MILNET Opinion -

MILNET Opinion
Underplayed Crisis: Iranian Centrifuge Enrichment, September 2004

"Iran has designed its nuclear weapons program so that it could produce enough enriched uranium to construct a warhead within days..."

- WorldNetDaily, in a GeoStrategy-Direct Intelligence Briefing, 2/28/2004 ¹

The real problem nuclear proliferation is one of time. By the time we hear of nuclear proliferation problems, the cause for that concern can only have grown worse, not better. And in most cases, our information is so old we don't realize the REAL danger.

Iran is the classic case. Focus on nuclear plants that have certain capacities is certainly troubling. However, in some cases, that is not the correct focus. In the Iranian case, direct production of highly enriched uranium, that stuff that bombs are made of, could very well be part of the Iranian shell game. While we are watching direct production, they could easily be taking low enrichment uranium and feeding it into the front of a facility being used to produce low enrichment uranium and get better and better output. Repeating the process, assuming the Iranians are using the right kind of centrifuges, produces weapons grade material more than enough quantities to make a handful, if not several handfuls of weapons. One estimate is 5 to 25 weapons load MAY ALREADY HAVE BEEN PRODUCED CLANDESTINELY.

Now that is a scary thought. While the U.N. dithers and threatens on a timeline that gives Iran years to pull together a weapon, they may have already produced the needed weapons grade material.

The cause of this situation today is diplomacy. It moves far too slow and requires so much legal-like bickering that it works fully in the favor of malicious government who is under scrutiny. Iran simply has to say "No way, you are wrong, we have no nuclear ambitions" and the U.N. is off on a three to five year gabber fest that will do nothing practical toward solving the problem.

And politicians who fear unilateral action and who are unwilling to challenge this slow and ineffective process pander to the malicious government by their inaction.

Bless his heart, Colin Powell is making all the right noises. But unfortunately, it is too little, too late. The moment a centrifuge touched land in Iran, the U.S. should have taken the steps it is belatedly taking now. What one can do with one centrifuge is little -- except to learn what to do with several thousand, and then magically with 50,000.

According to one source, the Iranian Natanz facility was in the process of assembling a mind boggling 50,000 gas centrifuges. So what if the Iranian technology only produces a fraction of a gram of weapons grade Uranium? A half a gram times 50,000 is 25,000 grams. 25 kilograms is enough to build a weapon, including wastage in the manufacturing process.

Do we wait until Iran has all 50,000 online? Will we ever know when they have 50,000 online? Consider that 3,000 machines in one location will produce (at a tenth of a gram per centrifuge) 300 grams. Now put your trucks at the output end of the cycle and run the material back to the front end again. What do you get now? More HEU. Duh!

You don't need 50,000 centrifuges. Any fraction of that will do, because it only matters how much time you need to run a single cycle. And if you keep reprocessing in the gas centrifuge, you continue to get more HEU. You need other goodies to go into the process, but for some stupid reason, we don't track those materials quite as efficiently as the uranium. In any case, Iran already has enough raw product to get there. In fact, they probably already done do'd it in Bill Clinton's vernacular. We bring up Slick Willy because a lot of what has happened, occurred on his watch. The current administration is not faultless however.

While the Bush administration started out correctly by immediately challenging Iran, Iraq and North Korea, they gave non-proliferation fans a boost. However, as stated earlier, diplomacy is far too slow.

The problem with our national thinking, is even despite 9/11, we tend to be a little weak kneed. And some of that has rubbed off on Israel too -- the destination for the Islamic bomb being built in Iran.

The United States does not have to invade Iran to take care of this problem. We know where the centrifuges are. Take them out. It is not that tough to do.

Of course, the panders will cry "foul!" and say "You will create new waves of terrorism in the U.S. and may even entice them to bring nuclear weapons to the U.S.!"

The problem of course is that it is only a matter of time before the nuclear terrorist pays a visit, and he or she may already be on the Iranian payroll. Least we forget, the Iranian backed terrorists do not like us any more than they like Israel.

Of course, now may be too late. Again the hand wringers will whine, "all the more reason not to bomb them."

Rational thinking that attempts to get 100% national security, however, rejects the claim. Here's the logic. Suppose it is not too late. If we level the facilities that contain the centrifuges, ore mining, and fuel rod manufacturing, then that will end, for some time, the risk of Iran producing a weapon. They have lied, we know they are lying, and we clearly know now that we simply cannot allow a rogue nation to acquire nuclear weapons.

Let the Iranians squawk. Don't forget that this stuff costs huge sums of money. When they get pretty far along in rebuilding, we do it again. Pretty soon they are going to run out of money, folks. Or at a minimum, their budget will reflect these huge losses and perhaps it will force those enamored with their nuclear weapons program to lose power within the schizophrenic Iranian government.

Now use the opposite logic -- we do nothing but engage with the U.N. The U.N. has a dismal record in getting anyone to stop doing anything the world community has not wanted them to do. Their successes are almost always in "tattle-taling", raising the alarm AFTER something nasty has been done covertly. The only exception is one nation on the African continent AND THAT NATION VOLUNTEERED TO END THEIR PROGRAM. The U.N. "pressure" was almost laughable and had little to do with South Africa's decision. No country will disarm voluntarily unless it feels it is in its best interest. Only force will make that change occur if they don't believe it is in their best interest. For those who believe the U.N. CAN be effective in the nuclear proliferation regime, take a piece of paper and write down these nation names - India, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, North Korea. For that matter, add Israel to the list in the first column. In a new column write down South Africa. 5 or perhaps 6 to 1 against success from the U.N.

So why does the U.S. continue to pursue the U.N. approach. It is hard to understand unless you remember that the United States has been involved in a public relations effort since the Vietnam War -- an effort to play the "good guy". Of course, like all good guys, we take our share of punishment. 9/11 was a direct effect of our counterintelligence and counterterrorism people being "good guys". Never, never again.

It's time to take a play from the Israeli play book. When they learned of a nuclear reactor was capable of producing weapons grade material, they didn't wait for it to almost produce enough for a weapon, they took it out in 24 hours. We need to adopt that mindset and execute on that plan time and time again. This is the ONLY way to be sure we don't face a nuclear weapon in an American City.

If keeping my family from getting killed by a nuclear weapon in my city means being a little on the nasty side, then damnit, let's get mean and nasty! About time!

The Centrifuge Connection, The Bulletin of American Scientists, March/April 2004
Iran Can Produce Nuke Warheads in Days, WorldNetDaily, 2/28/2004