Q In "Field Artillery Vision 2020" [by Brigadier General Leo J. Baxter, December 1994], we explore possibilities for maneuver and fires, both direct and indirect. As the Army develops Crusader, extended-range rockets and missiles, precision munitions along with the Comanche helicopter and Tank 1080, how do you see the combined arms team changing?

A I believe we're at the threshold of major change for the combined arms team - the ascendancy of fires. What that means is that we, as a nation, will fight conventional battles using firepower of all kinds from longer ranges, much of it indirect - not eyeball-to-eyeball using direct fire. We'll use long-range fires as the spearhead of the attack to the extent that the ground maneuver forces may only need to mop up after the fires. That's a totally different concept of operations. This concept aims at achieving decisive results while minimizing the usual high casualties of the direct fire battle.

As I see it, there are two reasons for this ascendancy of fires. One is that we have superior capability to locate the enemy forces with precision. The second is that we have now and are further developing artillery, precision munitions and associated systems to such an extent that we can devote more of our battlefield efforts to raining accurate - highly accurate - volumes of fire on the enemy. As another element of this capability, we have attack helicopters with great firepower and wonderful accuracy that provide both fires and movement, which are key to success in combat. Add to these fires the capability to integrate fires from fixed-wing aircraft and sea-based platforms, and it is easy to imagine the devastation possible when fires are orchestrated by a know-ledgeable battlefield commander.

Q In your more than 35 years in the Army, how have you seen the combined arms team evolve?

A When I came in the Army in 1946, it was an Army of foot soldiers. When we started World War II, the normal employment of tanks in most of our forces (Patton's division was different) was to take a couple of tanks from an armor company and give them to an infantry platoon and so on until each infantry platoon or company had one to three tanks. We focused on the infantry and used tanks to support them - a totally wrong concept of employing armor.

By the end of World War II, we realized the tank was the mobile firing platform of shock action and the hallmark of ground combat capabilities. So it became the centerpiece of combined arms team and our modern, mechanized army.

Now, 50 years later, we're evolving into the next stage of combined arms wherein fires become the centerpiece. In this stage, ground movement (tanksand infantry) support fires instead of vice versa.

This concept has great impact on the artillery. The ascendancy of fires will demand highly accurate and timely knowledge of enemy locations through reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition and the ability to bring devastating fires to bear day, night or in bad weather or obscurations.

Let me give you an example of the impact of the change on the artillery at the micro-level. For years, the artillery has emphasized the capabilities of the forward observer to bring fires to bear for the frontline troops - and rightfully so. With the ascendance of fires, if the artillery must emphasize the capabilities of the FO, then we've failed to destroy or neutralize the enemy before our ground maneuver forces make contact with him.

The long-range fires used to destroy or neutralize the enemy will come from multiple means: surface-to-surface assets, such as tube and rocket artillery; aircraft, both fixed wing and attack helicopters; UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) and other sources. The devastating effects of our precision-guided munitions with sub-munitions (vehicle and anti-personnel) and mines will keep the enemy from moving.

Under those conditions, an enemy commander will find his options are few. No matter what he does, his forces will be subjected to heavy fires. Then our ground maneuver forces - tanks and infantry and, by the way, artillery and helicopters - can move in and complete the devastation, forcing the enemy to quit. The main objective in battle and the campaign is to make the enemy quit. It doesn't matter if he quits by surrendering, withdrawing or your killing him - just that he quits.

Now, I'm not saying we need to do away with tanks and infantry - far from it. But I am saying the focus of the combined arms team is evolving into another stage of development as it did in World War II.

With our knowledge base increasing, with artillery ascendancy in firepower and precision and with attack helicopter mobility - a third dimension - and great accuracy, we have a new era.

Now that's a quick explanation of what I believe to be the ascendancy of fires on the combined arms team. And the Field Artillery sits right in the middle of it for the next two or three decades.

Q What impact do you see this ascendancy of fires having on the organization and employment of Field Artillery?

A Organizationally, we'll see more artillery per unit of force than we've had in the past. Such recommendations have already started. In the recent past, we've had three direct support battalions in an Army division. Then we've had a corps artillery of so many artillery groups or brigades and so on. In the future, we'll see more artillery in the force at all levels. And we might consider artillery divisions - I suggested that in 1986.

Why have an artillery division? As I see it, we fight artillery and other weapons, essentially, by battalions because the battalion is the largest organization that has a single weapon system. So the question is, if the evolving concept requires more artillery battalions, how do you command and control those battalions? If the increase in artillery turns out to be several brigades that can fall under a corps artillery, then fine. If the increase is considerably more and we need an artillery division for command and control, then we ought to have one. The idea is to create the command and control organization for the number of battalions we need. So we create an artillery division if the size of the artillery force calls for it.

We'll employ Field Artillery differently in the primacy of fires concept. The fundamental tenet of the construct is that we not expose our forces to enemy fires any more than we have to. The construct says, "I'm going to fight the enemy by fire first and then by movement and fire." So our firers must get within

range to hit the enemy's range. The logical conclusion is that artillery will move to where it can bring fires to bear on enemy targets.

You'll notice that when I talk about moving the artillery to range targets, I don't talk about crossing the "FLOT" [forward line of own troops] - nor will I because there won't be a FLOT in Force XXI. The language of FLOT envisions lines. TRADOC [Training and Doctrine Command] Pam 525-5 Force XXI Operations says there aren't going to be lines. I agree with that. The juxtapositioning of artillery and ground maneuver forces is going to be very different in the future. On occasion, our indirect fire forces will be closer to the enemy than our ground maneuver forces will be. (I don't visualize a forward and rear in nonlinear operations.) We'll position artillery so it can fire on the main enemy forces. If those positions are in danger of being attacked by smaller enemy ground elements, then ground maneuver forces will support indirect fires, the centerpiece of the future battlefield.

But when it comes time for the ground maneuver forces to move in, then they become the center of the battle and the artillery and other indirect fire assets support them.

Q As a unit commander through the division level and a combat veteran, what lessons have you learned that apply in warfare today?

A In all wars, there are some basic requirements for success - enduring lessons of combat. First you must have knowledge superior to your adversary. You must know more about him - what he's doing when and how - than he knows about you.

Superior knowledge is a tremendous advantage at any level of combat in any war. At the squad level, if you can see the enemy, his positions, and can count him while he can't see or count you, you have superior knowledge.

At each level of command, the specifics of the information needed are different, but the descriptors are the same. You need to know where the enemy is, what he's doing and in what strength, and you need to know that information faster and more accurately than he knows it about you.

Part of having superior knowledge is knowing that same information about your own forces. You might think perhaps that's a trivial statement - knowing where your forces are. But that's not true. Even a squad leader with, say, nine soldiers scattered out in positions can lose track of one and cause a disaster in the squad.

The Army is working to ensure we have superior knowledge. Our leaders understand that digitization, that information flow and the ability to integrate information, is key to any future endeavor. In terms of reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, situational awareness during battles, logistical resupply and command and control, digitization will greatly enhance the Army's capabilities.

The next requirement for success in combat is having superior fire and movement. If you put superior firepower on the enemy and maintain freedom of movement to position your troops advantageously, you win. Your fire prevents the enemy from moving freely while you fire and move on the enemy freely. Of course, the development of these capabilities has led to the ascendancy of fires.

Now, that's a very simple explanation of the key requirements for winning in combat, which, by the way, is very difficult to do.

Q What message would you like to send Field Artillerymen stationed worldwide?

A A message I've been sending for the past 30 years - that is, in all of modern warfare, the biggest killer on the battlefield has always been the artillery. I only see the role of artillery ascending.

The artillery state of mind and development must reflect that - and I think it does. Your vision for Field Artillery in Force XXI adds yet another dimension in capabilities to ensure you can rain great volumes of long-range, precise fires on the enemy with devastating effects.

General Glenn K. Otis retired from the Army in 1988 after serving as Commanding General (CG) of the NATO Central Army Group and Commander-in-Chief of US Army Europe. He also served as CG of the Training and Doctrine command (TRADOC) with its headquarters at Fort Monroe, Virginia; Deputy Commander of the Army's Combat Development Activity, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; Deputy Commander of the Armor Center at Fort Knox, Kentucky; and the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans at the Pentagon. General Otis commanded the 1st Armored Division in Germany and the 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment of the 25th Infantry Division in Vietnam.