MILNET
Opinion The Iranian Bomb-Sooner Than You Think
September 22, 2006
Last year The Israeli Defense Minister stated that the trigger for
decisive action against Iran was the attainment of the knowledge of how
to successfully enrich uranium that leads to the production of weapons
grade material. This is a premature trigger -- it would take
several years, once enrichment actually began to create enough
material, even with huge numbers of centrifuges...
-Ashton Carter, Co-Chairman of the Preventitive Defense Project at the
Kennedy School of Government and past Assistant Secretary of Defense in
the Clinton Administration, paraphrased, in testimony before the U.S.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, September 19, 2006 1
Experts tend to
deliver their opinions as if they were supported by uncontroversial
facts and as if at the very moment they issue their statements they
expect it to be written in stone for future generations to hold
dear. The opposite is usually true. Expert opinion is still
that -- opinion. Indeed the art of diplomacy and governance is centered on the ability to
listen to all and attempt to make the best decision possible given the
information provided by your counselors.
In the ongoing effort to second guess those actually tasked with making
the decisions, the U.S. Senate's Foreign Relations Committee has been
holding hearings in order to get a fair understanding of what the
various experts have to say about pursuing various options centered on
the ultimate goal -- keeping Iran from completing and testing a nuclear
weapon.
And has been the case for decades, the experts cannot agree with any
certainty on positive steps, only that it is most likely a lost
cause...not that we at MILNET counter that pessimism to any degree.
Time is On Our Side?
The most frustrating element in this "debate" is the occasional
utterance by experts on the element of time. Time we do not have,
yet year after year, time seems to be pushed back toward that day when
no expert will claim there is time left -- the day Iran conducts its
first nuclear test.
Why is this element so difficult to pin down? And why are we at
MILNET so pessimistic about this key issue in the debate? Is
there really time or is that simply a "see no evil" proposition that
leads to disaster?
First, let's walk down the path that would-be experts would lead
us. Enrichment of uranium is a process based in rather simple
terms upon how much input product you have, how many facilities you
have to process that material and how long it takes to actually step
through an enrichment cycle. In the end, the math is simple as
well. Suppose it takes six enrichment cycles to produce weapons
grade material. If your machine (in this case we'll assume
we are talking about a rather simple but highly sensitive process that
makes use of a centrifuge) produces an gram of weapons grade material
and we need about one and half kilograms, then with 1500 centrifuges,
we only need six cycles to produce enough material to make a
bomb.
In the end, say the experts, that math means that ONCE YOU START, and
you have those 1500 centrifuges, then you only have to have the raw
material in, people operating machines, and enough time to complete six
cycles (all the numbers here are fictional). Some say that with
1300 centrifuges (this is real number proposed by the Iranians
themselves) the processing time is something on the order of two years.
Assuming they had the machines today and started today.
What irritates us is that this math is so prolific. People cite
this math as fixed and resolute. The opposite is true.
First and foremost, it is mythical. It assumes that there are no
half steps in the processing, and that everyone plays fairly and begins
the game with raw material that takes a full set of six (or whatever
the number really is) to complete the enrichment process. The
facts are more depressing. You DO NOT have to start with raw ore,
and you certainly can obtain material in various stages of purity from
a number of sources in the black market. Several years ago, very
useable material ripe for enrichment was intercepted leaving a
former soviet republic. While cheered as an excellent "catch",
the event reminded us that smuggling of this kind of material does take
place, and to the pessimist, it makes one wonder just how much material
was NOT caught previously or after on its way out of that and other
former soviet block nations.
The point here is simple. Iran has clearly found a way to bolster
their importance in the middle east -- declare themselves to be a
nuclear nation. They can pursue both peaceful and military
options for use of nuclear materials and this has suddenly made them
the center of attention to the most powerful nations on the
planet. Given their desire is real (and we do not doubt it), then
their already known proclivity for the dark side would indicate they
would be looking for black market material that could help them
shortcut the enrichment process.
Evidence and Naiveté
When faced with questions on timing and shortcut nuclear material, the
experts of course scoff at the very idea. They make statements
like, "There is no evidence to lead us to conclude such material is
actually available and certainly there is no such material in the hands
of Iran."
It is this stupidity that concerns us the most, and we certainly hope
no one in position of authority listens to it seriously. In every
case of "surprise" nuclear capability, the intelligence, law
enforcement, and diplomatic communities expressed both surprise and
chagrin when a newly emerging nuclear nation conducted their first
test. "We should have known, but no real indicators were
there..." seems to be the mantra.
And of course there is the simple matter that the two to five year
window towards enrichment began years ago with Iran. Anyone
familiar with clandestine operations will know that the last thing you
do is brag about your capability unless you are so far along that it
can't be stopped. And that is clearly the case of
Iran.
The IAEA gurus claim that Iran could not have begun enrichment in any
"serious quantity" yet since they (the IAEA) have not observed
any of the signs that there were in fact doing so. The problem of
course is that like the U.N., the IAEA assumes the people they are
watching have some modicum of honesty in their dealings with the
international community. For some reason, the concept of hidden
operations just does not seem to cross their mind. Again, so no
evil is at work and some expect our leaders to blindly accept that
drivel as a basis for risking the lives of our allies and perhaps our
own citizens at home. It is nonsense of course -- The IAEA has
yet to be right on their analysis prior to a test of a nuclear weapon.
If we use the case of North Korea, the IAEA sounded a warning only
AFTER it was clear that North Korea had begun and then was surprised at
the speed of which the North Korean processes produced weapons grade
material. This major "OOPS" should not be forgotten. How
did North Korean "sneak" into having material so quickly? They
haven't told us why, and the IAEA, being of the ostrich clan, do not
propose to make such analysis -- after all it would point out where
their particular processes of analysis have once again failed. As
with Libya, South Africa, Pakistan and India, the international
monitoring community has proven they are worthless sources of
intelligence in the very arena they are supposed to focus.
Clearly we cannot trust their analysis of Iran.
Don't let the Fact Get in the Way
We are witnessing, once again, the myths that says time is on our
side. And the experts are quick to point out that there are no
facts to get in the way here. What we don't know cannot be
analyzed, therefore it does not exist.
What can be learned from fairly recent past history? That the
experts can be wrong on the time factor by many years. Two to
Five years in fact. Ah hell, then the statement we have two to
five years means it is already too late? That is correct.
Many intelligence analysts in this arena agree that by announcing
intention, Iran is telling us of accomplishment. They are well
along in their clandestine program, and the so called public program is
used as a false flag to keep the international community "seized upon
the issue" while the real program carries on to its conclusion.
Ashton Carter, in other testimony before the Senate committee made the
incredible statement that "what we do not know we cannot judge." And
then went on to talk about what we think based upon public information
as if it was any better than that which is unknown. When of
course, it is that very unknown which as surprised time and time again
in the nuclear arena. This admission tells it all. We
don't know about any hidden program. This doesn't mean there
isn't one, and his attitude clearly told us that he suspects there is
in fact a well hidden program. And it is the hidden program that
will produce the material required not the public one. So why do
we continue to waste time debating the publicly available information?
Building the Bomb
Of course, once you have the material in hand, building the bomb is a
simple mechanical exercise. Or Ashton Carter would have us
believe. In actuality, it is a little more difficult.
Carter says any knucklehead can build a bomb with material in
hand. Perhaps Carter's definition of a knucklehead needs a little
refinement, yes?
You need some pretty accurate machining, and the ability to move
mechanical objects around in thousands of an inch increments. Not
difficult, but a bit hard to do with any accuracy using a vice and a
pair of vice grips (the preferred tools of the knuckleheads we
know). So given you need a "real" machinist's facility and some
skilled workers, there is also the fact that assembly of a weapon
requires more than just a blueprint (which we are pretty sure Iran
has...they probably contributed to A.Q. Kahn's retirement fund --A. Q.
Kahn is the Pakistani scientist who is believed to have given Libya
everything they needed to know about building a nuclear weapon for tidy
sum).
And there is the minor fact that one needs to be very careful when
building the actual bomb, since some of the materials are highly toxic
and very susceptible to being degraded past their ability to function
as desired by contaminants.
On the flip side of this issue is the fact that it is quite possible to
have purchased the actual inner workings of a fission weapon. A
lot easier to do in fact then getting the material. Machine
parts, disassembled and shipped separately would be impossible to
trace, especially if they had never been exposed to the nuclear
material. Once received and re-assembled, a "ready-to-go" device
could easily be waiting in a secret lab in Iran. Just waiting for
the magical material that makes it all work.
We sometimes forget that despite the major industrial and scientific
effort that produced the first U.S. atomic weapons test, the actual
weapon itself was not that complex and despite a fundamental lack of
knowledge of the practical and mechanical physics that make a very
powerful bomb, the first test was not only successful, but wildly
successful. A few kilotons of yield would be all Iran would need
to change the dynamic of their influence in the middle east.
Alternatives Not Discussed
In addition to the frustrating lack of practical and common sense
opinion we have seen on this issue so far, we also are aghast to see a
lack of real out-of-the-box thinking. This failure to imagine
seems relevant -- Airliners can be turned into missile quite easily and
at least a dozen or so airliner crash analysts failed to sound a
warning or were not heeded prior to 9-11. A failure to listen and
a failure to imagine...could this be happening again?
In this case, the one possibly frightening but interesting alternative
to allowing Iran to march down the nuclear weapons road, is to explore
if others in the region are not also working on their own weapons.
Take for instance Egypt or Saudi Arabia. Given that these two
countries tend to be well respected by their Arab colleagues and they
have economic wealth as well, would it not be reasonable to assume that
the last things these two nations want is a nuclear armed Iran?
And given that nothing is going to stop Iran's program (it may already
be we beyond the point of no return as the Israelis say), then what
would be the next steps in the region's nuclear development
efforts. Again the experts agree. At least one other Middle
Eastern nation will "begin" their own program to counter that of an
existing Iranian program, if for no other reason but to take away
Iran's unchallenged march to hegemony.
An alternative not discussed is simply breaking all the rules and
handing Egypt the weapon. Or perhaps Saudi Arabia. Of
course the non-proliferation experts scream at the very idea. The
turn of logic is not so awful however. If the region is destined
to become the center of a new nuclear arms race, why not end the race
before it begins.
Very few analysts will deny that Israel not only has the technology but
has already deployed fission if not fusion weapons in sufficient
quantity to ensure their survival should an overwhelming force attack
their homeland. That makes for one nuclear nation in the Middle
East. With Iran, that would make two, and thus a third is not
hard to imagine. Rather than allow Iran to ascend to some sort of
supremacy in the region based upon their being first, why not arm Egypt
or the Saudis with such a weapon so that they can counter the less than
responsible Iranian influence.
Experts deny the logic of this alternative, simply because it runs
counter to the non-proliferation mantra. The concept of a third
world nation owning such a weapon and acting responsible seems to be
impossible to consider.
Irrational Support for Diplomacy
What strikes us as ridiculous is that the experts seem to ride the wave
of pessimism and agree to go along with diplomatic efforts to dissuade
Iran when few have any hope of success. And while the military
option has a certain appeal to it, it is hard to imagine positive
results (or should we say positive results beyond the satisfying
destruction of at least part of the Iranian nuclear program) attacking
Iran's facilities might create worse conditions in the region than
Egypt suddenly announcing they have their own weapon.
At least, with another nuclear nation besides Iran (and many experts
believe that it would only be a short order of time before a third
middle east nation had conducted their own test following an Iranian
test), their list for influence it would be diminished.
Yes the support for diplomacy continues. Again, it is Ashton
Carter who tells us why. His opinion is that in order to move to
more coercive steps in any response to the Iranian lunacy, the full and
complete attempt at diplomacy has to be taken -- and failed -- before
you can move toward coercion. While this is logical, it again
ignores the obvious. True leadership does not waste time where
time is of essence.
Every day spent at useless diplomacy -- and few if any experts are
optimistic in truth about diplomacy in this case -- is a day that
allows Iran to further their aspirations for a weapon, whether it be
their public program or their clandestine one.
Iran and Terrorism
Another key issue that fortunately is not ignored by the experts is
Iran's proclivity to aiding and abetting terrorism, not to mention
their efforts to derail the peace process. While a few public
figures disagree, it is quite obvious to the majority that Iran
supports not only Hezbollah and Hamas, but as Under-Secretary State
Nicholas Burns 2 indicated in his testimony
recently, Iran's fingerprints can be found on funding to several other
organizations (for example citing only --the PFLP General Command and
worse, Islamic Jihad which is tied to Bin Laden and of course the
ever-present Syrian Intelligence operatus still present in Lebanon).
One of the largest concerns is that a rogue element in (assuming there
are more responsible officials in the Iran government, an assumption
that may already be pushing the limits of credibility) the Iranian
government might turn over the necessary recipes and actual materials
(whether it be bomb casing, internal workings or nuclear material) to
their favorite terrorist organization for use against Israel or even a
neighbor.
Some believe that the revolutionary zeal of the new Iranian government
in fact is already in-of-itself a terrorist organization operating
under the guise of a sovereign nation. Whether that view is
rational or not is beside the point. Evidence mounts that Iran is
more than a willing contributor to destabilization of the Middle East
via funding to Hezbollah and would-be political party Hamas.
The Israeli Factor
We at MILNET offer another scenario that tends to be ignored --
not completely, but rather waved off as some sort of nightmare not to
be considered. Soon, and not too long from now, the Israeli
government's analysis of the Iranian nuclear program, coupled with the
clearly irresponsible Iranian threats made publicly against Israel,
will drive that small nation to take pre-emptive action.
There of course is precedent, the Israelis took very decisive action
against an Iraqi nuclear reactor decades ago. And while there is
no hope that the Israelis could completely destroy the Iranian program,
it is also clear that they could get away with a large scale of
destruction than a major power like the U.S., who after all, has but a
small number of assets at risk from an Iranian nuclear weapon as
compared to Israel.
Indeed, the Israeli Defense Minister has been quoted as saying that the
point of no return for the Israelis is when the Iranians have learned
how to enrich the weapons grade material. This obviously comes from the
notion that once they CAN enrich, the WILL. And once the
START, predictions as to when the FINISH are usually and invariably
wrong. Surprises abound in the nuclear arena and Israel, simply
and forcibly, cannot be surprised. Will not be surprised.
Thus, given that in the public arena that Iran is bragging about how
they know how to create the weapons material and are clearly set upon
publicly acquiring the centrifuges necessary to process enriched
uranium, one is led to believe that Israel's trigger point has already
been met. Time for Israeli action therefore, and using their
definitions not our own, is well overdue and pending.
This perhaps, means that the next big step in the Iranian march to a
bomb is not going to be an Iranian step, but an Israeli step.
MILNET has discussed at some length the tactics for attacking
Iranian nuclear facilities. While the flight paths might differ,
the targets do not, and Israeli tacticians most assuredly do not need
MILNET's maps, arrows and notations to figure out how to attack the
major chunks of the Iranian nuclear capability. We would only add
that missile building facilities would clearly be added to any Israeli
attack, from factories for small rockets to the build sites for equivalents of MRBM or ICBM in the Iranian
arsenal.
And while the number of aircraft required to make these assaults is
large, and detection of the attackers is without doubt a
certainty, it is also clear that for Israel, the risk of heavy
losses are outweighed by the very survival of their nation.
Watching their response to events this summer, it is clear that Israel
simply looks at its security differently than any other country in the
world.
Regime Change
An extended effort to foster democracy in Iran was thought to be a
valid course to deter the Iranian nuclear program. Indeed the
U.S. and its allies poured support into Iran in order to aid the more
moderate forces to win an Iranian election in 2005. Whether one
believes that the very idea of U.S. support swayed the populace in the
opposite direction or that the Iranian people really do not want
democratic reforms, the results are the same.
Revolutionary zealots were elected into office and the hard liners have
demonstrated that mandate weekly, calling for both the destruction of
Israel and accusing the West -- especially the U.S. of seeking the
destruction of Iran.
Unfortunately, in this the Iranians are correct. They are
creating a self-fulfilling prophecy -- we do want the current
leadership gone, and we at MILNET suspect that a top of list item for
the CIA is to undermine and seek an overturn of the current regime in
Iran.
And if the Israelis were to attack Tehran and catch the current
leadership in their beds one morning, I doubt if the U.S. government
would mourn the loss.
But can the U.S. do anything further to aid a regime change?
Aside from invasion, there is little else that can be done. And
an invasion is clearly out of the question, unless of course, the
troops taken out of Afghanistan are routed back overseas after their
long deployment. Some pessimists believe this is possible -- the
military calculus has changed now that other nations are replacing U.S.
forces in Afghanistan.
And short of a U.S. or Israeli attack on Tehran directly aiming for the
new leadership in Iran, few if any efforts will result in a regime
change.
A Pessimistic Conclusion
MILNET joins the pessimists in various conclusions visa-vis the Iranian development of a nuclear weapon.
We agree with the Israeli Defense Minister -- the point of no return is
the knowledge of how to enrich the material necessary to produce a
weapon. We are pessimistic because we have covered this issue
well beyond the five years it would take to create the necessary
material and despite the public experts repeated shifting of the
timeline outward, it is clear that a clandestine program has had more
than enough time to produce the fissile material necessary. The
point of no return HAS passed.
We agree, belatedly perhaps, that time for military action has
past. Destroying the facilities is a good short term solution,
but has no long term benefits. Indeed, we believe the assessment
that the response by Iran against U.S. allies is a critical factor in
refuting the military option as viable. Having said that, it is
also clear that given nothing else appears to provide the necessary
security for the region, perhaps the military option becomes, at a
minimum, a delaying tactic. The throw of the dice by using this
option may produce unexpected positive results. Some believe the
population of Iran, outside the mullahs and the current leaders, might
rebel if a strong response to Iran's foray into nuclear weapons results
in attacks inside Iran.
We also agree, and have agreed all along, that diplomatic efforts,
while worth the effort, are doomed. Not only is it too late to
dissuade the Iranians, but diplomacy never really had any hopes of
succeeding. In fact, diplomacy has never really worked in this
arena. The only case where it appeared to work is where the
nations in question were clearly making half hearted attempts at
nuclear weapons in the first place. Diplomacy only works where
there is a set of common goals. We have none with Iran, and they
certainly do not want to even discuss it with us. It is also
clear that Iran believes their nuclear program is paramount to their
ascending to their rightful place amongst Arab nations. That is
all but impossible to counter.
We fear the Israeli response. Given a short while to recover from
their Lebanese involvement this summer, the freshly awakened Israeli
military knee-jerk is very likely to look at their next, great,
military challenge, and that can either be Syria or Iran. With Iran
continuing to publicly threaten Israel AND brag about their program to
build all the necessary elements of an enrichment program, it is clear
that Israel will no longer be able to resist the urge to do something
decisive militarily.
And frankly, MILNET believes that the Israeli military option, while
setting off a series of very negative follow on events in the region,
it is not clear that all would be negative. We believe that many
Arab leaders curse the brashness of the Iranian leadership and do not
condone that country's effort to build a nuclear weapon. Egypt
and Saudi Arabia, for instance, while publicly remaining quiet on the
Iranian verbal attacks on Israel, may be quietly saying to themselves
that the Iranians are just asking for trouble and when it comes, add
that Iran got what it deserved for being so stupid. That
possibility needs to be thoroughly explored...perhaps there is an
opportunity to gain support for an Israeli response simply because Iran
is baiting the tiger and everyone expects the given response to that
baiting. Indeed it is one of the things the recent expert panel
before Congress suggested -- working to build a new alliance against
Iran using our so called friends in the region.
In any case, the continued arrogance and revolutionary mantra of the
Iranians is abhorrent. It will produce nothing but bad things for
the region and Iran's Arab brothers do not seem, at this time, to be
attempting to dissuade Iran from taking the course they have. It
appears moreover, that the Arab community of nations are fatalistic in
their response...it will be what it will be. As if they could do
nothing to change this course of events. It is that apathy that
will be the undoing of the region. At some point Israel will no
choices left, and while the world will condemn them harshly, many will
quietly rejoice in the expected Israeli response.
Sources:
Ashton Carter,
paraphrased (actual verbal Q&A is not available at this time),
testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committeee,9/19/2006
Nicholas Burns, testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committeee,9/19/2006
