MILNET: Department of State Briefing 1/11/99
DEPARTMENT OF STATE DAILY PRESS BRIEFING INDEX Monday, January 11, l999 Briefer: James P. Rubin
KAZAKHSTAN 1 US agrees with OSCE that elections conduct fell far short of international standards. CHINA 2 US today resumes bilateral human rights dialogue, led by Assistant Secretary Harold Koh. 2-3 US positions at UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva remain to be determined. 16 US is aware of publication of former Secretary Henry Kissinger's latest book. ISRAEL 3-5,7 Secretary Albright will make recommendations to President on possibility of clemency for Jonathan Pollard based on foreign policy considerations. 5-6 Recommendation to the President comes from State's Office of the Legal Adviser. 7,8 President and PM Netanyahu spoke about Pollard's case several times, before and during Wye. MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS 4 Palestinians have been making good-faith efforts to comply with Wye agreements. 4 US has not seen Israelis implement further re-deployment agreed in Wye. IRAQ 8 US strongly believes UNSCOM has done an enormous service to the world. 8 UN sanctions can be lifted only when Iraq disarms. 8 US has always been open to ideas to improve inspection regime. 8-9 Reports of Iraqi planned disavowal of its border with Kuwait are extremely disturbing. 9 US is determined to work with its friends at UN and in region to assist Iraqi people. 9 War of words with other Arab governments a sign of increasing Iraqi isolation. 9-10 Reports that 25 Iraqi officers were executed have surfaced since mid- December. 10 Opposition sources say 63 additional civilians have been executed in past two months. 10,13US welcomes productive meeting of two Iraqi Kurdish leaders on January 8, and their agreement to share revenues. 11 Proposed disbursement of funds in Iraq Liberation Act will be reported to Congress. 13 US sees no need to investigate UNSCOM. 13 UNSCOM's mission remains extremely important, and the best method to disarm Iraq. 14 US uses elaborate national technical means to monitor Iraq. 14 US is determined to enforce the no-fly zones. COLOMBIA 15 US closely cooperating with GOC on huge cocaine seizure last month. 16-17 Secretary Albright will do all she can in effort to release documents on Pinochet. CUBA 15-16 Statements by Cuban officials disappointing; US will implement announced measures soon. SIERRA LEONE 17 US sends condolences to family of Myles Tierney, AP newsman killed in Freetown. 17 US remains extremely disturbed over danger to civilian population in Freetown. 17 US has told Liberian Government it should stop its support for rebels. LIBYA 17-18 US supports efforts to get Qadhafi to comply with UNSC resolution on Pan Am 103. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DAILY PRESS BRIEFING DPB # 5 MONDAY, JANUARY 11, 1999 P.M. 12:50 P.M. (ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED) MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing here on this Monday. I have a couple of statements I want to start with and then we'll go directly to your questions. On the subject of Kazakstan, the US Government concurs with the OSCE -- the preliminary statement -- that the overall electoral process in Kazakstan fell far short of international standards for open, free and fair elections. We have noted before that preparations for the elections were seriously flawed. On short notice, the date was advanced, giving candidates little time to organize. Candidates received unequal access to the media, and there were numerous instances of voter and opposition intimidation prior to the election. In view of this situation, the OSCE sent only a limited mission to assess and report because the situation was already clear. We are disappointed by the fact that the election process was carried out in a manner inconsistent with international standards. The conduct of this election has set back the process of democratization in Kazakstan and has made more difficult the development of the important relationship between our countries as well as Kazakstan's full participation in Euro-Atlantic institutions. We encourage the government of Kazakstan to take the necessary steps to improve its electoral legislation and its human rights observances so that elections scheduled for this year will meet - that is, local and parliamentary elections - will meet international standards and Kazakstan's commitments. Do we have any questions on that subject? QUESTION: Does the United States have an aid program to Kazakstan? MR. RUBIN: We do provide some assistance targeted towards - it's my understanding, the assistance is targeted towards promoting greater democracy; and we will continue to pursue our interest in promoting greater democracy. There is no doubt that by handling the election in this manner, Kazakstan has set back prospects for democratization and violated important international commitments. This has tarnished Kazakstan's reputation and will make it more difficult for Kazakstan to participate in international organizations. It has also cast a shadow on our bilateral relations. Our assistance programs are designed to promote Kazakstani social, political, and economic reform in ways that will help Kazakstan integrate into the international community of nations. It remains in our interest, therefore, to support and continue those programs. Turning to a second statement which will also be available after the briefing, at the June summit, President Clinton and President Jiang agreed that candid dialogue is an important element for resolving differences. In that spirit, the United States today resumes its official bilateral human rights dialogue with the government of China. Our delegation will be led by Assistant Secretary Harold Koh, and will include key officials from across the government. The Chinese delegation will be led by their Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Guangya, and will include officials from across their government. Bilateral exchanges and bilateral dialogues like this offer the United States the chance to pursue a frank and full exchange of our views with counterparts in other governments. Such dialogues, as you know, are not limited to China. This particular dialogue provides us the opportunity to raise our concerns about the human rights situation in China, which are deep and considerable; including the recent disturbing and counterproductive arrest, trial and sentencing of a number of democracy activists for the peaceful expression of their political beliefs. We will address numerous issues, including the protection of human rights, fundamental freedoms through the rule of law, legal reform, due process. We will encourage China to ratify - and this is important - and adhere to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. We look forward to what we hope will be a candid exchange. We have clear differences with China on many human rights issues, and we think it's important that we address those differences clearly and frankly through this dialogue. QUESTION: Where is it? MR. RUBIN: The dialogue is here in Washington. I don't know the technical location; I presume it's in the State Department, though. QUESTION: On this subject, do you suppose Koh could come down and brief us after the meetings are over? MR. RUBIN: I will try to have a way for us to communicate to you as much as possible of that type of session. Given the circumstances of him conducting the session, it may not be possible to do it simultaneously. QUESTION: Has the US Government given much thought yet to the meeting of the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva in March and what strategy they should adopt towards human rights in China? MR. RUBIN: We believe that the United Nations Commission on Human Rights makes a vital contribution to the promotion of human rights around the world, and we have always strongly supported the efforts of this commission. Prior to last session, both the United States and the European Union chose not to sponsor a resolution on the human rights situation in China. That decision was based on positive steps that the government of China had taken, and the expectation of further progress in human rights. The decision did not mean that we regarded China's record as satisfactory; we clearly do not. Nor did it mean that we would stop speaking out publicly about human rights. What we will do in Geneva this year remains to be determined, and will depend in part on conditions in China when the commission begins. QUESTION: Do these talks, will they have an influence on - MR. RUBIN: Well, obviously, a dialogue on human rights and the responses we receive from China to our areas of concern and our specific cases of concern and how they respond to what happens at this meeting will, as I said, play a role in any determination that we make. QUESTION: Did you give a date for this meeting? MR. RUBIN: Which meeting? QUESTION: The Koh -- MR. RUBIN: Today and tomorrow. QUESTION: Today and tomorrow. MR. RUBIN: Other subjects? QUESTION: Are you prepared to talk about the advice the Secretary is giving the President concerning Jonathan Pollard? MR. RUBIN: It is not our practice to provide publicly the advice the Secretary of State gives to the President on matters such as this. Let me say that our views about the issue were requested. It is my expectation that by the end of today, those views will have been communicated to the White House. We will, in that recommendation, address the question to what extent, if any, foreign policy consideration should be taken into account in this decision. But I'm not in a position to talk about what specifically she will say in that recommendation. QUESTION: In her recommendation, part of her recommendation will not be whether Pollard should be released or not? MR. RUBIN: The questions that she will address from the State Department will be both the generic question of the importance of keeping our nation's secrets and the specific question of what foreign policy considerations, if any, the President should take into account in deciding whether to grant clemency to Jonathan Pollard. That is the role for the Secretary of State to play. QUESTION: Has the failure of the Israeli Government, specifically Prime Minister Netanyahu, to carry out their Phase II commitments, does this have any effect on the recommendation in the Pollard case? MR. RUBIN: Let me say that there has been a past history here of the State Department's recommendations in this area that take into account a variety of factors. That is our job -- to take into account those factors. I don't think that it would be possible to address your question without beginning to preview or provide some presumption or assumption about what the Secretary's recommendations would be. Let me say that on the subject you asked, we have said very clearly that we believe that the Palestinians have been making a good faith effort to implement a number of the commitments in the Wye Agreement, including the commitment to amend the charter of the Palestinian National Council, including the fight against terrorism. In both of those cases, we believe they are making strong and largely successful efforts. In other areas, including the question of police and weapons confiscation and number of committees, they have also been making a good faith effort. To the extent there are problems, we believe the Palestinians and the Israelis should be working those problems out through discussion and communication. On the Israeli side, we have not seen the Israelis implement their commitment to withdraw from a second phase of the further redeployment. So that is the status of implementation of the Wye Agreement; but I wouldn't be able to make a direct connection there for you. QUESTION: Jamie, on Pollard, just generally speaking, when you talk about foreign policy ramifications, what does that mean? MR. RUBIN: Well, each case is different. Obviously -- I'm trying to help, because to the extent that it's about this case, it becomes very difficult for me to talk about it. As the nation's chief diplomat and the architect of our foreign policies after the President, it is the Secretary's job to alert the President to issues that could provide compelling or overriding concerns in his decisions on such matters as this. Whether it's a case of law enforcement or whether it's a case of another decision the President has to make, the President has to make these tough decisions. The idea, as I understand it, is the law enforcement professionals talk about the law enforcement ramifications of a decision one way or the other; the intelligence community talks about its concerns; and the Secretary of State needs to talk about to what extent there may or may not be overriding foreign policy considerations that would justify a particular action or another. That could, hypothetically, in other cases, mean that the United States would gain greater benefit or huge benefits from some action, as opposed to the down sides of a particular action. But that is the concept of how this kind of a recommendation and this kind of a process would work. None of that is designed to suggest to you what the Secretary specifically, or the State Department specifically recommended. For your knowledge, the recommendation comes from the Legal Adviser's office and not from the Secretary of State herself. QUESTION: At the risk of getting too specific, then, if it came down - (inaudible) word this, preserving the Wye accord would not be a ramification, then, of this decision; or is that too specific? (Laughter.) MR. RUBIN: It sounds a lot like a delicately phrased form of the last question by your colleague, which would make it very hard to answer. But in theory, peace is a foreign policy consideration. QUESTION: I'm going to write that one down. (Laughter.) QUESTION: In deliberations on this or similar matters, would the fact of an election season in another country be a factor taken into account? MR. RUBIN: One would certainly hope that in every recommendation on every subject that the State Department would be aware of the political developments in every country that it considers and talks about. To not be aware of the political situation in a country would be an abdication of our responsibility to know what's going on in another country. So any recommendation that we make would take into account the foreign policy considerations and analysis in any country on any subject of our best judgment of what is going on in another country. But none of that is to say that we will take positions that interfere in the electoral processes of a sovereign state which is a thriving democracy. QUESTION: Jamie, you said the decision comes from the Legal Adviser's office, not from the Secretary. MR. RUBIN: Right. She's aware of - she approves the recommendation. QUESTION: She approves it, so it's under her name to the President? MR. RUBIN: No, it's actually not. But what I'm telling you is that she would be aware of and agree with and decide how to communicate such a recommendation, especially on a matter like this. But as a technical matter, this is done by lawyers. So the lawyers talk to each other. But she's obviously aware of what the Legal Adviser's office and concurs in what the Legal Adviser's office would recommend. QUESTION: So if she did not concur, there would be -- MR. RUBIN: I doubt they would be sending such a letter. QUESTION: Jamie, rather than fact, why is it done by the Legal Adviser's office when this is mainly - when you're looking at the foreign policy ramifications? MR. RUBIN: Because it's a legal case. But I'll have to ask them what precedent it is. I just don't really know; I just know that that's the form that these often take. At different times, it is done in different ways. I'm not sure it's really relevant to the fact that the Secretary and her legal office discussed this issue and made a joint recommendation. In other words, they agreed with each other about how to frame our response. QUESTION: I just want to be clear. Seen from the specialized point of view of the State Department, a recommendation that is sent from this department will not deal with the relative guilt or innocence of Pollard or the degree of guilt, but only with the foreign policy considerations and the impact on keeping the nation's secrets; is that right? MR. RUBIN: Correct. QUESTION: Let's go back to this question of the legal adviser. MR. RUBIN: A point I'm sorry I raised. (Laughter.) In my pursuit of giving you more and more information, I am continually amazed at how much difficulty is created by more rather than less. QUESTION: The only question raised is, the Justice Department is theoretically handling that end of things - the legal end of things -- MR. RUBIN: No, Ruff has sent out the requests. It is my understanding that White House spokesmen have said that Charles Ruff, the President's chief counsel - I believe is his title - sent out requests for recommendations and considerations to his counterparts at all the various agencies. Now, on a matter like this and most matters, it would be unlikely in the extreme that any legal office of the Pentagon or the intelligence community or the Justice Department or the State Department would make a recommendation on this without the concurrence of their superiors, in this case, the Secretary. I was merely pointing out a procedural fact. QUESTION: Right, that makes perfect sense now, thank you. QUESTION: Was this Department asked to take into account any additional factors that had not been addressed during previous such deliberations? MR. RUBIN: I believe the request was generic to take into account what we believed to be the current foreign policy considerations. Since the last time, the world has changed in many different ways. We would hope that a responsible Department -- and we would hope that all the officials involved -- would look at the situation now as compared to the situation last time and decide whether any considerations had changed, if any had changed. We would certainly expect the people advising the Secretary to take into account the fact that it's 1999 and not 1998 or 1997. QUESTION: Just for the record, Jamie, at Wye the President did not tell the Prime Minister of Israel that he would release Jonathan Pollard? MR. RUBIN: It is my understanding that there were a series of discussions about Jonathan Pollard between the President and Prime Minister Netanyahu, preceding the Wye conference and during the Wye conference and at nearly every meeting the President and Prime Minister Netanyahu had. The President's commitments were to review the matter, and he said at the conclusion of Wye review it seriously. That is what is going on now and what the Secretary is contributing to in her capacity as the nation's chief diplomat. QUESTION: I know you don't speak for the President, but can you give any sort of possible time frame for the - MR. RUBIN: No, that would be up to the White House to provide you. QUESTION: I know you can't talk about the specific recommendation, but can you tell us what, if anything, the Secretary has said about this subject in the past, her feelings, prior to this recommendation delivered today? MR. RUBIN: That was another well-formulated attempt to get at the question. I'm not aware of her making any public comment on this, other than describing accurately to all of you and others about what transpired at Wye and the commitment the President made to seriously review the case. As far as her personal views, I can certainly say that like any senior official of this government or previous governments, she takes extremely seriously the commitment to protect the integrity and release of classified information that could affect our nation's security. QUESTION: One more, do you know that if in the thousands of documents that Pollard turned over to the Israeli Government any State Department classified documents were included? MR. RUBIN: I wouldn't know the answer to that question. I don't know whether I would ever be able to answer it, but I will inquire. QUESTION: Nearly every meeting - you're not talking about Wye, you're talking about bilaterals -- MR. RUBIN: It is my understanding that in nearly every meeting between Prime Minister Netanyahu and the President prior to Wye, that the Prime Minister raised his concerns about this case. I would not say that at every meeting the President had with the Prime Minister at Wye this issue came up, because there were dozens of such meetings. But I am sure that it did come up in a significant number of those discussions. QUESTION: On Butler, he spoke today in Washington. He acknowledged there may have to be a different UNSCOM - that is, one that just monitors as opposed to carrying out intrusive inspections. What is the US position on this; is it UNSCOM or nothing as far as the US is concerned? MR. RUBIN: Well, I haven't seen Ambassador Butler's comments, so I would not be in a position to respond to a rendition of them. Let me simply say on UNSCOM, we believe very strongly that the UN Special Commission has done an enormous service to the world in its effort - largely successful in the early phases - to disarm large quantities of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. We believe very strongly that the Security Council resolutions make it clear that sanctions can be lifted only when Iraq complies with the requirements to disarm. With respect to particular ideas, we have said, and we will continue to say, that we look forward to discussing with any country ideas they have on how to get the most effective regime to disarm Iraq into Iraq. But Security Council resolutions make it clear that sanctions can only be lifted when Iraq complies. These resolutions simply can't be leap-frogged; they are on the books. Iraq has not disarmed, and the United States is committed to see that years of work by the Security Council and the UN Special Commission calling for Iraq's disarmament are respected. We expect the discussions in New York this week to continue with an emphasis on the need to sustain a disarmament program and to improve the humanitarian program which the Council has mandated. Having said that, let me also add, we have always been open to ideas to improve the professionalism, the competence and the effectiveness of the UN Special Commission's regime. We will continue to be willing to discuss any such ideas with our partners in the Security Council. QUESTION: Saddam Hussein has said that Iraq should not abide by the border between Iraq and Kuwait. Does that cause the blood pressure to rise? MR. RUBIN: Well, certainly the one area where there had deemed to be some progress during the time that Secretary Albright was Ambassador in New York was a time when Iraq formally went through the process of recognizing that border. The reports that Iraq may consider rescinding that recognition of Kuwait and the relevant UN Security Council resolutions are, therefore, extremely disturbing. We think this is an extremely serious matter, and we will be watching this situation very carefully. We will act if Iraq threatens its neighbors. QUESTION: Jamie, are you encouraged that the Iraqi Parliament decided not to take up the issue itself? MR. RUBIN: We are hard-pressed to be encouraged by anything that is done by the Iraqi leadership or its parliament because not doing something illegal is hardly something to be encouraged by. QUESTION: Saudi Arabia has - I don't know if this was a part of another question - but Saudi Arabia has said that they are encouraging the ouster of Saddam Hussein; his regime is a blot on the Arab world. I believe Egypt has joined, and Kuwait has said something to this effect. This comes in reaction to the fact that Saddam asked for revolution in the Arab states that did not support him in this military incursion. So I would ask you, is this a welcome development, that Saudi Arabia has taken the lead? MR. RUBIN: Well, let me say that there are several aspects to Saudi Arabia's position that I'd like to address. First of all, the United States has been among the foremost advocates for humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people. The Saudis have suggested some proposals to provide increased aid to the people of Iraq. We have not yet seen a detailed proposal and, therefore, can't comment in detail. We can say that we are determined to work with our friends and allies, including Saudi Arabia, in the region and on the Security Council to assist the Iraqi people. We will be consulting closely with Saudi Arabia, members of the Security Council and others about ideas for improving and expanding the humanitarian assistance for the people of Iraq. Of course, this must be done in such a way as to ensure that we deny Saddam Hussein access to revenue from exports or control over imports. He has proved time and time again that he would use such resources to rearm rather than help his own citizens. With respect to the call for ouster, let me say that the war of words being waged between Iraq's leadership and the other countries in the region are yet another in a series of signs that the Iraqi regime is getting increasingly isolated in the Arab world and around the world. We would welcome a new government in Iraq, one that is committed to living in peace with its neighbors and fulfilling its international obligations. We would work with such a government to lift sanctions and relieve its debt burden if that were to occur. In that regard, let me add a couple of points about events in Iraq. Opposition sources have reported at least four separate incidents with more than 25 officers executed between December 13 and December 19. On December 13, 18 officers were reportedly executed at Abu Ghuraib prison, four for plotting to assassinate Saddam Hussein. On December 18, at least five officers, including two generals, were reportedly executed for attempting a mutiny at the Al Rashid military base outside Baghdad. On December 19, two lieutenant colonels were said to have been executed on unspecified charges at the Al Taji military base outside Baghdad. Opposition sources also report that the commander of the 11th Mechanized Division was killed on the orders of Ali Hassan Al Majid. They and several members of his staff met the same fate shortly thereafter. In the past, the 11th Division has been noted in action against civilian targets. The exact reason for Al Majid's dissatisfaction with the division is unclear, but all accounts describe insubordination related to an order to strike against Shia civilians. We have seen reports from the Iraqi opposition in the civilian side that 63 civilian political prisoners were killed at the Abu Ghuraib prison outside Baghdad starting December 13. Combined with some of the reports I gave you earlier, this brings the total summary execution total for the last two months to nearly 500 persons. Reports of a heightened number of summary executions in Iraq have been reaching us since 1997. They evince a profound disregard by the Iraqi regime for human life, human rights and political and religious freedom. We deplore and condemn in the strongest terms this reported activity, and we call on the government of Iraq to allow human rights monitors to enter Iraq. With respect to confirming and I use the word "reports," the exact accuracy of these reports, obviously only human rights monitors could do so if Iraq permitted them to enter the country. The UN Special Rapporteur for Iraq considers past reports of summary executions emanating from Iraq to be credible, as do we, because they are from multiple, independent sources; provide a telling level of detail; and in denying access by human rights monitors, the regime is going out of its way to prevent efforts at confirmation. Meanwhile, in the North, the two Iraqi Kurdish leaders held very congenial and productive meetings in Salahedin in Iraq on Friday, January 8. We were in close contact with them before and after the meetings, as were our Turkish and British colleagues. The talks focused on ways to implement further the reconciliation agreement the leaders concluded during their meetings with Secretary Albright in September. We welcome this development and congratulate the leaders for taking one more courageous step forward on behalf of the people of Northern Iraq. In their joint statement, they reaffirmed their commitment to the provisions of the Washington agreement; indicated they would implement immediately - and this is important - provisions related to finance and revenues; announced that the few remaining prisoners each side was holding would be released; and several other provisions. Certainly the fact the two parties are now sharing revenues is of major significance. With this financial link established, it should be much easier for them to coordinate administrative programs throughout the three Northern provinces. Obviously, the fact that Mr. Talibani was able to travel to the headquarters of the KDB in itself indicates the high degree of trust. So all of that information is designed to suggest to you that Saddam Hussein is becoming increasingly isolated in his region, amongst the Arabs, amongst the world; that people in Iraq are obviously are sufficiently appalled and abhor the decisions he has made to take the brave steps that some have taken. Also, obviously, the reported assassinations are an indicator of the deep unhappiness of the Iraqi people and many in the Iraqi regime system with the policies, practices of Saddam Hussein. QUESTION: But why doesn't, then, the United States join with Egypt and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and take this matter, say, if I may be so bold as to say, to the UN and suggest an ouster to the Security Council, some kind of Security Council pronouncement for the ouster of this man while there are still those in Iraq to revolt? MR. RUBIN: Let me say that we have made clear our support for a policy of containing Iraq so long as Saddam Hussein is in power, while working to promote regime change during that period. That is our policy; that is what we are doing. We've been meeting with opposition groups to that effect. Obviously, we are making known in private our policy to all the relevant governments. That is what we are pursuing. With regard to your specific idea, I'm not sure that would advance the cause of overthrowing the regime, but I'm sure there's someone in the State Department who wouldn't mind that if you fleshed it out and sent it to them. QUESTION: As long as you're talking about regime change and working with the opposition groups, can you bring us up to date on how much, if any, of the money appropriated by Congress has been spent in that part? Not the military $97 million part but the other, I think, $7 million? MR. RUBIN: Well, I don't have a number for expenditures. We are going to be reporting to Congress on the decisions as to which groups are eligible for the assistance provided in the Iraq Liberation Act, which specifies that groups are committed to democratic values, respect for human rights, peaceful relations with Iraq's neighbors, territorial integrity of Iraq and cooperation among democratic opponents of the regime. With respect the discretionary authority - with respect to the $5 million, I don't have a list of expenditures. I do know that we have a plan in that area, and I'll try to get you more details on it. QUESTION: Has any money been spent, specifics aside? MR. RUBIN: I will try to check the exact status of expenditures. QUESTION: A couple of points. When you gave all these long lists of incidents and then you spoke of multiple independent sources, you're referring specifically to the US reports coming from these latest reports of executions and so on? MR. RUBIN: I will check, but my understanding of that language was designed to suggest the opposition groups in different places have corroborated accounts, and that they have come from sufficiently multiple places with sufficient details that we believe these are credible reports. That is my understanding. QUESTION: The other thing is, you spoke in passing of relieving Iraq's debt burden under an alternative government. Is that a new phrase, or has that been standard part of US policy? MR. RUBIN: I think you would have to go back to the Secretary's March speech in 1997 to see the official language we've used with respect to our looking forward to the day when we can work with a regime after Saddam Hussein is gone. Certainly, we would, as I indicated, be looking at that question with an eye towards trying to work with such a government both to lift sanctions and relieve its debt burden. QUESTION: The dates you say here are interesting -- December 13th and 19th. I think the bombings started on the 15th. I don't know whether you could establish a link between these rebellious movements and the US-British bombing campaign. MR. RUBIN: Well, I'd prefer to report to you what I've been provided as the situation. I know General Zinni talked to this issue at the Pentagon last week, and I don't know how far he went. I think he probably is in a position to go farther than I am. QUESTION: Establishing two Kurdish TV in Northern Iraq. Do you have any financial and technical assistance - MR. RUBIN: Are you still on the subject of Kurdish TV? QUESTION: Yes, Kurdish TV in Iraq. MR. RUBIN: I'll have to check for you. If you would provide those questions to us in time for us to get specific answers, then maybe I'd be able to do something. QUESTION: Let's go back to Butler for a second. How do you feel about his decision to cancel all U-2 flights over Iraq? MR. RUBIN: I am not aware of that information, but we certainly have confidence in Ambassador Butler's decisions on this subject; and certainly the Iraqi interference and refusal to cooperate with UNSCOM has made it difficult for UNSCOM to do its job, one element of which has been to use U-2 photography to assist them in their task. QUESTION: He said that. MR. RUBIN: I'm just not aware of it. QUESTION: That in the wake of the - didn't say in the wake of the allegations, but he said while the Security Council was deliberating, he has suspended all U- 2 flights. He also said that - and he didn't say it too hard, but he did say that an investigation into these allegations - some sort of internal UN investigation -- might be something he would consider in the future. MR. RUBIN: I understand the Secretary General has made clear he's not looking to such an investigation. QUESTION: Okay, how would the US feel about such an investigation? MR. RUBIN: We don't see the need to look into the fact that the United States has been responding to a call by the Security Council for us to provide assistance and information -- obviously, that included intelligence information - to UNSCOM to work on the task that required a vigorous effort by UNSCOM to overcome Iraq's intransigence, concealment, obstruction and other activities that made it impossible for UNSCOM to act without a very active program to get to the bottom of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. That is what we did. We don't see the need to investigate that. We understand the Secretary General has said he doesn't intend to do so. QUESTION: On the revenue sharing agreement between the two Kurdish factions, does that deal include any potential American aid? And was such a deal in any way a condition for their getting any American aid? MR. RUBIN: Well, this meeting took place with limited American involvement - the meeting that just took place in Northern Iraq. So I don't think that was a critical factor. What is important here is that they can't coordinate administrative programs throughout the Northern provinces without this kind of revenue sharing agreement. I will check what our intentions are with respect to assistance, but I can tell you that it's my impression that the prospect of American assistance was not what made them decide to work together and share revenues. It was more a joint decision about the importance of working together to advance the interests of the Kurdish people as Saddam Hussein has tried to suppress the Kurdish people in Iraq. QUESTION: On Butler, he said today in response to a question that he expected UNSCOM would be back in Iraq possibly in a month or a little bit more, and would have the power, the authority to do their job that they haven't had in the past, et cetera. I just ask you, does that seem realistic? MR. RUBIN: I haven't, again, seen that particular quote from Ambassador Butler. It would surprise me if he put it just the way you put it. But let me say that we believe that the UNSCOM mission is extremely important; that until Iraq cooperates with whatever proposals UNSCOM has to disarm Iraq, there is no way for Iraq to get the sanctions lifted. Therefore, we think, as we've always said, that the best way and the best method to protect the world from the weapons of mass destruction Iraq has or could have would be a vigorous UN inspection system. We would be supportive of a test of such a system as a precursor to UNSCOM's return; we've said that before. We have our doubts - extreme doubts - that Iraq has changed its stripes. It's been pretty clear for the last year or so that Iraq wants to do two things that are incompatible: one is to keep its weapons of mass destruction; and two, get sanctions lifted. But if that were to change, that would be fine with us and we could start down the path of confirming the destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, as we have always wanted to do. QUESTION: Jamie, it's been said perhaps by you, but certainly by others publicly, that Iraq could begin reconstituting the biological weapons program almost overnight in the absence of monitoring. Now that there's no U-2 flights, no on-the-ground monitoring at all, I'm just wondering how serious that threat might be in this interim period; and how are you monitoring it? MR. RUBIN: Well, we are always concerned about the threat of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. We believe that the use of force that took place - the significant and substantial use of force that occurred last month makes clear to Saddam Hussein the costs in stark and dramatic and compelling terms of any effort that he might make to move in that direction, both to reconstitute and/or to use such weapons of mass destruction. We think that that military action will make it less likely that he would make such a move in the direction you've described. If he were to do so, we have made clear that we reserve the right to use military force and we are prepared to act if he reconstitutes his weapons of mass destruction. What will exactly trigger that decision and what level of evidence and what level of reconstitution, I wouldn't be in a position to specify in this forum for you. QUESTION: Without specifying, is there some kind of monitoring going on, or is there really nothing? MR. RUBIN: We have a very elaborate national technical means of keeping track of what goes on in Iraq, and we will continue to pursue that vigorously. QUESTION: Regarding the latest confrontation in the Northern no-fly zone today, is the US prepared to keep this "policy of containment" indefinitely; or is it getting to the point that more aggressive action is increasingly becoming more likely? MR. RUBIN: As far as what steps need to be taken to ensure the successful enforcement of the no-fly zone beyond what has been taken, I wouldn't be in a position to speculate. What I can say is that the President and the Administration are determined to enforce the no-fly zone and use what means they think are appropriate and necessary to do so. QUESTION: Last January 6, Congressman Dan Burton sent a letter to Madame Albright in reference to a possible obstruction from the State Department to hiding information about some cocaine seizure in Cartegena, Colombia, that was going to Cuba. He demanded an investigation and an answer within the next two weeks. Is there an answer on that today, or is there going to be an answer? MR. RUBIN: It's simply not true that anyone ordered the Colombian Government to cover up information about the seven-ton cocaine seizure last month. We have been cooperating closely with the Colombian Government investigation into the seizure, and we hope that this will result in arrests. But the basic charge is simply not true. QUESTION: On Cuba, the measures announced last week that Secretary Albright have been met with a very negative reaction in Cuba last Friday. Do you have anything on that? MR. RUBIN: Let me say that as we indicated last week, these measures are designed to advance the interests and the cause of the people of Cuba. Therefore, it is hard not to be disappointed by the initial public response the Cuban officials have made that could make it less likely that the benefits of this arrangement to the Cuban people would be made possible. We made clear at the time that many of these provisions required the acquiescence or cooperation of the Cuban officials. Therefore, we trust that upon reflection, the Cuban Government will choose to cooperate on these measures where their concurrence is needed. Again, we will take the January 5 package -- the streamlined visa process, expansion of licensed flights to Cuba, broadening the category of persons eligible to send remittances to Cuba, authorizations of purchases of food and agricultural inputs by independent non-governmental entities in Cuba, and a restoration of direct mail service - and these are the concrete measures we've put forward designed to bring real benefits to the Cuban people. We will proceed to implement these measures as soon as we can and as soon as the regulations have been issued. We intend to do so expeditiously, and we hope that the government of Cuba does not impede the workings of these arrangements to the detriment of the people of Cuba. That government has done enough to harm the people of Cuba, and we certainly hope that they allow these benefits to move forward. QUESTION: What about the ball game? MR. RUBIN: I haven't heard anything on the ball game. Are you polishing your baseball? QUESTION: I take it from what you say, you haven't had any formal response, then, from the Cuban government on whether they will cooperate? MR. RUBIN: On the specifics, correct. We've seen this general statement by the Cuban officials, and we take note of different parts of it that say different things. Like last time, their reaction was similar; but when it came down to the specifics, we were able to move forward on much of them. QUESTION: Do you know when the regulations will be - MR. RUBIN: Soon. As soon as we know, we will try to get that information to you. QUESTION: (Inaudible.) MR. RUBIN: In certain cases, acquiescence or cooperation from the government is necessary. For example, if you want to have flights from different cities in the United States to cities other than Havana, obviously you need the Cuban Government's acquiescence in that effort. QUESTION: Did a delegation from the Baltimore Orioles go, or do they plan to go? MR. RUBIN: I'm not familiar with that, and I will try to get that for the record for you. QUESTION: How disturbed was the Administration that they released the information this weekend about past Secretary of State Kissinger providing information to the Chinese? Can you give us some type of a read-out on that - if this is something that's disturbing, or is this something that you just accept or anything like that? MR. RUBIN: I'm aware of this book; is that what you're talking about? I didn't hear any panic on the seventh floor this morning. I think we are aware of the importance of bringing to the public, many decades afterwards, to light, information. We've certainly worked very hard at the Bureau of Public Affairs - and it would be nice if sometimes you all would note this - to accelerate the process of putting out the official histories of the foreign relations of the United States. We're making some progress in getting them out on time; during the course of which we work very hard - sometimes with not total agreement, but eventual agreement, from other agencies in the government to get out as much information as possible. So our general posture has been that 20-odd years later, that one should try to put out as much information as possible about events, provided one doesn't go beyond the necessary protections for our national security. But I don't have a formal reaction for you. QUESTION: Okay, and so, then, in fact, will the Pinochet papers be released soon, then? It's more than 20 years. MR. RUBIN: I fail to see the connection. You asked me about Kissinger and -- QUESTION: I'm asking you about documents. I guess the line is, following documents that have been released more than 20 years ago - national security information being released, will the Pinochet papers be released? MR. RUBIN: Right. Well, as you know, we've taken the position that the Secretary is going to do all she can to encourage release of documents, provided it meets the criteria set forth, in the case of Chile, as she has in other cases. But because we're supportive of something happening on one given day doesn't mean that the wheels of government turn and the next day all the documents that some would like to see can be released. But we do try to keep those wheels moving and prod them and poke them as best we can. QUESTION: Jamie, Sierra Leone, any comment on the situation there, with particular respect to the shooting of two AP journalists? MR. RUBIN: First of all let me say - especially to you, George - we express our deepest condolences to the family of Myles Tierney, an AP television news producer who was killed on the 10th in Sierra Leone, while covering the unrest in that West African country. It just points up the extraordinary risks that people in your profession go to to report the news from around the world. Our consular officer in Guinea is endeavoring to work with the authorities in Sierra Leone to ascertain the exact circumstances of his death and also to provide the documents necessary for repatriation of the remains of Mr. Tierney to the United States. The news accounts that we're familiar with indicate that he was riding in a car in Freetown, the capital, with other journalists, and that car came under gunfire. With respect to Sierra Leone more broadly, the RUF commander publicly rejected President Kabbah's call for a cease-fire, announced January 7. ECOMOG forces were reinforced over the weekend and seem to have taken the offensive to regain control of the the city. We suspended our operations on December 24th. We remain extremely concerned for the safety and well-being of the population of Freetown. So far, in the current RUF offensive against Freetown, we have not received reports of mass executions, mass kidnappings and other forms of extreme torture that the RUF has been known for since 1991. We do, however, have reports of rapes, lootings, house burnings and other abuses of civilians by rebel forces. We have told the government of Liberia that we know they are supporting RUF activities, and we condemn support from any source to the insurgence. This has come from a growing body of evidence that indicates that the government of Liberia has been supporting those activities, and we continue to urge Liberia to stop the support and play a more constructive role in the conflict in Sierra Leone. QUESTION: On Libya, do you know about these negotiations involving the Saudi ambassador, et cetera? MR. RUBIN: I'm familiar with efforts by some in the international community to make clear to Libyan leader Qadhafi the importance of abiding by Security Council resolutions. We do not support negotiations on this point. We do support efforts by those who have or might have influence on the Libyan leader to bring home to him the simple and stark choice he faces, which is either to accept the idea of a third country trial, pursuant to the arrangements the UN has painstakingly worked out, or know that we will by next February, this next month, be working to establish additional measures against Libya. So to the extent that these interlocutors can bring home to him that it's time for him to accept a proposal that the Libyan authorities originally put out there and stop the stalling and get on with implementing the proposal, we think that would be a good idea. QUESTION: Thank you. (The briefing concluded at 1:45 P.M.)