to other states, as Beijing has done previously with its own technology, including a deal with Pakistan for M-11 ballistic missiles. Today's faltering economies in Russia and other former Soviet Republics, along with attendant hardships among individuals with military and scientific expertise, could lead to more disturbing military transfers and could also encourage illegal exports of technology and material.
Both China and North Korea are also significant WMD proliferation concerns. Having apparently no threshold governing its sales, Pyongyang is willing to sell to any country with the cash or oil to buy and is a key supplier for states such as Iran and Syria. North Korea has sold extended range Scud missiles to Iran and Syria, and is now marketing its new, 1,000 km range No Dong ballistic missile. In addition, North Korea may have already passed nuclear technology to Central Region states. China is also a major proliferation concern and serves as an alternative supplier when Western export controls make technology and weapons more difficult to acquire. Beijing has sold missile, chemical, and nuclear technology and equipment to states such as Iran, Syria, and Algeria.
