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Version 2.24: 20 February 1999 (Updated 10/19/2006 by MILNET)
In the game of comparing nuclear arsenal sizes a number of different methods of measurement can be used. The most popular are the number of warheads, and the total megatonnage of the arsenal. Number of warheads is meaningful when each warhead is large enough to destroy the target it is used against. Targets large enough to require many warheads are relatively few in number, even if the warheads are small (as nuclear weapons go), so warhead number is a fairly good indicator of the effective arsenal size. Megatonnage provides a more direct measure of the gross destructive power of the arsenal, and is especially important for estimating long range effects (like fallout). Since the destructive potential of a nuclear weapon is not necessarily proportional to its size, an alternative to total megatonnage has been proposed called equivalent megatonnage. The equivalent megatonnage of a warhead is its yield in megatons raised to the two-thirds power: Y^(2/3). This metric assumes that blast is the important destructive effect, as it is against most structures. The area affected by the thermal flash is directly proportional to size however, and this casualty producing effect thus dominates in large weapons.
An additional complication in discussing arsenal sizes with respect to the United States and Russia is that these nations are currently "building down" from their bloated Cold War arsenals. Both nations thus have large numbers of superfluous weapons that have yet to be dismantled, but are not part of their official arsenals. Information about these inventories of these retired weapons are available for the U.S., but is spotty at best for Russia. But these weapons do still exist and could be put back into service on short notice if the decision to do so were made. Even after dismantlement, the expensive nuclear materials will still exist, often in the form of fabricated weapons components, and manufacturing new weapons from them could be undertaken relatively rapidly.
7.2.1 United States of America
On 1 October 1998 a new SIOP (Single Integrated Operational Plan), known as SIOP-99 went into effect. The SIOP is the comprehensive policy guidance for employing nuclear weapons. SIOP-99 was the first new operational plan since SIOP-81 was enacted at the beginning of the Reagan Era, and was drafted in response to Presidential Decision Directive 60, signed by President Clinton in November 1997.
Since the invention of nuclear weapons, the U.S. has built about 70,000 warheads, and dismantled about 58,000 of them with most of the nuclear materials being recycled into new weapons. The U.S. currently has about 12,500 weapons in existence, but only 8700 (approx.) are in active service. The remaining 3800 or so are retired weapons either awaiting dismantlement, making up part of the inactive reserve, or both. Some counts give somewhat lower numbers for operational weapons (e.g. 7200), but the weapons making up this differential are simply "in storage", have not been transferred to reserve status, and are in full operational condition. At its numeric peak in 1967, the U.S. arsenal had some 32,500 warheads.
The U.S. has produced no new nuclear warheads in the past eight years (the last fissile bomb core was fabricated in December 1989, the last weapon was assembled 31 July 1990). The U.S. is currently dismantling a large part of its existing nuclear arsenal, and has no plans at present for building any new nuclear weapons, or any new strategic delivery systems. Existing warheads have been modified however, creating for example the B61 Mod-11 tactical bomb, and remanufacturing of existing warheads to extend their service life is expected. If START II is implemented, by 2007 the U.S. plans to have about 4450 warheads in service (the last time there were fewer than this was in 1957 when 5828 warheads existed) with a combined hedge stockpile and inactive reserve of an additional 5000 warheads. The hedge stockpile will contain fully operational weapons that are kept in storage away from their delivery systems (so that they are not immediately available), there are currently no weapons assigned to this category. The inactive reserve contains weapons that are intact but not in operational condition. Extensive work may be required to return an inactive weapon to service (e.g. expansion of tritium production facilities, followed by stockpiling of additional tritium; modification of inactive warheads to mate with current delivery systems, etc.). 350 W-84 warheads are currently assigned to the inactive reserve.
On 1 March 1995, President Clinton declared 212.5 tonnes of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium to be excess to national security needs. Since that time additional information about the amount, locations, and forms of this material has been released. The excess plutonium (38.2 tonnes) is stored at 10 locations in Washington, Idaho, Colorado, New Mexico (two locations), Texas, Ohio, New York, Tennessee and South Carolina. The HEU (174.3 tonnes) is stored at six locations in Washington, Idaho, Colorado, New Mexico, Texas and South Carolina. It is expected that the HEU will be blended with natural uranium to produce some 7000 tonnes of civilian power plant fuel over 8-10 years. About 10 tonnes of HEU has already been placed under international safeguards at the Oak Ridge Y-12 site.
The excess HEU consists of 33 tonnes of >92% enrichment material (originally used or intended for weapon primary cores), and 142 tonnes of 20-92% enrichment material (much of it used or intended for thermonuclear secondaries). No HEU for weapons use has been produced since 1964, and production of HEU for use in naval reactors ended in 1991 with future needs to be met from the stockpile.
On 6 February 1996 U.S. Dept. of Energy declassified significant additional information about plutonium stocks and their location. It was disclosed that since 1944 the U.S. produced or acquired 111.4 tonnes of plutonium, principally for weapons programs. 93.5% was produced in government reactors, 5% was imported from 14 countries and 1.5% arose from commercial reactors.
89.3% of the 111.4 tonnes produced or acquired remains in the DOE/Department of Defense inventory (99.5 tonnes). The balance consists of plutonium used in the Nagasaki bomb and in weapons tests (3.4 tonnes, 3.1%), waste (3.1%), inventory differences (2.5%), fission and transmutation (1.1%), transfer to foreign countries (0.6%), decay (0.4%) and distribution to the civilian nuclear industry (0.1%).
Of the 99.5 tonnes in current inventory, 85 tonnes is weapons-grade plutonium (less than 7% Pu-240), 13.2 tonnes is "fuel-grade" (7-19% Pu-240) and 1.3 tonnes is reactor-grade (over 19% Pu-240) material. 38.2 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium was declared excess inventory, and will be disposed of. The remaining 46.8 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium includes 32 tonnes of plutonium contained in weapons still in the U.S. stockpile, and 5000 pits from disassembled weapons as part of a strategic reserve. Of the excess inventory: 55.8% (26.1 tonnes) is located Pantex - almost all in the form of fabricated weapon pits; 31.2% is located at Rocky Flats, and is thus inaccessible for weapons use at present since the facility has been shut down; most of the remaining 13% is distributed between Hanford, Los Alamos, and Savannah River.
A total of 90.5 tonnes of weapon grade plutonium was produced by the U.S. 54.5 tonnes of this was produced at Hanford, 36 tonnes was produced at Savannah River.
Three countries provided the bulk of the foreign-derived material: United Kingdom (5,384 kilograms), Canada (254.5 kg) and Taiwan (79.1 kg). 749 kilograms of plutonium that was transferred to 39 foreign countries between 1959 and 1991 under the U.S. "Atoms for Peace" program. The plutonium was used for a variety of civilian purposes, primarily power reactor development under International Atomic Energy Agency supervision.
The strategic reserve also contains thermonuclear secondary stages from disassembled weapons, in addition to the 5000 pits. These secondaries contain enriched uranium (in the sparkplug and fissile tamper) and lithium-6 deuteride. When weapons are disassembled at Pantex the secondaries are shipped to Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee, where the Y-12 plant that manufactured them is located. Some of the secondaries are dismantled, but others are retained as part of the strategicv reserve. The number retained for this purpose is not known, but may perhaps match the number of pits in the reserve.
Despite the halt in weapons manufacture and testing, and the draw down in weapon stockpiles, the U.S. has expressed no interest in abandoning nuclear weapons (and netiher has any of the other nuclear weapons states). To maintain the existing weapon stockpile, and an infrastructure capable of weapon development, production and testing, an ambitious research and construction program has been developed. This program maintains the level of funds devoted to the nuclear weapons related programs at the DOE at about the same level as during the Cold War. The content of this program has been summarized by the DOE as follows:
Under this program the national weapons laboratories are continuing to devise new weapon designs and modifications. Los Alamos is developing a replacement warhead for Trident II Mk5 reentry vehicle. Lawrence Livermore is studying the reuse of old weapons pits in new weapon designs. Both labs are working on adding state-of-the-art safety features to some weapons that now lack them.
7.2.1.1 Current Nuclear Forces
The U.S. is currently
wrapping up an interim consolidation of its strategic forces, a process
set in motion by the unilateral demobilization of thousands of nuclear
weapons by Pres. Bush on 27 Sept. 1991. A planned force reduction
envisioned by the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) to complying with
the provisions of the START II treaty, originally to be completed by 5
December 2001 and then extended by Helsinki agreement until the end of
2007, is now on hold indefinitely. As of Feb. 1999 START II has still
not been ratified by the Russian Duma and congressional legislation
prohibits complying with the START II prescribed force levels until
this occurs. If ratification by the Duma occurs within the next few
years, meeting the 2007 date will present no difficulty. The U.S.
military is on record favoring the introduction of further force
reductions -- particularly the planned decommissioning of four
submarines -- to save costs regardless of Duma action.
In any case the START I and START II treaties, like the SALT treaties before them, use strategic delivery vehicles and delivery vehicle loadings as the unit of accountability. This practice was originally instituted due to mutual suspicion and secrecy during the Cold War since delivery vehicles could be counted by satellite, and their configurations confirmed by occasional surprise examination. Nuclear weapons (warheads) per se were not counted. This remains true under START I and II, the limits set are calculated in terms of agreed upon counting rules for delivery vehicles and loadings. Thus there are no restrictions placed on the number of actual nuclear weapons, operational or otherwise, that can be stockpiled by either power, and no restrictions on many types of tactical nuclear warheads. Accordingly the 1994 NPR specified that the U.S. will actually maintain an intact stockpile of some 10,500 weapons, known as the Enduring Stockpile, in various stages of readiness even if and when START II goes into full effect. This is an inventory some four times the officially calculated 2000-2500 deployed strategic warhead limit for START II (for START I the level is 3500). Until such time as other treaties are concluded, or a future posture review makes a unilateral revision, this stockpile level will be maintained indefinitely.
There are currently nine warhead types in the Enduring Stockpile. Each of the two national weapons labs is responsible for the stewardship of the warhead types that they developed. Los Alamos National Laboratory is responsible for five warheads - the B61, W76, W78, W80, and W88. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is responsible for four - the W62, W84, W87, and B83.
ICBMs
The planned START II deactivation of the 50 Peacekeeper missiles is now on hold. Under START II the US intends to rely solely on the Minuteman III as a land-based ICBM, and programs to implement this contingency are continuing. The MM III force is now based at Malmstrom AFB, Montana (200 missiles in the 10th, 12th, 490th, and 564th missile squadrons of the 341st Space Wing); Minot AFB, North Dakota (150 missiles in the 740th, 741st, and 742nd missile squadrons of the 91st Space Wing); and F.E. Warren AFB, Wyoming (150 missiles in the 319th, 320th, and 321st missile squadrons of the 90th Space Wing). Warren also hosts the sole Peacekeeper squadron (50 missiles, of the 400th missile squadron also of the 90th Space Wing). The redeployment of MM III missiles from Grand Forks AFB in North Dakota was completed 3 June 1998. Inactivated silos have been destroyed by explosive demolition as required by START I at MM III bases that were previously closed. On 13 September 1996 the 149th former silo was blown up at Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota; the 150th and last silo at Ellsworth has been nominated as a National Historic Landmark. In December 1997 the silo demolition program was completed at Whiteman AFB, Missouri (still home to some 550 strategic bombs). The fate of the silos at Grand Forks are currently being debated, it has been proposed that some them could used by a National Missile Defense (NMD) system. If the START II treaty goes into force, the MM III force will be downloaded to one warhead each.
The responsibility for maintaining the ICBM force has been contracted out now, to TRW Inc., for a possible 15 year term running through 2012 at a cost of $3.4 billion (less than what the Air Force expected to spend). TRW is also managing the three-part upgrade program for the MM III force. Since the average age of the MM III inventory is already approaching 25 years (last one assembled 11/30/78), a U.S.$5.2 billion program is refurbishing them and extend their life to 2020. The first part of the program has already been completed, in which the MM III launch control centers (LCCs) were upgraded with Rapid Execution and Combat Targeting (REACT) consoles developed for the MX Peacekeeper program. The second part of the program involves upgrading the electronics and guidance system for the Minuteman. Between 1998 and 2002 a total of 652 new guidance units will be produced for the MM III fleet. These guidance units are the same Advanced Inertial Reference System (AIRS) developed for the Peacekeeper and will enhance MM III accuracy to a comparable or better CEP of 100 m. The third part of the program will remanufacture the solid fuel boosters including repouring the solid propellant.
SLBMs
The Ohio class SSBNs are the only ballistic missile submarines still in the U.S. arsenal, all subs belonging to older classes have been decommissioned or converted to other uses. The first Ohio class submarine, the Ohio (SSBN 726) was launched 7 April 1979 and commissioned 11 November 1981. All of the 18 planned boats have now been commissioned. The final boat, the Louisiana (SSBN 743), was commissioned on 6 September 1997. The first 8 Ohio class subs were equipped with the Trident I missile. Starting with the 9th boat, the Tennessee, commissioned in March 1990, subsequent subs have been equipped with the D-5 Trident (Trident II). The Ohio fleet is based at Bangor, Washington (Submarine Group 9, consisting of a single squadron of 8 boats) and Kings Bay, Georgia (Submarine Group 10, consisting of a squadrons No. 16 and 20 each with 5 boats). Currently only Kings Bay supports the Trident II, which reached its full strength of 10 boats with the Louisiana.
Under START II and the NPR the oldest 4 subs would be retired for a fleet of 14, the remaining 4 Trident I boats will be converted to use the Trident II, allowing the Trident I missile to be retired. The first submarine to be retrofitted with the Trident II was the Alaska (SSBN 732) in 1998. The contract for the second upgrade, the U.S.S. Nevada (SSBN 733), of $62.8 million was awarded in January 1999. The retrofit program is to be completed in FY 2005. Bangor is now being equipped to support the Trident II, eventually both bases will support 7 boats each. Trident II procurement continues, now the only U.S. strategic missile production program (five were purchased in the FY99 budget).
Due to the failure of the Russian Duma to ratify START II, the decommissioning of the four oldest Trident II subs had been in doubt. On 5 January 1999 Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. J.L. Johnson, testified to congress that the costs of keeping them is service past their planned decommissioning dates is prohibitive due to the need for costly refueling, remarks later echoed by Secretary of Defense Cohen. It thus now appears that these subs will be decommissioned starting in 2002 regardless of the status of START II.
Under Start I, the Trident II is limited to 8 warheads (its design capability is 14 or more). This lower loading extends its range to over 11000 km. START II will lower the loading to five each, further extending the range. The extended timetable for START II agreed to at Helsinki would require that there be no more than 2160 SLBM warheads (down from the current 3456), or five per missile for a fleet of 18, by the end of 2004, and no more than 1750 by the end of 2007. The patrol rate (proportion of fleet on patrol at any time) is little changed from the Cold War -- 9 or 10 boats are on patrol at any time. Usually four boats are on "hard alert", that is in their patrol area and within range of all their targets. The other boats are on "modified alert" which means in transit, going to or returning from patrol, and are available for combat although with poorer target coverage. The U.S. Navy disclosed early in 1998 that the actual patrol loading is an average of 5 warheads per missile (thus 480 warheads are kept on hard alert), perhaps for the range advantage provided.
Bombers
The B-1B Lancer has been converted to a conventional bombing role and by the end of 1997 had been phased out as part of the U.S. strategic nuclear forces. They can still carry nuclear weapons (both bombs and crusie missiles) however and can be quickly returned to strategic nuclear duty. Of the original 100 B-1Bs 5 have crashed, leaving a force of 95.
The B-52 Stratofortress force is has been scaled back to a total fleet of 93 planes, all of them B-52Hs (out of an original 104 H models). Despite its age (the last was delivered in October 1962) the B-52H airframe is estimated to be good for service at least to 2030 (this is 83 years after the B-52 program's inception!). Plans for retrofits and upgrades (including reengining) of the B-52H are underway. The B-52H force is based at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana and Minot AFB, North Dakota. Barksdale AFB supports the 11th, 20th, and 96th Bomb Squadrons of the 2nd Bomb Wing with a total of 58 B-52Hs. Minot AFB hosts 5th Bomb Wing with 35 planes, two test aircraft are kept at Edwards AFB, California. With the transfer of the B-1B to conventional duty the B-52H is now the only nuclear cruise missile carrying aircraft.
The Northrop Grumman B-2A Spirit continues to slowly enter service, with some delivered aircraft being sent back for upgrades to the current Block 30 standard as deployment proceeds. The 21st and last new production plane was delivered in January 1998. All 21 planes will be converted to the Block 30 standard operational configuration when full deployment is complete in 2000. At the end of 1998 a total of 19 planes were operational. The Block 30 modification provides the B-2 with the ability to carry all types of strategic nuclear bombs (i.e. the B61-7, B61-11, B83, and B83-1 bombs) and a variety of conventional bombs (including the Mk 84), missiles, and other munitions. The ACM and ALCM cruise missiles are not supported however. The first operational B-2 was delivered to the 509th Bombardment Wing (the same unit that flew the atomic bombing missions against Japan in WWII) at Whiteman AFB, Missouri 17 December 1993. The 509th is composed of the 393rd and 325th Bomb Squadrons. The first full squadron (the 393rd) did not become became operational until 1 April 1997. The 325th became operational on 8 January 1998. In March 1998 the B-2s participated in their first major exercise when they deployed to Andersen AFB, Guam for 10 days.
DELIVERY SYSTEMS ENTERED RANGE PAYLOAD CEP WARHEAD NUMBER
SERVICE (km) (kg) (m) AND TYPE
ICBM
LGM-30G Minuteman III Mk 12 1970 13000 1150 300 3 x W62
Mk 12A 1979 13000 1150 200 3 x W78
LGM-118A Peacekeeper (MX) 1986 13000 3950 100 10 x W87-0
SLBM/SUBMARINE
UGM-96A Trident I C4 1979 7000+ 1500 500 8 x W76
UGM-133A Trident II D5 Mk-4 1990 7-11000 2800 8 x W76
Mk-5 1992 7.4-11000 2800 100 8 x W88
Ohio Class Submarine 1981 24 x Trident I/II
AIRCRAFT
B-52H Stratofortress 1961 11-14000 25000 10 20 x ALCM/ACM/
100 B61/83 bombs
B-1B Lancer* 1986 11000 10 20 x ALCM/ACM/
100 B61/83 bombs
B-2A Spirit 1994 11000+ 20000 100 16 x B61/83 bombs
CRUISE MISSILES
AGM-86B ALCM 1981 2500 110 10 1 x W80-1
AGM-129 ACM 110 10 1 x W80-1
*No longer deployed in the strategic nuclear role, but can be reactivated.
U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES: DECEMBER 1998
WEAPON
DESIGNATIONS LAUNCHER WARHEAD LOADING WARHEAD TOT. YIELD
NUMBER NUMBER x Mt NUMBER Mt Equiv Mt
ICBM
Minuteman III Mk 12 200 3 x 0.17 600 102 184
Mk 12A 300 3 x 0.335 900 327 470
Peacekeeper (MX) 50 10 x 0.30 500 150 224
SLBM/SUBMARINE
Trident I C4 192 8 x 0.10 1536 154 331
Trident II D5 Mk-4 192 8 x 0.10 1536 134 290
Mk-5 48 8 x 0.475 384 182 234
Ohio Class Submarine (18) 24 x Trident I/II
AIRCRAFT
Active/Total
B-52H 44/93 20 x 0.15/0.3/1.2
B-52H and B-2A force combined: 1750 959 1209
B-2A Spirit 19/21 16 x 0.30/1.20
GRAND TOTAL 1085 (active) 7206 2008 2942
U.S. OPERATIONAL STOCKPILE: JULY 1998
This stockpile includes all weapons actually deployed on delivery vehicles, all weapons that are certified and kept ready for use, and a modest set of certified spares that are used to replace ready-for-use weapons when these are taken off duty for inspection or maintenance.
As of July 1998, the active U.S. stockpile consists of the following weapons:
WARHEAD/WEAPON FIRST YIELD (kt) USER NUMBER TOTAL YIELD (MAX)
PRODUCED Mt Equiv. Mt
STRATEGIC WEAPONS
B61-7 Bomb 10/66 0.3 to 340 AF 610* 207 297
B61-11 Bomb 1/96 0.3 to 340 AF 50 17 24
B83/B83-1 Bomb 6/83 low to 1200 AF 600** 720 678
W76 for Trident I C4 6/78 100 Navy 3200 320 689
W88 for Trident II D5 9/88 475 Navy 400 190 244
W62 for Minuteman III 3/70 170 AF 610 104 187
W78 for Minuteman III 8/79 335 AF 915 308 441
W87-0 for Peacekeeper 4/86 300 AF 525 158 235
W80-1 for ALCM 12/81 5 to 150 AF 400 60 113
W80-1 for ACM ?/90 5 to 150 AF 400 60 113
NON-STRATEGIC WEAPONS
B61-3/4/10 Tactical Bomb 3/75 0.3 to 170 AF/NATO 750 128 230
W80-0 for SLCM*** 12/83 5 to 150 Navy 320 48 90
GRAND TOTAL 8780 2320 3341
* 310 of these are in storage.
** 120 of these are in storage.
*** All are stored ashore.
The Hedge and Reliability Replacement Stockpiles
Any
functional nuclear weapon that is not in active service is available
for use in principle. Most or all of the dwindling backlog weapons now
awaiting dismantlement (about 1500 in mid-1998) are probably functional
so any of them could be reactivated on short notice. There are two
defined classes of warheads that are not on active duty, but will be
retained indefinitely as part of the U.S. Enduring Stockpile - the
hedge stockpile, and the reliability replacement stockpile. As weapons
are taken off operational status over the next several years, they will
be placed in one of these two stockpiles instead of being dismantled.
Warhead Retirements
At the end of 1990 the U.S. held some 21,000 operational warheads, plus another 750 retired warheads that were awaiting dismantlement (due to the manufacture of new weapons in the 80s, relatively little effort had been spent on dismantling old ones). In 1990 weapon manufacture ceased, a change that was not entirely intentional but was forced upon the DOE by safety problems at its Rocky Flats and Savannah River plants. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and Pres. Bush's decision to begin reducing U.S. nuclear forces in September 1991, the whole system was put into reverse and reduction and dismantlement became the primary activity. Since that time some 10,500 warheads have been dismantled, and another 1,500 await dismantlement (as of mid-1998) -- a process to be completed by September 2002. As of mid-year 1998 there were approximately 1500 weapons awaiting dismantlement of three types -- the W56 (Minuteman II), the W69 (SRAM) and the W79 (203mm [8 inch] artillery shell). Most of the weapons have been dismantled at the Pantex Plant, some that contained HEU as the sole fissile material were dismantled at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant.
Pantex Weapon Dismantlements
FISCAL YEAR NUMBER OF WEAPONS
1 Oct to 30 Sept
1990 1151
1991 1595
1992 1303 (Y-12 dismantled another 553)
1993 1556
1994 1369
1995 1393
1996 1064
1997 498
TOTAL 10482
Disassemblies of Warheads by Type
FY 1990-1997*
Warhead/Weapon Type Number
B28 Bomb 624
B43 Bomb 258
W44 ASROC 104
W48 155 mm shell 759
W50 Pershing 1A 160
B53 Bomb 28
W54 SADM 145
W55 SUBROC 160
W56 Minuteman II 1
B57 Bomb 2242
B61-0, B61-2, B61-5 Bombs 1159
W68 Poseidon SLBM 2468
W69 SRAM 60
W70 Lance 1170
W71 Spartan ABM 39
W79-0, W79-1 203mm shells 3
*Does not include disassemblies of types currently in the stockpile.
7.2.1.2 Existing Weapon Infrastructure
Most of the
weapons production infrastructure that was constructed during the Cold
War has been (or will soon be) shut down, much of it is being
dismantled. Plans are now being formulated to transfer various
production and maintenance functions to other facilities as needed,
mostly to the U.S. national laboratories: Los Alamos National
Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Livermore Natational Laboratory (LLNL), and
Sandia National Laboratory (SNL). With the termination of weapons tests
and production the role of the laboratories have been redefined to be
"stockpile stewardship" - maintaining the safety and reliability of the
existing stockpile.
All manufacture of nuclear materials for weapons has been halted. There is now a stockpile surplus of U-235, Pu-239, and enriched lithium deuteride.
Tritium has not been produced in the United States since 1988, when the government shut down its last weapons reactor at the Savannah River Site in Aiken, S.C. Weapon retirements will offset tritium decay in stockpile weapons so that no new tritium production will be needed to support the NPR defined post-START II arsenal until 2011 (allowing a 5 year reserve). Since START-II has not been approved by the Russian Duma though, the DOE is required by congress to continue support a START I-sized arsenal indefinitely. This larger arsenal will require replacement tritium by 2005 (again allowing for a reserve). Planning to develop a new tritium production capability resulted in a decision announced Dec. 1998 by DOE Sec. Richardson to begin producing tritium in the commercial Watts Bar nuclear plant operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority near Knoxville, Tenn with the TVA's Sequoyah nuclear plant outside Chattanooga as a backup. This is the first time a civilian commericial facility has been designated for use in producing nuclear weapons materials in the U.S.
There are two nuclear weapon design labs - LANL and LLNL. Each lab is responsible for supervising and maintaining the weapons it designs. Currently the labs are responsible respectively for the following weapons:
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL)
This weapon
design lab competes with Los Alamos. It was established June 1952 near
Livermore California and has always operated under a contract with the
University of California Board of Regents. The 12.2 square mile
facility employed 7,800 people on 25 Nov 1995.
LLNL conducts R&D activities associated with all phases of the nuclear weapons life-cycle, as well as research on non-proliferation, arms control and treaty verification technology. Facilities include the High Explosive Application Facility (HEAF), a tritium facility, the NOVA laser used for Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) research, and the Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation (AVLIS) plant. It is currently planned to be the site for the National Ignition Facility (NIF), a new ICF laser facility
Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)
Opened in 1943 to design atomic bombs as part of the Manhattan Project,
Los Alamos has always been operated under a contract with the
University of California Board of Regents. This 43.0 square mile
facility employed 7,987 people on 25 Nov 1995.
Los Alamos National Laboratory originally manufactured pits in small numbers for weapons tests at its TA-55 (Technical Area-55) plant. This four acre facility is currently the only full-function plutonium handling facility in the U.S. It opened in April 1978 at a cost of $70 million, and houses 400 scientists and engineers. The 150,000 square foot PF-4 (Plutonium Facility-4) is the actual plutonium processing area of TA-55.
Plans are now for it to begin production for weapon stockpile use in 1997 (with one W88 pit), increasing to 50 pits/yr by 2000. Los Alamos will support stockpile maintenance by requalifying 100 pits a year (this implies a remanufacturing lifecycle of nearly 100 years for all active weapons, and nearly 50 years for requalification).
Until FY 1984 Los Alamos had the capability to fabricate and assembly nuclear weapon test devices. This function was terminated due to persistent security problems, and is now handled by the Nevada Test Site.
Nevada Test Site (NTS)
Located 65 miles from Las
Vegas, NTS was established as a nuclear weapon test range in 1951 with
its first nuclear test (January 27, 1951). The last nuclear test was on
23 September 1992. A total of 928 total tests (100 atmospheric, 828
underground) are known to have been conducted there. The 1,350 square
miles facility employed 4,901 people on 25 Nov 1995.
NTS is currently the only U.S. facility capable of manufacturing nuclear explosive devices. With U.S. nuclear explosion tests permanently terminated, its function has shifted to sub-critical tests with high explosives and fissile material in enclosed test chambers. In mid-1993, construction was completed on the $100 million Combined Device Assembly Facility, a 100,000 square foot building within a highly secured 22 acre portion of the test site. The facility includes five high explosives containment cells, called "Gravel Gerties," three weapon assembly bays, two radiographic areas and storage bunkers.
Pantex Plant
This 16.6 square miles facility, located
near Amarillo, Texas, has long been the sole facility for the
assembly/disassembly of nuclear warhead and bombs. It has not produced
any weapons for nine years, the last new nuclear weapon (a W88 warhead)
was assembled on 31 July 1990. It is now performing dismantlement
operations only, along with a modest evaluation program that involves
disassembling and reassembling about 60 warheads a year for stockpile
reliability purposes. By 2000, when the current backlog of weapons has
been dismantled, Pantex will reestablish a modest standby manufacturing
and remanufacturing capability. Over the period 1990-1996 Pantex
averaged 1347 dismantlements a year. This fell to only 498 in 1997 when
a number of accidents, including the cracking of a pit during
disassembly, caused all work to halt for a time.
In operation since May 1952, it is run by the Mason and Hanger-Silas Mason Company. It employed 3,348 people on 25 Nov 1995, and remains staffed at close to this number in 1999. Staffing is projected to fall to 1600 in 2003 when the current dismantlement program is completed. Its current annual operating budget is $265 million.
Pantex currently stores pits from disassembled weapons (eventually most or all of these will be moved to a planned facility at SRS). In mid-1998 it had 10500 pits in storage and had upgraded its pit storage capability to 12000. As of mid-year 1998 there were approximately 1500 weapons awaiting dismantlement of three types -- the W56 (Minuteman II), the W69 (SRAM) and the W79 (8 inch artillery shell). When the current backlog of weapons awaiting dismantlement is cleared (planned date September 2002) this storage capacity will be full.
On 6 Feb. 1996, the DOE declared that Pantex holds 21.3 tonnes of weapon-grade plutonium (and 16.7 tonnes of highly enriched uranium) considered excess inventory including planned dismantlements, this represents the plutonium from some 7000 pits. 5000 additional pits, containing 15 tonnes of plutonium, are being retained in the strategic reserve.
Sandia National Laboratory (SNL)
Sandia was
established to provide engineering services for the development of
nuclear weapons at the end of WWII. Its 11.9 square mile main facility
is located inside Kirtland Air Force Base near Albuquerque, New Mexico;
it has a 413 acre branch laboratory near Livermore. It is operated by
the Lockheed Martin Sandia Corp. and employed 8,527 people on 25 Nov
1995. More recent figures (Jan. 1999) are about 6,600 people in
Albuquerque and another 900 in Livermore.
SNL has taken over production responsibility for neutron initiators from the now closed Pinellas Plant, and a contingency capacity to produce thermal batteries, where they were originally manufactured. Equipment has been transferred from the Pinellas plant and installed at Sandia and personnel have also been moved from the Pinellas plant. The first thermal battery production was expected in 1998 and delivery of the first Sandia-produced neutron initiator in 1999. At full capacity Sandia expects to be able to produce 500 neutron initiators per year.
Savannah River Site (SRS)
Located near Aiken, South
Carolina, Savannah River was established to be the primary production
site of nuclear materials for weapons in 1952 at the height of the Cold
War. This capability has now been completely shut down. The 300 square
mile facility contains deactivated production facilities occupying 16
square miles. It employed 16,655 people on 25 Nov 1995. Its current
weapon-related work focuses on tritium handling, and managing the
radioactive waste left over from the production of plutonium and
tritium.
In Dec. 1998 DOE Sec. Richardson also announced that a new $500 million plant to disassemble the pits (plutonium cores) of nuclear bombs would be built at Savannah River. The facility will disassemble nuclear pits and convert the recovered plutonium metal to an oxide form suitable for disposition. Disposal methods would include fabricating the plutonium oxide into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel, which would be burned in existing domestic reactors, and immobilization of the plutonium in ceramic surrounded by vitrified high level waste. The DOE is currently conducting a demonstration of a prototype pit disassembly and conversion system at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The demonstration, which involves dismantling of pits over a two-to-three year period, provides information for designing and operating the full-scale pit disassembly and conversion facility. The full-scale facility is to be designed and constructed over 1999-2004, with production operations beginning in 2005. Up to 50 tonnes of plutonium is expected to be disposed of by this facility. Construction and operation of the full-scale facility is contingent on reaching agreement with Russia on plutonium disposition.
Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR)
Located at Oak Ridge,
Tennessee, this was one of the two original production sites for
nuclear weapons material established by the Manhattan Project, the
selection of this site was on September 19, 1942 (code named Site X)
was in fact the first major decision taken as part of the Project. The
reservation covers 55.1 square miles and has three main facilities
located on it - the 4.5 square mile Oak Ridge National Laboratory
(ORNL), the 1.3 square mile Y-12 Plant, and the 2.3 square miles K-25
Plant. It is currently operated by Lockheed Martin Energy Research
Corporation and employed 14,639 people as of 9/30/97. Its 1997 budget
was $1.1438 billion (not including DOE's Oak Ridge Operations Office).
Originally the K-25 and Y-12 plants both produced enriched uranium for the Manhattan Project. Later the function of Y-12 was switched to manufacturing materials for thermonuclear weapons (enriched lithium-6) and the thermonuclear secondaries themselves. It has also held the responsibility for fabricating enriched uranium components for weapons. It now has responsibility for dismantling secondaries from disasembled weapons, and maintains custody of U.S. stocks of weapons grade enriched uranium, and the reserve stockpile of secondaries that are kept intact. ORR also produces weapon components to support to support the activities of the design laboratories and the Nevada Test Site and fabricates fuel materials for the naval nuclear reactor program.
Over the years ORR has produced some 483 metric tons of uranium-235, and 442.4 metric tons for nuclear weapons. Currently 189 metric tons of uranium-235 and 3.0 metric tons of low-enriched uranium are stored at the Y-12 Plant, 1.5 metric tons of uranium-235 at the K-25 Plant, and 1.4 metric tons of uranium-235 and some uranium-233 at ORNL. 84.9 metric tons of this uranium-235 declared excess by President Clinton on March 1, 1995.
Other Facilities
Nearly all non-nuclear bomb
components are manufactured at the the Kansas City Plant operated by
the Bendix Kansas City Division of Allied-Signal. This 136 acre
facility (containing 3.2 million square feet of process building space)
was opened in 1949 and employed 3,291 on 25 Nov 1995.
The existing U.S. gaseous diffusion enrichment facilities at
Paducah, Kentucky, and Portsmouth, Ohio are operated by the United
States Enrichment Corporation (established by the Energy Policy Act of
1992). These plants only produce low-enriched uranium. In January 1991,
the NRC received an application to construct and operate the nation's
first privately owned uranium enrichment facility in Homer, Louisiana.
The only facility for producing uranium hexafluoride is the
Allied-Signal plant in Metropolis, Illinois.
WEAPON DEPLOYMENT/STORAGE SITES
As of mid-1997 the U.S. had
nuclear weapons stored at 26 sites in 15 states and 7 foreign countries
(this does not count ballistic missile submarines on patrol in the open
ocean). The 1997 figure is a significant decline from a few years ago,
and a dramatic one over the last decade when hundreds of sites existed
around the world. Several more of these sites are being closed now, or
due to be closed over the next few years.
In the early 1990s, shortly after the demobilization of nuclear weapons begun by Pres. Bush, the Pantex Plant in Texas had more U.S. nuclear weapons than any other site in the world, over 5000, although none of them were part of the active stockpile. By mid-1997 this number had declined to only 350, the largest number of nuclear weapons were now being held at Kirtland AFB in New Mexico with 2850. Only 450 of these warheads were operational, 1400 of them slated for dismantling, and another 400 are held as part of the U.S. reserve stockpile. The inactive warheads are held in the 58 storage bays and bunkers of the Kirtland Underground Munitions Storage Complex (KUMSC), a new 300,000 square foot facility opened in 1992 at a cost of $30 million. Because of Kirtland, New Mexico has more nuclear weapons than any other state.
Kings Bay Naval Base in Georgia has more operational nuclear warheads stationed there than any other base in the world with 2000, although a substantial portion of these are on patrol at sea at any given time (also making Georgia the state with the most operational warheads). Second place is Bangor Naval Base in Washington state with 1600. The Air Force base with the most warheads is Nellis AFB in Nevada (home of Area 51) with 1450, second place is F.E. Warren AFB in Wyoming (950).
Only 150 warheads were deployed overseas (not counting ballistic missile submarines on patrol), al of them B-61 tactical thermonuclear bombs based in Europe.
U.S. DEPLOYMENT/STORAGE SITES7.2.1.3 Planned Nuclear Forces
STATE WARHEADS LOCATIONS
New Mexico 2850 Kirtland AFB
Georgia 2000 Kings Bay
Washington 1600 Bangor
Nevada 1450 Nellis AFB
Wyoming 950 F.E. Warren AFB
North Dakota 805 Minot AFB (805)
Montana 600 Malmstrom AFB
Missouri 550 Whiteman AFB
Texas 520 Pantex Plant (350), Dyess AFB (170)
Louisiana 455 Barksdale AFB
Nebraska 255 1 site
California 175 North Island NAS - San Diego
Virginia 175 Yorktown NAS - Norfolk
South Dakota 170 Ellsworth AFB
Colorado 138 1 site
Approx. Total 12700
FOREIGN DEPLOYMENT/STORAGE SITES
COUNTRY
Germany Buechel, Memmingen, Norvenich, Ramstein (U.S. base)
United Kingdom Lakenheath (U.S. base)
Turkey Balikesir, Murted, Incirlik (U.S. base)
Italy Ghedi-Torre, Aviano (U.S. base)
Greece Araxos
Netherlands Volkel
Belgium Kleine Brogel
Europe Total 150
DELIVERY SYSTEMS: 2007
WEAPON SYSTEM NUMBER WARHEAD NUMBER YIELD (kt) TOTAL WARHEADS
AND TYPE
ICBM
Minuteman III 450-500 1 x W87-0 300 450-500
SLBM/SUBMARINE
Trident II D5 256 5 x W76 100 1280
80 5 x W88 475 400
Ohio Class 14 24 x Trident I/II - 336 missiles
AIRCRAFT
B-52H Stratofort. 33 12 x W61/W83 10 to 1200 396
33 20 x ALCM/ACM/bomb 5 to 1200 660
B-2A Spirit 20 16 x B-61/83 bombs low to 1200 320
CRUISE MISSILES
ALCM (AGM-86B) 1 x W80-1 5 to 150
ACM 1 x W80-1 5 to 150
PROJECTED STOCKPILE: 2007
OPERATIONAL
WARHEAD/WEAPON FIRST YIELD (KT) USER NUMBER TOTAL YIELD (MAX)
PRODUCED Mt Equiv. Mt
STRATEGIC WEAPONS
B61-7/B61-11 Bomb 10/66 10 to 300 AF 420 126 188
B83/B83-1 Bomb 6/83 low to 1200 AF 500 600 564
W76 for Trident II D5 6/78 100 Navy 1280 128 276
W88 for Trident II D5 9/88 475 Navy 400 190 243
W87-0 for Minuteman III 4/86 300 AF 450-500 150 224
W80-1 for ALCM/ACM 12/81 5 to 150 AF 400 60 113
NON-STRATEGIC WEAPONS
B61(-3,4,10) Tact. Bomb 3/75 0.3 to 175 AF/NATO 600 105 188
W80-0 for SLCM 12/83 5 to 150 Navy 350 53 99
GRAND OPERATIONAL TOTAL* 4450 1412 1895
*Plus an additional 500 spares
INACTIVE RESERVE STOCKPILE
W76 for Trident II D5 6/78 100 Navy 450 45 97
W78 for Minuteman III 8/79 335 AF 900 302 434
W84 GLCM Warheads 10-50 ? 350 18 47
Bombs and cruise missiles 5 - 9000? AF 800 1000? 1000?
GRAND INACTIVE RESERVE TOTAL 2500
Principal sources for the section on the United States are:
The Russian nuclear arsenal remains in an uncertain state of flux due to the direct and indirect consequences of the breakup and economic collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia completed the redeployment of nuclear weapons from the territory of the non-Russian former Soviet republics by November 1996, but now faces severe funding problems for maintaining a standing strategic weapons force. The existing Russian nuclear arsenal, largely built up in the 1970s and early 1980s, is reaching the end of its useful service life. In September 1997 Gen. Vladimir Yakovlev, chief of the Russian strategic rocket forces, stated that 62 percent of Russia's ICBMs are beyond their guaranteed service life. In late November 1998, Anatoly Perminov, chief of the strategic missile force's general staff, put the figure at 58 percent. Remanufacturing the existing weapons as the US is currently doing is costly, and Russia appears to lack the engineering and industrial resources to undertake such an effort. Much of the original industrial base for these weapons was located in now independent former republics, particularly Ukraine. The alternative, which Russia is pursuing, is to to replace existing weapons with new ones. The severe budget crisis makes replacing existing weapons on a one-for-one basis impossible.
Although under the (as yet unratified) Start II treaty Russia is permitted 3500 warheads, Pres. Boris Yeltsin apparently used the proposed Start III levels of 2000-2500 warheads as the basis of stockpile planning at a review held on 6 July 1998, perhaps reflecting an awareness of the impossibility of maintaining larger stockpiles. Most estimates of Russia's likely nuclear forces over the next decade are sharply lower than this however.
A variety of estimates have been bandied about over the last year. Such predictions are of course sensitive to the state of the economy. Prior to the July 1998 review, prominent Russian strategist Lev Volkov estimated that Russia may have only 700 warheads by 2007. Sergei Kortunov, a top Kremlin defense aide, has written that "with a lot of effort" Russia might climb back to 1,000 warheads by 2015. Perhaps the most serious indication of the straits Russia's nuclear forces are in, because of its official imprimatur, came in October 1998. News organizations reported that a secret report to the Russian Duma by First Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Maslyukov, a former top Soviet-era military-industrial planner, had estimated that Russia may well be able to field only 800 to 900 nuclear warheads by 2005.
By contrast, according to the Natural Resources Defense Council in Washington, the Soviet Union in 1990 had 10,779 strategic nuclear warheads (this excludes an estimated 6,000 to 13,000 nonstrategic warheads which have never been covered by arms control treaties.)
The pressure from such hard realities appears to have begun to move the START II treaty, which has been awaiting action by the Russian Communist Party led Duma for 6 years, towards ratification. On 12 November 1998 the Duma finally began consideration of a bill that would have brought START II to a vote. Anger at the December 1998 Operation Desert Fox attacks by the US against Iraq, and then the January 1999 announcement of US intentions for deploying a limited ABM system, has again delayed action however. Despite this no less a figure than the Russian Communist Party leader in the Duma Gennady Zyuganov stated on 26 January that START II could be ratified if the United States guarantees the observance of all the earlier concluded agreements on nuclear missile arsenals reduction and complies with the decisions of the UN Security Council. Reflecting the grim budget realities, Russian officials and Duma members have talked unofficially about revising downward warhead numbers on both sides, even from START III numbers.
The most notable action taken by Russia over the last year towards maintaining its nuclear arsenal was the deployment of the first operational regiment of ten Topol-M ICBMs (designated as either RT-2PM or RS-12M2 and designated SS-27 by NATO). This is the first missile to be built exclusively in Russia.
The first test flight of this missile version was 20 December 1994, it successfully completed its six flight test schedule on 9 December 1998 with a launch from the Plesetsk cosmodrome in northern Russia. The regiment was declared operational by Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev, a former chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces, on 27 December 1998 at a strategic missile base in Tatishchevo, near the Volga River city of Saratov. The first two missiles were actually installed at the base in old SS-19 silos near in December 1997.
The Topol-M is being deployed as a single warhead missile although it is capable of carrying three warheads. It has a range of 10500 km, and is suitable for silo or mobile basing. It has improved reliability and operational features, including an improved road-mobile launcher and turning radius, and succeeds the SS-25 Topol. Like its predecessor it is an inertially guided three-stage solid-fuel missile. The missile's launching weight is 47 tonnes, the payload (warhead weight) is one tonne. The missile's length without the warhead is 17.9 meters, and the maximum diameter of the body is 1.86 meters.
Maslyukov, who is in charge of the Russian military-industrial complex, has stated that the Russian Strategic Missile Force (RVSN) will receive another 10 Topol-M missile systems in 1999, with production reaching 40 a year by the end of 2000, at which time a total of 40 will be in service. In the Soviet era, the Votkinsk factory, which builds the Topol-M in the central Urals mountains, made about 80 missiles a year. According to Maslyukov Russia plans to build 35 to 45 Topol-M ballistic missiles every year starting in 2000. It is believed that a complete force of 500 or so will be deployed some time after 2010 if plans stay on track.
In contrast to other state defence programmes, the Topol-M production program was fully funded in the 1998 budget. Gen. Vladimir Yakovlev, head of the RVSN, said that just to build the Topol-Ms, which cost about $30 million apiece, "will require the concentration of all our resources."
Russia is also working on keeping existing systems in operation as long as practical. To support this effort the RVSN made a successful test launch of an RS-22 ICBM (known as the SS-24 Scalpel by NATO) with multiple warheads from a railway missile system on 10 December 1998. The launch from Plesetsk tested the deployment of 10 warheads and "hit targets at the Kamchatka test site with high precision," according to the Interfax news agency.
Maslyukov has said that Russia must build 35 to 45 Topol-M ballistic missiles every year starting in 2000 and build several nuclear submarines of the Yuri Dolgoruky class, armed with ballistic missiles. It must also modernize its control, early warning and space intelligence systems, he said.
On 27 December it was also announced that a parliament committee is drafting a bill that would guarantee funding to the strategic missile forces until 2010, regardless of the country's economic situation, Interfax reported. The measure would ensure that Russia maintains nuclear parity with the West, according to Roman Popkovich, chairman of the Defense Committee of the State Duma, the lower house of parliament.
A contentious issue currently under discussion within the Russian government is a plan to restructure the command of nuclear forces, an topic which has rarely been discussed in public before. At issue is Defense Minister Sergeyev's recent proposal to establish a single command over all nuclear forces, along the lines of the US Strategic Command. Sergeyev said that on 3 November President Boris Yeltsin initialed a document approving the idea, but there has been stiff resistance from the General Staff. The arguments have been laid out in a series of dueling essays published in Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, a weekly newspaper devoted to military issues.
Currently, control over nuclear weapons passes through the General Staff, which would oversee the various services in combat. Sergeyev has proposed creating a separate organization that would be in charge of all of Russia's nuclear weapons, whether on submarines, long-range bombers or land-based missiles. Sergeyev also has proposed including in the new command the 12th Main Directorate of the Defense Ministry, which is in charge of maintaining the nuclear stockpile.
Sergeyev has said he would like the new command to be headed by his protege, Gen. Vladimir Yakovlev, the current head of the RVSN, who would be elevated to first deputy minister of defense. A source said Sergeyev sees implementation of his plan as urgent because it is unlikely he would serve beyond the expiration of Yeltsin's term, which ends in the summer of 2000. Sergeyev's proposal supports Russia's current national security doctrine, which emphasizes the importance of preserving its nuclear deterrent at a time when conventional forces are decaying.
Sergei Rogov, director of the Institute for the Study of the United States and Canada, said the advantage of Sergeyev's proposal is that it would provide a "substantial simplification of command and control" for the Russian nuclear forces as they grow smaller.
But criticism has come from the military's General Staff, which would lose one of its most important functions. The generals have scoffed at the idea of investing more money in a new organization while the military budget is extraordinarily slim. Alexander Lebed, the governor of Krasnoyarsk and a former general, has joined opposition to Sergeyev's plan, which he denounced as "impossible to create." Lebed said, "We must not complicate an already complicated system."
Under the Nunn-Lugar Act, a program named for its originators originated by Senators Richard Lugar and Sam Nunn, D-Ga., the United States has spent more than $400 million each year since 1991 to help Russia dismantle its old Soviet weapons, and plans to allocate an additional $440 million in 1999.
Under the 'swords for plowshares' deal signed in January 1994 to dispose of excess weapons material, the U.S. Government will purchase 500 tonnes of HEU from Russia for dilution, for US$11.9 billion. Under the Russian-U.S. agreement the United States Enrichment Corporation will purchase a minimum of 500 tonnes of military HEU over 20 years, commencing with 10 tonnes for the first five years and not less than 30 tonnes per year thereafter. The weapons-grade is to be blended down to 4.4% U-235 in Russia and the Russians intend to use 1.5% U-235 for this, to minimize the levels of U-234 in the product. In the short term the military uranium is likely to be blended down to 20% U-235, then stored. In this form it is not usable for weapons.
The blending down of 500 tonnes of military HEU will result in about 15,000 tonnes of low-enriched uranium over 20 years. This is equivalent to about 150 000 tonnes of natural uranium, or approximately three times western world demand in 1993. The dilution of 10 tonnes of military HEU per year for the first five years will displace approximately 3,700 tonnes of uranium oxide production per year, equivalent to output from a medium to large uranium mine. By 2000 the dilution of 30 tonnes of military HEU will displace about 11,200 tonnes of uranium oxide mine production per year which represents approximately 20% of the western world's uranium requirements.
In 1995 the U.S. Enrichment Corporation received its first shipments of low-enriched uranium from Russia (186 tonnes), derived from six tonnes of weapons-grade material. The first shipment of this to a customer, valued at US$145 million, was made in November, and is presumably now generating electricity.
On 27 April 1997 Nuclear Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov announced that Russia had dismantled almost half of its arsenal, removing nearly 400 tonnes of HEU in the process.
7.2.2.1 Current Nuclear Forces
Over the last two years there has been little change in the formal size of the Russian nuclear forces although their effective size has shrunk slightly due to continuing system deterioration.
Current strategic plans are to manufacture the Topol-M (SS-27) to replace most of the ICBMs currently in service. Under START-II Russia can retain SS-19s (downloaded from six warheads to one) and SS-25s in service. The SS-19 is a relatively old system (some have now been in service 20 years) and probably will have to be retired before 2007. By that time the Russian ICBM force would likely consist of 320 SS-27s, and as many as 360 SS-25s, all with single warheads.
The RVSN is organized into four missile armies with headquarters at Vladimir, Omsk, Orenburg, and Chita. There are 19 missile bases, each consisting of a separate missile division. The RVSN's 6th Main Directorate is responsible for nuclear security and custody. As of mid-1998 there were 754 missles of four basic types: 180 SS-18s, 168 SS-19s, and 10 SS-24s in underground silos; 36 SS-24s on railroad cars, and 360 road-mobile SS-25s. 10 silo based SS-27s were added at the end of 1998.
The Russian strategic ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force officially consists of 42 boats of six types (Yankee-I, Delta-I, Delta-II, Delta-III, Delta-IV, and Typhoon), but only boats of the latter three classes are believed to be in actual operation so the true force is much smaller. The Russian Navy only counted 26 submarines as actually operational in mid-1998. Of six Typhoon ICBM-equipped subs built in the last decade, only three are still operational due to technical problems requiring overhaul on the three oldest boats, reducing the effective count to only 23 or so. According to Bruce Blair of the Brookings Institute only only two were on patrol at at time, the remainder are likely kept ready in port as static (but highly vulnerable) missile launchers. By 2003 only 10-15 boats are likely to remain in service -- 3 Typhoons, 7 Delta-IVs, and some Delta-IIIs.
There is a new SLBM missile under development, but as of the end of 1998 had not yet been test flown. The keel of the first Borey-class ballistic missile submarine was laid in November 1996, one of three planned new subs, but is still under construction and neither of the other two has yet been started. Probably no new subs will enter service before 2003. Under the strategic stockpile review held in July 1997, Yeltsin directed Russian strategic forces to shift to greater emphasis on sea-based missiles by putting half of all warheads on submarines (up from about 30% from today).
Of the three legs of the Russian nuclear arsenal, the bomber force is in the worst state. There are nominally 74 heavy bombers in service in mid-1998: 6 Tu-160 Blackjacks and 68 Tu-95 MS6/MS16 Bears. Of the 6 Blackjacks (built in 1991) only 2 (perhaps as many as 4) are believed to be flight-worthy, plans to purchase the 19 Blackjacks located in Ukraine have collapsed due to lack of funds, and their poor condition. The Blackjack production line was shut down in 1994, but efforts to complete 6 remaining planes are evidently underway, and Russia appears committed to keeping a force of Blackjacks, however small, in service. The older Bears are expected to be retired before 2005.
DELIVERY SYSTEMS
DESIGNATIONS YEAR RANGE (km)/ CEP(m)
NATO RUSSIAN PAYLOAD (kg)
ICBMs
SS-18 M4/M5/M6 Satan RS-20, R-36N Voevoda 1979 11000/8800 250
SS-19 M3 Stiletto RS-18, UR-100NU 1979 9000/4350 300
SS-24 M1/M2 Scalpel RS-22,RT-23U Molodets 1987 10000/4050 200
SS-25 Sickle RS-12M, RT-2PM? 1985 10500/1000 200
SS-27 Topol-M RS-12M2, RT-2PM? 1998 10500/1000 200
SLBM/SUBMARINES
SS-N-18 M1 Stingray RSM-50 1978 6500/1650 400
SS-N-20 M1/M2 Sturgeon RSM-52 1983 8300/2550 500
SS-N-23 Skiff RSM-54 1986 9000/2800 500
AIRCRAFT
Bear H6 TU-95 MS6 1984 13000/
Bear H16 TU-95 MS16 13000/
Blackjack TU-160 1987 12500/
Due to the disordered state of Russian affairs in general, and military affairs in particular, it is difficult to estimate the actual available nuclear forces. The figures given below are the maximum available forces. The actual effective SLBM and aircraft forces are likely to be a fraction of those indicated. At one point during the summer of 1995 only one Typhoon SLBM boat was deployed. Few, if any, Blackjacks are currently operational. Some of the forces that have become unavailable due to maintenance and support problems may eventually be reactivated.
Current Deployment Locations
ICBM
SS-18: Aleysk, Dombarovski, Kartaly, and Uzhur (186 total)
SS-19: ?
SS-24 M1: Bersht, Kostroma, and Krasnoyarsk (12 each)
SS-24 M2: Tatishchevo (10)
SS-25: ?
SS-27: Tatishchevo (10)
(Only 8 of 19 bases listed)
SUBMARINES
Typhoon submarines: Nerpichya, Kola Peninsula (6)
Delta IV submarines: Yagelnaya, Kola Peninsula (7)
Delta III submarines: Yagelnaya, Kola Peninsula (4);
Rybachi, Kamchatka Peninsula (9)
BOMBERS
Bear H16: Mozdok (19)
Ukrainka (17)
Uzin (21 - these Ukrainian aircraft are non operational)
Bear H6: Mozdok (2)
Ukrainka (25)
Uzin (4 - these Ukrainian aircraft are non operational)
Blackjack: Engels Air Base (5)
Zhukovsky Flight Center (1)
Priluki (19 - these Ukrainian aircraft are non operational)
RUSSIAN STRATEGIC FORCES: 1 JULY 1998*
WARHEAD/WEAPON
DESIGNATIONS LAUNCHER WARHEAD LOADING WARHEAD TOT. YIELD (MAX)
NUMBER NUMBER x Mt NUMBER Mt Equiv Mt
ICBMs
SS-18 M4/M5/M6 180 10 x 0.55/0.75 1800 1170 1347
some 1 x 25?
SS-19 M3 168 6 x 0.55 1008 554 677
SS-24 M1 36 10 x 0.55 360 198 242
SS-24 M2 10 10 x 0.55 100 55 67
SS-25 360 1 x 0.55 360 198 242
SLBMS/SUBMARINES
SS-N-18 M1 192/12 subs 3 x 0.50 576 288 363
SS-N-20 M1/M2 80/4 subs 10 x 0.20 800 160 274
SS-N-23 112/7 subs 4 x 0.10 448 45 97
AIRCRAFT
Bear H6 29 6 x AS-15A ALCM/bomb 174 44 69
Bear H16 35 16 x AS-15A ALCM/bomb 560 140 222
Blackjack 6 12 x AS-15B ALCM/ 72 18 29
AS-16 SRAM/bomb
GRAND TOTAL 1236 6258 2870 3629
*10 SS-27 single warhead Topol-M deployed December 1998 not shown
Russia now has nine power stations operating 29 nuclear reactors, with 22 gigawatts of electrical capacity; this represents 12% of total electricity generated in Russia. The Minatom ministry plans to increase total capacity to 28 or 30 gigawatts before 2005.
Russia has four uranium enrichment facilities, in Ekaterinburg, Tomsk, Krasnoyarsk and Angarsk, with a total annual enrichment capacity 20 million SWU. Isotope separation has gone through several stages of development: gaseous dynamic nozzle technology, gaseous diffusion, and gas centrifuge. Russia is currently using 50% of her enrichment capacity for domestic and export production, and is thus aggressively marketing her high technology centrifuge separation capacity.
Principal sources for the section on Russia are:
7.2.3.1 History of British Nuclear Weapon Development
Britain was the first country to seriously study the feasibility of
nuclear weapons, and made a number of critical conceptual
breakthroughs. The first theoretically sound critical mass calculation
was made in England by Frisch and Peierls in Feb. 1940; and from 10
April 1940 to 15 July 1941 the MAUD Committee headed by Tizard worked
out the basic principles of fission bomb design and uranium enrichment
by gaseous diffusion. The work done by the MAUD Committee was
instrumental in alerting the U.S. (and through espionage, the USSR) to
the feasibility of fission weapons in WWII. A high level of cooperation
between Britain, the U.S., and Canada continued through the war,
formalized by the 1943 Quebec Agreement. Britain sent "the British
Mission", a team of first rank scientists to work at Los Alamos. The
mission made major contributions to the Manhattan Project, and provided
the nucleus for British post-war atomic weapons development effort.
Among the mission members was William G. Penney who later led the
British atomic bomb project.
Immediately after the war, in August 1945, the new Labor government in Britain organized a secret Cabinet committee to establish nuclear policy. Initial decisions focused on establishing nuclear infrastructure and research. In August 1946 the U.K. Air Chief of Staff issued a formal requirement for an atomic bomb. On 6 November 1946 the Atomic Energy Act (McMahon Act) severed close nuclear ties between the U.S. and Britain. On 8 January 1947, a secret committee of six Ministers (headed by P.M. Attlee) decided to proceed with development and acquisition of atomic weapons. This fact was not disclosed at all until 12 May 1948, when an oblique reference was made to atomic weapon development in parliamentary discussions.
The initial sites for Britain's nuclear program were selected in 1946. Harwell, on the Berkshire Downs 12 miles south of Oxford, was selected for the Atomic Energy Research Establishment. This research center was headed by physicist Sir John Crockcroft. Construction began there for Britain's first nuclear reactor, BEPO (Britain Experimental Pile Zero). BEPO went critical on 3 July 1948.
The fissile material production facilities were the responsibility of Christopher Hinton. A site for the first plutonium production reactors and plutonium processing plant was selected at Sellafield on the Irish Sea coast in Cumberland. The site was renamed Windscale, and construction began in September 1947. In October 1950 the first production reactor went critical. The plutonium plant began operation on 25 February 1952, and produced the first plutonium metal 35 days later.
A gaseous diffusion plant was also planned, and the site eventually chosen in Early 1950 was Capenhurst, near Chester. This plant finally began operation in 1953. An extension boosted its annual production capacity to 125 kg of HEU at the end of 1957.
In May 1947 William Penney learned of the decision to build an atomic bomb, and the following month began assembling a team to work on it. The effort suffered initially from disorganization - it was spread over several sites, and lines of authority with other research sites were not clear. By mid 1948 the responsibilities had been settled, and on 1 April 1950 a single site was selected for atomic weapons development at Aldermaston in Berkshire.
Due to the small size and high population density of Britain no suitable sites for atmospheric weapons tests existed. Britain thus sought sites in other countries to test its weapons, finally settling on the Monte Bello Islands in Australia. The plutonium for the first test device was needed by 1 August 1952 to meet the schedule. Because the Windscale plant was not quite able to meet this, some Canadian supplied plutonium was also incorporated into the core. 15 September 1952 the plutonium core for the first British nuclear device, code named Hurricane, left England. On 3 October 1952 Hurricane was detonated in a lagoon off the western shore of Trimouille Island. The bomb was exploded inside the hull of the HMS Plym (1450 ton frigate) which was anchored in 40 feet of water 400 yards off shore. The explosion occurred 2.7 m below the water line.
The British arsenal acquired its first deployed weapon, the Blue Danube plutonium bomb, in November 1953. This weapon was based on the Hurricane device. From a technology standpoint it was probably very similar to the U.S. Mk 4, which went into service in 1949. Like the Mk 4 it had a 60 inch, 32 lens implosion system and used a levitated core suspended within a hollow uranium tamper. Plans at this point called for building up an arsenal of 200 weapons by 1957 so plutonium production was expanded by adding two new dual use (plutonium and electricity) MAGNOX reactors at Calder Hall.
The U.S. had already demonstrated the feasibility of megaton size fission and thermonuclear bombs in October 1952, and by February 1954 the British had drafted requirements to add megaton weapons to their stockpile. The Teller-Ulam design had not been rediscovered by them at this point, and only pure fission designs were initially considered.
From March through May 1954 the UK was permitted by the U.S. to observe the Castle test series at Bikini atoll and use sampling aircraft in the mushroom clouds. This would have provided the British with clear, direct evidence of the high compression produced in the secondary stages by radiation implosion.
Possibly as a direct result of this data, on 16 June 1954 Winston Churchill decided that Britain should go ahead with H-bomb development, that is, to replicate the U.S. achievement (the USSR had not tested a staged thermonuclear bomb at this time).
Due to technical uncertainties a program of parallel development of alternate approaches was undertaken. The primary objectives were to acquire warheads with yields of approximately 1 megaton suitable for both an air dropped bomb, and a lighter one for the Blue Streak medium range ballistic missile (eventually canceled). Secondary objectives were to minimize the use of scarce and expensive fissile material in the designs. To achieve these ends a low-risk pure fission design, multiple boosted fission (Alarm Clock/Layer Cake like) designs, and staged thermonuclear designs were pursued. Since the pure fission bomb would have required 120 kg of U-235 (the entire annual production of Capenhurst, once expansion was complete in 3 years), and was too heavy for missile use, this was an option of last resort.
By mid-December 1955 the increasing international pressure for a halt to atmospheric testing gave further impetus to the parallel programs. It appeared quite possible that the UK might have only a very short window in which it could test megaton class weapons (and demonstrate this capability to the world). The requirement for a multi-megaton weapon had been added by this time, which only a two-stage thermonuclear device could provide. This decision was largely based on political considerations, since the Soviet Union had tested such a device on 22 November 1955.
By this time Britain had developed a pure fission design for the Mark 1 bomb case, and two boosted fission designs using U-235 surrounded by lithium deuteride: Green Bamboo and a smaller and lighter (but less efficient) device called Orange Herald. All were estimated to produce 1 megaton yields. They also had a large two-stage thermonuclear weapon design called Green Granite expected to produce multi-megaton yields (1-4 Mt). Green Bamboo and Green Granite were suitable for the heavy air-dropped bomb, only Orange Herald was suitable for the missile warhead. The Green Bamboo and Orange Herald devices were both quite expensive in fissile material. Green Bamboo required 87 kg of U-235, Orange Herald required 117 kg. Considering annual production was only 120 kg, neither of these devices could be deployed in very large numbers.
Fusion reactions using lithium deuteride fuel were ignited in the Mosaic test series conducted at the Monte Bello test site in the spring of 1956. Mosaic G1 (16 May 1956) produced a 15-20 kt yield and was apparently a failure. Mosaic G2 (19 June 1956), which produced an unexpectedly high 98 kt yield, provided data about fast fission of a U-238 tamper by fusion neutrons.
By January 1957 two variant designs had been developed for both Green Granite and Orange Herald. These were a light weight version of Green Granite (suitable for the missile), and a heavy weight version of Orange Herald using the Mark 1 case (too heavy for the missile, but more likely to be successful). Both Green Granite Large and Small (or Short) were expected at this time to produce a yield of about 1 Mt. A modified version of the Red Beard bomb (evidently to produce a higher yield) called Tom was used as the primary for both Green Granite designs.
The Green Granite Small, Orange Herald Small, and a device called Purple Granite which was substituted for Green Granite Large at the last minute (possibly a modified version of it) were ultimately tested in the 1957 Grapple test series at Malden Island in the Pacific. Green Granite Small was detonated in the Grapple 1/Short Granite test on 15 May 1957. Its yield was a disappointing 200-300 kt, but most of this was from the secondary stage providing proof of principle. Orange Herald Small was tested in Grapple 2/Orange Herald on 31 May 1957 producing 720 kt (the largest yield from this type of device on record). Surprisingly, Purple Granite produced an even smaller yield in the Grapple 3/Purple Granite test on 19 June 1957, about 150 kt.
All in all, the series was a mixed success. The rediscovered Teller-Ulam design, and a deployable megaton-class weapon design had both been proven. On the other hand, the H-bomb yields were far below those predicted. During the summer of 1957 the British government announced that it had successfully conducted thermonuclear tests. In his memoirs Prime Minister Harold MacMillan writes "On May 15 came the successful explosion of the first British H-bomb," referring to Grapple 1/Short Granite. This test was certainly an H-bomb, but not a very efficient one.
The next test, Grapple X, was held on 7 November 1957. The bomber squadron was only notified about the test in September, followed by four weeks of intensive training in preparation. Only one device, designated Round C, was tested with a yield of 1.8 Mt. This indicates that Grapple X was a hurriedly prepared and planned operation, intended to test a redesigned Teller-Ulam device following analysis of the disappointing results of the first and third Grapple tests. The high yield shows that the British had achieved mastery of H-bomb design.
Further development work on high yield thermonuclear weapons continued in 1958, with an international test moratorium rapidly approaching. Several high yield tests were conducted:
But an important change was taking place in the UK's relationship with the U.S. which would profoundly change the nature of Britain nuclear weapons program. Previously nuclear cooperation between the two nations had been fitful. During the war cooperation had been very close. A team of British scientists had been deeply involved in weapons design at Los Alamos (the "British Mission"), and the close cooperation had been officially ratified by the Quebec Agreement (1943) and the Hyde Park Memoranda (1944). In 1946 though, the highly restrictive Atomic Energy Act (McMahon Act) had shut down exchanges of information (this had been an important motivating factor in initiating the British nuclear weapons program in the first place).
An amendment of the Atomic Energy Act in 1954 had made limited exchanges possible, and the pressures of the Cold War made the need for cooperation ever more urgent as time passed. Finally in 1958 a major revision to the Act was made (signed into law 2 July) that opened the gates for detailed collaboration. The first meeting under this revised law occurred 25-27 August 1958 in Washington. This brought about considerable understanding of each party in the status of weapons developments by the other side. In the second meeting (15-17 September 1958) at Los Alamos detailed designs of American weapons were passed to the British, including the Mk 28, 44, 45, 47, and 48 warheads and information on the TX-41 and 46 then under development. These were the most sophisticated weapon then available to the U.S.
With this flood of data, backed by numerous tests, and representing weapons that had been engineered to a high state of sophistication and had been manufactured in large numbers, the British abandoned the idea of developing and fielding their own designs. The versatile and compact Mk-28 was quickly adopted as the design for the next British weapon and by November an American team was at Aldermaston discussing Mk-28 weapon manufacturing requirements. The goal was for the first British production unit to be completed by April 1960.
7.2.3.2 History of the British Nuclear Weapon Stockpile
Blue Danube (Mark 1)
This free fall bomb was
the first nuclear weapon stockpiled by Britain, going into service in
November 1953. It was a pure fission bomb initially using plutonium,
but later modified to use a composite plutonium/U-235 core. Tests were
also conducted with a uranium only core. It had a nominal yield of 15
kt. Based on Hurricane, the first UK tested device, it was essentially
a lab-built, limited production weapon. From a technology standpoint it
was probably very similar to the U.S. Mk 4, which went into service in
1949. Like the Mk 4 it had a 60 inch, 32 lens implosion system and used
a levitated core suspended within a hollow uranium tamper. The 5 ft
diameter explosive sphere was in a 24 ft long weapon case. This case
was almost twice as long as that used by the U.S. in its large diameter
fission bombs (10 ft 8 in), which made for a bulkier but more
aerodynamically stable weapon.
It was continuously modified, so it existed in a number of
"variants", some with yields up to at least 40 kt. It was tested in
Buffalo Round 2 (4 October 1956) and 3 (11 October 1956) with low yield
cores providing yields of 1.5 and 3 kt. Only about 20 were manufactured
by early 1958 when production terminated. It remained in service until
1962.
Red Beard
Red Beard was a second generation
fission weapon. It was a relatively light weight tactical fission bomb
using a tritium boosted plutonium/U-235 composite core. Development
began in 1954 and was substantially complete by 1958. Production in
significant numbers began in 1959, but it was not operationally
deployed until 1961. Red Beard was about 3 feet in diameter, 12 feet
long, and weighed 2000 lb. These weights and diameters make it roughly
the equivalent of the U.S. Mk-5 or Mk-7 bombs, both of which went into
service in 1952 (although these weapons were not boosted). The smaller
size made it possible for tactical aircraft to carry it as well as
strategic bombers.
It was tested in Buffalo Rounds 1 (27 September 1956) and 4
(22 October 1956) with yields of 15 and 10 kt respectively. A variable
yield of 5-20 kt has been claimed for this weapon. This device was
adapted as the primary for the first British thermonuclear weapons,
tested in 1957. Red Beard was in service from 1961 to 1971. A maximum
of 80 bombs was in RAF inventory, and about 30 in the Fleet Air Arm
stockpile, during the early 1960s.
Violet Club
This interim air dropped bomb had an estimated
yield of 500 kt. The case was very similar to the Mark 1, its weight
was 9000 lb. Deployed in early 1958, only five were planned for
deployment. The deployed bombs were subsequently converted to Yellow
Sun Mk 1 bombs.
The device used in Violet Club was called Green Grass. This device had not been previously tested, and was based on a design prepared for Grapple (but also apparently not tested), although its yield was predicted from devices that were tested in Grapple. Based on this, and the similarity in names, it may be surmised that Green Grass is based on Green Bamboo (bamboo is a type of grass after all). The probable alteration was to reduce the fissile content (to perhaps 75 kg or so) thus making better use of Britain's scant U-235 stockpile. The severe safety problems of this design clearly indicate a high fissile content. The intent would have been to provide a high yield weapon that could be quickly deployed in reasonable numbers (impossible for Orange Herald).
Yellow Sun Mk 1
This was Britain's first deployed "true"
H-bomb. Violet Club incorporated fusion fuel but represented an
awkward, expensive, inefficient, dead-end design. Yellow Sun Mk 1
employed the radiation implosion technology demonstrated during Grapple
in 1957. This was a megaton range weapon that entered service in 1958.
Since the first such design had been successfully tested only in
November 1957, it may be assumed that these weapons were akin to the
U.S. "emergency capability" thermonuclear weapons deployed in 1954.
That is, they were thermonuclear systems that would work, and could be
delivered, but cut a lot of corners in engineering and military
requirements areas like safety, reliability, cost, stockpile life,
flexibility, efficiency, etc. The high yield tests of April and
September of 1958 may have been in part refinements of this design.
The
Yellow Sun Mk 1 warhead was about 4 feet wide and 9 feet long, the
whole weapon was 21 feet long. Probably only a few were deployed. The
decision to adopt the advanced American Mk-28 thermonuclear weapon
design, made in September 1958, brought Yellow Sun Mk 1 manufacture and
development to a halt.
Yellow Sun Mk 2/Red Snow
It is believed that this weapon was the British manufactured version of
the Mk-28 1 megaton warhead. The first of these was completed in April
1961. The weapon seems to have been the same size as the Yellow Sun Mk
1, even though the Mk-28 is a much smaller weapon. Presumably the Mk-28
warhead itself is what is referred to as "Red Snow", but it was
deployed in the Yellow Sun weapons case. This may seem inefficient to
use a large heavy case for a small weapon, but in fact it probably
minimized force integration effort and cost. Aircraft, trained crews,
and handling facilities were all already available to carry the larger
weapon after all. It may also have been desirable to conceal the
radical reduction in warhead size.
The Yellow Sun Mk 2/Red Snow entered service in 1961. During their
initial deployment, they displaced the similar sized Blue Danubes then
in service. The Mk 2s remained in service until 1972, when they were
phased out by the WE-177. A maximum of 150 were built.
Blue Steel
This was Britain's first nuclear missile. The Blue Steel was a liquid fuel air-to-surface strategic missile, carried by the British strategic "V-bombers" - the Vulcan B.2A and Victor B.2R. The missile began development in 1956, and entered service December 1962 with full operational status being achieved during 1963. The last Blue Steel was w1thdrawn from Victor squadron service at the end of 1968, and from Vulcan service at the end of 1970. Originally a large 200 kt fission warhead was planned, but this was later changed to a thermonuclear warhead with a yield of 1 megaton or more. This warhead was most likely an adapted Mk-28. About 57 of the missiles were ordered, and about 40 were deployed
The Blue Steel was 10.7 m long, had a wing span of 4.0 m, and weighed 6800 kg. It traveled at up to Mach 2.5, with a maximum range of approximately 200 km. The missile used in inertial navigation system that provided an accuracy of 100-700 yards (CEP).
WE 177
The WE 177 free-fall bomb was Britain's last air-delivered nuclear weapon. With its retirement in March 1998, the UK no longer had any aircraft carried nuclear capability. This bomb was produced in three versions - the relatively high yield strategic A and B versions (200-400 kt), and the lower yield tactical C version (approx. 10 kt). The A and B versions entered service with the RAF in 1966, the C version was deployed by the Royal Navy in 1971 as a strike/depth bomb. The retirement of the C version was announced in June 1992. The origin of the WE 177 is not clear. It is believed to be based on American designs, most likely the B-61 if it is indeed a single basic design. It has been suggested that the C version may be a different design from the A and B versions, in which case the B-57 is a plausible candidate for this version. U.S. documents indicate that in 1961 Britain had plans to produce B-57 variants.
The WE 177A weighed 272 kg (600 lb) and had a maximum yield of 200 kt, the WE 177B weighed 431 kg (950 lb) and had a maximum yield of 400 kt. Both weapons were variable yield designs. Although they were both one-point safe, they lacked insensitive high explosive or fire-resistant pits. Both variant were parachute retarded for low level delivery and could be used in laydown mode (time delayed detonation on the ground).
Quantity production of the WE 177 was delayed until the 1970s due to the production demands of the Polaris warhead which ended in 1969. Deployment was completed by the late 70s. The WE 177 was retired from service in March 1998, and dismantling was completed by the end of August 1998.
Polaris Warhead
There is some confusion about whether there were really two Polaris warheads (that is, "physics packages") or only one. The initial deployment of the three warhead A3T Polaris SLBM was accompanied by the production and deployment of a British-produced warhead, apparently a version of the American W-58 200 kt warhead deployed on the U.S. Polaris A3. Later an update of the Polaris missile force, known as the Chevaline program, was carried out with the modified missiles being re-designated the A3TK. This update included a new bus (upper stage), new RVs, and a sophisticated penetration aid (decoy) package. It is not completely clear whether the existing Polaris warheads were simply repackaged, or whether a completely new model was introduced. Due to Britain's limited weapons development and production capacity it seems likely that the warheads used to equip Chevaline, were based on the preexisting Polaris warheads.
Immediately after the 10 June 1963 decision by the British Admiralty to acquire the next-generation A3T Polaris SLBM (in preference to the A2 version then deployed by the U.S., Aldermaston began full-scale developmental work on the Polaris warhead. The design is said to be completed in the spring of 1966, with production beginning in 1966 or 1967. The "developmental" and "design" work associated with this warhead presumably involved adapting the already proof-tested American W-58 warhead to manufacture in a British plant. The warheads were deployed in Mk-2 RVs purchased from the U.S.
The Polaris A3 was the first multiple warhead missile, equipped with three MRVs (multiple re-entry vehicles). The MRVs were dispersed around a central aiming point, they were not independently targeted. Four Polaris subs of the Resolution class were deployed, each with 16 missiles. It is believed that only 144 warheads (plus possibly some spares) were manufactured, enough to equip three subs at a time. The fourth boat was in port for maintenance and refitting at any given time.
Two mid-life update programs were instituted for the Polaris missile. The first and best known was the Chevaline program. It began in secret (as is true of all British nuclear programs) in the late sixties when the Soviet Union began deploying an ABM system around Moscow. Although this system eventually turned out to be very limited in scope, concern about the continuing potency of the British deterrent developed and proposals were made to develop a countermeasure system to improve the ability for Polaris to penetrate these defenses. The program was not an original British undertaking, but was based on a classified U.S. program called Antelope which had made available to the UK in 1967. Studies of the concept were made in 1967, by 1969 the Chevaline concept was defined, and by 1972 the system had been worked out in detail.
Chevaline was a complex system was based on the coordination of the 16 missiles on a single submarine, maneuver by the RVs to elude interceptors, along with multiple decoy re-entry vehicles, and hardening of the warhead against ABM weapon effects. Each missile would fly a different trajectory so that all missiles would arrive simultaneously over the target (Moscow) and release two real warheads (reduced from the three of the AT3) plus four decoy RVs, and a large number of decoy balloons. The defense would be presented with 96 simultaneous maneuvering targets to intercept (even after the balloon decoys burned up). The system proved far more difficult to develop and deploy than expected.
The first Chevaline warhead was tested 23 May 1974 (possibly designated the TK-100). The public disclosure occurred on 24 January 1980 during a debate in Parliament. Sea trials of Chevaline were conducted in November 1980. Production of the Chevaline warhead ran from 1979-1982 with 100 warheads being produced. Chevaline went on patrol for the first time mid-1982 with deployment completed in 1987. The estimated yield of the Chevaline is 225 kt.
The second update program for Polaris involved remanufacture of the solid fuel motors. This program began in 1981, and led to the installation of new motors in all missiles during 1986-87.
Trident Warhead
The first batch of British Trident warheads were completed in September 1992. They were designed by the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) at Aldermaston, and are assembled at Aldermaston and Burghfield. The warheads are though to have similar characteristics to the U.S. W-76 now on U.S. Trident I and II missiles. Production of this warhead was probably halted in March 1998, with the issuing of the 1998 Strategic Defense Review that scaled back Britian's nuclear deterrent posture.
The British Trident warheads are capable of selective yield, ranging from under a kiloton up to the full yield of 100 kt or so (this appears to differ from U.S. SLBM warheads). Yields are probably 0.3 kt, 5-10 kt and 100 kt.
7.2.3.3 The Current British Nuclear Weapon Stockpile
Given
the historical paucity of information provided by the British
government on its nuclear arsenal, precise estimates of its size have
been difficult to make. In recent years the British had trimmed their
nuclear arsenal to just two types of nuclear weapons: the WE177 A/B
bomb (200-400 kt) and the Trident missile warhead (100 kt).
In March 1998, after 10 months of work, a comprehensive Strategic Defense Review was completed. As part of this review, a major reduction in Britian's nuclear arsenal and posture was declared. Effective immediately all WE177 bombs were removed from service, and all of them (175 WE 177 A and B bombs - with yields of 200 and 400 kt) were dismantled by the end of August. This leaves only a single nuclear weapon system in service - the Trident submarine.
This system too was significantly scaled back. The final seven Trident II missiles that had been planned were cancelled (saving 50 million pounds and writing off another 40 million), leaving the UK with a total missile inventory of 58. The number of submarines on patrol at any given time was reduced to one, and the number of warheads deployed on a submarine was reduced to 48 (identical to the force loading on its previous Polaris fleet). The SDR also announced that Britain would hold its arsenal to "a stockpile of fewer than 200 operationally available warheads". The UK was already believed to have fewer than 200 Trident warheads, although the number could have eventually gone as high as 248 under previous MoD directives. As of the fall of 1998 Trident warhead production is still apparently on-going but should wrap up soon, perhaps early in 1999. In keeping with the reduced operational tempo, only a single crew for each submarine will be maintained. The SDR further declares that "the submarines will routinely be at a 'notice to fire' measured in days rather than the few minutes quick reaction alert that we sustained throughout the Cold War."
The SDR points out that the implied arsenal of 192 warheads "is a reduction of a third from the maximum of 300 announced by the previous government and represents a reduction of more than 70% in the potential explosive power of the deterrent since the end of the Cold War".
The SDR confirmed plans for the Royal Navy to complete the construction of four Vanguard-class nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). The first submarine of the class, the HMS Vanguard, went on its first patrol in December 1994. The second, the Victorious, entered service in December 1995. The Vigilant was launched in October 1995, and was expected to enter service in the summer or fall of 1998. The final sub, the Vengeance, is under construction with an estimated launch date of 1998, with service likely in late 2000 or early 2001. THE SDR anticipates keeping this force in service for at least 30 years.
The 58 missile bodies being procured are fewer than the 64 required to completely equip all four boats, so rotating missiles between submarines will be required. But since only one Trident submarine will be on patrol at any given time, it will be easy to have one submarine out of service - undergoing refitting and maintenance - at any given time, requiring only 48 missiles for the three active boats. This is similar to the practice the UK followed with its previous submarine fleet, the Resolution class Polaris missile subs. The UK produced only enough warheads for three of the four boats, so that warheads were rotated from boats in port to ones that were setting out on patrol. Typically two Trident submarines may be at sea at any given time, one going or coming back from patrol while the other is on duty.
The Trident II missiles are not actually owned outright by the UK. Instead the Trident II missiles belong to a pool of missiles managed by the United States and stored at Kings Bay, Georgia. British boats pick up their load of missiles at Kings bay when they are commissioned and exchange them there when missiles need servicing. The Trident warheads are mated to the missiles on-board the submarine at the Royal naval Armament Depot at Coulport.
Although the average number of warheads per missile will be 48, the actual distribution of warheads on missiles is uncertain. Beginning in 1996 the UK adopted the strategy of "sub-strategic deterrence". This is basically the same idea as the U.S. policy of "flexible response". It entails having a range of nuclear options, especially limited ones. Some Trident missiles are thus downloaded to a single warhead so that it is possible to launch a strike without using multiple warheads, others will thus have a higher loading. The Trident warheads also offer multiple yields - probably 0.3 kt, 5-10 kt and 100 kt - by choosing to fire the unboosted primary, the boosted primary, or the entire "physics package". According to the 1996 Defence White Paper this policy will become fully operational when the Vigilant goes into service.
Active British Stockpile: End of 1998
The approximate composition of the British stockpile was:
WARHEAD/WEAPON FIRST YIELD NUMBER TOTAL YIELD (MAX)
PRODUCED (kt) Mt Equiv. Mt
Trident MIRV 1992 100 192 19.2 41.4
GRAND TOTAL 192 19.2 41.4
Active British Forces: End of 1998
DELIVERY VEHICLE DATE NUMBER RANGE (km)/ WARHEAD LOAD TOTAL
DEPLOYED PAYLOAD (kg)
SUBMARINE-BASED MISSILES
Trident II D-5 1994 58 7400/2800 1-6 x MIRV 192
7.2.3.4 British Nuclear Installations
In the United Kingdom nuclear weapons development, acquisition and deployment now occurs entirely within the organizational structure of the Ministry of Defense (MoD). The organization within the MoD responsible for the development, manufacture, and servicing of nuclear weapons is the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), which is under the authority of the Procurement Executive of the MoD. The AWE came into existence on 1 September 1987 through the merger of the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment (AWRE) at Aldermaston, and the Directorate of Atomic Weapons Factories (aka the Royal Ordnance Factories, or ROF) at Burghfield and Cardiff. Prior to its transfer to the MoD in 1973, the AWRE had been under the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority since 1954.
AWE Aldermaston
This is the central facility
of the British nuclear weapon establishment. It is located at
Aldermaston, near Reading, in Berkshire. This facility not only
performs most research activities, it also develops weapon designs, and
manufactures the majority of weapon components, including nuclear
components. It was officially established 1 April 1950 on the site of a
World War II airfield. Weapons development work was transferred there
from the codenamed "High Explosive Research" (HER) project at Fort
Halstead in Kent. The AWE employs about 5000 people.
The facility at Aldermaston covers 880 acres and is broken up into 11 areas. The main administration building is F6.1 in the F area. Area A is known as the Citadel, it occupies the north side of the site and includes the plutonium manufacture and pit fabrication facilities. The A1 plutonium manufacturing buildings were the original fabrication facilities that opened in the early to late 50s. They became badly contaminated in 1978 and were closed, but were reopened in 1982 to manufacture the Chevaline warheads. Operation continued long after its planned closing date, and it manufactured the first Trident warheads. The replacement A90 complex began construction in 1983 and after many delays went into operation in 1991 (5 years late). The A90 complex has 300 glove-box production units, and now handles Trident plutonium component production.
AWE Aldermaston is organized into three major departments relating to weapons development: the Warhead Physics Department, the Warhead Design Department, and the Materials Department.
The Warhead Physics Department is responsible for research and analysis of the fundamental physical processes involved in nuclear weapons. It is divided into the Mathematical Physics Division (conducts theoretical work and computer modelling and simulation), the Warhead Hydrodynamics Division (conducts experimental work in the processes of weapon assembly and disassembly), the Radiation Physics Division (conducts experimental work in both nuclear radiation physics and radiation hydrodynamics), and the Foulness Division (conducts explosive experiments at Foulness in Essex).
The Warhead Design Department develops the complete nuclear weapon design. It is divided into the Weapon Engineering Division ("physics package" design), the Weapon Diagnostics Division (system testing for EMP and nuclear hardening, etc.), and the Electronic Systems Division (fuzing and arming systems development).
The Materials Department develops the materials and processes required to design and manufacture nuclear weapons. It is divided into the Chemistry and Explosives Division, the Chemical Technology Division, and the Metallurgy Division.
AWE Burghfield
The Royal Ordnance Factory
(ROF), Burghfield (now AWE Burghfield) was established in 1954 as the
final assembly plant for nuclear weapons (the British equivalent of
Pantex). It is located 5 miles southwest of Aldermaston and covers 265
acres, although since 1976 it has been omitted from all British maps.
It employs some 600 people. Many of the non-nuclear components of
nuclear weapons are manufactured at Burghfield - including electronic
components, and various casing and component packaging materials. At
any given time a number of weapons may be stored there for servicing or
disassembly.
AWE Cardiff
Located in Llanishen, 3 miles
north of Cardiff, Wales, AWE Cardiff has been involved in nuclear
weapon component production since at least 1963. It has a work force of
400 and specializes in high precision components and complex
assemblies. Essential parts of thermonuclear weapons, and
beryllium/U-238 tampers for fission primaries are manufactured there.
Up to 50 tons of depleted uranium may be stored on site. In 1987 AWE
Cardiff used 2300 kg of beryllium. Servicing/disassembly of nuclear
weapon components also occurs at the facility.
AWE Foulness
This is a 2000 acre test range
located on remote Foulness Island on the northern edge of the Thames
estuary near Shoeburyness. High explosive tests are conducted at the
range, both for weapons development and safety, and to simulate nuclear
weapon blast effects.
Sellafield/Windscale/Calder Hall
The main
plutonium production site in the United Kingdom is at Sellafield
(renamed Windscale when the reactor facility was first built, but now
reverted to the original name Sellafield) in north-west England,
located on the Cumbrian coast of the Irish Sea. Two 100 MW air-cooled
graphite-moderated natural uranium plutonium production reactors (the
Windscale Piles) were built there starting in 1950. The first reactor
went critical in October 1950, the second in June 1951. These Piles
operated until Windscale Pile No. 1 caught fire on 7 October 1957. The
fire burned for five days, releasing tens of thousand of curies of
radioiodine, and 240 curies of polonium-210 which was being
manufactured in the reactor for weapon neutron initiators. During the
11 reactor-years of combined operation these piles produced about 385
kg of weapon-grade plutonium.
Starting in 1956 four more reactors were built at Sellafield - the Calder Hall (CH) Magnox reactors. The Calder Hall reactors entered service between October 1956 and May 1959. These were 180 MW carbon-dioxide cooled reactors with a dual-purpose: they could produce both weapons grade plutonium and electricity. Weapons grade plutonium production tends to interfere with the most economical production of electricity (requiring more uranium for fuel, longer shut down times, and more spent fuel handling), so they were not operated continuously for weapons grade plutonium production. Weapons plutonium production appears to have occurred during 1956-64, the late 1970s, and the mid-late 1980s. These reactors were uprated (as were the identical Chapelcross reactors) to 240 MW in the 1960s, and then downrated slightly in the 1970s.
Sellafield is also the location of British fuel reprocessing facilities, now operated by British Nuclear Fuels Limited (BNFL). The original plant employed the Butex separation process and went into operation on 25 February 1952. The first billets of impure plutonium were produced 31 March 1952. There are now two main plants - the older B205 facility used for Magnox fuel and the newer THORP (thermal oxide reprocessing plant) facility which handles only civilian fuel and is safeguarded. The B205 plant has a capacity of 1,500 tonnes of spent fuel per year , compared to 1,200 tonnes/year for THORP.
Chapelcross
Four more military production
reactors, identical to the Calder Hall models but designated "CX", are
located at Annan, near Dumfries on Solway Firth in south-west Scotland.
Although these reactors have been used for plutonium production, they
are also the principal source of tritium for the UK. Although Britain
is known to have produced kilogram quantities of tritium before 1970
(6,7 kg of it were exported to the U.S.) the initiation of tritium
production at Chapelcross was announced in April 1976. Tritium has
apparently been purchased from the U.S. at certain times.
Total Plutonium Production
In addition to the
militarized nuclear reactors mentioned above, prior to 1969 spent fuel
was diverted from other civilian nuclear reactors as well. Attempting
to estimate British weapons plutonium production from these many
sources is quite difficult. The best estimates have been made by
Albright, Berkhout, and Walker in Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium
1996,
SIPRI Press. Their net estimate is that Britain produced 3.6 tonnes of
weapon grade plutonium in reactors (using fuel burnups of 400-800
megawatt-days/tonne) +/- 0.5 tonnes. About 0.5 tonnes has been
effectively lost through reprocessing waste, expenditures in tests, and
transfers to the United States. Another 8.7 tonnes of fuel or reactor
grade plutonium is also in military inventory.
A British nuclear industry report on plutonium holdings for 1995 showed that British Nuclear Fuels PLC held a total 85 tonnes tonnes of civilian plutonium. 54 tonnes are owned by UK utilities and 31 tonnes owned by BNFL or its overseas customers. Of this 85 tonnes, 39.5 tonnes remains in spent fuel. Only 66 kg was listed as being in MOX fuel exported, none in MOX stock. All separated plutonium had more than 15% Pu-240. The military plutonium stockpile was given as 4.5 tonnes held in various forms by the UK Atomic Energy Authority.
Capenhurst
Britain's indigenous
supply of enriched uranium is supplied by the gaseous diffusion plant
at Capenhurst, originally the site of a Royal Ordnance factory, 25
miles from Risley in Cheshire. Although an enrichment plant was
authorized in October 1946, the site was not selected until early 1950.
Capenhurst made its initial start up in February 1952, but did not
successfully enter operation until 1953 (producing low enriched
uranium), and did not produce highly enriched uranium (HEU) until 1954.
The plant was given successive upgrades during the fifties, reaching a
military significant capacity of 125 kg of highly enriched uranium a
year in 1957, and much higher levels in 1959 (as much as 1600 kg/yr, or
an enrichment capacity of 325,000 SWU/yr). Capenhurst operated as a
source of HEU at full capacity only until the end of 1961. Most of the
stages were shut down at that point and the plant converted to
low-enriched uranium production for civil reactor use. The 1996 SIPRI
estimate was 3.8-4.9 tonnes of HEU being produced, almost all of it in
1959-1961.
The original gaseous diffusion plant was dismantled in 1982, and a new gas centrifuge plant was built called Capenhurst A3. This plant has a capacity of 200,000 SWU/yr and has never produced HEU. After start up ion 1984-85 it produced 4.5% enriched uranium for export to the U.S. either for further enrichment to HEU or in exchange for an equivalent amount of HEU. Since 1993 Capenhurst A3 has been operated as a civilian fuel enrichment plant operated by Urenco under IAEA safeguards.
The majority of Britain's HEU supply was purchased from the United States. Prior to 1970 6700 kg of HEU was imported. An estimated 4000 kg has been acquired from the U.S. since that time. The total amount of HEU acquired by the UK since the start of its nuclear program is estimated by SIPRI at 15.1 tonnes, of which 5.8 tonnes have been used in submarine reactors, 1.0 tonnes used in nuclear tests, and 0.5 tonnes lost in processing wastes. This leaves 7.8 tonnes available for weapons use (+/- 25%)
As part of the SDR, the UK released its first official figures about its holdings of fissile weapons material. These figures can be compared with the estimates given above. Current defence stocks are 7.6 tonnes of plutonium, 21.9 tonnes of highly enriched uranium (both substantially higher than the estimates above) and 15,000 tonnes of other forms of uranium. With the reduction in planned warhead numbers, the UK plans to place a surplus of 0.3 tonnes of weapons grade plutonium under international safeguards (along with surplus non-weapons grade material).
The UK also declared that:
"We will also cease exercising our right as a nuclear weapon state under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to withdraw fissile material from safeguarded stocks for nuclear weapons. Future withdrawals will be limited to small quantities of materials not suitable for weapons purposes and the details will be made public. No material withdrawn from safeguards will be used in nuclear weapons. All planned future reprocessing will also be carried out under safeguards and we intend to publish an initial report by 2000 on past defence fissile material production."
Principal sources for the section on the United Kingdom are:
7.2.4.1 History of French Nuclear Weapon Development
Although France had been a leading nation in research in nuclear physics before World War II, it lagged badly behind the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and even Canada, in the years immediately afterward. Progress had been slight under German occupation, and it was largely cut off from the rapid advances made during the war (in contrast Britain had been an active participant with the U.S. in much this research, and large quantities of material about it had been passed on to the Soviet Union).
A decree by the French provisional government, issued 18 October 1945 under the authority of President and General Charles de Gaulle, established the French Atomic Energy Commission (Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique, or CEA). Like the U.S. AEC (established later), it had authority over all aspects of nuclear affairs - scientific, commercial, and military. Raoul Dautry was appointed Administrator-General and Frederic Joliot-Curie, France's preeminent nuclear scientist, was made High Commissioner. The site for the main nuclear research facility was selected at Saclay, south of Paris, but initial work began at a temporary site while the Saclay facility was constructed. The site selected was the old fortress of Fort de Chatillon on the outskirts of Paris. There France's first nuclear reactor, the heavy water/natural uranium oxide EL-1 or ZOE (Zero power, uranium Oxide fuel, and Eau lourde - or heavy water), was constructed. ZOE went critical 15 December 1948.
During 1949 the CEA constructed a laboratory scale plutonium extraction facility (initially really just a plutonium chemistry research lab) at Le Bouchet that worked with irradiated fuel from ZOE. On 20 November 1949 the CEA announced that it had extracted its first milligram of plutonium as a pure salt. Le Bouchet extracted 10 mg by the end of 1950, and 100 mg by the end of 1951. By that time a sophisticated extraction process based on solvent extraction with tributyl phosphate, similar to the American Purex process, had been developed. A pilot industrial processing plant was subsequently built at Fontenay-aux-Roses where the first gram of plutonium was isolated from spent fuel rods from ZOE in 1954.
In 1952 a second reactor entered service, the EL-2 (or P-2) at Saclay. This was a heavy water moderated, natural uranium metal reactor, cooled by pressurized gas. Between 1954 and 1957 the Fontenay-aux-Roses pilot plant produced about 200 grams of plutonium from EL-2 fuel.
Although de Gaulle had been an enthusiastic supporter for acquiring atomic arms immediately after the war, in the latter forties interest languished. Part of the reason for this was the high profile of French communists who (in keeping with the internationalist line emanating from Moscow) opposed proliferation. In fact High Commissioner Joliot-Curie himself was an ardent communist, a fact that kept France frozen out of American, British, and Canadian nuclear activities.
In 1951 Joliot-Curie was dismissed as High Commissioner and replaced by Francis Perrin in April. In August Felix Gaillard was appointed Secretary of State for Atomic Energy (later to become Prime Minister and order France's first nuclear test). On 21 August Administrator-General Dautry died, and was replaced in November by Pierre Guillaumat. Under the leadership of these three men, a five-year plan for atomic energy was drawn up by the end of 1951. This plan, approved by the National assembly in July 1952, authorized the construction of industrial scale plutonium production facilities at Marcoule on the Rhone River - although without any discussion of the military implications of this program.
By this time large deposits of uranium had been discovered near Limoges, in central France, providing them with an unrestricted supply of nuclear fuel. The G-1 reactor at Marcoule, was a natural uranium, graphite moderated design, which could be constructed solely with France's own internal resources. G-1 went critical in 1956 at a power level of 38 MW (thermal) and was capable of producing 12 kg of plutonium a year (later increased to 42 MW by 1962). G-1 operated until 1968. Subsequently work began on a reprocessing plant at the same site, built by Saint-Gobain Techniques Nouvelles (SGN). Two larger reactors of similar design, G-2 and G-3, were completed in 1959 with operating powers of 200 MW each (later increased to 260 MW).
Official approval for developing nuclear weapons was not authorized until late 1954, even though by then the necessary plutonium production program was well advanced. Following the route of French forces at Dien Bien Phu, and the loss of then French Indochina, France's interest in nuclear weapons to bolster its national prestige took a sharp upswing. On 26 December 1954, Prime Minister Pierre Mendes-France met with his cabinet and authorized a program to develop an atomic bomb. On 28 December a new Bureau of General Studies (Bureau d'Etudes Generales) was created with General Albert Buchalet as head to pursue this option. In 1955 the Armed Forces Ministry (Ministre des Armees) began transferring funds in large amounts to this program.
The next blow to French morale, the humiliating Suez Crisis of October 1956, further intensified development efforts. The Crisis involved a joint British-French (and Israeli) invasion of Egypt. The U.S. vigorously opposed the invasion, and Britain's commitment to it quickly collapsed. These events acted to make France deeply suspicious of relying on allies for support, an attitude instrumental in France's later decision to abandon NATO's defense structure and develop its own independent nuclear deterrent. It is probably no coincidence that on 30 November 1956 the Ministre des Armees and the CEA signed a memorandum committing them to arrange a nuclear weapon test.
The most outspoken proponent of nuclear weapons in the military, Col. Charles Aillert, became a general in 1956 and on 10 June 1958 was put in charge of the Commandement des Armes Speciales (Special Weapons Command). On 11 April 1958 Felix Gaillard, the last Prime Minister of the Fourth Republic, signed an official order for the manufacture and testing of a nuclear device. Late in 1958 Charles de Gaulle returned to power as the first President of the Fifth Republic. The nuclear weapons program now had the enthusiastic backing of a forceful leader, holding a newly created powerful executive office. It was under de Gaulle's leadership that France's independent force de frappe (strike force) came into being.
The first French nuclear test, code-named Gerboise Bleue, was detonated at 0704 GMT on 13 February 1960 at Reggane in Algeria (00.04 deg W, 26.19 deg N) atop a 105 m tower. This device, a prototype for the AN-11 warhead deployed three years later, used plutonium and a notably high yield of 60-70 kt. No other nuclear power has ever detonated such a powerful device as its first test.
France continued to use the Reggane site for the next three atmospheric tests. The last of these, on 25 April 1965, was really a low yield "scuttle" of the test device to prevent it from falling into the hands of mutineers during the "Revolt of the Generals", set in motion three days earlier by General Maurice Challe. These atmospheric test brought severe condemnation from other African nations, so all subsequent tests in Algeria shifted to underground testing at In Ecker in southern Algeria. Testing in Algeria continued until 16 February 1966, three and a half years after Algeria had gained independence. France's testing program then moved to the Mururoa and Fangataufa Atolls in the South Pacific.
Through the early sixties, France concentrated on fielding high yield pure fission designs intended as strategic weapons. A series of warheads (the AN-11 and AN-22 bombs, and the MR-31 missile warhead) had yields from 60 to 120 kt. These weapons all used plutonium as the only fissile material. The 120 kt yield probably represents a practical upper limit for pure fission plutonium weapons.
France began a program to develop ballistic missiles on 17 September 1959 with the creation of a special company called SEREB (the Society for Research and Development of Ballistic Engines). The technology had to be developed from scratch with the goal of building missiles for both land and sea basing with an intended range of 3500 km. The flight test center for the project, code-named "Precious Stones", was based in the Algerian Sahara.
On 26 November 1965 France launched its first satellite. The first ballistic missile to be developed - the SSBS S2 (Sol-Sol Balistique Strategique) IRBM (intermediate range ballistic missile) began testing in launches in October 1965. It was deployed on the Plateau d'Albion between Marseille and Lyon where 18 silos were built in two groups of 9. The missile force, armed with the 120 kt pure fission MR-31, finally went operational on 2 August 1971.
In 1965 a large gaseous-diffusion plant went into operation at Pierrelatte, initially producing only low enriched uranium. In 1967 the rest of the plant was completed and highly enriched uranium became available for weapons, the first HEU being delivered in April. Accordingly the next design tested and introduced (the MR-41) was a boosted fission design using HEU with a yield of 500 kt. Three tests were conducted between 7 July and 3 August with a combined yield of over 1000 kt, indicating both a high production rate and rapid incorporation into test devices.
In 1965 also a shift towards tactical weapons began. Lower yield pure fission designs for a tactical bomb (the 6-25 kt AN-52) and a battlefield missile warhead (the 10-25 kt AN-51 for the Pluton missile). These weapons entered the stockpile in 1972-73.
Sometime in the early sixties, an effort to develop thermonuclear weapons began. The man chosen to lead the project was a brilliant young physicist employed by the CEA named Roger Dautry. Little is known about this program, but it came to fruition in the Canopus test at 18:30 on 24 August 1968 over Fangataufa Atoll. In this test a 3 tonne device suspended at an altitude of 600 m from a balloon produced a yield of 2.6 megatons (and became the largest nuclear device France ever tested). The device used a lithium-6 deuteride secondary jacketed with highly enriched uranium and heavily contaminated the atoll, leaving it off limits to humans for six years.
In June 1962 the Coelacanthe Program was formed to coordinate the development of a nuclear ballistic submarine fleet among the CEA (for warheads and naval reactors), and the Defense Ministry's Directorates of Missiles (Direction des Engins, DEN) for ballistic missiles, and Naval Construction (Direction des Constrouctions Navales, DCN) for submarines. The French Strategic Oceanic Force (Force Oceanique Strategique, or FOST) was formed in 1967 to operate the fleet.
France's first class of strategic missile submarine (usually designated by SSBN, but called in France "sous-marins nucleaires d'Englins" or SNLEs) was the Redoubtable class of five SSBNs was deployed between 1972 and 1980. The lead ship of this class, the Redoubtable, was launched 29 March 1967, but did not enter operational service until 1972, when it began its first patrol on 28 January. These submarines originally carried 16 MSBS M1 SLBMs (later replaced by the M2 and then the M20 SLBM), armed with the 500 kt MR-41. France's first thermonuclear weapon, the 1 Mt TN-60, was finally deployed in 1976 atop the third generation of French SLBMs, the MSBS M20. The TN-60 was eventually replaced with a reduced weight TN-60, redesignated the TN-61.
Although five submarines were deployed, missiles were purchased to equip only four at a time. This reflects the fact that only four SLBMs are available for deployment at any given time, the fifth sub is undergoing servicing or overhaul. This practice of equipping only four subs at at time remains in force.
The seventies saw a number of modernization programs initiated.
In 1978 a fleet updating program began in which a new second-generation submarine sharing the same basic hull design as the Redoubtable class would be built but incorporating the latest technologies and carrying a new missile, the MSBS M4A, the first French missile to be armed with MIRV warheads (six 150 kt TN-70 thermonuclear weapons). This new submarine was named the L'Inflexible and was deployed 1 April 1985. Subsequently all of the Redoubtable class SLBMs were overhauled and refitted to the new standard set by L'Inflexible, with the exception of the Redoubtable itself, which was "paid off" (retired) in October 1991. Between October 1987 and February 1993 the other four refitted submarines were returned to service now redesignated as part of the L'Inflexible class.
The initial phase of development for the MSBS M4 started in 1978 when the submarine fleet updating program was authorized. Before the first production M4A was built (in 1984), a missile updating program for the M4 began in 1983. The MSBS M4B went into service in December 1987 armed with the new TN-71 warhead, a reduced weight and hardened version of the TN-70.
Development was initiated in 1972 on a second generation of IRBM, the SSBS S3. This missile replaced the S2 on a one-for-one basis. The S3 began service in June 1980 and was fully operational by January 1983, the same time an EMP hardening program began. By September 1984 all 18 missiles were hardened and designated the SSBS S3D (for durci, or hardened). The SSBS S3/S3D was armed with the same TN-61 thermonuclear warhead as the MSBS M20.
In the early 1970s interest developed in extending the ability of aircraft to deliver nuclear weapons by equipping them with a nuclear armed missile. Such a missile would permit the delivery of nuclear warheads against highly defended targets, extend the effective range of an aircraft, allow it to attack multiple targets more quickly, and allow older aircraft to remain useful in service longer. The ASMP (Air-Sol Moyenne Portee) program was launched in May 1978, and entered the French nuclear arsenal in May 1986. The ASMP was originally armed with the 300 kt thermonuclear TN-80, which was later replaced by the lighter TN-81.
7.2.4.2 History of the French Nuclear Weapon Stockpile
AN-11 Bomb
This free fall bomb was the first
nuclear weapon stockpiled by France, going into service in 1964. It was
a pure fission plutonium implosion design, a development version of
which was fired in France's first nuclear test on 13 February 1960. A
prototype bomb was first tested 1 May 1962. The bomb was intended for
high altitude delivery against strategic targets by France's first
strategic nuclear bomber - the Mirage IVA (entered service October
1964). A live drop from a Mirage IVA was conducted 19 July 1966. The
bomb weighed 1500 kg, and had a yield of 60 kt. The bomb was stockpiled
from 1963, when full-scale production commenced, to November 1968.
About 40 were built. Replacement by the AN-22 began in 1967.
AN-22 Bomb
This bomb replaced the AN-11, which
it resembles in most respects. It was a pure fission plutonium bomb,
originally weighing 1400-1500 kg, with a yield of 60-70 kt, intended
for free-fall delivery from Mirage IVA bombers. It went into service in
late 1967 and was retired July 1988. The bomb had improved safety
features. Modifications while in service reduced its weight by half
(with yield unchanged) and equipped it with a retarding parachute for
low-level delivery. About 40 bombs were built, one for each of the 36
Mirage IVA aircraft in service. As the Mirage IVAs were retired in the
late eighties so were their bombs. The last squadron retired 1 July
1988.
MR-31 Warhead
This missile warhead was in the
stockpile from 1970 to June 1980. It was test fired 11 September 1966.
It armed the SSBS S2 IRBM, and entered operational service with the
first nine S2s in August 1971. The remaining nine S2s went operational
in April 1972. It remained in service until the last SSBS S2 was
retired, the S2/MR-31 combination being replaced by the SSBS S3/TN-61.
The warhead was an pure fission plutonium warhead with a yield
of 120 kt and a weight of 700 kg. This is probably the highest yield
plutonium fission device ever developed. The warhead was unhardened, it
is probably a practical impossibility to harden a large pure fission
warhead like this against predetonation effects.
MR-41 Warhead
The MR-41 was France's first
boosted fission warhead, and its highest yield non-thermonuclear
warhead. The MR-41 was in the stockpile from 1971 to 1979 and armed the
MSBS M1 and M2 SLBMs. The initial development of the warhead began in
1963, and a second development stage ran from 1966 to 1971. This design
was based on highly enriched uranium boosted with deuterium and
tritium. It was tested 15 July 1968 and 3 August 1968. The final design
was tested 12 June 1971. It had a surprisingly light weight for a high
yield fission bomb, about 700 kg, and had a yield of 500 kt.
Fabrication of warhead components began in 1969. The MR-41 went into
operational service with the first patrol of Le Redoubtable
on 28 January 1972. About 35 warheads were built to support two sets of
strategic submarine missiles loads (16 MSBS M1/M2 missiles each for two
subs). The MR-41 was replaced by the TN-60, which armed the MSBS M20,
between 1977 and 1979.
AN-51 CTC Warhead
The AN-51 was based on a
pure plutonium fission warhead design called the MR-50 CTC (charge
tactique commune, or common tactical charge). The MR-50 design was
tested 2 July 1966 with a yield of 30 kt, the AN-51 was proof tested 5
June 1971 with a yield of 15 kt. The AN-51 was used to arm the Pluton
tactical missile which went into service 1 May 1974. The last AN-51 was
manufactured January 1977, the warhead was stockpiled from 1973 to
1993. There were two yield variants - one with a 10 kt yield, and a
high yield version of 25 kt. The warhead was relatively light, weighing
about 500 kg. A total of 70 warheads were manufactured, one for each of
70 missiles (assigned two to a launcher).
AN-52 CTC Warhead
The AN-52 was France's first
tactical warhead, and like the AN-51, was based on the same warhead
design - the MR-50 common tactical charge (CTC, charge tactique
commune). The AN-52 was a low yield parachute retarded bomb deployed
with the Mirage IIIE and the Jaguar A aircraft of the Air Force, and
the Super Etendard for naval aviation (Aeronavale). The AN-52 was
airdropped 28 August 1972 (yield 6.6 kt). It was stockpiled from
October 1972 to September 1991. There were two yield variants - one
with a 6-8 kt yield, and a high yield version of 25 kt. The bomb
weighed 455 kg, was 4.2 m long, with a body width of 0.6 m (0.8 m fin
span). 80-100 bombs were manufactured.
TN-60/61 Warhead
This is a family of
thermonuclear warheads that began development at least as far back as
1968, when the first developmental nuclear tests were conducted. The
first member of this family, the TN-60, was also France's first
thermonuclear weapon. The development process was quite lengthy,
requiring 21 nuclear tests spread over eight years. The resulting
warhead was relatively sophisticated however, similar to U.S. designs
of the early sixties such as the W-56 Minuteman II warhead fielded in
1963. The TN-60 was replaced by the improved TN-61 which was lighter in
weight and was hardened against nuclear weapon effects. The TN-60/61
family was used to arm both submarine launched missiles (the MSBS M20
and MSBS M4) and land-based missiles (the SSBS S3).
The first TN-60 was transferred from the CEA to the military on 24
January 1976, and effectively entered service in early 1977 when the
first SSBN patrol carrying the MSBS M20 missile was made. The TN-60 did
not remain in service for long since it was quickly superseded by the
TN-61, which entered service late in 1977. Both warheads had a yield of
1 megaton, the TN-61 weighed 275-375 kg (700 kg with re-entry vehicle).
The lighter weight of the TN-61 allowed the addition of penetration
aids (e.g. decoys) to the RV. Enough TN-60/61 warheads were built to
arm four submarines at a time, a total of 64 warheads. A maximum of
about 70 warheads total were in stockpile at any given time (to allow
for spares). The last TN-61 was withdrawn from naval service in
February 1991.
The TN-61 also armed the SSBS S3 missile based in silos on the Plateau
d'Albion. The first set of nine TN-61 armed missiles went operational 1
June 1980, and the second set of nine on 1 January 1983. About 20
TN-61s were built for land-based deployment (18 on duty, and 2 spares).
The TN-61 was retired from service with the deactivation of the SSBS
S3D on 16 September 1996. A total of about 90 TN-61s were manufactured
for all purposes.
TN-70/71 Warhead
The TN-70/71 thermonuclear
warhead family has lower yield, lower weight, and higher survivability
compared to its TN-60/61 predecessor. The smaller warhead size allows
the TN-70/71 to be used for arming missiles with multiple warheads
(MIRVs). Six MIRV TN-70/71 warheads are used to arm each MSBS M4A and
M4B SLBM. Both warheads have a yield of 150 kt. The TN-70 weighs less
than 200 kg, the TN-71 less than 175 kg. This makes the TN-71
(stockpiled starting in 1985) roughly similar to the U.S. W-76 Trident
warhead (stockpiled starting in 1978) in size and yield.
The development of warheads suitable for MIRV deployment started in
December 1972, the first nuclear tests occurred in 1974. The first
TN-70 was transferred to the military on 12 July 1983 and went on
patrol on 25 May 1985. A total of 96 TN-70s were deployed on a single
set of 16e MSBS M4A missiles. In 1985 manufacture of the improved TN-71
began, and the first set of these warheads went on patrol on 9 December
1987. A total of three sets of warheads were deployed (288 on 48 MSBS
M4B missiles). Since the total number of M4A/B missiles had declined to
48 by the end of 1996, it may be that the TN-70 has already been
removed from service.
TN-80/81 Warhead
The TN-80/81 warhead is a
miniaturized, hardened nuclear warhead for the ASMP air-surface
missile. The TN-80/81 family is similar to the TN-70/71 in technical
sophistication. It is a higher yield warhead though, roughly similar in
yield and weight to the U.S. W78 Minuteman III warhead (deployed in
1979). The TN-80/81 has a yield of 300 kt, and a weight of about 200 kg.
Development of the TN-80 may have started as early as 1974, but in any
case it was underway before the end of 1977. It became operational on 1
September 1985, and full deployment was reached by December 1987 when
all 18 Mirage IVPs were armed. The improved TN-81 was first tested in
1984 and began manufacture in 1987. It entered service 1 July 1988 on
the Mirage 2000N, was then deployed on the Super Etendard, and finally
replaced the TN-80 on the Mirage IVP in 1991. A total of 65 TN-81s were
deployed. All are expected to remain in service beyond 2005.
TN-90 Warhead
This tactical missile warhead
was intended to arm the Hades battlefield missile, replacing the AN-51
armed Pluton. The Hades was originally slated to be armed with an
enhanced radiation warhead ("neutron bomb") which France had developed
in the late 70s/early 80s. Instead the TN-90, a variable yield
thermonuclear warhead with a maximum yield of 80 kt was deployed. The
TN-90 is equivalent to the U.S. state of the art in this warhead class,
and incorporates safety features such as insensitive high explosive.
Development began in 1983, series production began in 1990. A total of
30 were built, entering service in 1992. The Hades/TN-90 was never
actually deployed to the field. With the collapse of the Soviet Union,
President Mitterand declared in September 1991 that the procurement of
Hades missiles would be slashed from 180 to 30, and that they would be
put in storage as they were built (the only targets reachable from
France were in the newly reunified Germany). With the retirement of all
French land-based missiles in 1996 the warheads were transferred to
storage at Valduc awaiting disassembly.
TN-75 Warhead
Despite its lower number than
the TN-90, the TN-75 is actually the last warhead to be developed and
proof-tested by France. Completing the proof testing of this warhead
was a major motivation for France's final and much criticized test
series in the South Pacific. This warhead brings French strategic
warhead technology up to par with the U.S. The TN-75 is a highly
hardened, miniaturized, safety-enhanced thermonuclear MIRV warhead with
a yield of 100 kt. It is a stealthy warhead with a low radar cross
section to evade detection and interception. It is being deployed on
the new MSBS M45 SLBM, to replace the current MSBS M4B/TN-71
combination. The combination of a lighter warhead and an improved
booster provide extended range. This is the only French warhead now in
production.
7.2.4.3 The Current French Nuclear Weapon Stockpile
France completed its sixth and last test in its 1995-96 Pacific test series on 27 January 1996. This 120 kt explosion, the largest of the series and probably a test of the TN 75 warhead, was declared to be the last France would ever conduct by PM Jacques Chirac two days later.
On 23 February 1996 Chirac announced a major restructuring of France's nuclear posture. As part of a dramatic overall reduction in French military structure (the largest in Europe), Chirac announced the elimination of all land-based nuclear missiles, and a halt in production of all fissile material for weapons. The 18 SSBS S3D MRBMs based on the Plateau d'Albion were retired (being deactivated on 16 September 1996), along with the Hades tactical missile (currently in storage). Plans are going forward though to upgrade the air and sea-based legs of the French nuclear arsenal. The submarine fleet will eventually be re-equipped with the M51 long range ballistic missile, and the ASMP nuclear missile carried by the Mirage 2000N (and the Rafale after the turn of the century) will be upgraded. The scale of all these programs has been reduced over original plans however.
It is estimated that the French nuclear arsenal reached its historical peak size in 1991-92 with about 538 warheads. It currently has some 450 warheads (of three types) in service, which is expected to decline to around 400 (of two types - the TN-75 and the TN-81) by 2005.
France and the U.S. signed an agreement to share data on nuclear weapons design on 4 June 1996. The agreement builds on 1961 and 1985 accords to share information on the "safety, security and reliability" of nuclear installations and weapons systems. Under the agreement, the United States will share computer data drawn from simulated explosions, information considered so sensitive that it has previously only been shared with the UK. The agreement aims to facilitate work on eight different scientific challenges posed by the global test ban, including ensuring that existing warheads remain potent as their components age, and preventing accidental detonation of these warheads or their seizure by extremists. To avoid handing over information that could be used to design new weapons, the U.S. decided to release the classified results of computer simulations that describe the workings of fission devices, but not the fusion stages. Since fusion energy cannot be released without detonating a fission trigger, safety and security issues for thermonuclear weapons can be adequately addressed by only considering the fission primary.
Recently, for the first time, the French government has published figures on civilian plutonium in France. A total of 206 tonnes was held. This consists of 55 tonnes of separated plutonium (as isolated plutonium or in fresh MOX fuel), nearly half of which belonged to foreign customers, and the balance in spent fuel. Of the latter, 64 tonnes was in spent fuel at reactors and 87 tonnes at reprocessing plants. Production of military plutonium remains classified, but is estimated by SIPRI to have been 6.0 tonnes (+/- 1.7 tonnes) by the end of 1995. Due to losses from processing and weapons tests the current inventory is about 5.0 tonnes (+/- 1.4 tonnes). In May 1993 the CEA Administrator-General announced that France had ceased production of plutonium for military purposes in 1992.
No figures are available about actual inventories of weapon grade uranium, but SIPRI estimates that some 45 tonnes (+/- 30%) of highly enriched uranium could have been produced by Pierrelatte. After subtracting losses from various causes (naval reactor use, weapons tests, etc.) they estimate 22-26 tonnes (+/- 30%) of weapon grade material may have be on hand, two to three times the amount probably required for their arsenal.
With the retirement of its tactical and strategic land based missiles, the bulk of France's nuclear force rests with its L'Inflexible class strategic missile submarines. On 24 July 1981, pres. Mitterand announced plans for an entirely new third generation submarine class to be called Le Triomphant. Originally slated to be a fleet of six submarines, in May 1992 this was scaled back to four. The lead ship of the class, Le Triomphant (S 616), was rolled out in Cherbourg on 13 July 1993 and went into service late in 1996, carrying the new MSBS M45 SLBMs. These successors to the MSBS M4B missile are an updated extended range version of the M4 family and are armed with the new TN-75 warhead. The second boat, Le Temeraire, is under construction and won't go into service until mid-1999. As each boat is deployed it will replace one of the L'Inflexible class. Future modernization plans call for replacement of the M45 missile with the M51 during 2010-15.
The TN-75 is the only nuclear warhead currently being manufactured. It is being produced at the Centre d'Etudes de Valduc (Valduc Research Institute, the "Pantex of France"), near Is-sur-Tille, 40 km north of Dijon. The program to develop the TN-75, a miniaturized hardened stealthy thermonuclear warhead of moderate yield, began in 1987. Developmental testing of the warhead ended in 1991, but Chirac asserted in June 1995 that a full yield proof test was needed prior to deployment. Its first full-yield test was probably the 110 kt detonation on 1 October 1995 at Fangataufa. Series production began soon afterward, and probably will continue until 2001-2003. Since at about 100 kt the TN-75 has reduced yield compared to its predecessor the TN-71 (150 kt) the MSBS M45 missile will carry a somewhat smaller amount of firepower.
The other leg of the French Force de Dissuasion (Deterrent Force, formerly the Force de Frappe or Strike Force) consists of the ASMP missile (Air-Sol Moyenne Portee) carried on the Mirage 2000N and the carrier-based Super Etendard (the Mirage IVP having been retired in July 1996). The ASMP has carried the burden as France's air delivered nuclear weapon since 11 September 1991 when Mitterand announced the retirement of the AN 52, France's last nuclear gravity bomb. The number of Mirage 2000N aircraft committed to nuclear missions has been reduced from 75 in 1989 to 45 today. These are deployed in two squadrons at Luxeuil and Istres. The number of nuclear capable Super Etendard aircraft is scheduled to be reduced from 55 to 24 (only 20 missiles are available to equip them in any case). A possible future modernization of this arm may be to deploy a range-enhanced "ASMP plus" (500 km vs. 300 km). The Rafale next-generation multipurpose fighter/bomber, now being procured at a (very) slow rate will eventually replace both the Mirage 2000N and the Super Etendard. By late 1996 only 10 Rafales (out of a planned deployment of 234) had been delivered. The Navy has priority for the Rafale and 8 of the 10 delivered so far have been the naval version. The air force will form its first operational squadron in 2005.
The AN 51 Pluton warheads and the AN 52 gravity bombs have already been dismantled at Valduc. Currently the 18 TN 61 one Mt warheads from the S3 MRBMs, and the 30 TN 90 variable yield warheads for the Hades are in storage awaiting disassembly. The dismantlement of the land-based ballistic missile silo complex will be completed in 1998.
Active French Stockpile: End of 1996
The approximate composition of the French stockpile was:
WARHEAD/WEAPON FIRST YIELD NUMBER TOTAL YIELD (MAX)
PRODUCED (kt) Mt Equiv. Mt
TN 70/71 for MSBS M4A/B 150 288 43.2 81.3
TN 75 for MSBS M45 100 96 9.6 20.6
TN 81 for ASMP 300 65 19.5 29.1
GRAND TOTAL 449 72.3 131.0
Active French Forces: End of 1996
DELIVERY VEHICLE DATE NUMBER RANGE (km)/ WARHEAD LOAD
DEPLOYED PAYLOAD (kg) Per Vehicle TOTAL
AIRCRAFT (Land Based)
Mirage 2000N 1988 45 2750/ 1 x ASMP TN 81 45
AIRCRAFT (Carrier Based)
Super Etendard 1978 24 650/ 1 x ASMP TN 81 20
SUBMARINES
SUBMARINE-BASED MISSILES
MSBS M4A/B 1985/87 48 6000/ 6 x TN 70/71 288
MSBS M45 1996 16 6000/ 6 x TN 75 96
AIR LAUNCHED MISSILES
ASMP 1986 90 300/ 1 x TN 81 65
7.2.4.4 French Nuclear Installations
Just as the old AEC once did on the United States, the CEA administers all nuclear activities in France. Military programs are controlled by the Military Application Division (Direction des Applications Militaires, or DAM), which was created on 12 September 1958. There are six DAM research centers (Centre d'Etudes) for the research, design, and development of warheads as well as their manufacture and assembly. The DAM is also responsible for the production of weapon grade nuclear materials.
Centre d'Etudes de Limeil-Valenton
Located in
Villeneuvre-Sain-Georges, 15 km southeast of Paris, this is "France's
Los Alamos" the central weapon design laboratory. The site is an
ancient fortress that was appropriated for atomic weapons work on 3
September 1951. The first French nuclear device was assembled there, at
Batterie de Limeil, and on 1 January 1960 it became Centre d'Etudes de
Limeil. It expanded until it overran the commune of Valenton, and now
comprises 12.5 hectares. It has a staff of about 950.
Centre d'Etudes de Valduc
This research center
is "France's Pantex", the site were weapons are actually assembled and
disassembled. It is near Is-sur-Tille on the Cote-d'Or, 25 km north of
Dijon. It was established in 1958. In 1986 it employed over 1000
people. In addition to weapons manufacture, it processes waste products
from weapons manufacture and conducts high pressure research on nuclear
materials (e.g. plutonium). It is equipped with a high pressure gas gun
for shock compression studies.
Centre d'Etudes du Ripault
Located in
Mont-sur-Guesnes, in the Indre-et-Loire, 30 km south of Chinon, this
center manufactures high explosives components (detonators, insensitive
and liquid high explosives, etc.), performs stockpile maintenance
functions, and has an accident response team. It was established in
1962 and now occupies 103 hectares. It has over 80,000 square meters of
buildings and employs about 800 people.
Centre d'Etudes Scientifiques et Techniques d'Aquitaine (CESTA)
This
research center is located in Le Barp in the Gironde, 30 km southwest
of Bordeaux. It is France's equivalent of Sandia Laboratories - it
performs militarization and production engineering functions for
warhead designs developed by Limeil-Valenton. It was established in
1965 and occupies 700 hectares in the forest between Bordeaux and
Arcachon.
Centre d'Etudes de Bruyeres-le-Chatel (CEB)
This
research center is situated 35 km south of Paris, west of Arpajon in
the Essone. It was established in 1957 and occupies 35 hectares. The
Centre's activities include research on metallurgy, chemistry,
electronics, seismology, toxicology, and the diagnostic measurement of
nuclear explosions.
Centre d'Etudes de Vaujours-Moronvilliers
Located
17 km northwest of Paris at Vaujours in the Seine-Saint-Denis, this
Centre was created in 1955. It performs explosive and high pressure
research. It is equipped with shock tubes and high pressure light gas
guns.
Pierrelatte
France's uranium enrichment plant
is located near the village of Pierrelatte (Drome), on the Rhone river
about 80 miles northeast of Marseille. The plant uses gaseous
diffusion. The gaseous diffusion program began in 1953,and following a
successful demonstration of a pilot plant at Saclay in 1958, approval
for a full-scale plant was given. A diffusion barrier plant was built
in 1960. In 1964 the first of four sections of the plant became
operational, producing 2% enriched uranium. The next three sections
reached full operation in late 1965, early 1966, and April 1967. when
the fourth and last section became operational the plant became
producing weapon grade uranium. Only the last two sections remain in
operation today.
Marcoule
The main facility for the production
of plutonium for military purposes is the complex located at Marcoule,
in the commune of Bagnols-sur-Ceze in the Gard. Founded in 1952,
Marcoule was equipped with France's first plutonium production reactor,
the natural uranium fueled, graphite moderated, gas-cooled G1 reactor,
and its first plutonium separation plant, known as UP1. Larger versions
of the G1 known as G2 and G3, 250 MW each, were built in the mid-late
fifties. These three reactors accounted for about half of France's
total military plutonium production. Also located Marcoule are the 190
MW (thermal) Celestin I and II reactors, and the Phenix prototype
breeder reactor. The Celestin reactors are heavy water designs fueled
with plutonium (originally) and later with enriched uranium. These
reactors have been used for civilian isotope, tritium, and military
plutonium production. The 563 MW (thermal) Phenix was intended as a
prototype for larger breeder power reactors, but its plutonium
production appears to have been primarily for military purposes.
The G1 reactor went critical 7 January 1956, reached full power (40 MW thermal) September 1956, and was decommissioned October 1968. G1, and its larger sister reactors G2 and G3, were dual-purpose - producing both plutonium and electrical power. G2 and G3 were both 250 MW (the same size as the original Hanford reactors in the U.S.). G2 went critical July 1958, reached full power in March 1959, and was decommissioned February 1980. G3 went critical June 1959 and was decommissioned July 1984.
The first Celestin reactor went in to operation in May 1967, and the second in October 1968. Originally dedicated to radioisotope and tritium production, they began producing military plutonium by the mid-70s. Around the decommissioning of G2 it appears their function became primarily military plutonium production. Since 1991 they have been alternating operation, only one operating at any given time. Since military plutonium production was discontinued in France in 1992, presumably these reactors are now being used primarily for tritium production again. They are expected to remain in service at least until the end of the century. These reactors have the capacity to produce some 1.5 kg of tritium annually. In their current alternate operation mode they could be producing 750 g a year, an ample amount to maintain the current and planned French arsenal (which probably requires less than 200 g annually).
Phenix started operation in 1973 and is still in service. It could have produced up to 1400 kg of military plutonium by the end of 1997, but actual production is probably substantial less.
Construction on UP1 began July 1955 and the plant reached full operation in January 1958. UP1 employs the Purex solvent extraction process. By August 1984 it had reprocessed over 10,000 tonnes of gas-cooled reactor fuel and separated more than 2.5 tonnes of military plutonium.
La Hague
A second plutonium separation plant
called UP2 was built at La Hague near Cherbourg in Normandy. UP2
started operation in 1966, and can handle 800 tonnes of spent fuel a
year.
Other Reactor Sites
France does not separate
its civilian and military weapons programs, and has produced
substantial quantities of military plutonium from civilian power
reactors. Among the reactors believed to have made substantial
contributions to the military stockpile are Chinon-1, Chinon-2,
Chinon-3, St. Laurent-1, St. Laurent-2, and Bugey-1. The amount is
highly uncertain, ranging from 500 kg to 2000 kg.
Principal sources for the section on France are:
Given China's size in terms of geography (third in the world, only slightly behind Canada), population (number one), and economy (second largest in the world by 1995 CIA equivalent purchasing power estimates, with current growth rates in the double digits), it seems inevitable that China will become the dominant power in the world within a few decades. China's leaders are acutely aware of this fact, and are also acutely aware that except for the last few centuries, China has consistently been the most powerful and advanced society in the world for 3500 years. They undoubtedly intend that China will have military capabilities commensurate with this future and historic status.
Over the years China has certainly invested a much smaller amount of resources (although not necessarily a much smaller proportion of its resources) to developing and deploying nuclear weapons than either of the two superpowers. The exact size and composition of its nuclear forces is very difficult to determine however due to strict secrecy. Force structure estimates consequently are rather uncertain, and published estimates are even a bit mysterious. It is hard to assess the ultimate source or reliability of the data provided.
To date China has conducted many fewer nuclear tests than the United States or the Soviet Union/Russia (less than 5% as many as either) and this discrepancy accounts for China's initial reluctance to sign on to a permanent ban of all nuclear tests at the CTBT negotiations, although these reservations have now been overcome with the conclusion of China's final test series.
The final test series concluded in the spring and summer of 1996. According to Japanese government sources (reported in Nihon Keizai Shimbun), the penultimate underground Chinese nuclear test on 8 June 1996 (calculated at 20 to 80 kilotons) was actually a simultaneous detonation of multiple warheads (a common practice by both the U.S. and USSR). It was said to be part of a program to produce smaller warheads for submarine-launched and multiple-targeted missiles. Overall, the yields since 1990 have suggested that two warheads have been in development: one in the 100-300 kt range, and one in the 600-700 kt range.
China's last nuclear test, and which with luck may be the last nuclear test ever conducted, was detonated at 0149 GMT (9:49 p.m. EDT) on 29 July 1996. According to the Australia Geological Survey Organization in Canberra its yield was 1 to 5 kilotons, registering 4.3 on the Richter Scale. This was China's 45th test, and its 22nd underground one.
It is believed that with the conclusion of this series, China has completed development of a range of warheads similar to the state of the art weapons developed by the other major nuclear powers. These would be miniaturized hardened thermonuclear warheads with yields in the tens to hundreds of kilotons. It is believed that these include enhanced radiation ("neutron bomb") warheads, and probably also variable yield options.
Since the cut-off of aid to its nuclear weapons program in 1960 by the Soviet Union, most of the technology used on the program has been developed indigenously. There has been (and continues to be) considerable concern in the West about the export of this technology to non-nuclear powers interested in acquiring these weapons. China is known to have given Pakistan considerable assistance, possibly including actual warhead designs. Recent concern has focused on Chinese deals with Iran. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, China has turned its interest to obtaining more advanced nuclear technology from the successor to its old mentor. Nihon Keizai Shimbun has reported that China has recently bought computer simulation technology for nuclear warheads from Russia.
China's nuclear delivery system program's have traditionally proceeded very slowly. This has resulted in the deployment of forces that have been one to two decades behind the other nuclear powers in technology (although cause and effect may be reversed, lack of advanced technology may have been the cause of such tardy deployments). It is believed that fewer than 250 ballistic missiles have ever been deployed (with only the first cryogenic liquid fuel missile having been retired). The vast majority of China's arsenal is not capable of reaching the United States, and thus seems geared towards deterring (or threatening) its immediate neighbors.
Current estimates assert that only 7-10 ICBMs are in service - the Dong Feng (East Wind)-5A. This low estimate seems a bit strange in light of China's ability to produce the same basic booster in larger numbers as the Long March 2 satellite launcher. The U.S. government has stated that there are 10 DF-5As deployed in hardened silos at two sites. It is thought to carry the largest warhead ever tested by China (4-5 Mt).
China has placed little emphasis on aircraft as a strategic weapon carrier. The Hong-5 (a redesign of the Soviet Il-28 Beagle) has been retired. The Hong-6 and Qian-5 are short-medium range, light payload aircraft suitable more for tactical or regional-strategic operations. The main bomber, the Hong-6, is based on the Tu-16 Badger which entered Soviet service in 1955 and first flew in China on 27 September 1959. This plane was used to drop two live nuclear weapons in tests in 1965 and 1967. The most attractive possibility for modernization of this arm is simply to purchase advanced fighter bombers from Russia (where they are readily available on easy terms) and modify them to carry Chinese nuclear weapons. China has already purchased 26 Su-27 Flankers, and is planning to build an assembly plant for them in China. There is no information available to indicate that they have been assigned a nuclear role however.
China has had a rather unsuccessful ballistic submarine program. China has only one operational ballistic missile submarine, the Xia (No. 406). It was laid down in 1978, but apparently only entered service after 1988. A second submarine was reportedly launched in 1982. It is not now in service, and unsubstantiated reports claim it was lost in a 1985 accident. The Xia began a modernization refit in 1995 which may be completed by the end of 1997. The submarine is armed with the Julang-1 (Giant Wave) solid fuel missile. There will very probably be no more submarines of this class. A new design (Type 093) submarine, to be equipped with the longer range JL-2, is under development.
Active Chinese Stockpile: End of 1996
The approximate composition of the Chinese stockpile was:
DELIVERY VEHICLE DATE NUMBER RANGE (km)/ WARHEAD LOAD TOTAL
DEPLOYED PAYLOAD (kg) Number/Yield
AIRCRAFT
Hong-6 (B-6) 1965 120 3100/4500 1-3 x bomb |150 to 180
Qian-5 (A-5) 1970 30 400/1500? 1 x bomb |kt to Mt
LAND-BASED MISSILES
Dong Feng-3A/CSS-2 5/1971 50-100 2800/2150 1 x 3.3 Mt 50-100/165-330 Mt
Dong Feng-4/CSS-3 11/1980 10-20 4750/2200 1 x 3.3 Mt 10-20/33-66 Mt
Dong Feng-5A/CSS-4 8/1981 7-10 13000+/3200 1 x 4-5 Mt 7-10/28-50 Mt
Dong Feng-21A/CSS-6 1985-86 36 1800/600 1 x 2-300 kt 36/7.2-10.8 Mt
Dong Feng-31 Late 90s 0 8000/700 1 x 1-200 kt 0
Dong Feng-41 c. 2010 0 12000/800 1 x MIRV 0
SUBMARINE-BASED MISSILES
Julang-1/CSS-N-3 1986 12 1700/600 1 x 2-300 kt 12/2.4-3.6 Mt
Julang-2/CSS-N-4 Late 90s 0 8000/700 1 x 1-200 kt 0
TACTICAL WEAPONS
Artillery/rockets/ADMs mid 70s 120 low kt 120/1-2 Mt
TOTAL 380-480/400-600 Mt
Principal sources for the section on China are:
"Though India has not made any official statements about the size of it nuclear arsenal, the NRDC estimates that India has a stockpile of approximately 30-35 nuclear warheads and claims that India is producing additional nuclear materials. Joseph Cirincione at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (3) estimates that India has produced enough weapons-grade plutonium for 50-90 nuclear weapons and a smaller but unknown quantity of weapons-grade uranium. Weapons-grade plutonium production takes place at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center, which is home to the Cirus reactor acquired from Canada, to the indigenous Dhruva reactor, and to a plutonium separation facility."
- Federation of American Scientists, dated 12/01/2005
That India can build nuclear weapons has been an established fact since 8:05 18 May 1974 (IST), when India exploded a 12 kt plutonium bomb 107 meters underground in the Rajasthan Desert. This test, code named "Smiling Buddha", was located at 27.095 deg N, 71.752 E, which is usually identified as being "Pokaharan" (or "Pokhran"), the name of a town that is 24.8 km southeast from the test site.
India has maintained that this test was for peaceful purposes, and that it possesses no nuclear arsenal. No plausible rationale has ever been offered for how this test advanced the cause of peace, and this explanation has recently been directly challenged. On 10 October 1997 the Press trust of India reported comments by nuclear scientist Raj Ramanna, former director of BARC - India's nuclear agency - and the man directly responsible for developing and conducting Smiling Buddha. Ramanna, who has also served as junior defense minister, was quoted as saying "The Pokhran test was a bomb, I can tell you now." He was also quoted as saying later: "An explosion is an explosion, a gun is a gun, whether you shoot at someone or shoot at the ground." He said the "peaceful" label had come "from the political side", adding: "I just want to make clear that the test was not all that peaceful."
A key motivation for India's nuclear program is undoubtedly its concern about nuclear-armed China, which faces India along much of its northern border. Disputes about this border exist: China currently occupies the Aksai Chin plateau adjacent to Ladakh, Kashmir in Northwest India; India occupies the North-East Frontier Agency claimed by China. In October 1962 China invaded India, an attack that India was powerless to respond to. China eventually withdrew voluntarily later in the year. India has also fought repeatedly with Pakistan since 1947, and holds Kashmir - Muslim inhabited territory claimed by Pakistan. Pakistan's own nuclear program now serves as justification for perpetuating India's own program, although Pakistan did not begin acquiring weapon technology until after India's nuclear test. India also has aspirations to being a major power on the Asian continent, and may view nuclear weapons as a necessary component of acquiring this status.
The center piece of India's nuclear weapons program is the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) near Bombay which is the presumed center for nuclear weapons associated work. Not only was the Smiling Buddha device designed and largely fabricated there, but the plutonium was produced at BARC by irradiating uranium samples in the Canadian-supplied 40 MW CIR (Canadian-Indian Reactor) heavy water research reactor (also called Cirus). This reactor began operating in 1960 and can produce 6.6-10.5 kg of plutonium a year (at a capacity factor of 50-80%). The reactor is not under IAEA safeguards (which not exist when the reactor was sold), although Canada stipulated that it only be used for peaceful purposes. India argues that this allows its use in producing peaceful nuclear explosives (Ramanna's recent comments are an unofficial admission that this agreement was violated).
India probably began its development of a nuclear device shortly after China tested its first nuclear weapon in the mid-60s. A design had been developed by 1971, when Indira Gandhi decided to proceed with the manufacture and test of the device. According to Raj Ramanna, the director of BARC at the time, it took another two years to separate, purify, and fabricate the plutonium metal, and to manufacture the implosion lens systems and associated electronics. Most of the work was done at BARC, but the explosive lenses were made by the Defense Research and Development Organization. Apparently the precise implosion electronics gave them considerable trouble. It is rumored that an initial test of the device failed, probably due to a failure of these electronics. The neutron initiator was a Po-210/Be type code-named "Flower", which took a long time to design and assemble. Although the assertion that the test was for peaceful purposes can be dismissed (especially in light of Ramanna's recent admissions), the bomb was almost certainly an experimental test device, not a weapon in deployable form.
Whether India actually maintains an arsenal of assembled weapons is debatable. The U.S. CIA testified before congress in 1993 that it does not believe that India maintains assembled or deployed nuclear weapons, although it believes India is producing weapon components. In 1990 P, K. Iyengar, then head of the Indian Atomic Energy Agency, said "In how much time we make it, will depend on how much time we get." The obvious conclusion is that nuclear weapons are maintained in ready-to-assemble form.
India has developed indigenous plutonium production reactors. On 8 August 1985 the 100 MW Dhruva was commissioned, it is based on the Cirus design and can produce 20-25 kg of plutonium a year. Startup problems plagued Dhruva, but it began operating at one-quarter power in December 1986 and reached full operation in mid-January 1988. It is capable of producing 16-26 kg of plutonium annually (at a capacity factor of 50-80%).
An additional possible source of plutonium are a number of unsafeguarded CANDU power reactors, including Madras Atomic Power Stations (MAPS, known as Madras I and II, or MAPS-I and MAPS-II); the Narora Atomic Power Stations (NAPS, known as NAPS-I and NAPS-II), and the Kakrapar Atomic Power Station (KAPS). Like CIR and Dhruva, the CANDU reactors are heavy-water moderated natural uranium reactors that can be used effectively for weapon-grade plutonium production. The possible production by MAPS is much larger than CIR and Dhruva combined, although the fuel burnup in power reactors of this type normally produces lower grade plutonium that is less desirable for weapons. Each power station reactor could produce up to 160 kg/yr (at a 60% capacity factor). It is uncertain how practical it is to operate MAPS for weapons grade plutonium production, although even the reactor-grade output has weapons potential. If supergrade plutonium were produced at BARC by short irradiation periods, it could be mixed with MAPS plutonium to extend the plutonium supply. In 1989 India had a total of 8 power reactors operating, producing 1478 MW (electrical), but with 13 more planned or under construction that would boost electrical output by another 5100 MW.
The separated plutonium for the 1974 test was produced at the separation plant in Trombay, near to Bombay, capable of processing 50 tonnes of heavy metal fuel/yr. Construction on the first facility there began in the 1950s, and began operating in 1964. In 1974 it was shut down for repair and expansion and reopened in 1983 or 1984. Trombay handles the fuel from both the Cirus and Dhruva reactors.
India also can separate plutonium in the Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing (PREFRE) facility. This plutonium separation plant was built at Tarapur, north of Bombay, and began operating in 1979. The plant has encountered operating problems, but India reports having overcome these by 1990. The nominal annual capacity is given as 100-150 tonnes of CANDU fuel. A much larger plant is now under construction at Kalpakkam sufficient to handle all existing reactors.
Given its immense thorium resources, India is actively interested in developing the thorium/U-233 fuel cycle. India is known to have produced kilogram quantities of U-233 by irradiating thorium in CIR, Dhruva, and MAPS reactors. Substantial production of U-233 is not practical though with natural uranium fueled reactors. The thorium cycle requires more highly enriched fuel to have an acceptable breeding ratio with the non-fissile thorium blanket. Reactor-grade plutonium from MAPS could serve as start-up fuel for U-233 plants in the future. If available U-233 is as effective a weapon material as plutonium.
India has been developing the capability to produce heavy water domestically to provide the moderator load for future reactors. The heavy water for the existing reactors was imported however. Canada provided the heavy water for CIR. The 110 tonnes of unsafeguarded moderator for Dhruva and Madras I and II were ironically provided by China.
Taken together, India has developed an extensive plutonium production and reprocessing capability. SIPRI has estimated that India had produced 420-450 kg of weapons-grade plutonium through the end of 1995 (70-100 bombs worth). These estimates are based solely on CIR and Dhruva production. About 100 kg of plutonium has been consumed though, principally in fueling two plutonium reactors, leaving 320-350 kg of plutonium available for weapons. Approximately 1000 kg of unsafeguarded reactor-grade plutonium also exists.
India has acquired and developed centrifuge technology and built centrifuge enrichment plants in Trombay and Mysore in the 1980s. The larger Rare Metals Plant (RMP), as it is called, at Mysore has a cascade capable of producing 30% enriched uranium in kilogram quantities, beginning in 1992-93, although reliability has been a problem. These enrichment plants appear to have no role in India's power reactor development plans, so they may be intended to offset the prestige of Pakistan's enrichment capability, or to provide additional standby weapons production capability. India has reported that it plans to build an enriched uranium reactor, and a domestically fueled nuclear submarine.
India has developed short and medium-range missiles (the Prithvi, range 250 km, and the Agni, range 2500 km) capable of carrying light nuclear weapons (500-1000 kg). India has an active space program which could provide the technology for eve longer range weapons. India reportedly has investigated development of an ICBM-class missile called Suriya.
India denies having produced additional plutonium pits for nuclear weapons. India's interest in light weight weapon design can be surmised from BARC's acquisition in the 1980s of a vacuum hot pressing machine, suitable for forming large high-quality beryllium forgings, as well as large amounts of high purity beryllium metal. India is known to manufacture tritium, and may have developed designs for fusion-boosted weapons.
India is not a signatory to NPT and has opposed the treaty as discriminatory to non-weapons states. India has previously taken the position that a world-wide ban on nuclear testing, and the production of fissionable material for weapons is called for. Except for China, which continues testing, there is now a de facto halt to testing worldwide, as well as the production of weapons grade plutonium and uranium by the U.S. and Russia. India has shown no interest so far in restricting its own activities despite these changes in the world situation. India has also rejected offers at bilateral negotiation with Pakistan, but in December 1988 the two nations signed an agreement prohibiting attacks on each other's nuclear installations and informing each other of their locations (though not their purposes).
During the fall of 1995 India changed its position on the CTBT from supporting to opposing it on the grounds that while the five nuclear states possessed weapons, a ban on nuclear tests was discriminatory. On 15 December 1995, the New York Times reported that India might be preparing for a second nuclear test. The newspaper quoted (unnamed) U.S. government officials as saying spy satellites have recorded activity at the Pokaharan test site in the Rajasthan desert in recent weeks. It said, however, that intelligence experts could not tell whether preparations were being made to explode a nuclear bomb or whether they involved some other experiments connected with India's nuclear weapons program. The Indian government called the New York Times report "highly speculative" but stopped short of an outright denial. Strong domestic support for such a move was shown in an India Today survey of 2000 adults on 5 December 1995 (before the Times story). It showed 62 percent of the respondents would approve if India exploded an atom bomb to develop its nuclear weapons capability. Pakistan indicated that such a move might cause it to conduct its first test.
Pakistan's nuclear program has been the source of great angst amongst non-proliferation experts. The German trained metallurgist Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, brought centrifuge technology to Pakistan and once their weapons were proven by testing, he was a key individual in exporting that technology to other countries. Of most concern was the export of the technology to Libya and Iran. Libya later renounced and halted their nuclear program, however, Iran continues to push forward refusing both economic positive incentives as well as threats of sanctions. As of October 2006, analysts believe Iran may be close -- immediately to up to two years away -- from detonating their first nuclear test."On May 28, 1998 Pakistan announced that it had successfully conducted five nuclear tests. The Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission reported that the five nuclear tests conducted on May 28 generated a seismic signal of 5.0 on the Richter scale, with a total yield of up to 40 KT (equivalent TNT). Dr. A.Q. Khan claimed that one device was a boosted fission device and that the other four were sub-kiloton nuclear devices.
On May 30, 1998 Pakistan tested one more nuclear warhead with a reported yield of 12 kilotons. The tests were conducted at Balochistan, bringing the total number of claimed tests to six. It has also been claimed by Pakistani sources that at least one additional device, initially planned for detonation on 30 May 1998, remained emplaced underground ready for detonation."
- Federation of American Scientists, dated 5/31/2006
"The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) estimates that Pakistan has built 24-48 HEU-based nuclear warheads, and Carnegie reports that they have produced 585-800 kg of HEU, enough for 30-55 weapons. Pakistan's nuclear warheads are based on an implosion design that uses a solid core of highly enriched uranium and requires an estimated 15-20 kg of material per warhead. According to Carnegie, Pakistan has also produced a small but unknown quantity of weapons grade plutonium, which is sufficient for an estimated 3-5 nuclear weapons.
Pakistani authorities claim that their nuclear weapons are not assembled. They maintain that the fissile cores are stored separately from the non-nuclear explosives packages, and that the warheads are stored separately from the delivery systems. In a 2001 report, the Defense Department contends that "Islamabad's nuclear weapons are probably stored in component form" and that "Pakistan probably could assemble the weapons fairly quickly." However, no one has been able to ascertain the validity of Pakistan's assurances about their nuclear weapons security.
- Federation of American Scientists, dated 5/31/2006
Without declaring itself officially as a nuclear power Pakistan has gone to great pains to make clear its nuclear capabilities. On 7 February 1992 Pakistani Foreign Minister Shahryar Khan stated in an interview with the Washington Post that Pakistan had the components to assemble one or more nuclear weapons. This statement went further than any made by other "non-weapon state" in admitting to the existence of a nuclear arsenal. Pakistan had previously admitted to having fabricated pits for fission weapons. In July 1993 General (retired) Mirza Aslam Beg, former army chief of staff, claimed that Pakistan had conducted a 'cold' test of a nuclear device in 1987. A 'cold test' generally refers to a complete nuclear design but using non-fissile material (i.e. natural or depleted uranium) for the core. And in August 1994, former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said "I confirm that Pakistan possesses the atomic bomb" although the government repudiated the statement (but admitted having the capability to make them).
The program began in great secrecy the 1972 under the leadership of PM Zulfiakar Ali Bhutto. This was immediately after Pakistan's fourth war with India (fought in December 1971), in which India had invaded East Pakistan and had dismembered the country to form Bangladesh. So too, international suspicions of India's interest in nuclear weapons had sharpened in the wake of its refusal to join the NPT. The Indian test of a nuclear device in 1974 further accelerated effort on the project. Serious large scale work commenced in 1976 with the establishment of the Engineering Research Laboratories (ERL).
The Pakistani program is based on an indigenously constructed centrifuge uranium enrichment plant, using technology misappropriated from the European uranium centrifuge consortium URENCO (Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands are the participants). The intelligence gathering at URENCO was apparently conducted by Dr. Abdul Qader Khan, a Pakistani metallurgist. He was employed from 1972 to 1975 by Ultra-Centrifuge Nederland (UCN) the Dutch partner in the URENCO consortium where he worked with two early centrifuge designs, the CNOR and SNOR machines. In 1974 UCN asked Khan to translate classified design documents for two advanced German machines, the G-1 and G-2. He left Europe before his espionage was detected and assumed technical leadership of the program at ERL. Due to his efforts, the slow recognition of the program by western intelligence, and the weak export controls at the time, Pakistan made relatively rapid progress in developing U-235 production capability. In 1981, in recognition of Khan's contributions the ERL was renamed the A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories by Pres. Zia ul-Haq (who had seized control of Pakistan in a 1977 coup). He was convicted of espionage in the Netherlands in 1983 in absentia and sentenced to four years in prison. The conviction was later overturned in 1985 for failure to properly deliver a summons to him.
Although A.Q. Khan and his centrifuge designs formed the basis of the program, the development of nuclear weapons by Pakistan - one of the poorest countries on Earth - could not have occurred without the massive transfer of technology and materiel from more advanced countries. During the late 70s and early 80s, a number of Pakistani agents were arrested trying to violate export control laws in the west. In 1984 three Pakistani nationals were indicted in the U.S. for attempting to smuggle out 50 krytrons (high speed switches suitable for implosion detonation systems), and in 1987 the purchase of U.S. maraging steel was attempted.
These interceptions were more the exception than the rule however. It was ul-Haq's great good fortune that the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on 27 December 1979, and Ronald Reagan was elected President scarcely more than 10 months later. This converted Pakistan into an inestimable strategic asset and opened floodgates of military and other aid from the U.S.. At the same time Pakistan was an essential ally for China, who was just as concerned by the Afghanistan invasion (with which China shares a border) as the U.S., and in addition wanted a counterweight to India on China's southern border (and with which China had fought a war only 17 years before).
As a result Pakistan found itself able to acquire whatever technology it needed with little scrutiny. In fact China actively provided equipment, technology, information, and advice in the sure knowledge that it was for the development of nuclear weapons. Among this information in fact was an actual design of a tested weapon. Khan's knowledge of western centrifuge design no doubt flowed back to China in return.
Other countries, such as France and especially Germany also sold "dual use" material in large quantities. For example Germany even transferred a uranium hexafluoride manufacturing plant.
Though masterminded by A.Q. Khan, the program was largely managed by government minister Ghulam Ishaq Khan. In 1980 a number of experimental centrifuges were believed to be operating in Pakistan. By the late 1980s Pakistan was publishing technical articles about centrifuge design, flaunting their capability and placing design details, previously secret, in the public domain. This includes an 1987 article co-authored by A. Q. Khan on balancing sophisticated ultracentrifuge rotors.
The uranium enrichment facility is the Kahuta gas centrifuge plant near Islamabad. This facility began operating in the early 1980s, but suffered serious start up problems. It is believed that China offered significant technical assistance in exchange for URENCO technology, but the exact form of assistance is unknown. Dr. Khan announced that Kahuta was producing low enriched uranium in 1984. U.S. intelligence believes that uranium enrichment exceeded 5% in 1985, and that production of highly enriched uranium was achieved in 1986. Pakistan probably acquired the ability to build a nuclear weapon at that time, or very soon after. Pakistan had by then reportedly manufactured 14,000 centrifuges, but had only 1000 operating. By 1991 about 3000 machines were operating according to U.S. intelligence. This implies a production capacity of 30-50 kg U-235/year depending on the separative capacity of the machines, the tails concentration, and production efficiency. This is enough for 2-3 implosion weapons a year. Shahryar Khan has said that the cost of Kahuta was relatively modest, less than $150 million.
Pakistan has operated its plant intermittently. PM Benazir Bhutto halted production of highly enriched uranium in June 1989 prior to a trip the U.S.. Production was resumed in early 1990 and continued until sometime in 1991. This coincided with a sharp escalation in tension between India and Pakistan over violence in Kashmir, an area occupied by India but claimed by Pakistan. Border clashes with India occurred and the outbreak of a fifth Indo-Pakistani war seemed possible.
According to Burrows and Windrem in Critical Mass, Pakistan did not convert the highly enriched uranium hexafluoride into metal form until May 1990, during the Kashmir crisis. Burrows and Windrem report that 125 kg of HEU metal was produced and fashioned into 7 bomb cores, some may even have been assembled into weapons. U.S. intelligence detected what appeared to be a nuclear alert. This was apparently done without PM Bhutto's knowledge at the behest of Ghulam Ishaq Khan, at that time President of Pakistan. Burrows and Windrem attribute the August "judicial coup" that deposed Bhutto from office to attempts by Bhutto to reign in the nuclear program.
The shutdown in HEU production in 1991 was probably motivated by a cutoff of U.S. aid. With the Afghanistan War and the Cold War now over, there was nothing inhibiting the U.S. from pressuring Pakistan to abandon its nuclear program. The Pressler Amendment, passed in 1984, which required an aid cutoff if Pakistan acquired nuclear arms finally went into action. Nonetheless a large package of arms, ordered and paid for by Pakistan, was never delivered.
SIPRI estimates that Pakistan had acquired 157-263 Kg of enriched uranium by the end of 1991 (enough for 10-18 weapons). Production of low enriched uranium has continued. The intended purpose of this low enriched uranium is not known, but by now amounts to many tonnes of material. By using this stockpile of partially enriched material as feedstock, Pakistan has the ability to produce fissile material for 20-30 additional bombs in a matter of months.
Pakistan has built a second enrichment plant at Golra, 10 km west of Islamabad. It is expected to be even larger than Kahuta, with more advanced centrifuges. It may not yet have begun production though due to difficulty in obtaining the necessary parts now. In March 1996 the New York Times reported that last year China had sold Pakistan 5000 samarium-cobalt ring magnets suitable for use in the top suspension of gas centrifuges.
The Kahuta plant will probably be renovated soon as the current centrifuges reach the end of their operating lives. Improvements in centrifuge design could lead to a production capacity of 50-75 kg/yr of HEU (3-5 weapons) or even more.
Pakistan is developing weapons-related nuclear technology in other areas as well. It has a pilot plutonium reprocessing plant called "New Labs" at the Pinstech complex near Rawalpindi. It attempted to purchase a complete plutonium separation facility from France, which pulled out of the project part way through. Work has continued in secrecy at the site near Chasma indicating Pakistan is attempting to finish the plant on its own.
Most of Pakistan's known reactors are safeguarded by the IAEA, and thus unavailable for use in a weapons program. Pakistan is known to have been developing a "swimming pool" reactor in the late 80s using domestically produced enriched uranium fuel, which may already be in operation. Pakistan is also manufacturing reactor-grade graphite, presumably for a natural uranium plutonium production reactor. It currently possesses one power reactor with an output of 137 MW electrical (MWe). A 300 MWe pressurized water reactor for electricity which is under construction by the China National Nuclear Corporation at Chashma.
A "multi purpose" natural uranium/heavy-water reactor, entirely constructed by Pakistani engineers, has been recently (circa 1996) completed near Khushab, in Punjab. Its power level has been variously reported ranging from 40 to 70 MW thermal. It is said to be used for isotope production for export and for doping silica for use in solar energy applications, but his has been dismissed as "inaccurate and baseless" by Pakistani sources. Its type and size (about the same size as the Dimona reactor in Israel) as well as the secrecy surrounding it indicates that its likely use is for the production of plutonium (enough for 3-5 bombs a year). This reactor has not been placed under IAEA safeguards.
Prior to the start-up of its indigenous reactor(s) Pakistan could not have produced Po-210 or tritium, required for neutron initiators, since this would require illegal use of its IAEA safeguarded reactors. It could of course have acquired this material from China. It is known to have smuggled 0.8 g of tritium gas from Germany in 1987. This would allow the manufacture of several tritium initiators. During the trial of Rudolf Ortmayer 1n 1990, the source of much of the recent data on Pakistan's nuclear program, it was revealed that Pakistan was acquiring technology for tritium production. It is likely that they are pursuing fusion boosting designs for their weapons.
They are believed to possess proven implosion weapon designs. Reportedly Pakistan received from China the design used in its fourth tested weapon, exploded in 1966. This is said to be a low weight (200 kg class) solid-core bomb design intended for missile deployment. Pakistan is known to have conducted a large number of explosive tests related to it nuclear weapons program. Undoubtedly a tested implosion system has been developed, and cold implosion testing (i.e. without nuclear yield) using uranium cores has been reported. Zero-yield testing using enriched uranium (with a small nuclear yield equal to several Kg) is also possible, but the possession of a tested design eliminates any need to conduct nuclear tests.
Pakistan has missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Currently the HATF 2 (500 kg payload) and the M-11/DF-11 (800 kg payload) are in service - both with ranges of 300 km. The M-11 was acquired from China, about 25 are believed to be in service. The HATF-3 is under development with a range of 600 km and a payload of 500 kg. On 13 June 1996 the Washington Post quoted a leaked CIA draft document as saying Pakistan had "probably finished developing nuclear warheads" for Chinese-supplied M-11 missiles. In December 1997 Pakistan claimed to have developed a new ballistic missile named Ghauri with a range of 1,500km. This missile is believed to be similar in design to North Korea's Nodong II.
Pakistan also possesses advanced fighter-bomber aircraft, including the F-16, capable of delivering nuclear weapons at ranges sufficient to reach most of India (including the capital New Delhi) without refueling.
North Korea appears to have begun an active program of weapon development in 1980, when the construction of a small natural uranium-graphite power reactor began at Yongbyon, 100 km north of Pyongyang. Intelligence revealed the project in 1984, prior to its operation in 1986. The reactor is based on 1950s MAGNOX technology (graphite moderator, aluminum-magnesium clad natural uranium fuel, CO2 gas cooling) which is very good for producing weapon grade plutonium as a byproduct. After startup problems, it was operating at 20-30 MW by 1990.
A larger 50 MW MAGNOX-type reactor is under construction at Yongbyon with a completion date in 1995. A 200 MW of the same design is under construction at Taechon, 60 miles north of Pyongyang (completion is possible as early as the beginning of 1996), and a 600-800 MW reactor is also underway at Taechon (completion possible by 1997). The largest of these reactors could produce 180-230 Kg of plutonium a year, enough for 30-40 weapons. It is almost certainly intended for power production, but the potential for dual use exists.
A large secret plutonium separation facility was built at Yongbyon early in the 1980s capable of handling several hundreds of tons of fuel a year, enough to handle fuel from all of the reactors. The existence of this plant was discovered through intelligence in 1989.
A small radiochemical laboratory in located in Pyongyang, built with Soviet aid in the 1970s. Small quantities of plutonium were separated there in 1975 from Soviet-supplied irradiated fuel.
Under pressure from the Soviet Union, North Korea joined Non-Proliferation Treaty on 12/12/85, and told the IAEA of the existence of the Yongbyon facility. On 5/4/92 North Korea made its initial declaration of its holdings of nuclear material. During an inspection by the IAEA soon after to verify this declaration, North Korea revealed that it had separated 100 g of plutonium in March 1990. Subsequent analysis of the composition of samples allowed the IAEA to determine that more plutonium had been separated than the North Korean had admitted. The plutonium samples examined by the IAEA had a composition of 97.5% Pu-239, and 2.5% Pu-240. This indicates a fuel burnup of 330 MW/days at the time of removal, indicating 16 kg of plutonium existed in the reactor core at the time. This implies that it had operated about 45% of the time (assuming a 25 MW operating level) since fuel was first loaded. Requests for additional inspections led North Korea to announce its withdrawal from the NPT on 3/12/93.
North Korea did not actually withdraw from NPT, but tense negotiations continued over the next year during which N. Korea refused to comply with the treaty. On 4/8/94 N. Korea shut down its reactor in preparation for refueling. Up to this time N. Korea had kept the original load of fuel in the reactor (it said), the earlier separations were allegedly from damaged fuel rods that had been replaced. On 5/12/94 North Korea finally began unloading the 50 tonnes of irradiated fuel from its reactor. If the earlier operating regime had been followed, the fuel contains some 32 kg of weapon-grade plutonium (5-6 bombs worth), although 25 kg is considered more probable. The range of plausible estimates is 17-33 Kg. The maximum possible amount (assuming unrealistic operating conditions: full power for 80% of the time) is 53 Kg. So far this fuel has not been reprocessed.
The CIA believes that North Korea removed up to half of the fuel during a 1989 shutdown. Assuming 55% operation up to this time, this implies 7-14 Kg of plutonium was removed. This fuel may have been reprocessed, and would supply sufficient plutonium for 1 or possibly 2 bombs.
The economy of North Korea had begun collapsing in the early 1990s following the cut off of Soviet and Chinese aid. In the spring of 1994, elderly and ailing Great Leader Kim Il Sung revised long standing policy and signaled increasing accommodation with the West. As a result of a diplomatic mission by Jimmy Carter, Kim agreed to compromise on the North Korean nuclear program. Kim died soon after this meeting, but North Korea generally continues to adhere to his policies.
In the fall of 1994 North Korea agreed to suspend its nuclear program in exchange for a $4.5 billion assistance program to build two safeguarded light water power reactors (1000 Mwe each), after complex negotiations with the U.S.. Most of the funding would be supplied by Japan, the reactors themselves would be built by South Korea. This agreement required that all reactor and reprocessing plant work be halted, that all irradiated fuel remain under safeguards, and that North Korea's domestic reactors eventually be dismantled. The situation remained tense over the next several months with North Korea refusing to implement this agreement, and Dear Leader Kim Jong Il making ambivalent statements. It did not resume its nuclear activities however, and as the economic situation grew increasingly desperate agreed to allow foreign rice in to the country to relieve famine. On 13 June 1995, North Korea officially endorsed the nuclear pact with the U.S..