A. INFORMATION SUPERIORITY

1. Definition

Information Superiority (IS) is defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) as the "degree of dominance in the information domain that permits the conduct of operations without effective opposition" (Reference 8). To acquire, verify, and assimilate the information needed to effectively neutralize and dominate adversary forces, IS must combine the capabilities of command, control, communications, and computers (C⁴); intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and information warfare (IW).

Command and control (C²) is defined as the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission. C² functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission (Reference 9). The C² process involves gathering information, assessing the situation, identifying objectives, developing alternative courses of action, deciding on a course of action, transmitting orders that can be understood by recipients, and monitoring execution (Reference 10). This requires maintaining a seamless, robust network linking all friendly forces and providing common awareness of the current situation (C⁴). The ISR component of IS provides near-real-time awareness of the location and activity of friendly, adversary, and neutral forces throughout the battlespace. For the purposes of this document, C⁴ and ISR will be referred to collectively as C⁴ISR. The IW component discussed in this chapter deals with the capability to defend one's own information, information-based processes, information systems, and computer-based networks against outside infiltration and manipulation.

The term information system includes information, information-based processes, information systems, and computer-based networks either individually or in combination with each other. It should be noted that information superiority is a dynamic area. Doctrine, policy, and taxonomy are evolving as quickly as the supporting technology. Accordingly, this taxonomy describes the relevance of key technology initiatives to joint warfighter requirements, but is not representative of the entire spectrum of warfighter IS roles and missions.

Information superiority is essential to achieving virtually all other joint warfighting capabilities. U.S. information superiority requires an ability to protect the information collection, processing, and dissemination capabilities of the United States and its coalition partners.

2. Operational Capability Elements

Warfighters of the future must be able to respond rapidly and effectively, with little or no tactical warning, to a wide range of uncertain threats. These threats include conventional forces and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) of increasing technological sophistication. There is a decreasing likelihood of forward-based U.S. forces in a theater. An effective U.S. response is likely to require interoperation and sharing of resources with other coalition forces in the face of these threats. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Joint Vision 2010 calls for the rapid deployment of forces capable of engaging the enemy on arrival and sustaining operations with a minimal logistics tail in the area of operations.

This demands significant advances in our ability to deliver the right data and information at the right time to commanders at all levels, to use that data and information to develop superior knowledge of the battlespace in real time, and to employ that knowledge effectively in planning and executing operations. The goal, as illustrated in Figure IV.A-1, is to enable the development of new concepts of operation that will ensure operational dominance of the battlespace supported by information superiority. This is accomplished by blending three broad areas of operational capabilities—battlespace awareness, effective force employment, and a grid of assured services, referred to simply as the grid—into an overall federated system. These capabilities are significantly more advanced than the initial capabilities of the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) and those recently successfully demonstrated in the Bosnia Command and Control Augmentation (BC²A) program.

The Advanced Battlespace Information System (ABIS) study defined three operational capability elements within each of the three broad operational capability areas (Reference 11):

• Battlespace awareness—information acquisition, precision information direction, and consistent battlespace understanding. These capabilities allow the joint warfighter to control and shape the pace of the battle by providing commanders with a broader perspective and better intuitive feel of the battlespace, including the environmental conditions and operational situation. Note that information acquisition was included as a subset under precision information direction in the ABIS report. However, because of its importance to battlespace awareness, it is included here as a separate operational capability.

• Effective employment of forces—predictive planning and preemption, integrated force management, and execution of time-critical missions. These capabilities allow the joint warfighter to plan and execute operations in a manner that achieves an overwhelming effect at precise places and times.

• The grid—universal transaction services, distributed environment support, and high assurance of services. These capabilities allow the joint warfighter to rapidly adapt to changing situations and environmental conditions and to attack high-priority targets throughout the battlespace. Information superiority empowers lower echelon force elements by distributing the commander's intent and the information needed for timely and effective execution. Because these capabilities inevitably degrade in the course of battle, a key objective of IS is to enable commanders to plan for this eventuality, to identify and protect essential capabilities, and to reconfigure C² structures to meet changing needs.

As a part of the ABIS operational capabilities, the joint warfighter must have a superior IW operational capability to defend information systems from both deliberate and accidental disruptions, intrusions, manipulations, and corruptions. This gives the joint warfighter a credible deterrent across the full spectrum of conflict, ensures information superiority, and permits the conduct of operations without effective opposition. Figure IV.A-2 represents a conceptual view of the IW environment. This capability is of increasing importance as information technology becomes more widely available throughout the world.

The IW technology base must support joint warfighter requirements in both defensive information warfare (IW-D) and effective C⁴I. IW-D operational capabilities include information security, operations security, information integrity, attack detection, and restoration.

In the 1996 JWSTP, IW was a separate chapter. Here IW is integrated with Information Superiority. As in the ABIS study, IW-D operational capabilities are included under assurance of services as part of the grid. Effective C⁴I has been integrated into various other capability areas as appropriate.

Battlespace Awareness. Battlespace awareness includes the operational capability to acquire and assimilate information about the position and movement of friendly, adversary, and neutral forces, and about the geospatial situation (e.g., terrain, weather, space bathymetric conditions) in which they are deployed. It includes the capabilities to provide a common view and understanding of the situation across tactical and supporting forces, from joint force commanders to individual shooters. The effective integration of battlespace awareness within a federated system will provide the warfighter with an extended view of the battlespace and of current and projected operational conditions, and an enhanced ability to identify and localize features of the battlespace in the face of degraded environmental conditions and hostile countermeasures. This extended view will support and enhance the warfighters' intuitive feel for situations and command options.

The specific operational capabilities necessary to achieve battlespace awareness are as follows:

• Information acquisition—the provision of sufficient, timely, and high-quality surveillance, reporting, target designation, and assessment information on enemy, friendly, and U.S. units, events, activities, status, capabilities, plans, and intentions to ensure that joint or coalition commanders have dominant battlespace knowledge.

• Precision information direction—the capability to dynamically direct and integrate both tactical and supporting C⁴ and ISR resources for targeting, weaponeering, mission preview, battle damage assessment (BDA), and combat assessment to maintain the ability for the on-scene commander to exploit and shape the battlespace.

• Consistent battlespace understanding—the capability to elevate the level and speed of the warfighter's cognitive understanding of enemy, friendly, and geospatial situations, and to maintain consistency in that view across tactical and supporting forces.

• Predictive planning and preemption—the ability to be proactive in the planning process in order to avoid direct confrontation (by employing alternative means), to be prepared to react and exploit opportunities when direct confrontation must occur, and to shape expected actions in order to stay within an enemy's decision cycle and keep him out of ours.

• Integrated force management—the capabilities needed to achieve the dynamic synchronization of missions and resources from components and coalition forces.

• Execution of time-critical missions—the ability to provide processing languages, interface characteristics, and linkages that enable rapid target search and acquisition, battle coordination and target selection, handoff, and engagement for the prosecution of time-critical targets.

The critical operational capabilities of the grid are:

• Universal transaction services—the capability to provide warfighters and their systems the ability to exchange and understand information, unimpeded by differences in connectivity, on a "just-in-time" basis, regardless of location.

• Distributed environment support—the mechanisms and services required to allow the warfighters to craft their C⁴ISR information environments from the full set of assets connected through the grid, including the ability to establish distributed virtual staffs and task teams.

• High assurance of services—high-quality services that warfighters must have, when needed, to meet dynamically changing demands and defend against physical and information warfare threats. This includes adaptive network management that anticipates changing requirements, and the defensive IW operational capabilities of information security, operations security, information integrity, attack detection, and restoration. Information security encompasses confidentiality, integrity, authentication, nonrepudiation, and, to some extent, availability. Operations security ensures that critical friendly information and activities cannot be easily intercepted or observed by adversary intelligence systems. Information integrity ensures that the information to support battlefield awareness is unimpaired.

Achieving the IS operational capability elements will require significant advances in numerous functional capabilities to manage the acquisition, simultaneous processing, and parallel dissemination and presentation of information in an assured and secure manner, and to effectively integrate mission planning functions. These functional capabilities are listed below. Table IV.A-1 provides a mapping of the functional capabilities to the operational capability elements and broad operational capabilities.

• Intelligence processing and broadcast
• Intelligent, distributed mapping, charting, and geodesy (MC&G)
• Collaborative situation assessment and BDA
• Collection and distribution of weather and environmental conditions
• Common understanding and representation of the battlespace
• Situation projection, whereby components viewed at any level are consistent with the total situation.
• Mission rehearsal and embedded training
• Command projection, resulting in wider sharing of the commander's intent, particularly at lower echelons.
• Support for simultaneous, coordinated operation
• Repair and consumables management
• Joint force automated battle rules of engagement
• Theater intelligence processing and broadcast
• Shared, distributed collaborative planning
• Rapid, accurate BDA
• C⁴ISR system management
• Force status and execution management
• Parallel dissemination of intelligence/BDA
• Rapid, accurate automated targeting
• Automated mission and weapon-to-target pairing
• Seamless connectivity, including integration across communications media; automatic multilingual and multimodal adaptive interfaces, protocols, and standards.
• Automatic adaptive information conditioning, including automatic compression/encoding; automatic "brokering" of quality versus timeliness.
• See the enemy
• Location-independent addressing, including personal and group addressing, both stationary and on the move.
• Flexible, adaptive access control
• Support for heterogeneous users and interfaces
• Knowledge-based access, retrieval, and integration of information
• Distributed, collaborative processing
• Massive, heterogeneous distributed information management
• Automated intelligent grid system management, including grid system management based on user's status and plans; tools for appraisal of grid status and capabilities.
• Service extension, including modular plug-and-play, projectability, and scalability.
• Information consistency, including integrity, protection, and authentication of information systems.
• Access controls/security services, including the ability to ensure information security and integrity by limiting access to information systems to authorized personnel; trusted electronic release, multilevel information security, and policies.
• Service availability, including communications support for distributed computing.
• Network management and control, including the use of reconfigurable, robust protocols and control algorithms, self-healing applications, and systems capable of managing distributed computing over heterogeneous platforms and networks.
• Damage assessment, including the ability to determine the effectiveness of attacks in a defensive capacity (e.g., where and how bad).
• Reaction (isolate, correct, act), including the ability to respond to a threat, intruder, or network or system disturbance; intrusion characterization; the capability to isolate, contain, correct, and monitor surreptitiously. The ability to correct includes recovery, resource reallocation, and reconstitution.
• Vulnerability assessment and planning, including the ability to realistically assess the joint warfighter's information system(s) and information processes; the use of critical protection functions such as risk management and vulnerability analysis.
• Preemptive indication, including the ability to provide system and subsystem precursors or indications of impending attack.
• Intrusion detection/threat warning, including the ability to detect attempted and successful intrusions (malicious and nonmalicious) by both insiders and outsiders.
• IW and spectrum dominance planning and monitoring.

4. Current Capabilities, Deficiencies, and Barriers

Currently fielded information systems do not support the kind of robust, assured, and timely flow of accurate and relevant information needed to meet future joint warfighting needs. Operational practices limit flexibility and effective employment, even though ongoing DoD efforts such as the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII, part of the National Information Infrastructure) and C⁴ISR Integration Task Force are making important improvements.

The structure for C⁴ISR remains divided along organizational and functional lines and is strongly tied to the hierarchical command structure, due in large part to inadequate capabilities for the automation of multilevel security. Users must know the secure network addresses of all the nodes with which they want to communicate—a daunting requirement in the heat of battle. Even when information can be provided, it may be in a form that has been tailored and optimized for some other mission. These divisions, tied to a rigid framework of battlefield geometry, limit a commander's ability to assign sensors to priority targets and to dynamically retask high-value assets across missions and services in response to changing situations and opportunities. Furthermore, communications bandwidths and connectivity are inadequate to support the flow of data under conditions of peak demand.

"Stovepiping"—the operational fragmentation and end-to-end segregation of information flow by type, command structure, and mission—makes it difficult to acquire, process, and disseminate essential information across joint forces, and makes it virtually impossible to develop a common picture of the battlespace. Although there is a high degree of assurance (i.e., confidence in the integrity, confidentiality, and availability) associated with information received via stovepiped classified systems, there is less assurance associated with information received across heterogeneous systems.

Current C⁴ISR systems provide only a limited ability to detect and monitor targets and events concealed in foliage, in structures, under ground, or in adverse weather or countermeasure environments. Rigid ISR systems and lack of visibility of independent tactical sensor tasking and coverage further limit our ability to manage and coordinate sensor assets for real-time operations.

IW-D limitations include:

• Inadequate management of distributed information
• Lack of high-assurance systems with multiple levels of security and multilevel security (MLS) that facilitate interoperability
• Countermeasures that are generally reactive to emergent IW rather than anticipatory
• Lack of predictive and anticipatory network management capabilities
• Limited IW sensors and processing capability for grid self-defense
• Intrusion detection techniques that do not scale or that do not facilitate damage assessment or automated response.

A number of technological, organizational, operational, and programmatic barriers make it difficult to overcome these limitations. Nonetheless, existing capabilities are being applied in unique ways and are being extended to provide more effective means of network protection. Ranging from advanced access control systems to effective means of encryption of databases and transmitted information, tools are becoming available that help ensure the availability, integrity, and confidentiality of critical information for the joint warfighter.

Technological advances alone are not sufficient. Traditional concepts of operation and rigid C⁴ISR structures will need to change if the warfighter is to realize the benefits of advancing technology. Battlespace awareness transcends individual service and organizational divisions and will require the effective integration of, and sustained commitment to, individual service and joint programs within a common architecture.

Table IV.A-2 provides a mapping of key technologies to limitations to functional and operational capabilities.

5. Technology Plan

Achieving information superiority and seamlessly integrating IS into warfighting operations will require both advances in technology and development of new operational concepts to exploit them. Table IV.A-3 provides a complete list of IS DTOs. Table IV.A-4 maps these DTOs to operational capabilities, while Figure IV.A-3 traces the flow of key technologies to operational capability elements. The volume on DTOs provides further information on demonstrations and DTOs. Figures IV.A-4 and IV.A-5 provide an integrated roadmap of key demonstrations and JWSTP DTOs. Note that the IS DTOs are closely linked with DTAP DTOs, especially in the areas of Information Systems Technology and Sensors, Electronics, and Battlespace Environment.

The current JWSTP program includes demonstrations recommended by the ABIS report (Reference 11), although most are demonstrations of partial ABIS capabilities. These provide the basis for immediate improvements in battlespace awareness and the integration of improved knowledge into mission planning and execution. These demonstrations also support new concepts of C⁴ISR operation and improvements in the warfighter's ability to use ISR assets. These will demonstrate the value of information superiority to the operational forces and provide a strong foundation on which to build an effective long-term program to achieve the JCS's future warfighting vision. In addition, new C⁴ISR capabilities and concepts will immediately begin to affect capabilities and concepts of operation in all other warfighting areas.

The IS DTOs listed in Table IV.A-3 also cover a wide range of initial IW needs. The Navigation Warfare ACTD (A.16) is aimed toward improving the survivability of GPS information. Information Operations C² (A.04) will provide an electronic attack capability against advanced communications in use today as well as those that are being further developed as recognizable potential threats in future conflicts.

Near-term demonstrations will provide a basis for further improvements in tactical integration, real-time management of C⁴ISR, and dynamic retasking of forces; and for better integration of concurrent planning and execution at the system level in the 2000-2005 timeframe. The prototype grid capabilities demonstrated in the near term will begin to evolve into the type of massive, heterogeneous, distributed, and responsive information services environment envisioned in the long-term ABIS objectives.

Further advances and demonstrations are required for the 2000-2010 timeframe to ensure the availability of information superiority, and the secure and effective services that the warfighters will need in future conflicts. The Information Systems and Technology DTOs cover a number of longer term objectives, discussed in the Defense Technology Area Plan. These DTOs will demonstrate IS capabilities in support of new operational concepts to achieve overwhelming effect across the full spectrum of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimension protection, and focused logistics capabilities envisioned by the ABIS study. Transitions from demonstrations associated with DTOs into fieldable systems integrated with a common architecture are critical to providing the joint warfighter with these technical capabilities.

6. Summary

The programs described above will demonstrate and evaluate a wide range of potential IS improvements over the next 3 to 5 years. Realizing the incremental improvements that lead to the JCS chairman's revolutionary vision of overwhelming dominance in the battlespace will require a continuing long-term commitment not only within the S&T program but also to integrating these capabilities into systems. These efforts, coupled with the projected continued doubling every 2 years of the performance of the underlying information system hardware, should result in significant incremental improvements in the warfighters' visibility and command of the battlespace, as well as in the availability of accurate, detailed sensor-to-shooter information (see Figure IV.A-6).

Between now and the year 2000, improvements in force employment capabilities will largely be based on better target recognition and timely attack, improved C² early in the campaign, the beginnings of a defensive IW capability, and an improved information environment for collaborative work. Battlespace awareness will be improved by providing a consistent situational picture and an ability for the integrated tasking of signals intelligence (SIGINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT) capabilities. Improved awareness capabilities will support tactical needs and provide real-time sensor information directly to shooters. Grid capabilities will be improved to support the rapid configuration of tactical networks (including nodes for mobile users) with enhanced abilities to integrate and distribute information securely in a broadly heterogeneous environment.

In the longer term (2000-2010), the continued evolution of operational concepts and the availability of new technologies will provide a basis for the full development of ABIS concepts. Further improvements in force employment capabilities will be possible through wider dissemination of each commander's intent. Improved automated tools for local decision making, coupled with better status information and an ability to forecast likely future options and contingencies, would enhance the ability of commanders at all levels to reason from ambiguous information and to tailor force and mission packages to meet the needs of an ongoing conflict. Battlespace awareness capabilities will be enhanced by continuously projecting friendly and enemy moves and their likely outcomes, by adaptively supporting cognitive functions of diverse users, and by providing tailored information for mission execution when and where it is needed. Grid capabilities will be made more robust by advances in adaptive network management and information warfare, and by providing end users with an ability to tailor and adapt their information environment and access to information.

Information warfare is a relatively new joint warfighting area that is integrated into all three IS broad operational capability areas. Near-term capabilities will internetwork warfighters at the tactical level, improve the security and reliability of distributed databases, and provide improved protection techniques. Midterm capabilities will take advantage of high-bandwidth, encrypted links to internetwork warfighters at varying levels of security, and provide a suite of IW planning tools and effectiveness models. The successful advancement of these technologies will ensure the availability, confidentiality, and integrity of information by providing the warfighter with a robust, adaptive, automated, context-based information infrastructure and suites of tools to protect friendly information systems, while adaptively managing our own information management services.

It is important to recognize that the information warfare threat is real. IW capabilities, at various levels, are widely available throughout the world. DoD systems, particularly those that are unclassified, are currently vulnerable. While a concerted, coordinated attack against DoD interests would require considerable resources, significant focused damage to DoD information systems is already possible. The S&T community takes this threat seriously and will continue to focus funding on key technologies that support the joint warfighter IW requirements.

These recommended DTOs take fully into account commercially available technology and often utilize such technology. However, even with the continued capability improvements of commercial information systems, it will be a great challenge to meet the demand for greater bandwidth, processing throughput and faster response time. In addition, unique technology will be required for capabilities needed only by the military. Also, in some areas military capability is needed earlier than the commercial market has sufficient demand to justify.

While all the DTOs listed here are important critical components of the IS capability envisioned by Joint Vision 2010 and articulated in ABIS, they are insufficient. Out-year demonstrations will be needed to illustrate and validate additional advances. The emphasis in the out-year program will need to be on development and demonstration of essential intelligent, adaptable capabilities to ensure availability and security of services at all echelons and to support dominance in all types of conflict.

Information superiority, with integrated information warfare capabilities, represents a new tenet in military doctrine. The appropriate investment in the supporting technologies will enable DoD to achieve military superiority through information superiority.