Q: I have a three-part question for you. One,
how would you evaluate the airstrikes against Iraq? Are they imminent?
Two, are you going to the Persian Gulf area before those strikes?
Three, will the Saudis let us use Al Kharj and other bases in
Saudi Arabia for those strikes?
A: First of all, there has been no decision by
the President as to whether we would use or resort to a military
strike. That is something that has certainly been deferred until
the President determines that all diplomatic avenues have been
fully explored and have been unproductive and are at an end. He
has not made that determination yet, nor has the Secretary of
State recommended that they have been completely futile at this
point. So we're not going to address the military option at this
point.
We would hope that we can achieve a diplomatic solution to the
crisis as it exists, and the best way to achieve that is to have
solid support within the Security Council and the United Nations.
To the extent that Saddam sees there's a division within the Security
Council, then he will seek to exploit it, so we're hoping that
we can persuade the members to support a very strong resolution
and to support the United States in this effort. But we have not
made a determination yet.
If and when a determination is made, then obviously we will have
whatever resources are necessary to carry out such a mission.
That's all I can say at this point.
Q: Your second two parts, are you going to the
region before the strikes?
A: I have only tentative plans to go to the region.
I will go in the President asks me to go. He has not asked me
to go at this point. But if he does so, then I have the flexibility
to leave from Europe. I'll be in Germany next week, and I also
plan to be in Moscow, and I've built enough time in that I could
travel to the Gulf if necessary.
Q: And the last part about the Saudis letting
us use their basis for such strikes.
A: I have every confidence that the Gulf states
will support whatever action is necessary on the part of the United
States, including Saudi Arabia.
Q: What additional forces are you planning to
send to the Gulf?
A: We've made no determination to send any additional
forces at this time. There has been a request made. We are looking
at that request to examine whether it's necessary, and we will
keep that in mind as we develop any plans that might be necessary
to take, any action plans.
Q: The request is for what? Is it for additional
aircraft as well as ground troops in Kuwait?
A: Well, I really don't want to talk about what
is in a request. A request has been made. I'm looking at it. The
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is looking at the request to see
whether any additional forces or assets will be required for a
military operation.
Q: Mr. Secretary, I know no one likes to enter
the realm of a hypothetical, but should airstrikes become necessary,
can you talk about what you hope to achieve politically on the
other side of that? Do airstrikes make people change their minds?
Do they make inspections easier, or do they eliminate them entirely?
Certainly you can't hope to get all the weapons of mass destruction
stashed in all the different parts of a country like Iraq.
A: I think you correctly stated the nature of
the, not dilemma, but at least the problem. The best solution
for containing Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction is
to have the inspectors on the ground. There is no adequate substitute
for that. To the extent that they have been completely precluded
from carrying out their mission or negated in their effectiveness,
then you have to look to see what the other options are.
To the extent that there is a military option, it is not an adequate
substitute for inspectors being on the ground, having unfettered
access. So that's why we continue to stress the need for unfettered
access. If there were military action, I think we should not raise
expectations unreasonably high. What we would hope to accomplish
if that becomes necessary is to curtail as best we can, Saddam
Hussein's capacity to regenerate his weapons of mass destruction
capability or to marshal those forces that could pose a threat
to his neighbors. But I don't think anyone should be under the
impression that this is going to be a mission which will accomplish
the complete elimination of his weapons of mass destruction, or
force him to say he surrenders, or remove him from power. That
would not be the goal of the United States and hopefully our allies
in any sort of military operation.
Q: It would seem that if you did it and inspectors
could not go back in, then you would have to do it again about
every six weeks to guarantee or even have any small measure of
guarantee that Iraq could not regenerate its ability to create
these weapons, so you'll have to do it again and again and again.
A: I think it's clear that a military operation
would not necessarily be a one-time operation or action. I think
what's important is that we have the support of our allies to
make sure that sanctions stay in place; that the message to Saddam
Hussein is that unless you allow the inspectors back in there
is no prospect of relief from those sanctions. I think Saddam
Hussein has basically two goals in mind. Number one, to get rid
of the inspectors; number two, to get rid of the sanctions. Again,
I repeat that the best way for us to avoid the necessity of even
considering a military option is for the security council members
to speak very clearly on this and very solidly on this, that he
must give unfettered access. So we're hoping that will be the
case. In the event that it's not, then we will have to deal with
the issue as best we can, recognizing once again that there's
no single silver bullet solution or single military action that
would be complete. So we would have to then follow up with other
plans, again, in conjunction with our allies in terms of what
measures could be taken to restrict his ability to regenerate
those systems.
Q: Mr. Secretary, the Secretary of State said
this morning that any military response would be significant.
With that, an Arab newspaper in London is describing a three-point
attack: first against the Republican Guard; if that doesn't bring
the result, the second would be against strategic targets in the
palaces; and then the third option, third stage of that, would
be possible landing of U.S. forces in specific areas. So there's
your battle plan for you. But can you speak to the significance
of what you would do?
A: I'm not sure where those reports are coming
from in terms of the reliability of those sources. I think it's
adequate that I say that should military action be necessary it
would not be meager, it would be substantial in size, and I think,
impact. But beyond that, I wouldn't care to say.
Q: Mr. Secretary, by virtue of the sorts of targets
that U.S. military strikes might go after in any kind of military
action, by many estimates, this would entail civilian casualties.
How much has that been a consideration in the discussion in the
Administration? And is the Administration prepared for the kind
of political fallout that would follow civilian casualties in
such an endeavor?
A: I think it's always been the policy of the
United States in considering any potential military operation
to consider what the impact would be upon innocent civilians.
The phrase is collateral damage, but it really means concern about
innocent people being harmed or killed, so that's always a factor
in any kind of planning operation for the military and something
that we take into account and factor in in any kind of operation.
Q: Is it a larger factor this time around because
of some of the potential targets? The chemical, the biological
weapons facility sites that are suspected are in fact situated
in civilian areas, many of them operated by civilians. So is it
a bigger consideration this time than if you were simply going
after specific military targets?
A: I think any time you're talking about weapons
of mass destruction and the potential for collateral damage, in
that context, you take a good deal more concern about it into
account.
Q: You mentioned two areas. One was, a number
of people have said that airstrikes will not be effective, particularly
if Saddam Hussein is still in power. You touched on that briefly.
Is there a chance that the U.S. might have a series of escalating
strikes. That one strike, if that doesn't put enough pressure
on the allies then an ever-increasing, another escalating activity.
The eventuality of perhaps going in to remove Saddam Hussein.
Again, what are your thoughts about... Many critics have said
that the problem with the Persian Gulf War is you were still left
with Saddam Hussein. Are we again going to be left with him?
A: I can see that you are intensely interested
in my first year in office by your questions.
Q: It's something that you inherited.
A: Let me repeat it. I don't think it's appropriate
for me to speculate what our plans are since there has been no
plan that the President has approved to use military force at
this time. Any speculation on my part or discussion of it I think
is counter-productive. What I've said is, should military action
become necessary, we should not raise expectations unreasonably
high. That what the goal would be under those circumstances would
be to curtail his ability to manufacture chemical and biological
weapons, or nuclear weapons for that matter, and to pose a threat
to his neighbors in the way of his missile capability or his ability
to mobilize forces and move them against either Kuwait or Saudi
Arabia. Those would be the goals should it become necessary.
But no one should be under any illusion or expectation that this
is an all complete and satisfactory solution to the issue. What
we need to have is inspectors on the ground, and that's the reason
why we are spending so much time seeking to get unanimous support
on the part of the Council members to back up the resolutions
with their strong support. To the extent that we don't get that,
then I think it undermines, my personal judgment is it undermines
and affects the credibility of the UN itself. So there's a lot
at stake here.
I think as you're seeing some of the members, the French in particular
have indicated that they've become somewhat frustrated in dealing
with Iraq. They have looked for creative solutions to resolving
the issue diplomatically, but according to all press reports,
they, too, are experiencing great frustration.
I think what we have to do is to solidify the support within the
Security Council and the UN. That would be the best way to pressure
Saddam Hussein to yield. If he thinks there's an opportunity to
split the Council; if he thinks there's an opportunity to exploit
these differences, then it's going to make it that much more difficult.
Q: Again, going after Saddam Hussein, that should
definitely not be a goal for the U.S. military.
A: I don't think we should anticipate that that
is going to occur.
Q: Mr. Secretary, what are some of the unintended
consequences of large airstrikes in the region? And a second question
is has the Lewinsky matter at all complicated the decisionmaking
process in this regard in your view?
A: The answer to the second question is no. The
President has focused on this issue intensely for the past several
weeks. He met with the CINCs, the commanders in chief of our combatant
commands and our service chiefs this week, and made a major speech
at the National Defense University. So he has been kept up to
speed on our plans and efforts for the past several weeks and
has been intensely involved. It has no impact.
With respect to what could go wrong, as such, in terms of large
military operations. There's always the chance of errant missiles;
there's always a chance in the "fog of war" to hit targets
that were unintended; there are always miscalculations that can
be involved. But that's part of the planning operation. That's
why it's very important that very detailed plans be made and proper
exercise of the military troops be undertaken, that they be well
trained and well led -- understanding that any time there's a
military operation there's always a chance that things can happen
which are unintended.
Q: I know you're waiting for word from the President
on this, but what will determine whether or not you go to the
region? If you go should this be seen as a rather grim sign? That
things have taken a trend for the worse?
A: No, if the President feels that I can make
a contribution to helping to either shore up support or convey
a message from him, then I would do so. But what will determine
it is the President. If he asks me to go, I will go.
Q: Could you describe for us the difference between
the weapons that are available today and the weapons that were
used in the Gulf War?
A: Generally speaking they are more accurate,
they have greater lethality and more precision guided than they
have been in the past. We would anticipate that they would be
more effective. Beyond that, I don't think I should say any more.
Q: Do you have much greater numbers of precision
guided...
A: I think we have a greater capability with
precision guided equipment.
Q: Mr. Secretary, a Russian envoy is headed back
to Baghdad. So you think that Saddam Hussein is simply pulling
the string one more time, playing it out as long as he can to
make some last minute concession that looks as if he's going to
cooperate on weapons inspections? Precisely what do you think
Saddam Hussein is up to and is he miscalculating?
A: I think it's obvious that Saddam Hussein has
been up to playing hide and seek for the past six or seven years.
He has engaged in a game of masterful deception, of delaying the
inspectors, of hiding and placing the materiels and equipment
that the inspectors are looking for outside their realm. But I
say that with one caveat. They have been reasonably successful
in their efforts. In spite of all of the hide and seek games,
they have been able to destroy -- as the President said during
his State of the Union message -- more weapons than were destroyed
during the entire Persian Gulf War. They have not destroyed them
per se, they have supervised the destruction of those weapons.
So I suspect that what he is up to now is to see if he can, in
fact, find some way to drive a wedge between the members of the
Security Council to see if he can't find ways to substitute other
personnel for U.S. personnel, to load them up with individuals
that he thinks would be more sympathetic to his cause. So I think
all of that is involved in his efforts. What we have to make clear
is that the United Nations has picked individuals for the inspection
teams based upon their competence and experience, and that we
have no objection to others contributing to the effort to conduct
these inspections but not as a substitute for the United States.
We've already indicated that to the extent that others have the
capability of supplementing or complementing the U2 efforts, we
have no objection to that. But we are not prepared and will not
agree to any regime which simply politicizes the Security Council's
efforts, the UNSCOM inspectors, or undermines its expertise.
Q: Has he miscalculated?
A: I think it's a miscalculation, and we'll have
to wait and see if we have the united support of the Security
Council, but I think there's been a big miscalculation on his
part.
Q: Mr. Secretary, when the Monica Lewinsky thing
broke you were quoted as saying that if her allegations are true
it's all over. Were you chided by the President or anyone else
at the White House for that statement? And since we are very interested
in your past and also your future, do you plan to stay on for
another 53 weeks?
A: Number one, I did not make such a statement.
Number two, the President had no conversation with me pertaining
to that whatsoever. We were together during the course of the
week, in fact I attended a function for the commanders in chief
at the White House. This has never been a subject of discussion
for us.
Q: Mr. Secretary, you have mentioned several
times the importance of the Security Council staying together
on this issue. Would it not be of tremendous importance to get
from the Security Council a statement or a finding that Iraq is
in material breach?
A: It would be helpful, but it's not necessary.
We believe that we have the authority to act without any resolution
of material breach. I think it would be helpful to show there
is solidarity of support, and frankly, I find it incredibly hard
to accept the proposition that in the face of Saddam's actions
that members of the Security Council cannot bring themselves to
declare that this is a fundamental or material breach of conduct
on his part. So we don't think it's necessary. Would it be helpful?
I think it would be helpful.
Q: But if you don't get it, then it shows that
he has succeeded in driving a wedge, that this simple factual
finding which is so obvious, as you point out, they are unable
to come together with the United States.
A: I think it challenges the credibility of the
Security Council if they as individual members cannot find the
strength to say that this constitutes a significant material breach.
But we don't think it's necessary to do that. We think the authority
is there to take action without it. But I think it does reflect
upon the Security Council's lack of commitment to enforcing the
resolutions if they cannot find the will to say material breach
or substantial significant breach of the conduct on his part.
I find it hard to accept that proposition. It may be the case,
but we don't think it's mandatory or essential. Again, I think
it would be helpful.
Q: Mr. Secretary, the Indian Prime Minister this
morning said that India would not tolerate a U.S. strike on Iraq.
I wonder if that is a factor, how much of a factor that is in
any of the decisions you're making; and peripherally, beyond that
question, does this apparent improvement of relations with Iran,
that looks on the horizon, have any effect on what you would do
in the area?
A: I think they're separate entirely, and frankly,
if the Indians have objection to any resort to military force
should it be required, I would hope they would have a more constructive
recommendation as to how to help get support for imposing the
sanctions and enforcing them, and the UN resolution. So I think
it's one thing for those on the outside of the process right now
to criticize or condemn, but I hope that they would have a more
constructive approach on how they would be helpful in getting
support for inspectors being on the ground, unfettered, and imposing
the sanctions.
With respect to Iran, that really is not a factor in our deliberations.
Q: You mentioned going back to your one year
in office and you avoided answering the next 53 weeks. What do
you see ahead of you for your future?
A: I don't think I avoided answering, I think
it was a three-part question, and I thought by answering the first
part it took care of the third part.
I would anticipate being here for the remainder of my term, and
I hope to be, and hope to continue my efforts in promoting the
Revolution in Military Affairs, presiding over the Revolution
in Business Affairs, and helping to transform our military so
it is at least one to two steps ahead in generation from any competitor
in the future. So I hope to continue to make those kinds of contributions
in the coming years.
Q: During the Gulf War, some Iraqi troops surrendered
to an unmanned aerial vehicle. What's your assessment of what
will happen to the Iraqi military if there are sustained airstrikes?
A: I don't care to speculate what would happen.
Who knows what lurks in their minds and their spirit. Again, we
haven't made that decision yet, and if and when we do, we'll have
to wait for the outcome. I can't speculate on it.
Q: If UNSCOM has been relatively successful;
if Saddam Hussein remains in a box; he's really not at this point
threatening his neighbors. If he makes a move, we're all over
him. He's under a microscope right now. Why is it then, why would
it be then necessary to take that step of military action if he's
already so contained in the region?
A: Because without inspectors on the ground having
access to the sites that have been declared off-limits, there's
no way to verify and to determine whether or not he's building
a greater capability so he can threaten his neighbors. So it's
important that if you don't have the inspectors on the ground
that you curtail, as best you can, his ability to expand or build
upon those capabilities.
Press: Thank you very much.
milnet@milnet.com
