MILNET Brief
  Nuclear Terrorism, 2/7/2005, updated 05/02/2008

"...experts note that building a crude, bulky, low-yield nuclear weapon deliverable by truck or ship would be far easier than making the compact, reliable, high-yield weapons found in U.S. arsenals—and might well also be easier than stealing an atomic weapon."

- Could  Terrorists Make a Nuclear Bomb,  Council on Foreign Relations, undated.  1 

"He secured from a Saudi sheik named Hamid bin Fahd a rather long treatise on the possibility of using nuclear weapons against the Americans. Specifically, nuclear weapons," says Scheuer. "And the treatise found that he was perfectly within his rights to use them."

 - Michael Scheuer, 60 Minutes Interview, CBS, 11/14/2004

Updates
Axis of Evil Weapons Trade    Country Briefs: Iran, Syria, North Korea


Now that the world appears to be pretty well engaged in the War on Terrorism, the notion of a nuclear bomb built and delivered by an asymmetrical force such as a terrorist group seems to be not only within reason, but perhaps in the minds of some, pretty likely.  With reports of al-Qaeda already having a weapon and just waiting for the right moment to pull it out and ship it into the United States or Saudi Arabia, the scare has reached sensational extremes.

The truth, which we won't know until someone actually makes and delivers such a weapon, is perhaps shades of differing proportions from the sensation.  For instance, it would be far easier for al-Qaeda to purchase one of the European or Russian made EMP weapons or acquire the materials for a "dirty bomb" the radiological dispersion weapon, then to build a fissile, high-order nuclear weapon.  Of course, al-Qaeda has shown us that they can and will do things that we do not expect.




Basics  ||  Acquisition of a Weapon  ||  Delivery Systems  ||  Sources of Weapons Material
Threat  ||  What to Do  || Conclusion



Basics

There are two types of nuclear weapons to be discussed.  The high-order weapon otherwise known as the atomic (or less likely a hydrogen) bomb is the most devastating. Even a small high order detonation will deliver kilotons of damage. This will wipe out a major portion of a large metropolis.  Hiroshima (12KT) and Nagasaki (20KT) are examples of worst case destruction -- a modern and larger city might fare much better at the periphery with the same size (several kilotons yield) weapon.  Modern versions of a 2KT weapon are quite small and can be transported in a large suitcase (more like a steamer trunk if fully assembled).

The other type of weapon is the radiological dispersal weapon (RDW) or so called "dirty bomb".  The dirty bomb uses nuclear waste or simply large quantities of industrial use radioactive material to do its damage.  The bomb explodes sending the debris and radioactive material over an area commiserate with the size of the explosion and the shielding effects created by the environment.  The best place to detonate such a weapon is near the top of a large skyscraper, one would suppose.  A crash landing of small plane on the top of building might do it, or a weapon packed near an outside wall near the top floors. The dirty bomb's size will depend on how much radioactive material is stacked around the explosive portion in the center.  The larger the total package, the more radioactive material is dispersed and presumably, the more people dosed with radiation poisioning.

The fissile weapon will kill many more people right away as well as many afterwards due to exposure (100,000 at Hiroshima died within the first 30 days and 140,000 later due to radiation sickness).

While not as deadly, the dirty bomb is just as scary and will undoubtedly kill many after the initial blast. A ten foot square package might kill hundreds in the initial explosion and up to a thousand from long term radiation poisoning.  There are magnitudes, several magnitudes in fact, of difference between the two types of weapons in terms of killing power, but the terror potential is equivalent.

Both involve violent deaths at the explosion site, and some deaths from that invisible enemy radiation exposure.  Thus the terror content is more than adequate for the terrorist's cause.



Acquisition of a Weapon

The ability for a terrorist group to acquire a fissile nuclear weapon -- that is a high order explosive nuclear weapon, fission or fusion weapon  --   is less likely.  Not impossible mind you, but much less likely.

It is a matter of acquisition of materials -- it is perhaps easier to get one's hands on nuclear waste for a dirty bomb, than to get one's hands on fissile material necessary for a fission bomb.  A fusion bomb?  Well that is even more difficult. 

There is a U.S. government program in place to purchase or protect former Soviet nuclear materials and yes, it is bereft of the total funds necessary to secure all the material in question.  The political issue is the funding to support the War in Iraq, versus securing the materials.  The hand wringers documented by produce and writer Tom Selenski, have decided that the War on Terror -- specifically wasting money on Iraq in their questionable liberal eyes, is simply not acceptable while seconds go by with the former Soviets sleeping on the job with their nuclear material.  While the truth is that the Russians and former satellites of the Soviet Union might be lax, they are by no means stupid or totally inept. 

Intelligence reports are worrisome.  The black market in Russia seems to not only be alive and well, but thriving.  What better high value contraband than nuclear materials - either waste or fissile?  And what of China?  Might they also be a potential source for radioactive material?

Yet, the hand wringers will ignore rogue nations that would be happy to sell a nuclear weapon to the highest bidder.  Take for instance Iran or North Korea. Moving at a nice pace toward securing their own nuclear weapons while parts of the world watch and HOPE for the best, Iran will have their own weapon, and then begin exporting that technology just like their missile supplier North Korea.  Both pretty likely to begin this new illicit trade within the next two years.  If they haven't begun piecemeal exports already.

Why should a terrorist organization try to procure the means to build a weapon when they can simply buy one?  Again, the troubling thought occurs that perhaps the entire discussion is after the fact. 

 It is pretty clear that before (and perhaps for a short while after) Musarraf took firm control of Pakistan, that nation was quite happy to export WMD to their muslim friends in the Middle East and North Korea.  It could easily have been the case that the Khan organization let go more than just a few secrets to Iran and North Korea.  Mounting evidence indicates that Libya's nuclear program was taking advantage of the Pakistani nuclear team's export program.  What was to prevent them from also shipping out the necessary components with instruction on how to put it all back together again -- ready to go?  Nothing.  No U.N. organization and no intelligence organization in the world could stop that from happening.  It may very well have happened.  We will never know, even if a weapon goes off in some U.S. or European city.  Or more likely in Haifa, Israel.

Having said all that, many have raised the alarm over nuclear materials "lying around" under dismal security in the former Soviet Union. Unfortunately, those sounding the alarm have decided to mix politics with their cries and have damaged their cause beyond repair.  This is unfortunate and will in the end, only serve as a "told you so" some time in our future.  Also, while not beyond possibility, the building of a fissile weapon is perhaps not as big a concern as the weapon which is easier to build and has materials much easier to acquire.

The point is that the world has been asleep as far as terrorism goes, and the nuclear genie has already slipped out of the bottle.  To think otherwise is simply wishful thinking.  Well before 9/11, al-Qaeda was looking for the means to acquire a weapon, and long before that, Hezbollah.  Syria may have become the beneficiary of technology and technologists fleeing Iraq.  Blame that one on the U.S.?  Of course.  Leaving them in Iraq would have been better since the U.N. was doing such a bang up job of controlling Iraq.  The reality there is that sanctions were months from being pulled down, and Saddam would have restarted all of his programs immediately.  You can't tell that to the supporters of the "head-in-the-ground" crowd that spent decades believing Saddam's lies.

In any case, if you proceed from the logical conclusion that the materials don't need to be moved to the known Terrorists since they already have them, then the next step is to assume a weapon or two is ready to be assembled at its destination.  The real task then is two fold -- keep new materials from moving around -- on the off chance that the terrorists don't have enough or screw it up somehow -- and then perhaps most important, we can stop the devices from reaching their destinations.

Likely targets come to mind unbidden, and the number is frightening. Any major city in the U.S., Europe or several high value targets in Israel litter the potential target list.

If you want to spend money on something important, it would be securing against a terrorist moving the necessary components into place to explode a nuclear weapon.  How do you do that?


Delivery Systems
For a terrorist group, the chief problem once a weapon is obtained, is the delivery.  And fortunately, some of that process spills over into the terrorist actually getting their hands on the right material too.  For this discussion we will assume delivery to detonate mirrors delivery for possession. 

Typically, terrorists don't have access to bombers.  This is not that problematic, however.  Cargo aircraft are abundant, and in fact less secure than airlines (speculation).  However, you must get the weapon to the cargo aircraft.  In major transportation hub nations such as the U.S. and in Europe, getting a weapon close enough to a cargo aircraft to load it is problematic.  A small plane could be used, however, again, coming from outside the country is problematic.  Once in country, things are still pretty tough however it is easier to move cargo of an illicit nature than it is passengers (speculation).

The same goes for the other fine delivery vehicle, a container ship. Again for major target countries, the sourcing ports now have lots of added security and the containers themselves are under great scrutiny.  As are non containerized cargo shippers as well. However, there are some ports which do not have high security both inbound and outbound.  Unfortunately for the terrorist, these ports do not ship to the major countries without off shore inspection by customs.  Exceptions are slowly being eliminated as well. For instance, after the Bali bombings, Indonesian ports were the recipients of new security. After the tsunami, however, that security may be lax, and it is quite possible that a nuclear weapon could be smuggled into Indonesia and detonated.

Another ship to consider is the pleasure boat or small fishing vessel.  Again these are subject to entry problems, but as years of Cuban refugees have proven, they can reach the shore with some repeatability.  Europe has an even larger problem, not having mounted an anti-refugee program like the U.S.  In all small ships over 10 feet and under 50, the cargo will not escape attention, however, are also less subject to inspection or detection.

Another delivery system is the railroad.  Again, the terrorist must get the device close enough to clandestinely load it on the train.  Trains crossing national boundaries are subject to cargo inspections and it is likely that a weapon might set off a radiological alarm, either a technically based or animal based.

The same holds true for trucking.  Trucks are favored simply by their numbers.  It is easy to hide a nuclear weapon amongst the vast numbers of trucks found on the world's roads (especially in Europe and the U.S.).

Once a weapon is inside the target country, however, shipment to the destination city is trivial if not ridiculously easy.  Little scrutiny of cargo goes on other than roadway safety and weight inspections.  Terrorists could easily avoid detection by keeping under the problematic weights and simply using a reputable trucking firm with a false bill of lading.  Crossing state lines or nations within the EU for instance create some problems to be worked around (imagine the surprise of an agricultural insepector finding a dirty bomb while looking for illicit oranges crossing between states in the U.S.).



Sources of Weapons/Material

There are two major sources of nuclear material, both in terms of dirty bombs and fission weapons.

Nations

Of the designated terrorist supporting nations, the usual suspects are highly likely to also provide nuclear weapons.  The countries to be concerned with who would give or sell weapons (government involvement) are in order of likelihood, North Korea, Iran, Syria and Sudan. Sudan probably does not have a viable nuclear program, and Syria's program is most likely undergoing changes due to the importation of goods and knowledge workers from those who fled Iraq.  That leaves Iran and North Korea -- both programs well documented on MILNET (see the references in the Sources list below).  One other unknown is China.

Other, possibly unintentional sources or those where smuggling (crime related) has created the sourcing of nuclear materials are Russia, Pakistan, and India. 

Nuclear technology via plant operations lists other countries as well.  It includes Russian but also adds China, Pakistan, India, Germany, and France.

The U.S. provided Israel with nuclear technology in the 1960s so it does not stand alone as some paragon of nuclear non-proliferation except perhaps in the last two decades (since 1980).

The material in question is both nuclear material as well as the industrial components that go into a bomb.  Nuclear material is Uranium, Plutonium, Beryllium, Tritium and Lithium-Deutride. Industrial components are nuclear triggers, machined parts, and conventional shaped explosives.  Of all these materials, only Uranium and Plutonium are very hard to come by, and the nuclear triggers are extremely well watched, while not quite foolproof in terms of terrorists getting their hands on them.


Industry and other Sources

The Monterey Center for Non-Proliferation 6 published a very interesting report on the topic, a report that should be read by anyone concerned or interested in the sources of material for dirty bombs or fission bombs.  According to the report:
"Low-level waste may be a particularly attractive terrorist target; It is produced by many companies, universities, and hospitals, it is not always stored or shipped under tight security, and it is routinely shipped across the country.  Although labeled 'low-level', some of this waste has high levels of radioactivity and could potentially be used to make an effective device."

 - National Research Council, Nuclear and Radiological Threats, as cited by the report. 6
The report also makes it abundantly clear which radioactive isotopes are key targets for terrorists -- medium half-life isotopes.  Long half life are not dangerous enough to due the damage needed before cleanup (still terrifying however so we call this conclusion to question), and short half-life isotopes cannot be part of a dirty bomb assembly process -- they lose their dangerous attributes before the weapon can be fully assembled let alone delivered unless found, brought, and placed very quickly.  Not impossible, but much more difficult to manage.  Medium half-life isotopes are the solution and unfortunately, that is also the most abundant.  Nuclear plant rods supply both long and medium half-life products, as due many medical use products.

For dirty bombs there are two basic types of isotopes to be concerned with:



Note from the table, that Cobalt-60 and Iridium-192 are your "medium half-life" products.  Krypton-85 gas is pretty toxic as well and while dispersing a gas is difficult for a terrorist, it could be used inside a builiding's ventilation system.   We should also note that Cesium-137 and Strontium-90 are toxic, their effects (unless huge amounts are ingested) can be treated effectively.  Not that anyone would willingly get close to any of these substances.

Other unsealed types of isotopes are found in various types of insecure storage. For instance, companies manufacturing smoke detectors and other similar devices may store large amounts of Amercanium-241 (Am-241).  Strontium-90 (Sr-90) is widely used in older Russian light sources for lighthouses as well as RTG (Radio-isotope Thermoelectric Generators) power sources.

The following chart shows the severity of health risks in select isotopes of interest:



The report calls out the concern for unsecured and lost radioactive sources which already pose a danger, and consist of approximately 150 sources (in the U.S. -- Europe's 70 not counted) of the following:


Isotope
 Cis
Am-241
 11.2
Cs-137
 11.3
Ir-192
 7.0
Sr-90
 1.3


Radio-isotopes that can be used in dirty bombs are also, not surprisingly found in the nuclear fuel cycle, i.e. in nuclear reactors and their waste products.  The chart below summarizes these.




This information is perhaps a tenth of that contained in the report and serves to show how prolific the use of radioisotopes are and the numerous the sources.  It contains no less than six full pages of reactors that supply radio-isotopes or are used in the nuclear fuel cycle.  There is also a very interesting chart on the security of selected key isotopes at various types of facilities from reactors, hospitals, commercial concerns, and other such sources and users.



The report is both thorough and frightening. It is quite easy to see, after reading the report, that for the purposes of building a dirty bomb, only patience and collection overall several years will yield enough material, especially in the black market, to produce a dirty bomb.

And while a dirty bomb is far less dangerous than a high-order nuclear weapon such as a fission bomb, the terror and death will be no less significant for the terrorists purpose.



The Threat List

Below is a table of the U.S. recognized Terrorist Organizations with the last column commenting on that organizations willingness and capability of building a dirty bomb or fission bomb.

U.S.-Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations3

#
 Name and base of
operations		 Description Goals and targets Est.strength Nuclear
Intent
 Activities
1
 Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) a.k.a. Fatah; Iraq Transnational organization, composed of functional committees.  Found in 1974
 Targets U.S., UK, France, Israel, moderate Palestinians, the PLO, Arab countries 400 Possible, but low funding, group in disarray.  Regional targets only
 Attacks in 20 countries, killing or injuring 900. Leader Abu Nidal died in 2002
2
 Abu Sayyaf Group; Philippines, Malaysia Separatist group composed of several semiautonomous factions Found in 1991
 Aims to create Islamic state in Philippines; profit-driven terror 200-500 Low likelihood,
 low funding,
Focuses on ransom.
If the group had a weapon it would be used against regional targets only
 Kidnappings, bombings, assassinations, and extortion
3
 Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade; West Bank, Gaza Strip, Israel Small cells of Fatah-affiliated activists.  Founded in 2000
 Aims to drive out Israelis and to establish a Palestinian state Unknown Possible, but low funding.  If handed a weapon would use it, most likely to use against regional targets
 Shootings, suicide operations (first female suicide bombing)
4
 Ansar al-Islam (AI); Iraqi Kurds and Arabs Iraqi Kurds and Arabs.  Founded in 2001
 Aims to create an Islamic state in Iraq; allied with al-Qaeda 700–1,000 Possible, but low funding.  If handed a weapon would use it most likley to use against regional targets only
 Ambushes and attacks
5
 Armed Islamic Group (GIA); Algeria Islamic extremists.  Founded in 1992.
 Aims to replace Algerian regime with an Islamic state Less than 100 Possible, but low funding.  If handed a weapon would use it agaisnt local targets only
 Massacred thousands of civilians, targeted foreigners
6
 Asbat al-Ansar; Lebanon Sunni extremist group associated with Osama bin Laden. Founded in 1990s
 Aims to create Islamic state, opposes peace with Israel 300 Possible, but low funding.  If handed a weapon would use it on regional targets only
 Assassinations, bombings of Western targets, failed coup
7
 Aum Shinrikyo (Aum); Japan, Russia Cult established by Shoko Asahara.  Founded in 1987
 Claims U.S. will start WWIII with Japan, beginning Armageddon Less than 1,000 Possible, but low funding and not very likely.  If handed a weapon would use it.  Local targets only
 Chemical attacks on Tokyo subways, no recent activity
8
 Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA); Spain, France Established to create an independent Basque homeland.  Founded in 1959
 		Targets Spanish and French government interests, tourists Unknown Low likelihood, but might use a weapon if handed one, local targets but might export to neighboring countries in Europe
 Since 1960, more than 850 killed, hundreds injured
9
 Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA); Philippines CPP's military wing that aims to overthrow the government through guerrilla warfare.  Founded in 1969
 Targets Philippine security forces, politicians, judges, government informers, NPA rebels More than 10,000 Might use a weapon if handed one.  Local targets only
 Assassinations, murders, attacks on U.S. personnel and interests
10
 Contintuity Irish Republican Army, a.k.a. Irish Continuity Army Council (ICAC); Continuity Army Council (CAC) Splinter group from the IRA/RIRA.  Claimed responsibility for a number of attacks and attempted attacks in Northern Ireland.  Founded/came to prominence in 1996. Primarlily members became disaffected with the peace process and the IRA ceasefire. The CIRA has supporters in the Republic of Ireland, Belfast, Fermanagh / south Donegal area, and Derry / north Donegal area. There have been claims that the CIRA is, in effect, the military wing of Republican Sinn Féin (RSF) but this has been denied by RSF leaders. Targets British troops and those opposed to a separate Ireland Republic
 Unknown
 Possible if handed a weapon MIGHT use it. Local targets only
More likely to sell a stolen weapon		 Ignores cease-fire, has continued attacks.  Between July 13, 1996 and March 4, 2001, the group claimed responsiblity for 18 major attacks in Ireland and London, England.
11
 Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group); Egypt Egypt’s largest militant group now split into two factions, one calling for cease-fire.  Founded in 1973.
 Aims to replace Egypt's government with an Islamic state Unknown Possible, but low funding.  If handed a weapon would use it.  Local targets most likely but might export.
 1993 World Trade Center bombings, attacks on tourists
12
 HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement); West Bank, Gaza Strip, Israel Outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.  Founded in 1987
 Aims to replace Israel with Palestinian Islamic state using political and violent means Unknown Has the funding to acquire, might use against an Israeli city or smuggle into U.S. via borders or U.K. via ferry or cargo ship. 
Large-scale suicide bombings and attacks against Israelis and Palestinian collaborators
13
 Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM); Pakistan Islamic militant group aligned with the radical JUI-F faction. Founded in 1985
 Targets Indian troops, Kashmiri civilians, and Western interests 100s Possible, but low funding.  If handed a weapon would use it. Local targets only
 Linked to al-Qaeda, hijacked Indian airliner in 1999
14
 Hezbollah (Party of God); Lebanon, worldwide cells A radical Shi'ite group with aims for the creation of Iranian-style Islamic republic.  Founded in 1982
 Dedicated to eliminating Israel, is anti-U.S. and anti-Israel A few hundred Has the funding to acquire, might use against an Israeli city or smuggle into U.S. via borders or U.K. via ferry or cargo ship. Suicide bombings of U.S. Marine barracks (241 killed), hijacked 1985 TWA Flight 847
15
 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU); South Asia, Tajikistan, Iran Islamic militants opposed to Uzbekistani President Islom Karimov's secular regime.  Founded in 1991.
 Aims to remove Karimov, establish an Islamic state, and to fight anti-Islamic opponents Less than 700 Possible, but low funding.  If handed a weapon would use it. Local targets most likely but might export
 Car bombs, taking foreign hostages, most active in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan
16
 Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) (Army of Mohammed);
Pakistan		 Islamic extremist group formed after Masood Azhar's release from prison.  Founded in 2000
 Aims to unite Kashmir with Pakistan, targets Indian government and political leaders 100s Possible, but low funding.  If handed a weapon would use it.  Local targets only
 Murder of U.S. journalist, Indian Parliament bombing, anti-Christian attacks
17
 Jemaah Islamiya organization (JI); cells span Southeast Asia Southeast Asian network aims to create an idealized Islamic state.  Founded in 1990s
 Plotted against tourist spots, U.S., Israeli, British, and Australian diplomatic buildings Unknown Possible, but low funding.  If handed a weapon would use it.  Local targets most likely but might export.
 Bombings in Indonesia and Philippines, 2002 Bali bombings (202 killed, 300 wounded)
18
 Al-Jihad; Cairo, Egypt, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, UK Egyptian Islamic extremists, merged with al-Qaeda in 2001.  Founded in 1970s
 Aims to replace the Egyptian government with Islamic state, attack U.S., Israeli interests 100s Highly likely through al-Qaeda funding and contacts, would definitely acquire or build bomb and use it
 Attacks on Egyptian government personnel, assassinated Anwar Sadat
19
 Kahane Chai (Kach); Israel, West Bank Jewish extremist group aims to restore the biblical state of Israel.  Founded in 1994
 Organizes protests against the Israeli Government Unknown Unlikely due to  low funding. Ideology might also prevent its use.
 Threats made to Arabs, Palestinians, and Israeli officials
20
 Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) a.k.a. KADEK; Turkey, Europe, Middle East Marxist–Leninist insurgent group aims to create a democratic Kurdish state.  Founded in 1974
 Targets Turkish security forces, officials, and villagers who oppose organization 4,000–5,000 Possible, but low funding.  If handed a weapon MIGHT use it.  Local targets only
 Attacked diplomatic and commercial facilities, bombed tourist sites
21
 Lashkar-e- Tayyiba (LT) (Army of the Righteous); Pakistan Armed wing of a Pakistan-based Sunni anti-U.S. missionary group.  Founded in 1989
 Targets Indian troops and civilians in Kashmir 100s Possible, but low funding.  If handed a weapon MIGHT use it. Local targets only
 Attacks on border security forces and Indian Parliament
22
 Lashkar i Jhangvi; Pakistan, Afghanistan A Sunni sectarian radical group banned in Pakistan in 2001.  Founded in 1996.
 Anti-Shi'ite group aims to create a Muslim state in Pakistan. less than 100 Possible, but low funding.  If handed a weapon MIGHT use it. Local targets only
 Armed attacks, bombings, attempted assassinations
23
 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE); Sri Lanka Most powerful Tamil group in Sri Lanka aims to create a Tamil state.  Founded in 1976
 Targets key personnel, senior political and military leaders 8,000– 10,000 Possible, but low funding.  If handed a weapon MIGHT use it. Local targets only
 Assassinations, suicide bombers: “The Black Tigers”
24
 Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)
(Al-Jam'a al-Ismaliyyah al-Muqatilah bi-Libya)		 Declared the government of Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi un-Islamic and pledged to overthrow it. Some members maintain a strictly anti-Qadhafi focus and organize against Libyan Government interests, but others are aligned with Usama Bin Ladin’s al-Qaida organization or are active in the international mujahidin network.  Emerged from those who fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan.
 Claimed responsibility for a failed assassination attempt against Qadhafi in 1996 and engaged Libyan security forces in armed clashes during the mid-to-late 1990s. Continues to target Libyan interests and may engage in sporadic clashes with Libyan security forces. Unknown, but thought to be in the several hundred
 Possible, but low funding.  If handed a weapon MIGHT use it. Local targets only Assassination, bombings, gunfights with security forces in Libya 12
25
 Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK); Iraq Marxist–Islamic group expelled from Iran receiving Iraqi support.  Founded in 1960
 Largest armed Iranian opposition to the present government, advocates a secular Iranian regime 3,800 Possible, but low funding.  If handed a weapon MIGHT use it. Local targets only
More likely to sell a stolen weapon
Assassinations, terrorist bombings, foreign military- aided assaults, large-scale overseas attacks
26
 National Liberation Army (ELN); Colombia, Venezuela Marxist insurgent group inspired by Fidel Castro and Che Guevara.  Foudned in 1965
 Targets foreign employees from large corporations 3,000 Possible, but low funding.  If handed a weapon MIGHT use it. Local targets only, more likely to sell a stolen weapon
 Kidnapping, hijacking, bombing, and extortion
27
 Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ); Israel, West Bank, Gaza Strip Militant Palestinians committed to destroying Israel through holy war.  Founded in 1970s
 Targets Israeli military and civilians, opposes secularism Unknown Possible, but low funding.  If handed a weapon MIGHT use it. Local targets only
More likely to sell a stolen weapon
Suicide bombings, attacks on Israeli interests
28
 Palestine Liberation Front (PLF); Iraq Broke away from PFLP-GC and split into pro-PLO, –Syrian, and –Libyan factions.  Founded in 1970s
 Known for aerial attacks against Israel Unknown Possible if handed a weapon MIGHT use it. Local targets only
More likely to sell a stolen weapon
Attacked Italian ship Achille Lauro, murdered a U.S. citizen
29
 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP); Syria, Lebanon, Israel, West Bank, Gaza Strip Marxist-Leninist group that broke away from the Arab Nationalist Movement.  Founded in 1967
 Targets Israel's “illegal occupation” of Palestine and opposes negotiations with Israel Unknown Possible if handed a weapon MIGHT use it. Local targets only
More likely to sell a stolen weapon		 International terrorist acts in the 1970s, attacks against Israel and moderate Arab targets since 1978
30
 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command (PFLP-GC); Syria Split from the PFLP to focus on fighting, opposes Arafat's PLO.  Founded in 1968
 Attacks in Europe and the Middle East. Targets Israel, West Bank, and Gaza Strip 100s Receives funding in spurts, might be able to afford a weapn. Possible if handed a weapon MIGHT use it. Local targets only
More likely to sell a stolen weapon		 Unusual attacks: hot air balloons, hang gliders, Lebanese guerrilla operations
31
 Al-Qaeda; Afghanistan until 2001, Southeast Asia, Middle East, worldwide cells Osama bin Laden's network of Arabs who fought against the Soviet Union. Goal to establish a worldwide pan-Islamic Caliphate.  Founded in 1980s
 Targets “non-Islamic” regimes and U.S. citizens Seveeral
Thousands		 Intelligence indicates group has tried to acquire WMD and has the funding  Would target Egypt, Saudia Arabia, a new Iraqi government, Jordan, U.S., U.K., and many European cities.  If they had a weapon they would definitely use it.  May have already acquired some components.
 Bombings of embassies and USS Cole; September 11, 2001, U.S. attacks
32
 Real IRA; Northern Ireland, UK, Irish Republic Armed wing of the 32-County Sovereignty Movement unify Ireland. Founded in 1998
 Targets civilians, military, police, and Protestant communities 100–200 activists Possible if handed a weapon MIGHT use it. Local targets only
More likely to sell a stolen weapon		 Ignores cease-fire, Omagh bombing, more than 80 attacks since 1999
33
 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC); Colombia Oldest and most–capable Marxist insurgency with ties to narcotics trafficking.  Founded in 1964. Colombia says FARC documents indicate they may have bought and sold uranium  33
 Targets Colombian political, military, and economic interests, also foreign citizens 9,000–12,000 May have attempted to buy and sell uranium, indicating access.  Colombian officials cliam FARC may attetmp to build a RDW or "dirty bomb". Bombings, mortar attacks, kidnappings, extortion, guerrilla warfare, and drug trafficking
34
 Revolutionary Nuclei (formerly ELA); Athens, Greece Emerged from antiestablishment and anti-U.S./NATO/EU leftist groups.  Founded in 1995
 Targets U.S. and European interests and government buildings in Greece Believed small Possible if handed a weapon MIGHT use it. Local targets only
More likely to sell a stolen weapon		 Arson attacks, low-level bombings, usually striking in early-morning hours
35
 Revolutionary Organization 17 November; Athens, Greece Radical leftist group named for student uprising in 1973, founded in 1975
 Seeks removal of U.S. bases, Turkish military, and the severing of NATO and EU ties Believed small Possible if handed a weapon MIGHT use it. Local targets only
More likely to sell a stolen weapon		 Assassinations, bombings, improvised rocket attacks, supported by bank robberies
36
 Revolutionary People's Liberation Army/Front (DHKP-C); Turkey Marxist-Leninist group: “Party” refers to its political activities, “Front” refers to its militant operations.  Founded in 1978
 Anti-U.S., anti-NATO, and anti-Turkish establishment group Unknown Possible if handed a weapon MIGHT use it. Local targets only
More likely to sell a stolen weapon however have little opportunity
 Attacks on U.S. interests, suicide bombings
37
 Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC); Algeria Outgrowth of GIA and the most effective armed group in Algeria.  Founded in 1992
 Military and government targets, pledges to avoid civilians 100s Possible if handed a weapon MIGHT use it. Local targets only
More likely to sell a stolen weapon however have little opportunity
Attacks military, police, and government convoys
38
 Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL); Peru Based on Maoist teachings, aims to destroy Peruvian institutions.  Founded in 1960s
 Aims to build communist regime, targets political enemies 400–500 militants Possible if handed a weapon MIGHT use it. Local targets only
More likely to sell a stolen weapon.  Low opportunity to steal such a weapon, and most likely if they had one would use it locally
 30,000 dead, assassinations, bombings, villiage raids
39
 Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (QJBR) (al-Qaida in Iraq) (formerly Jama'at al-Tawhid wa'al-Jihad, JTJ, al-Zarqawi Network)
a.k.a. Monotheism and Jihad Group
Also known as the Al-Zarqawi Network
 Led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi [aka Abu Massad Al-Zakawi]. Al-Zarqawi is a Jordanian-born Sunni militant said to have links to Al-Qaeda.  Has allegiance to Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. and
has released a statement that they have officially joined the Al-Qaeda terrorist network, Al-Arabiyah television reported on 20 October 2004. Al-Jazeera broadcast a statement by the group identifying itself as Tanzim Qa'idat Al-Jihad in Bilad al-Rafidayn (Organization of Jihad's Base in the Country of the Two Rivers)
 He is wanted by the United States on suspicion on organizing terrorist attacks on U.S. troops in Iraq. Targets U.S. and Coalition forces in Iraq and most critically, anyone who supports them worldwide.  The group kills Iraqis wholesale. Formerly very active in Fallujah, Iraq, thought to have fled to Baghdad
 Unknown and depends on area within Iraq.
 Receives funding in spurts, might be able to afford a weapon. Possible if handed a weapon would definitely use it, most likely locally but might export depending upon opportunity to do so.

 15 attacks in a period in Iraq between  7/29/2004 and 9/14/2004, plus more since 10
40
 United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC); Colombia Umbrella organization that consolidates paramilitary groups.  Founded in 1997
 Targets “insurgents” from FARC and ELN 8,000–11,000 Possible if handed a weapon MIGHT use it. Local targets only
More likely to sell a stolen weapon.  Low opportunity to steal such a weapon, and most likely if they had one would use it locally
 Assassinations, guerrilla warfare, and drug trafficking
Source:  Primarily, U.S. Department of State, Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations 3 and links below 10-15
Nuclear Weapons Use Confidence

Color
Confidence Factor
Text
10%
Text
25%
Text
85%
Text
100%

From the chart, MILNET concludes that there are two very likely candidates for terrorist groups who have the funds, ideology, and desire to use nuclear weapons against countries across the globe, with Israel, the U.S. and the U.K. at the top of their lists.  Four would gladly use a nuclear weapon (dirty or fission) if they could afford to buy the components or were given, and/or had the opportunity to move the weapon into their target area.  Of the remaining 36, 1 would probably not use a nuclear weapon, four (Abu Sayaff for instance) has a very low probability, however if Al Qaeda, Iran, North Korea, or Syria were to give them a weapon all bets are off;  and the other 31 would probably use a nuclear weapon in their country or neighboring countries if they were given one.  Also we should note that those organizations that might sell a nuclear weapon if it fell into their hands would most likely sell it to the orange or red countries who are extremely anxious to get their hands on a nuclear weapon.

As the color legend shows, the confidence for use of the nuclear weapon by some terrorist group is 100%.  For instance Al-Qaeda or its very close networked organizations would clearly use a weapon if they had one, AND they have the funds or can get the funds.  The only thing stopping them at present are the components, ready to assemble bomb or one they can disassemble to ship and reassemble or place in its delivery vehicle.

Note also that Chechen terrorist groups are not shown in the chart above, and they too, if they could lay their hands on a weapon would certainly use it against Moscow.



What To Do

Securing the Ports and Borders

Number one:  secure all major ports.  In Europe, U.S. and Israel.  All it takes is any old ship.  ANY!  The hold of a large fishing vessel will do the trick.  A purchased Russian or Japanese trawler will do the trick.  If a boatload of Cubans can be landed on an island within nuclear striking distance of the U.S. coast, then it is pretty clear that a fishing vessel is just about the right size to escape the attention of the U.S. Coast Guard, Department of Defense and any other would be protectors.  Not that it is the first time, but the incursions into our safety zone are still so frequent as to defy logic.  Sure it's a big coastline. But that is the job, is it not?

Number Two:  For that matter, a large van can do the trick quite well.  These seem to come across the Mexican border filled with illegal aliens on a monthly basis -- how else do 30 million illegals find refuge in this country?  They didn't all walk across the border.

If we want to be serious about stopping that nuclear weapon from crossing into the U.S. than we have to do something about our borders.  A few hundred new border patrol -- even a few thousand is not going to get the job done.  We need to secure - for real - the borders of this nation.


Secure Importation Into This Country

One of the biggest jokes that no one is laughing at is the effort to generate background checks on Hazardous Material truck drivers.  As is if a terrorist group is going to announce their intention by hijacking a truck full of hazardous materials or put a HazMat sign on the outside of THEIR truck. Oh sure its possible. 

However, states along the Mexican border are talking about issuing driver's licenses to illegals and allowing Mexican trucks onto our freeways unchecked.  Talk about ludicrous!  All a terrorist need do is get their weapon components into three cities in Mexico along the U.S. border, and then drive them over!  There is no way to inspect all trucks coming across unless we lock down the border, and certainly we have a porous border already.  Smuggling a nuclear weapon into the United States would be child's play.  We are surprised some enterprising reporter has not already placed a box in a Mexican truck that reads "THIS IS A NUKE" and driven it to Seattle.

The recent program to inspect and seal containers at their ports of departure seems a good idea, but does beg the question, how do you ensure that some one is not bribed on the other end.  That's how smuggling works, you know, and a smart terrorist would disguise his cargo as something other than a crate marked "THIS IS A NUKE!".  All it takes is one such "OOPS" and San Diego, New York, Atlanta, or Galveston receives a present they will never forget.



Destroy Terrorism and the Rogue Nations That House, Feed, and Supply Them

Most Americans support the President's efforts at fighting the War on Terrorism.  MILNET, however, believes we need to both be tougher, and more more ruthless.  This is a war for survival.  Not a game where moving pieces around on the board will get us where we need to go.  Those intent upon securing constitutional rights for terrorists caught in the act are traitors to the civilized world. 

Rogue nations present a clear and present danger to the World -- not just the U.S., but the world.  But if the rest of the world is so stupid as to not recognize it, then fine, we act on our own nickel. Nothing new in that. 

There is a list of nations who support terrorism  There is a list of nations developing nuclear weapons AND who are quite likely to sell or even give them to terrorists.  Those nations cannot exist in this decade.  Give them 30 days to swear off their programs, expel terrorists and show genuine regime change.  Or take them out. Waiting will only allow them to get stronger, and perhaps if they don't already have their weapons of mass destruction, give them time to complete their preparations and to begin selling.



Conclusion

While there is lots of concern in all areas of radioactive materials, those who focus on fissile material may be drawing our attention from the larger problem. On the other hand, it is clear that maybe, due to the enormous complexity and sheer size of the problem relating to non-fissile radioactive material, that any funds spent in securing non-fissile material is a wasted effort or a waste of money.

As our analysis shows, and as the data from a large number of sources all conclude, with the availability of thousands of sources of the material necessary for a dirty bomb, it is only a matter of time before we witness the first such weapon used by a terrorist organization.

The use of a fission weapon by terrorists is much less likely, but certainly not out of the realm of possibility. MILNET concludes that the strategy for a smart terrorist organization like Al Qaeda appears to be, begin a parallel effort to create and deliver a dirty bomb while slowly pulling together the components for a fission weapon, over decades if necessary.  From current public evidence, Al Qaeda could very well have begun that parallel effort years ago.


Updates:

3/04/2008:  Colombian officials claimed that FARC rebels have bought and sold uranium, indicating a possible interest in themselves putting together a radiological weapon, the so called "dirty bomb".  The statements by Vice President of Colombia were based on documents on computesr seized in attacks on rebel hideouts.  Santos said the discovery demonstrates that the economic power of drug trafficking is enabling terrorist groups "to constitute a serious threat not just to our country but to the entire Andean and Latin American region." 33

11/28/2007:  An Associated Press report 32 (covered sparsely by the major media and blogs) indicates that 3 persons were arreested (two in Slovakia and 1 in Hungary) for attempting to sell 2.2 pounds of enriched uranium.  The event validates fears that former Soviet nations are the breeding ground for nuclear smugglers and punctuates fears that terrorists will be able to get their hands on nuclear materials necessary to build a full out nuclear weapon.  The arrests also raise fears that officials may have missed other attempts and that the material many nations say cannot be stolen -- is being stolen.

2/10/2005:  A report released by the Congressional Reporting Service on February 10, 2005 29 stated 
"Terrorists or rogue nations might acquire a nuclear weapon in several ways.  The nations of greatest concern as potential sources of weapons or fissile materials are widely thought to be Russia and Pakistan.  Russia has many tactical nuclear weapons, which tend to be lower in yield but more dispersed and apparently less secure than strategic weapons.  It also has much highly enriched uranium (HEU) and weapons-grade plutonium, some said to have inadequate security.  Many experts believe that technically sophisticated terrorists could, without state support, fabricate a nuclear bomb from HEU; opinion is divided on whether terrorists could make a bomb using plutonium.  The fear regarding Pakistan is that some members of the armed forces might covertly give a weapon to terrorists or that, if President Musharraf were overthrown, an Islamic fundamentalist government or state of chaos in Pakistan might enable terrorists to obtain a weapon.  Terrorists might also obtain HEU from the more than 130 research reactors worldwide that use HEU as fuel."  29


Sources:
  1. Could  Terrorists Make a Nuclear Bomb,  Terrorism Q & A , Council on Foreign Relations, undated
  2. Bin Laden Expert Steps Forward, 60 Minutes Interview with Michael Scheuer, CBS, 11/14/2004
  3. Foreign Terrorist Organizations, Office of Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, December 29, 2004
  4. Designation Chart (PDF 81KB), Office of Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, December 29, 2004
  5. Dirty Bombs: The Threat Revisited, Peter D. Zimmerman and Cheryl Loeb, Defense Horizons, January 2004
  6. Commercial Radioactive Sources: Surveying the Security Risks, Monterey Center for Non-proliferation,
  7. Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: A Progress Update, (PDF 549KB),  Matthew Bunn, October 2003
  8. Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, NTI, 2003
  9. Bin Laden's New Message, Timothy Burger, Time Magazine, 2/27/2004
  10. MIPT Terrorism Database, Incidents, dating up to 1/14/2005 (as of 2/7/2005)
  11. Jama'at al-Tawhid wa'al-Jihad, Global Security.org, undated
  12. Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, MetaReligion Terrorist Profiles, undated
  13. Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, FAS Terrroist Profiles, undated
  14. Continuity Irish Republican Army, FAS Terrorist Profiles, undated
  15. Terrorist Profiles for Oraganizations of Promience in the "Troubles", CAIN Web Service,  undated
  16. Foreign Terrorist Profiles, MILNET, undated
  17. The Iranian Nuclear Chronology, MILNET, 7/28/2004
  18. Iran Nuclear Goals Seem Clear (Opinion), MILNET,  6/2004
  19. MILNET Briefing: Chronology of North Korean Nuclear Events,  MILNET, 9/27/2004
  20. North Korean Nuclear Blackmail:  Threatening Again (Opinion), MILNET, 9/28/2004
  21. Nuclear Terrorism:  Is America Safer, Tom Selenski, December 2004 (Link TV)
  22. The Nuclear Iceberg, Tom Selenski, March 2003 (Link TV)
  23. Atomic haul raises fears of Bin Laden terror bomb, New Delhi (archived at WISE), April, 2002
  24. Radiation Weapon Is Among Most Discomfiting of Terror Threats, Miles Benson, Newshouse News Service, October, 2001
  25. Nuclear Threat Reduction Measures for Pakistan and India, Sharon Squassoni, CRS, 2/17/2005
  26. Conflict in the 21st Century:  Counterstrategies for the WMD Terrorist, Lt. Col. Linda E. Torrens, USAF Air War College paper, April 1999
  27. Military Role in Countering Terrorist Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Lt.Col. Lansing E. Dickinson, USAF Air War College paper, April 1999
  28. Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, Global Security, Union of Concerned Scientists, 5/26/2004
  29. Nuclear Terrorism:  A Brief Review of Threats and Response (PDF 100KB), Jonathan Medalia, 2/10/2005
  30. Nuclear Terrorism, About.com
  31. Nuclear Terrorism - - United States Steps to Counter Nuclear Terrorism's Threat, About.com
  32. Police Arrest 3 in Slovakia in Nuclear Material Smuggling Attempt, A.P., Fox News, 11/28/2007
  33. Colombia:  Rebels considering dirty bombs, A.P., Yahoo News, 3/4/2008
  34. Country Reports on Terrorism, The Global Challenge of WMD Terror, U.S. Department of State, April 30, 2008 (MILNET Mirror)


© Copyright 2005, Michael G. Crawford for MILNET