MILNET: Threat from the Former Soviet Union

Due to the breakup of the Soviet Union, the information on threats in this section has nearly become obsolete.

The disposition of weapons, both conventional and nuclear, remains very much like that at the time of the breakup (in terms of total count and locations). This fact has added a number of new nuclear powers to the world, powers that are in of themselves fledging governments with little stability.

Since much of the "off Russian soil" conventional weaponry also remains in the hands of these new goverments, it is clear a new accounting of the world's balnace of power must be made. But again, the disposition most likely follows that prior to the breakup. Therefore, the reader can take note of where disposition is implied in the following data, and should be safe in assuming that few changes have been made in terms of total count or location.

Recent efforts to pull nuclear weapons back into Russia or dispose of them at their locations in former Soviet States have wildly successful as has the destruction of weapons in Russian hands. Overall this has reduced the nuclear threat from the region, at least in terms of number of warheads and launchers.

However, political stablity in the region is not acceptable and it will be some time before the threat level falls to a level that is desirable.

To illustrate the danger we continue to face, we present a historical perspective on the former Soviet Union.

Soviet Military Spending

The Soviets were known for their unprecedented spending on arms, some 60% of their GNP in the years between 1950 and 1970. The spending rate did not decline and even in throughout the early 1990s environment of "lessening of tensions" the Soviets continued to expand and modernize their forces. While the threat from the countries of the former Soviet Union has lessened, it remains that the countries of the former Soviet Union still pose the major military threat that shapes how the U.S. structures its own military forces.

Other threats such as world terrorism and tensions in the Middle East will continue to shape contingencies planning in the U.S. The U.S. however will have to consider countering a huge BALTIC intelligence machine that is equalled by no other in the world.

A major set of the U.S.' weapons were poised to retalitate against nuclear attack from the Soviet Union. Of course, there were also conventional threats from the Soviet Union as well. The total concern for U.S. military in terms of the Soviet Union could be characterized by the threat of:

Soviet Strategic Nuclear Attack upon the United States
Soviet Strategic Nuclear Attack upon U.S. Allies in Europe (NATO)
Soviet Strategic Nuclear Attack upon any other U.S. Allies
Soviet Strategic Nuclear Attack upon anyone else in the world
Any use of Tactical Nuclear weapons anywhere in the world
Any conventional attack against U.S. Allies in Europe (NATO)
Any conventional attack against other U.S. Allies anywhere else in the World
Any conventional attack against any country in the world who requests U.S. assistance.

Stategic Threat

The Strategic Threat was the most severe, that is, the threat of Nuclear Attack with Strategic Nuclear Weapons. This threat was imposed by the :

Soviet Naval Forces
Soviet Air Forces
Soviet Ground Forces
Soviet Space Assets

Within these forces the threats originated from the forces controlled by the Soviet Command, Control and Intelligence structure (C3I):

Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces (ICBMs)
Soviet Navy (SLBMs)
Soviet Air Force (Bombers)

ICBMs

The Soviet ICBM threat continued to grow from the very first capable missile and warhead in Soviet hands. The U.S. had typically been at a higher level of technology in terms of accuracy of the delivery systems, and thus as the Soviets amassed a 3 to 1 or 4 to 1 ratio of their warheads over ours, there was not much concern. At the time of the breakup however, the accuracy of the Soviet missile arsenal had continued growing as older weaponry was being replaced with newer and newer equipment.

At the time of the breakup the Soviets had some 1,451 ICBMs which includes 165 of the latest model SS-25 single warhead, ground mobile missiles. The mobility of the ICBM force was a major problem for U.S. deterrence. In order to provide a military deterrence (as opposed to a general deterrence) you had to be able to strike at the Soviet's ability to wage nuclear war, thus eliminating any such power they might have to use elsewhere in the world. This deterrence, in response to a Soviet launch, required the U.S. to target the Soviet ICBM force. Unfortunately, mobile launchers place a heavy burden on strategic surveillance, the task being quite difficult and expensive to pinpoint mobile launcher locations.

With the increase of mobile launchers and the improvement in accuracy, the Soviet Union's weapons ratio quickly drew even to the U.S.

Today, the dismantling and destruction of weapons in both the U.S. and Russia have reduced the number of warheads dramatically. Again, it will take a historical perspective to finally account for the new balance of nuclear power when the current rounds of dismantling occurs.

SLBMs

The Soviet SLBM force continued to grow at an alarming rate. Production of SLBM and attack submarines in the Soviet had doubled and in some years tripled that of the U.S. Moreover, the Soviets continued to field a large number of different models of submarines, continuing to push the edge of technology and learning at a prodicious rate. At the breakup, the Soviet SLBM force numbers 69 submarines (does not include attack submarines which could also carry nuclear tipped submarine launched cruise missiles), with an approximate total of 960 SLBM missiles launchable. Some of these of course are multiple reentry/multiple warhead missiles.

Note:: It is not clear if Russia maintained absolute control of all the nuclear armed submarines, but it is postulated that one of the terms for U.S. support during the breakup was the maintenance of control. Perhaps this resulted in the return to Russian control of Soviet submarine technology. This will be a historical lesson to be learned, however, as little information is available today.

The advent of SLBM submarines has reduced the warning time from launch to detonation from the 30 minutes warning we have from satellites, to a meer 10 to 12 minutes. This doesn't leave much time for an effective retaliation force to be launched.

The effects of this SLBM force was (and may continue to be) a heavy burden on U.S. surveillance systems, both airborne and space-borne.

BOMBERS

The Soviets, at the breakup, maintained some 175 Bear long range bombers capable of carrying 40,000 pounds of ordnance to a max range of approximately 7000 nautical miles. 75 Bear H bombers were configured to carry air launched cruise missiles. The Soviets also had the luxury of some 175 TU-26 Backfire, Mach 2.5 bombers which were not counted as strategic bombers in the SALT treaty. The TU-26 can a weapon load of 17,500 pounds to a max range of around 4,000 nautical miles.

The Soviet Naval Force, just prior to the breakup, had added around 180 TU-26s to their force, presumably as maritime patrol. Of course these could easily be dual configured providing long range strike capability against shipping.

In a very short time after the TU-26 deploymnet, the Soviets had planned to deploy their new supersonic Blackjack bomber, adding to the new technology even further. It is not clear what the disposition of these aircraft is, or even if the planned build of these aircraft took place.

Conventional Threat

The Soviet Union's conventional threat has for years been seen as a threat to the Western European countries. With the Soviets able to place huge amounts of troops and equipment into their Warsaw Pact allies terrorities, they were able to place a formidable force right on the borders of our allies in Western Europe. The NATO alliance was formed to counter this threat, and the U.S. has invested billions to arm those allies with appropriate and leading edge technologies in weapons.

With the Eastern European country's governments falling to a new order, the previous level of threat has diminished considerably. Still the instability of the countries of the former Soviet Union does not offer much in the way comfort to analysts in the Western world. And while the Russian leadership may at times appear capable of dealing with world issues and demonstrates the necessary diplomacy to hold their new neighbors in check, it is clear a new conflict in the area could break out at any time. If we took the best scenario possible in the restructuring of the Eastern European governments, we would have a united Europe, poised on the borders of the emmensely powerful sister states of the former Soviet Union. This will only lead to the fomer Soviet states bolstering their forces at their own border instead of in Hungary, Poland, or East Germany.

The Bosnian conflict continues to swell, with it appearing to move into Kosolvo and pulling more Eastern European countries into the mire. Despite Western claims of success in peace negotiations, the region is dangerous and explosive.

With tensions lessening between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, it is clear that there will be need for change, and defense spending in both countries will fall. However, until the new governements in the region are truly stabilized, much can happen which could, virtually overnight, change the strategic balance dramatically. Decapitating our own forces in hopes that "everything will turn out okay" is not only dangerous, but irresponsible.

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