MILNET: Recent Events - Iraq
(Updated: 2002)

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Operation Desert Fox, December 1998
Dec '98 Force Levels
August 2001 Ships in the Gulf
Summary of U.N. Sanctions

August 26, 2002 Coalition aircraft strike a radar site near Irbil in Northern Iraq. No coalition aircraft were damaged and all returned home safely.

August 24, 2002

British Jets attack Army intelligence and air defense installation on Sunday in Ashar, south of Basra with no coalition damage or casualties

August 22, 2002 Coalition aircraft attacked air defense and command and control facilities in Missan province of southern Iraq, with no coalition damage or casualties. Iraq claims three civilians were killed. The attacks were in response to hostile actions by Iraqi forces.

June 16, 2002

For a second day in a row, U.S. and British jets pounded anti-aircraft sites which had threatened planes patrolling the Southern no fly zone. Baghdad accused the patrolling coalition of killing civilian encampments, however allied intelligence clearly shows the sites were classic Iraqi mobile anti- aircraft and air defense sites. Russia protested the attacks saying the attacks do not help resolve problems in the region (according to a Reuters news report).

May 20, 2002 The U.S. Central command reports a U.S. plane attacked a radar site after a SAM was fired at two U.S.fighters in the Southern No Fly Zone, 170 miles south of Baghdad. Central Command reported that the radar site had the ability to "share information with other systes."

April 22, 2002 General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff announced that throught April, Iraq has been moving SAM and radar sites into both the Northern and Southern No Fly zones. On two occasions, Coalition aircraft have responded to lock ons from these sites and so far two have been attacked U.S. jets. It is believed Iraq is in the process of updating their defenses including adding fiber optic links and installing separate receiver and transmitter facilities to better attempt to track stealth aircraft.

March 3, 2002 U.S. Aircraft once again respond to radar lockon from Iraqi anti-aircraft sites, attacking several sites over last week. U.S. aircraft returned home with no incident.

February 4, 2002:   In response to anti-aircraft artillery fire, Allied aircraft dropped precision guided bombs on a site northeast of Mosul in the Northern No-Fly zone, just 30 days after a similar opreation 30 days ago. The network television news network, eroneously suggested this is the first such attack since September, which is not true, however it is the first attack in the Northern flyzone since September.

January 28, 2002:   Pentagon announced on January 28, 2002 that U.S. aircraft, using precision guided munitions, pounded three missile and artillery sites on 1/21, 1/23, and 1/24. The attacks occurred in the southern no-fly zone as the Iraqi assets targeted coalition aircraft patrolling the no-fly zone.

September 4, 2001: nbsp; Following the four F-16 attack on a radar station at Basra airport on Thursday, 8/30, the Penagon announced a Tuesday 9/4/01 strike on anti-aircraft artillery and Surface-to-Air-Missile (SAM) sites near Ad Samawah, 100+ miles southwest of Baghdad. The strikes were composed of some 15 U.S. and British aircraft, with U.S. warplanes striking from the U.S.S Enterprise sitting in the Gulf.

No aircraft were damaged and all returned to their launch points safely. The attacks were part of the increasing regular, "rolling attacks" the Pentagon predicted early in August, slowly degrading Iraqi air defense capabilities thus decreasing the danger for Coalition aircraft patrolling the Northern and Southern No Fly Zones.

August 25, 2001: - U.S. planes launched a flight of air-to-ground missiles at Iraqi radar station 100 miles south of Baghdad as part of an ongoing effort to quell stepped up Iraqi lockons and missile firings at aircraft patrolling the Northern and Southern No Fly Zones. The attacks took place at 4:30 am and all U.S. and British aircraft returned home safely.

Iraqi news reported the attack quite differently saying that U.S. and British warplanes attacked "civil and service installations" and a civilian was wounded. The Iraqi news agency also claimed that Iraqi surface-to-air missile sites "courageous ground resistance" forced the coalition aircraft to "turn back in shame".

August 14, 2001: - U.S. planes strike again in a paced plan of destruction of Iraq's ability to threaten U.S. warplanes. F-16s using precision guided munitions attacked a SAM targeting radar site nearly 200 miles south of Baghdad and then returned home safely.

U.S. officials stated this is part of a gradual effort to go after Saddam Hussein's rebuilt air defenses. DoD spokesmen said today's attacks were in response to the increased boldness of Iraqi attempts to strike U.S. aircraft flying the No Fly Zones and made it quite clear that more would be forthcoming as events warranted.

Clearly U.S. military planners are assessing risks versus targets while checking off their list of sites dangerous to U.S. and British airmen flying Operations Northern and Southern Watch.

According to Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman, "This radar has been an element of the Iraqi air defense system that has been directly contributing to effectiveness of their integrated air defense system..."

"If Iraq were to cease its threatening actions, coalition strikes would cease as well" claimed U.S. Central Command. With this latest attack and the positioning of possilble future attacks, it is clear the U.S. has not given up on enforcing the No Fly Zones, nor will the U.S. allow Iraq to continue to threaten its aircraft performing that mission.

August 10, 2001: - As predicted, U.S. and British warplanes streaked through the Southern No Fly Zone to attack command and control facilities and missile batteries which have been boldly targeting Operation Southern Watch aircraft. The ground packages consisting of F-16, F-18 and British Tornado GR4 bombers, were escorted over the taraget by F-14 and the airspace was controlled by U.S. Navy E-2 Hawkeye A&EWC aircraft from the U.S.S. Enterprise situated off shore in the Persian Gulf.

U.S. officials stated that other raids were not out of the question and that the U.S. will continue to strike at threatening infrastructure as needed to protect the U.N. manadated Northern and Southern No-Fly zones.

The target of the attacks included a communications site at An Munaniyah, 115km south east of Baghdad and at an early warning radar station and nearby surface-to-air missile battery at An Nasiriyah some 165km further south east.

U.S. Officials also said that overhead reconaissance has recorded Chinese aid in rebuilding fiber optic links for the Iraqi air defenses.

August 7, 2001: - Iraqi missile batteries in northern Iraq lock on to a pair of U.S. F-16s patrolling from their base in Turkey. The F-16s fire and destroy the missile site with gravity bombs. Iraq claims some 14 sorties were flown in an attack against civilian and "service" targets and that their strong air defense repulsed the attack, forcing the American planes to hastily retreat back to Turkey.

The U.S. Defense Department, however, reports that the action consisted of two aircraft and the missile batteries, with no other missions and no other targets. When asked if the attack was somehow related to a retaliation for recent events such as the unsuccessful shooting at a U-2 and lock-ons onto E-2Cs flying in Kuwati airspace, DoD spokesman emphatically replied that the attack was in self defense and had no relation to earlier events.

July 30, 2001: - Iraqi SAM batteries shoot blindly at a U-2 overhead reconaissance flight. The U-2, flying well above most SAM flight ceilings, was not hit. Pentagon officials say the SAM was "free-fired", that is, launched without benefit of ongoing radar guidance, similar to launching the missile in the general vacinity of the aircraft in hopes of the missile straying into the aircraft.

The attempted attack follows an earlier provocation as a E-2C surveillance aircraft used to look down on the no fly zones was targeted unsuccessfully by Iraqi missile batteries.

Adm Craig Quigley, the DoD spokesman, said that the number of Iraqi provocations is up in 2001, already at 370 provocations in the Southern No Fly zone, up from 221 for all of last year. The Northern Fly zone is at 145 provocations, up from 62 so far in 2001.

April 12, 2001: - U.S. planes respond to anti-aircraft radar lock-on and attack and destroy AA site 130 miles southeast of Baghdad.

March 30, 2001: - U.S. Planes attack artillery site near As Samawah on the Euphrates River in Southern Iraq.

 

February 16, 2001 - U.S. and U.K. warplanes bomb attack Iraqi air defense systems in a major attack on Iraq's military infrastructure.

Once again, in order to reduce the risk to aircraft and pilots patrolling the no fly zones in Iraq, aircraft struck at Air Defense sites in Iraq. Prompted by an Iraqi build up of air defense as well as command and control facilities in and around Baghdad, U.S. and British planes struck sites in the suburbs but avoided striking populated areas. The strikes were conducted by 24 U.S. and Military aircraft including F-15, Navy F-18, and British Toranodos.

As briefed in the Pentagon by the Director of Joint Operations Staff, Lt. General Greg Newbold, ABC News reported that the strike aircraft left on the attacks at about 11:20 am on Friday Morning, 2/16. The aircraft began the attack at around 12:15 and by 12:30 began leaving the vicinity, clearing the Iraqi air space by 1:30 pm.

According to ABC News, the Iraqi Air Defense forces have fired more anti- aircraft missiles in the last 5 weeks prior to the attack than all of that expended in the last six months. Speculation would be that the increased Iraqi tempo helped Pentagon and Central Command commanders to make their decision to begin planning to reduce the danger to their pilots.

The attacks centered on 20 radars and fiber optic links which comprised 5 command and control sites around Baghdad according to Pentagon briefers.

The reasons given by General Greg Newbold were that the build up had gotten to the point that the Iraqi sites been for sometime presenting a clear danger to No Fly Zone patrol aircraft. Two types of radars were struck as part of the operations, both able to surveil well into the no fly zone patrol areas, and were consistently painting patrol aircraft. In answer to a question of the press, the General stated that they have been building this capability by moving destroyed radars nearer the no fly zone into what the Iraqi's thought were safer areas near Baghdad. The General also stated that all the targets were in military areas clear of any residential or local businesses and therefore civilian casualties should not have occurred. The General also stated that none of the attacks missed their targets.

The attacks came nearly on the anniversary of last years attacks on anti- aircraft sites near the northern border of the Northern No Fly Zone area. It is also the first really "inland" attack since the "Desert Fox" strikes in December of 1998.

The Pentagon briefing also pointed out that long range, standoff weapons were used so that U.S. aircraft were far from any anti-aircraft weapons in the vicinity of Baghdad.

ABC News incorrectly reported that the decision was made to attack "because there was a new President in office". The reporter was most likely interpreting comments made over the previous week by President George W. Bush that the "...U.S. would show a little more military muscle with Iraq". However, Lt. General Newbold clearly indicated the reasons for attacka and the timing came from the commanders in the region assessing risk to U.S. and British pilots patrol the No Fly Zones, and gained approval for the operation when they informed the President of their plans. Speculation might be that the build up was ignored during the election controversy so that the administration could better deal with the political fallout from such an attack. Typical and expected responses from China and Russia as well as a number of Arab states was noted almost that most of the nations in the Ariabian penninsula continue to fund the patrolling of the No Fly Zones and other sanctions against Suddam Hussein and Iraq.

In a later press briefing, President George W. Bush indicated that this was an operation presented to him in the form of a communication or notification of the military commanders intent to conduct operations already approved by the policy established for defense of those patrolling the no fly zone, and absent his veto the operation would go ahead. Obviouly President Bush supported the attacks and they went ahead as planned.

Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, on the day of the attack said:


 

February 2000 - U.S. and U.K. warplanes bomb attack Iraqi air defense systems:

U.S. and U.K aircraft attacked anti-aircraft facilities in Iraqi, and according to Reuters, this makes the eighth clash between the western forces and Iraqi military sites. Reuters also quoted the U.S. military, " ``The Iraqi forces fired anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) at coalition aircraft from sites near Bashiqah (in northern Iraq…Coalition aircraft responded to the Iraqi attack by dropping ordnance on elements of the Iraqi integrated air defence system'' .

 

January 1999 - Iraqi Belligerence Defies Logic

Saturday, January 23, 1999. Iraq continues to defy the U.N. by regularly flying aircraft near the No-Fly zone and illuminating U.S. and British aircraft patrolling the zone. The cycle of cat and mouse has continued since the cessation of bombing which ended less than a week after it begun on December 16, 1998. Following the four nights of bombing, Iraqi mobile SAM launchers began to move into hostile positions.

U.S. aircraft commanders, under rules of engagement that allow them to launch High speed Anti Radiation Missiles (HARM) at illuminating SAM sites, continually attack radar emitters. On January 23, U.S. aircraft took out one SAM site and on Sunday January 24, another is believed to be destroyed but not confirmed.

While the game continues, it is clear U.S. patience after the initial 1998 strike is once again wearing thin, and the opportunity for resumption of strikes gets closer.

Meanwhile, the Iraqis, hoping for support from the Arab League of Nations are surprised and stalk out of the meetings when their neighbors refuse to condemn U.N. sanctions and U.S. actions against Iraq. The Arab League urges Iraq to comply with the U.N. requirements for resumption of inspections and monitoring regimes.

On January 26 both North and South no-fly zones were busy. In the North, Iraqi artillery moved into attack positions and fired upon U.S. aircraft with anti-aircraft shelling. U.S. fighters responded by dropping laser guided bombs on these artillery emplacements. After being targeted by a SAM site, a U.S. EA-6B Prowler (ELINT aircraft) launched a HARM missile at the site threatening it. U.S. Aircraft also fired missiles at two other Iraqi SAM sites.

In the Southern No Fly Zone, U.S. aircraft fired at several targets at Basra after they were illuminated and fired upon by Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery, and threatened by Iraqi warplanes just south of the No-Fly zone border. U.S. aircraft also fired upon a SAM site, associated air defense systems and command and control elements. Iraqi run news services reported some 11 civilians were killed and another 59 were injured (Iraqi Press Agency).

On January 30, U.S. attacked six Iraqi Air-Defense sites near the city of Mosul, also in the northern No-Fly zone.

On January 31, U.S. and British warplanes struck again, first a U.S. F-16 based out of Incirlik, Turkey, acting in self defense, fired a HARM missile at a Iraqi radar site in the Northern No-Fly Zone, and then eight U.S. and British planes attacked communications sites in the Southern No-Fly Zone.

December 1998 - Another Crisis

On December 10, 1998, UNSCOM Chairman Richard Butler reported to the U.N Security Council that Iraq had refused to allow U.N. inspectors access to the Bathe Party headquarters. On December 11, 1998, Butler also reported that Iraq had refused to report on why and where a number of dual use equipment sets had been moved. This last report is even more alarming, as it may indicate the Iraqi's have resumed their production of chemical or biological weapons.

Meanwhile, the DoD and DoS warned that a continued array of forces were rotating into the region poised to strike if Iraq did once again allow inspections. At all levels, the U.S. government warned that the use of force option was still available.

On December 15, 1998, Butler once again ordered U.N. UNSCOM inspectors out of the region.

On December 16, 1998, U.S.President Clinton allowed the attack postponed in November to resume. The array of forces due in the area by December 18, 1998 would seem to indicate U.S. preparation for any Iraqi response. The new attack was dubbed Operation Desert Fox.

After more than three days of U.S. and British missile and bombing attacks, Iraqi Defense Minister vowed to not allow U.N inspectors back. Meanwhile, U.N. Security Counsel members China and Russia began a hard press to lift sanctions on Iraq.

With no inspections, it is clear that U.S. and British forces may have to return to bombing regularly to ensure no other weapons development could be started.

December 19 marked the last of attacks with no U.S. or British losses.

After the attack stopped, Iraqi President Suddam Hussein declared victory against the U.S. and British attacking forces. Many in the U.S. Congress called for concerted efforts to force the removal of Saddam Hussein.


November 1998 - The Beginning of this Year's Crisis

In early November, President Bill Clinton warned the nations press that the latest refusal by Iraq to allow inspections is the worst defiance by Iraq since the Gulf War. Following advice to allow diplomacy to take its course before promising military action, the President seems to have waited for a reasonable amount of time to pass while the diplomats have attempted to perform their magic. However, it is clear that this strategy is not only ineffective, but dangerous. On November 2, one day before state elections across the United States, the President announced that no option for response to latest Iraqi refusals for inspections is "off-the-table". In other words, the military option is once again being used as a lever to force the Iraqis into compliance. The next few weeks could result in return to events which began one year ago. (see October 1997 below.

On November 3, 1998, the U.S. State Department published a Travel Warning warning U.S. citizens of possible violence and military action in regards to Iraq's new refusals to honor their obligations. This is usually the first hint of military action.

November 5: The United Nations voted to cite Iraq for "flagrant violation" of the terms of the cease fire and inspection agreements, both the original and that brokered by the U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan earlier in 1998.

November 8: the U.S. President met with the Secretary of Defense William Cohen and the National Security Advisor Sandy Berger. Cohen had just returned from a Gulf nations tour consulting with various governments there, and Berger had just returned from consultations from the French and British.

November 12: U.S. President Clinton warns that the U.S. will not condone the recent refusals for inspections and that military action is clearly a very relavent action. The U.N., responding to the tenor of Clinton's message, and the Iraqi stubborn refusal to capitulate, withdraws all inspection teams out of Iraq.

November 14: With U.S. bombers literally on their attack missions Saturday, Iraqi officials finally agreed to allow U.N. weapons inspection teams to return to their inspections. The attack was aborted by U.S. President Clinton in time to prevent any of the attacking aircraft from completing their mission.

The President did, however, warn Iraq that the crisis was not over until the teams did, in fact, return to inspections. The military forces in the Gulf region will remain until the Iraqi capitulation is proven to be in effect.

At the time of the attack orders, the U.S. had considerable forces in place, with more than enough firepower to force Iraq back to an inspection regime.

This Year's Instigation: September 1998

Once again, Iraq has denied access to key facilities and inspectors have complained to the U.N Security Council. Once again Iraq has gone back on their word and after almost a year to-the-date from the beginnings of the last crisis.

The U.N. has called for Iraq to comply with the U.N. sanctions, however none of the Security Council members is willing to rattle the sword again. Some believe that the U.S. President, worried at home, is not able to politically spend the necessary funds to re-generate another operation into the Gulf region (last year's push to get ready for attack was called Operation Desert Thunder). However, after the November elections it is possible the U.S. will then make efforts to force Kuwait to comply.


October 1997 through March 1998

Overview

The previous crisis began in October as U.N. Inspectors began having trouble getting into a number of different sites. Then on November 6, 1997 the U.N. complained of Iraqis playing with monitoring cameras.

The Crisis reached a head when Iraq expelled inspection teams based on U.S. having members on these inspection teams On November 13, 1997, U.N. pulled out all the inspectors refusing to allow Iraq to define the make-up of the teams.

Diplomacy managed to replace the teams by November 21st, but Iraq begins right away with new rhetoric and refusals to allow inspections of "Presidential Palaces". The U.N. fed up with this game of cat and mouse began stepping up their threats, with the U.S. continuing its build up of military forces (a second carrier battle group).

Things cooled until mid January 1998, when once again Iraq refused access (as promised) to the so-called "Presidential Palaces". By the first week of February, 1998, a third carrier group and a Marine Expeditionary force were moved in as the Pentagon began finalizing strike plans.

Abstract

As part of the surrender and peace treaty between the U.N. Gulf Coalition and Iraq following the Gulf War, Iraq agreed to periodic, unlimited inspections by U.N. arms inspection personnel (U.N. Special Commission on Iraq - UNSCOM), obstensibly to ensure the dismantlement and prohibition for development of weapons of mass destruction.

On October 29, 1997, the Iraqis raised tensions in the area once again by refusing to allow U.N. inspection teams to continue their inspections. This was not the first time Iraq has pushed the envelope on Inspections, or in fact on any of the terms of the treaty following the Gulf War. Previous provokations included radar lock-ons to U.N. aircraft patrolling the Northern and Southern no-fly zones. Those provokations resulted in a set of SAM sites being destroyed by U.S. warship launched Cruise Missiles, and another set taken out by U.S. Aircraft using anti-radiation missiles launched from jet fighter aircraft.

In this new provocation, Iraq stated that U.S. members of the inspection teams were U.S. spys and therefore would not be allowed. According to the U.N. inspectors, they observed scientists leaving with loads of material during a surprise inspection, and subsequently found test kits for testing of anthrax and sarin gas...agents Iraq has been known to possess previously but thought to have been destroyed. When attempts were made to follow this trail of evidence, the inspection teams were barred from further inspections, and the current crisis began.

U.N. diplomats attempted to resolved the situation, citing Iraq's previous agreements which stated unlimited access and did not allow Iraq to have any say in the makeup of the inspection teams.

As U.N. rhetoric became more terse, Iraq appeared not to be backing down, and in fact, threats were made by Iraq to shoot down U-2 spy planes which the U.N. requested to overfly in order to verify treaty provisions.

The U.S. maintains that any hostile act against U.S. aircraft (the U.S. is providing the U-2 service to the U.N.) will be a clear act of agression with grevious results...in the words of President Clinton, "a big mistake".

A U.N. negotiating team flew into Iraq to discuss the terms of the agreement Iraq had signed as part of the capitulation following the Gulf war, and Russian and French diplomats also attempted to reason with Iraq. However Iraq remained intransient.

The next U-2 flight was postponed in order for the U.N. diplomats to carry out their negotiations, but when those negotiations failed, new U-2 flights were resumed, so far with no action from Baghdad.

Subsequently, new inspection attempts were also thwarted.

On November 12, 1997, the U.N. voted to add a highly restrictive travel ban on Iraqi citizens, and condemmed the refusal to allow inspections. It became clear some consession from Iraq was necessary to prevent further excalation of events.

The resolution made four made points:

  1. Condemmed Iraq for not allowing inspections
  2. Called for immediate and full cooperation with inspectors
  3. Created a travel ban in and out of Iraq (with only a few exceptions)
  4. Warned of other, unnamed actions if Iraq did not comply.

The U.S. ambassador to the U.N. called for immediate access by the arms inspection teams following the unanimous U.N. security council vote.

On November 13, Iraq expelled U.S. inspection team members. The U.N. quickly removed all inspection teams (save for a skeleton crew, location unknown), citing that a prior non-segragation policy prohibited Iraq from determining makeup of inspection teams. Analysis would also indicate this is a wise move as Saddam's next move would be to seize inspection team members and use them as human shields.

As the U.S.S. George Washington, a nuclear powered aircraft carrier, made its way throught the Suez Canel to join her sister ship in the Gulf, U.S.S. Nimitz, Iraq softened its tone slightly, saying they would prefer a diplomatic solution to the situation. However, Saddam Hussein, in his announcment over Baghdad radio, did not offer any such solutions leading most analysts to state this was a stalling move intended to give those favoring diplomatic efforts only ammunition to delay military action. The George Washington is due to reach the Gulf by th 19th of November.

By December, the inspectors were back on the job, however so called "Presidential Palaces" were deemed off limits. Although tensions seemed to have lessened somewhat, Iraqi rhetoric included removal of all sanctions.

In January of 1998, inspectors had uncovered possible leads into prisoners being used as test subjects for chemical and/or biological agents. When an American led team moved to interview and inspect documents and visit these facilities, they were blocked by the Iraqis. Once again UNSCOM officials briefed the U.N. Security Council and the crisis appeared to have begun again. Iraqis denied such tests and reiterarted their desire to have sanctions lifted by a date determined by Iraq regardless of compliance to the U.N. Resolutions.

By the end of January, it was clear that Iraq was using this as another tactic of delay, and when UNSCOM teams were once again being denied access, the teams officially notified the U.N. Security Council that they were no longer able to monitor and verify the absence of production of weapons of mass destruction.

In early February, 1998, the third U.S. carrier battle group arrived in the region, providing the necessary strike power to begin a 1-2 week air attack on Iraqi targets. Russian diplomatic efforts once again proposed a solution, however both the U.N. and the U.S. stated the proposals lacked merit and were just another delaying tactic similar to that conducted in late November, 1997. The U.S. appeared to be making attack plans in earnest.

Previous Events Chronology

Prior to October 29, 1997

U.N. Inspectors ( from the UNSCOM team) uncover possible test kits for Anthrax biotoxin and Sarin Gas

October 29, 1997

U.N. inspection team prohibited from inspecting, Iraq claims U.S. members are spys

November 3, 1997

U.N. envoys travel to Iraq to attempt resolution

November 4, 1997

Iraq states that it will shoot down U-2 overflights, U.S. responds "this would be a big mistake"

November 6, 1997

The UNSCOM team complains of Iraqi tampering with monitoring cameras, in a first real piece of evidence of the possible resumption of production. U.S. Secretary of Defense warns of seriousness of this action.

November 7, 1997

Iraq refuses to negotiate. U.N. votes to condem Iraq, however vote is not unamious as France, Kenya, China, and Russia abstain due to harshness of resolution's language and promise of severe sanctions.

November 11, 1997

U.N. inspectors once again refused entry.

November 12, 1997

U.N. votes unaminously to condem Iraq, promising other actions if Iraq does not comply, and sets up travel ban on Iraq

November 13, 1997

Iraq expells U.S. members of inspection teams - U.N. pulls entire inspection team out citing non-segragation policy.

November 14, 1997

Iraq restates their intent to shoot down U-2 overflights

November 16, 1997

U.S. Aircraft Carrier George Washington passes through Suez Canal on its way to join the U.S.S. Nimitz in the Persian Gulf. Iraq softens its stance somewhat by stating they would like to find a diplomatic solution, but offers no ideas in that respect.

November 18, 1997

U.S. President Bill Clinton makes decision to move 6 F-117, 6 B-52, 2 B-1B, and 28 other bomber aircraft into range of Iraq, as well as move the U.S. warship U.S.S. Intrepid into range. Russia's Boris Yeltsin met with an Iraqi official, purportedly to come up with a diplomatic solution to the situation. The U.S. says nothing short of full compliance will do.

November 20, 1997

After a mad rush by the Russian Foreign Minister (meeting with Iraqi Foreign Minister), Iraq agreed to allow the U.N. inspectors back into Iraq. U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albreight cheered the statement and hoped Iraq would indeed do as they said. Meanwhile U.S. continued the military buildup with the remainder of the F-16s leaving for the Middle East on Friday, 11/21.

November 21, 1997

UNSCOM inspectors arrive back in Baghdad. President Clinton cheers the event and expresses the hope that inspections will go unhindered. Meanwhile movement of a total of 30,000 troops to the region will complete, and stay in place until the U.S. is satisfied Iraq is fully compliant with U.N. Resoution 1137 (as well as the previous resolutions as demanded by the U.N.).

November 23, 1997

UNSCOM is warned by Suddam Hussien that his "presidential palaces" are off limits. These palaces are huge estates in some cases larger than the land area of Washington, D.C. according to U.S. President Bill Clinton. UNSCOM says they will attempt to defy Suddam's rhetoric in the coming days.

November 24, 1997

U.S. Secretary of Defense Cohen goes on the offensive, marching out reports on non-proliferation which show Iraq as a number one concern with an estimated of 20-200 possible tons remaining of VX nerve toxin and many pounds of anthrax suspected remaining. Cohen also releases information that a Baghdad University professor searched by U.N. inspectors during a visit to high tech facilities there, found a report with personnal covers which was actually a full report on how to create RICIN toxin, a deadly nerve agent which has no other peaceful use.

November 25, 1997

CINCCENTCOM commander briefs press at the Pentagon on the deployment stating, like Cohen, that Iraq can determine when the U.S. forces (some 30,000 troops, two aircraft carriers and better than 40 land based aircraft including stealth fighters and B-52s carrying cruise missiles deployed to Diego Garcia) will go home...he must allow full and unimpeded inspections. On this day, the Secretary of Defense also re-announced the availability of the Pentagon's Proliferation: Threat and Response, an analysis of threats from countries with weapons of mass destruction. The original report has been available since April 1996 (most recent not available electronically).

December 1997

Iraq reiterates its intention to prevent inspections of its "palaces" throughout December, and at the same time begins to campaign for removal of all sanctions as a result of the Gulf War.

January 10, 1998

Iraq steps up its rhetoric on disallowing inspections on "palaces", and says it will be setting a date for which sanctions must be removed. Meanwhile inspections and interviews indicate that Iraq may have tested chemical and/or biological warfare agents on prisoners.

January 15, 1998

Acting on information that inspectors can find more on the testing of agents on prisoners, an inspection led by a former U.S. military officer sets out to do a document search and interviews, but are blocked by Iraqi refusal to accompany them to the sites. This begins a new round of diplomatic efforts and a trip by Butler to discuss the latest events with Iraq.

January 21, 1998

UNSCOM director Richard Butler briefs the U.N. Security Council on Iraqis postion, confirming Iraq is not giving way on further inspections led by U.S. team members, and refusal to allow interviews which could confirm or deny prisoner testing of chemical or biological weapons. With the "palace" sites still unavailable, it appears that Iraq is slowly reducing the area of possible inspections to only those where there are no possibilities of finding weapons of mass destruction, and eliminating the inspections and research into areas where there is any suspicion. While the U.S. emphasises that they are pursuing ferverant diplomatic efforts, one begins to wonder how long this state of affairs can continue. U.S. carriers U.S.S. Washington and U.S.S. Nimitz are still in close proximity to Iraq and it is clear a military option is not only viable, but only seconds away from any decision to take military action.

January 26, 1998

The U.S. State Department officially warned Iraq that the U.S. feels it has the authority under the cease fire agreements at the conclusion of the Gulf War, to unilateraly enforce compliance with U.N. resolutions dealing with disposal of weapons of mass destruction and compliance with inspections on dual use sites. With this warning comes the statement "...Iraq is fast running out of time to meet full compliance with UNSCOM inspections" and that "...a military option will soon be the only response left available to the U.S.". Iraq's response is that the U.S. President is using this crisis as a means to deflect attention from problems at home, however the U.S. Congress steadfastly supports the President's position. Madeline Albright is expected to meet with Gulf Coalition allies this week to get approval for U.S. unilateral military action, which is expected to be nearly unanimous.
State Department Briefing || White House News Briefing

January 27, 1998

A U.S. Defense Department briefing confirms that the U.S. Independence, a third aircraft carrier is due to arrive in the Gulf in early February. DoD statements indicate that the U.S. President has not yet decided to take military action, however the Secretary of Defense will be traveling (probably with the Sec of State) to brief allies on the possible plans for military action.

January 28, 1998

Following the U.S. President's State of the Union Address, U.S. Secretary of State, Madeline Albright will be travelling to U.S. and Gulf Coalition Allies to brief them on the U.S. position visa-vis Iraq and UNSCOM's inability to inspect and monitor for continued development or production of weapons of mass destruction. Albright, in a speech to the world press, stated that she would be

"...making it clear that in confronting the clear and present danger posed by Iraqi lawlessness, the diplomatic string is running out."

This is perhaps the strongest language aimed at Iraq since the last time the U.S. used force, attacking SAM sites which illuminated U.S. aircraft in 1996. With Albright's moves to confer with allies and brief them on possible U.S. actions, it is clear the military option is becoming more and more possible, and that diplomatic efforts have failed. As in previous cases of Iraqi ignorance of world opinion and U.N. efforts to bring a diplomatic end to similar crisis, the Russian government envoy is meeting with Iraq in a last ditch effort to avert military action. However, as in previous cases, it does not look like Saddam Hussein will take their advice.

Presumed targets would be the so called "Presidential Palaces" and other suspected storage or production sites. Iraqi television showing Iraq moving their own citizenry into these sites further points out how the Iraqi government will use human shields...even their own people...in attempts to prevent attack. This despite clear warnings that these sites are potential targets.

January 31, 1998

In a Pentagon news briefing, Secretary of Defense Cohen cited clear goals for any possible military action, while stressing the preferred and fervent desire for a diplomatic solution to Iraq's non-compliance with U.N. and UNSCOM requirements for unfettered inspections. He also made it clear that the objectives of any possible military option would be to remove, at least temporarily, Iraq's ability to manufacturer weapons of mass destruction, but NOT to go after Suddam Hussein himself. He also admitted that the reason the solution is temporary is that without inspectors on the ground the military option would have to be repeated regularly in order to ensure no production was taking place.

February 1, 1998

The Russain envoy states a compromise has been reached with Iraq. The details include Iraqi control of the makeup of the inspection teams, and the opening of some of the so called "Presidential Palaces". The U.N. and the U.S. President state that this is not a compromise, but a return to the earlier state of affairs when U.N. inspectors were forced to leave Iraq.

February 2, 1998

Russian President Boris Yeltsin lashes out at U.S. President Bill Clinton accusing him of letting affairs at home influence his military decisions. The U.N. Security Council, however, stands firm in their analysis of the Russian brokered compromise as a non-starter.

February 4, 1998

The U.S.S. Independence arrives in the Gulf, and the U.S. announces a U.S. Marine Expeditionary Force comprised of 2000 Marines embarked on their support ships are also on the way. Along with the Independence, are four tomahawk armed missile cruisers and destroyers. With nearly 200 attack aircraft and 6 air wings of air superiority aircraft and a minimum of 6 Hawkeye command and control aircraft, the U.S. now has sufficient force to begin a prolonged (1-2 weeks) air assault on suspected Iraqi WMD sites. With this latest military force announcement and a brief statement during the daily White House press briefing, the U.S. government has grown quiet, a strong indicator that possible action is pending.

February 5, 1998

The White House briefing today shows clear support from the British Government in the possible military action against Iraq. Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom, visiting in Washington D.C., reiterated the U.N. Security Council position as well as adds his full support to the threat of military action on Iraq. The U.K's position sums up the situation by indicating that if a leader who has already used weapons of mass destruction is allowed to thwart the U.N.'s efforts to verify he is no longer producing such weapons, it is a clear threat to world security. If diplomatic efforts cannot resolve the issue, as they appear to have done, then the use of military force is unquestionably the only way to ensure the regions security as well as prevent Iraq from selling such weapons to terrorist organizations. [MILNET's analysis would indicate an attack could begin as early as February 7, 1998]

February 6, 1998

The Pentagon confirmed 2,000 + Marines are in transit to the Gulf area, and that the President has approved some 6 stealth fighters, 6 F-16s, and 6 more B-52s are being deployed. The B-52s will carry air lauched Tomahawk missiles and will be deployed to Diego Garcia. Along with U.S. ships, the H.M.S. Invicible, a Harrier outfitted Aircraft Carrier has joined the task force in the Gulf. The British Ship also carries attack and rescue helicopters as well as may embark combat/rescue troops. 8 Toronado bombers are being sent into Kuwait to aid in any possible air assault on Iraq. Details of the Gulf forces is available.

February 10, 1998

The Pentagon dubbed the current deployment to the gulf as Operation Desert Thunder (- Tom Brokaw, NBC News, 2/10/98). Also the pentagon confirmed in a press briefing that the U.S.S. Nimitz is on its way out of the region, but will be available should it be required. However it is on its normal end of deployment cruise back to its homeport of Norfolk, VA. The briefing also discussed the existence of an additional 23 aircraft en route, but would not release details at this time nor would they discuss whether an E-8A Joint Stars aircraft will be used.

February 17, 1998

The U.S. President lays out the reasoning, the plan, and prepares the American people for war in a briefing at the Pentagon. Secretary Cohen orders additional troops to Kuwait, which will raise the total to some 6,000 stationed there, to operate pre-positioned equipment. Meanwhile, U.N. inspectors are allowed to map out a number of so-called "Presidential Palaces" and report that one complex is 40,000 acres of land. Unfettered access is not granted, nor is there any communication of capitulation by Iraq. In a CNN interview, Former U.S. President Bush states his opinion that Saddam Hussien should be tried as a war criminal for his use of weapons of mass destructions against Iran and his own people. The White House Press Secretary reported on the U.S. position visa-vis the U.N. Secretary General's visit to Bagdhad in the coming weekend, in which may be THE LAST diplomatic event prior to the military option being executed.

February 21, 1998

U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan brokers an agreement with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein which is signed by Minister of Defense Tariq Azia. While details are not available until Annan returns to the U.N. on Tuesday, the plan appears to open inspections once again, however there is some questions on deadlines and perhaps some remaining sites which cannot be inspected. U.S. cautions that until details are known AND Iraq meets the committments, the crisis is still not resolved, and Allied forces will remain on alert in the region.

February 23, 1998

U.N. Secretary Kofi Annan signs Memorandum of Understanding with Iraq, stating Iraq will comply with U.N. resolutions, in exchange the U.N. will employ additional diplomatic representatives to the inspection teams that inspect so called "Presidential Sites".

March 3, 1998

U.N. Security Council votes to accept the Memorandum of Understanding, however, adds text stating that if Iraq does not meet this committment, severe circumstances will be the result. The use of the word severe in diplomatic languages implies violence, and U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., states the U.S. will certainly use this language as a carte blanche to take action if Iraq renegs on this last diplomatic agreement.

March 14, 1998

With a full week of resumed inspections, it appears the current crisis has ended. U.S. leaders continue to warn of severe action if the inspections are hampered. U.S. Senator Arlen Spector introduced legislation calling on the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. to request a war crimes trail to investigate a charge of war crimes against Saddam Hussein for use of chemical and biological weapons, and thus to set the stage for possible future U.S. attempts to overthrow the government of Saddam Hussein in Iraq.



September 28, 1998

Once again the U.N. has stated they can no longer perform their inspection duties as Iraqi officials are blocking access to key facilities. U.N. officials began to prepare to withdraw their field personnel from the country if negotiations cannot reestablish the inspection regime.

November 2, 1998

U.S. President Bill Clinton warns that U.S. forces are in place to enforce the inspection regime and that the military option is one of those available. Analysts view the 30 days of relatively non-military action as a gesture of impatience by the Clinton government and that escalation in this year's crisis will be swift. U.S. hints that they feel they already have authorization to conduct operations based upon the conditions of the resolution of the previous year's crisis.

November 5, 1998

The U.N. voted to condemn Iraq's "flagrant violation" of the terms of the cease fire, setting the stage for automatic U.S. intervention by the terms of the agreement ending the Gulf War.

November 8, 1998

U.S. President President Clinton, Secretary of Defense Cohen and National Security Advisor Sandy Berger meet at Camp David. Berger had just returned from consulations with Russia and France, and Secretary Cohen just returned from a Gulf tour where he spoke with the Arab States. This is an ominous meeting after the rhetoric of the previous week.

November 12, 1998

U.S. and U.N. rhetoric steps up two notches, and as predicted the use of force option has accelerated. The meeting between President Clinton Secretary Cohen, and National Security Advisor Sandy Burger earlier in the month, may very well have laid plans to attack. These plans, if made at that time, would fall into place for the weekend of November 14 and 15. U.N. inspectors are withrdrawn by the U.N., responding to the danger of U.S. attack and the U.S. instructs non- combatants to leave the area. The U.S. reports that intelligence assets show Iraqi forces preparing for battle, "coming out of barracks" so to speak.

November 14, 1998

U.S. launches air attacks on Saturday, November 14, however, Iraq quickly capitulates, just in time for Clinton to recall the attack in mid-air. Clintion warns Iraq that U.S. forces are NOT standing down, and awaits Iraqi upholding their promise of February last year to comply to the U.N. inspection regime. Some analysts argue that Iraq may be just stalling for time or simply playing games with the U.S. leaders.

December 3, 1998

Iraqi allow some inspections, however, early news are that documentation required for operations during the cease in inspections is not provided by Iraqi leadership.

December 10, 1998

UNSCOM Director Richard Butler reveals that several key inspections have been refused and documentation required by the November agreement has not been forthcoming.

December 15, 1998

Butler reports he has once again ordered his inspectors out of Iraq and a formal report to the U.N. Security Council states that his teams are no longer able to do their job and cannot assure compliance with U.N. resolutions made at the conclusion of the Gulf War.

December 16, 1998

U.S. resumes its aborted attacks on Iraq, with a wave of cruise missiles to soften up command and control centers, followed by F-117 fighter bombers to provide precision strikes on key chemical and biological warfare related sites, as well as attack Iraq's means to deliver or guard such sites. Follow-up attacks are expected by Carrier Based F-18 bombers and supported by F-14 air-to-air combat aircraft. Ground based attack aircraft are also expected to join the attacks. The attacks are expected to continue through the weekend and end just before the Muslim holidays. The three or four days of attack are intended to take out Iraqi command and control and eliminate the possibility of NBC production at sites closed to U.N. inspectors.

January 17, 1999

Iraqi jets try to lure U.S. aircraft patrolling the no fly zone into range of Iraqi SAM sites. U.S. Aircraft fire anti-radiation missiles from long range but do not appear to do any appreciable damage.

January 18, 1999

The cat and mouse game continues, with Iraqi jets getting closer and closer to the no fly zone. U.S. aircraft, however, save their missiles in hopes to better pinpoint mobile SAM sites or to draw them closer to their patrol zone.

January 23, 1999

U.S. fighter aircraft, with targets pinpointed, aim and attack with anti-radiation missiles and destroy at least SAM sites as Iraqi aircraft continue to taunt U.S. figthers patrolling the no fly zone.

January 24, 1999

U.S. fighter aircraft again target a SAM site with anti-radiation missiles and may have destroyed another SAM site. Speculation is that U.S. patience is wearing thin and that special means may be used to pinpoint SAM batteries and another wave of U.S. cruise missile attacks will eliminate the problem sites.

January 25, 1999

Both North and South no-fly zones were busy with Iraqi artillery moved into attack with anti-aircraft shelling. U.S. fighters dropped laser guided bombs on these artillery emplacements. After being targeted by a SAM site, a U.S. EA-6B Prowler (ELINT aircraft) launched a HARM missile at the site. U.S. Aircraft also fired missiles at two other Iraqi SAM sites. In the South, U.S. aircraft fired at several targets at Basra after they were illuminated and fired upon by Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery, and threatened by Iraqi warplanes just south of the No Fly zone border. U.S. aircraft also fired upon a SAM site and associated air defense systems and command and control elements. Iraqi says 11 civilians were killed and another 59 were injured (Iraqi Press Agency).

January 30, 1999

U.S. planes attack six Iraqi air-defense sites in the Northern No-Fly Zone near Mosul.

January 31, 1999

A U.S. F-16 fires a HARM missile at an Iraqi radar site north of Mosul, and U.S. and British aircraft attack communication sites in the southern no-fly zone.

February 2000 U.S. aircraft attack artillery sites near the border of the northern No Fly Zone.
February 16, 2001 U.S. and British aircraft reach into the suburbs of Baghdad to attack unoccupied areas where command and control centers, radars and fiber optic links had been added in recent months to the Iraqi Air Defense capabilities. 24 Aircraft participated in the attacks including USAF F-15s, Navy F-18s, and British Toronados. Downtown Baghdad was not attacked and U.S. reports that there should have been no civilian casualties since only the military areas planned to be attacked were hit -- no stray bombs since the weapons were precision and most likely guide by GPS onto their targets.
March 30, 2001 U.S. aircraft answer a lock-on from an anti-aircraft artillery site by bombing it. The site was near the city of An Samawaw on the Euphrates River.
April 12, 2001 U.S. aircraft answer an attack from an anti-aircraft artillery site by bombing it. This site was some 130 miles southeast of Baghdad. The strike occurred on the day after the artillery site fired on U.S. aircraft.
July 29, 2001 Iraqi missile batteries launch an uncontrolled SAM at an U-2 overflight, however the missile misses. Fired without the benefit of radar guidance during almost all of its flight, the Iraqi missile had little chance of getting close enough to do any damage. This is the second escalation of Iraqi challenges to aircraft flying and patroling the no fly zones over Iraq.
August 7, 2001 Iraqi missile batteries lock-on to two U.S. flown F-16s patrolling the Northern No-Fly Zone. The U.S. planes, based in Turkey, immediately arm up and fly in to deliver bombs, destroying the missile sites. The site of the brief battle is near the town of Mosul, in northern Iraq. Israeli officials claim some 14 sorties were flown out of Turkey in an attack on civilian and "Service" targets. No U.S. casaulties and the aircraft returned home safely.
August 10, 2001 In a delayed retaliatory strike, U.S. and British warplanes attack rebuilt missile and long range radar sites as well as a communication building in Southern Iraq. In the strike are F-16, F-18, and GR4 Tornado fighter bombers, as well as F-14 and E-2 from the U.S.S Enterprise sitting off shore in the Persian Gulf.
August 14, 2001 U.S. F-16s continue attacks begun on August 10, by attacking a radar site less than 200 miles southeast of Baghdad. The raid was said to be part of an ongoing pattern of attacks the U.S. is taking to slowly destroy Iraq's rebuilt air defense capabilities and thus make it safer
August 25, 2001 Continuing the pattern of stepped up attacks, U.S. and British aircraft pounded an Iraqi radar site in Waisi province, 100+ miles south of Baghdad, returning home safely. attacking a radar site less than 200 miles southeast of Baghdad.
September 4, 2001 Following the four F-16 attack on a radar station at Basra airport on Thursday, 8/30, the Penagon announced a Tuesday 9/4/01 strike on anti-aircraft artillery and Surface-to-Air-Missile (SAM) sites near Ad Samawah, 100+ miles southwest of Baghdad. The strikes were composed of some 15 U.S. and British aircraft, with U.S. warplanes striking from the U.S.S Enterprise sitting in the Gulf.
January 28, 2002 Pentagon announced that the U.S. had struck at Iraqi missile and artillery sites. The attacks were in response to the Iraqi units locking on to U.S. and coalition aircraft patrolling the southern no-fly zone (Operation Southern Watch). U.S. planes returned home without incident.
February 4, 2002 Allied aircraft, responding to anti-artillery fire in the Northern No-Fly Zone, attacked the site with precision guided weapons. All aircrarft returned home without inicident.
March 3, 2002 Allied aircraft, responding to anti-aircraft radar lockup in the Northern No-Fly Zone, attacked the artilliery site with precision guided weapons. All aircrarft returned home without incident.
April, 2002 Coalition aircraft have been targeted by SAM sites in both the Northern and Southern no-fly zones. The Pentagon says Iraq is attempting to improve their SAM sites and on two occasions U.S jets have attacked and destroyed site that have locked on.
May, 2002 U.S. fighter attacks Iraqi radar site with precision guided weapons after a SAM was fired at two U.S. fighters. The U.S. central command confirmed the destroyed site had the ability to "share information with other systems."
June 16, 2002 U.S. and British fighters attack Iraqi radar site for the second time in two days after Iraqi sites threaten planes patrolling the Southern No Fly Zone.
August 22, 2002 Coalition aircraft attacked air defense and command and control facilities in Missan province of southern Iraq, with no coalition damage or casualties. Iraq claims three civilians were killed. The attacks were in response to hostile actions by Iraqi forces.
August 24, 2002 British Jets attack Army intelligence and air defense installation on Sunday in Ashar, south of Basra with no coalition damage or casualties.
August 26, 2002 Coalition aircraft strike a radar site near Irbil in Northern Iraq. No coalition aircraft were damaged and all returned home safely.

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