JOINT WARFIGHTER S&T PLAN
CHAPTER IV -- ACHIEVING JOINT WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY OBJECTIVES

G. JOINT COUNTERMINE

1. Definition

Joint Countermine provides the capability for assured and rapid surveillance, reconnaissance, detection, and neutralization of mines to enable forced entry by expeditionary forces. It includes the capability to control the sea and the ability to conduct amphibious and ground force operational maneuvers against hostile defensive forces employing sea, anti-invasion, and land mines. For land forces, dominance means the ability to conduct in-stride tempo operations in the face of severe land mine threats.

2. Operational Capability Elements

The ability to shape and maintain dominance of the battlespace is critical to maneuver warfare. The threat posed by mines has the potential to significantly limit battlespace dominance, thus inhibiting or deterring a U.S. force's ability to execute our nation's tasking. To achieve battlespace dominance, U.S. forces must have a credible capability to counter the mine threat in all environments. For naval forces, this necessitates unencumbered passage through strategic lines of communication in support of joint strategic mobility, freedom of maneuver in operating areas in support of joint strike warfare, and rapid movement in amphibious operating areas in support of joint littoral warfare. For land-based forces, this means control of the land to enable rapid maneuver in joint littoral and land warfare as well as in joint regional engagement/presence missions such as peacekeeping.

Joint Countermine is one of the essential keys to unlocking control of the battlespace. Historically, countermine operations, both at sea and on land, have been considered in terms of a number of elements, individually and separately applied to various mine search and neutralization tasks in different environments. The objective of Joint Countermine is to address the complex countermine problem through a "system-of-systems" approach. This approach will integrate all equipment and operations into a seamless capability to conduct joint land and littoral warfare, including amphibious or land/airborne missions into hostile territory with minimal disruption and losses due to minefields. This seamless countermine capability will also significantly enhance the capability to safely maneuver forces in regional engagement/presence missions.

The diverse service countermine elements will be integrated through a common communication architecture that will provide commanders full visibility, status, and control of countermine operations. The Joint Countermine Operational Simulation (JCOS) will permit realistic staff training, mission rehearsal, and, ultimately, operational support at all operational unit echelons.

U.S. forces must be able to engage regional forces promptly and decisively on a global basis. In the post-cold war era, the United States and its coalition partners must be prepared to bring the battle to the enemy in expeditionary operations. In nearly all JWCA mission areas, mines (sea, coastal, and land) offer a potential adversary a low-cost means of holding our forces at bay or restricting their maneuver, particularly in view of America's low tolerance for combat losses. The best way to counter mines is to detect their presence and avoid them. However, even with "perfect" real-time intelligence, this may not always be feasible. Minefields are generally employed to shape the battlespace, channeling the opposition's forces in the direction that the enemy desires. In such a situation, circumventing a minefield may be playing into the enemy's hands. Consequently, breaching may become necessary to sustain maneuver. Regardless, the decision as to where, how, and when to enter a combat area must be made with the maximum confidence in our knowledge of the location and nature of the mine threat.

The first essential step in the Joint Countermine Joint Warfighting Capability Objective is broad, clandestine, and low-observable surveillance using all available sources, including national technical means (NTM) and human intelligence (HUMINT), to characterize battlespace and to narrow maneuver options. This initial surveillance phase is followed by tactical clandestine reconnaissance using a wide variety of sensors and platforms, including unmanned aerial and underwater vehicles (UAVs/UUVs), for detailed investigation of potential avenues of approach in the presence of mines, obstacles, and other defenses. The commander selects the actual assault path based on the latest intelligence and, once overt operations commence, seeks to establish a beachhead or lodgment within 2 to 6 hours of committing forces. Even in areas deemed to contain few or no mines, some breaching operations must be anticipated, since mines could be emplaced at the last minute or scattered into the area by aircraft, missiles, and artillery.

Figure IV.G-1 shows an integrated operational concept that relies on highly effective surveillance, reconnaissance, detection, characterization, and breaching or clearance of mine and obstacle fields to ensure force mobility in hostile areas. The individual systems used to implement this concept must provide the high confidence necessary to make reliable judgments concerning the likelihood of success and potential losses associated with various maneuver alternatives. The objective of countermine S&T programs is to have, by the year 2001, an initial limited capability to counter the most serious current countermine deficiencies and, by 2006, a demonstrated technical capability to address all currently known threats.

Figure IV.G-1.

The initial 5-year capability will be achieved through a combination of countermine systems integrated into a common joint command and control structure. Data collected by NTM will be made available in near-real time to tactical commanders. Individual elements of the S&T program are developing a variety of multispectral sensor systems for employment on remotely controlled UAVs and UUVs to detect minefields at sea, in the surf zone, on the beach, and on land. Several DTAP DTOs complement these S&T elements: SE.33.01, Advanced Focal Plane Array Technology; SE.28.01, Low-Power Radio Frequency Electronics; and SE.29.01, Design Technology for Radio Frequency Front Ends. These sensors for mine/minefield detection include multibeam sonars for high-rate underwater search; ultrasensitive magnetic sensors and synthetic aperture sonars for buried sea mine detection; ground-penetrating radar for nonmetallic targets; and multispectral, hyperspectral, forward-looking radar and infrared imaging for detection of mines and minefields in the surf zone, on the beach, and on land. Through the use of these sensors, the program will demonstrate the detection of volume and bottom sea mines, buried land and sea mines, and roadbed antipersonnel mines, including plastic mines, at greater than 95 percent probability of detection and acceptable false alarm rates. Breaching and clearing of surf, beach, and land areas will be accomplished by advanced mechanical and explosive systems currently in development.

Longer term (10-year) capabilities depend on advanced technologies now emerging from basic and applied research. These will form the basis for joint countermine forces to keep pace with the anticipated expansion of the sea and land mine threat well into the 21st century. Promising longer term technologies being pursued include directed-energy and underwater focused-pressure shock waves for mine destruction; hypersonic, water-piercing projectiles for standoff sea mine clearance; undersea acoustic local area networks and chemical sensing for underwater mine detection; and improved laser imaging and advanced synthetic aperture radar for clandestine reconnaissance and detection.

3. Functional Capabilities

Table IV.G-1 illustrates the joint countermine functions required to produce the operational capability elements.

4. Current Capabilities, Deficiencies, and Barriers

Table IV.G-2 presents the technologies needed to breach the limitations on achieving the joint countermine objective.

Current operational countermine surveillance capabilities are extremely limited. With the exception of mine reconnaissance by Special Operations Forces, very few dedicated collection systems exist. Exploitation of NTM for countermine intelligence is limited by the absence of tailored countermine products and less than adequate C4I capabilities and procedures for information distribution to operational commanders and forces. Mine-related databases are sparsely populated, and prediction/forecasting models are often not validated. Services now rely on overt tactical techniques to acquire and detect mines.

The Navy's mine detection capabilities are limited to dedicated mine countermeasures (MCM) ships and aircraft equipped with systems designed primarily for deep water or friendly port breakout missions. These systems have limited capabilities in the very shallow waters of the littoral, and the specialized platforms can require long lead times to reach a crisis response area. Organic mine reconnaissance systems for use by non-MCM surface ships and submarines have not yet been fielded. Detection of mines in very shallow water and in the surf zone is slow and limited to Navy SEALS using handheld equipment or marine mammals (not surf zone capable).

Table IV.G-1. Functional Capabilities Needed—Joint Countermine

Functional Capabilities Operational Capability Elements
Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Detection Breaching and Neutralization Battlespace Management
1. All-Source Intelligence Fusion



2. Environmental Characterization






3. Minefield Detection






4. Individual Mine Detection








5. Mine Classification








6. Mine Identification








7. Low Cost Robotics






8. Signal Processing and Sensor Fusion









9. Mine Removal/Destruction









10. Obstacle Removal









11. Common C4I Environment






12. High Data Rate Communications






13. Signature Reduction










14. Vulnerability Reduction










Strong Support Moderate Support

Likewise, land forces rely on fragmentary intelligence for the locations of mine and minefields. A primary source continues to be HUMINT via interviews with the local populace and the use of scouts and patrols to conduct visual reconnaissance missions. The detection of individual mines by land forces is still conducted much as it was during World War II using handheld magnetic detectors or probes.

Significant technological barriers exist in the detection of mines. The wide variety in mine designs (metallic/nonmetallic, contact/influence fuzed) and the different environments in which mines are employed (sea, surf, beach, land) preclude a single solution approach to the detection problem. Ultimately, the challenge is to detect and identify mines and minefields in high background clutter with a low false alarm rate. Several mine designs and environments provide unique challenges. In both the maritime and land environment, buried nonmetallic mines are difficult to detect. Optical, magnetic, and acoustic sensors are of limited effectiveness in the high ambient noise of the surf zone. Surf and tides quickly erase mine burial scars on the beach—limiting the effectiveness of electro-optical systems. The land environment offers similar challenges for magnetic sensors, ground-penetrating radar, and passive infrared sensors. These challenges include soil type, moisture content, diurnal cycle, and natural and manmade ground clutter.

Mine breaching and neutralization is currently slow, tedious, and often dangerous. Sea mines are cleared either by influence or mechanical sweeping or through one-on-one neutralization charges. Mechanical sweeping of naval mines is conducted by dedicated MCM ships or aircraft and is only effective against moored mines in relatively deep water. Once swept, moored mines become "floaters" and are still dangerous. No rapid method for neutralizing these floaters exists, and they must be engaged one-on-one using small-arms fire or small explosive charges placed next to the mines by a tethered robotic mine neutralization system (MNS) or by explosive ordnance demolition (EOD) personnel. Bottom magnetic or seismic influence mines are swept using influence sweeping devices deployed from MCM ships or helicopters. The United States has no capability to sweep pressure influence mines; the only method for neutralizing these mines is to first locate and then disable them using an explosive charge placed by the MNS or by EOD safe rendering procedures.

Table IV.G-2. Goals, Limitations, and Technologies—Joint Countermine

Goal Functional Capabilities Limitations Key Technologies
Operational Capability Element: Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Detection
Collect, correlate, and report prehostility mining operation; after mines are laid, provide commanders and individual units and soldiers the ability to detect and avoid mines/minefields from a safe distance at maneuver speed. All-source intelligence fusion Information from various national, theater, and tactical sensors is not fully compatible

No ability to provide continuous countermine surveillance

Limited access to intelligence databases at the tactical level

Exploitation of NTM for countermine purposes

GCCS compatible tactical decision aids and mission planning tools

Automated sensor/processor C4I interfaces

Environmental characterization Limited high search rate capabilities Autonomous ocean sampling for littoral marine environment
Minefield detection Limited ability to determine precise minefield boundaries

Limited ability to distinguish minefields from background clutter

Limited sensor ranges and high false alarm rates

Limited clandestine sensors for very shallow water, surf zone, and land

Autonomous/remotely operated air vehicles

Multispectral/hyperspectral imaging

Enhanced IR sensitivity and resolution

Multispectral image processing

Automatic target pattern recognition

IR polarization

Multisensor fusion

Multibeam volume search sonar

Synthetic aperture radar and sonar

Individual mine detection

Mine classification

Mine identification

Limited endurance of autonomous vehicles

Limited capability to detect buried mines in high clutter background

Limited capability to identify mines in very shallow water, the surf zone, and on land

Autonomous/remotely operated vehicles

Forward looking radar/IR

Low cost robotic platforms

Efficient power generation

Superconducting magnetic gradiometers

Ground penetrating radar/IR

High repetition rate laser imaging technologies

ATR algorithm enhancements

Signal processing and sensor fusion Limited capability to coregister multiple dissimilar sensor inputs Enhanced signal processing algorithms for coregistration
Operational Capability Element: Breaching and Neutralization
From the sea to land combat—dispose of mines in deep, shallow, and very shallow water through the craft landing zone into the land with minimal casualties to men and equipment. Mine removal/destruction

Obstacle removal

Mine neutralization is slow, dangerous, and labor intensive

Limited ability to breach and clear minefields in a timely and safe manner

No capability to sweep pressure influence sea mines

Limited capability to neutralize mines on land, in surf, and in shallow water

Robotic breaching, neutralization, and removal systems

Enhance efficiency of power generation and reduced weight for magnetic and seismic influenced sweeping sources

Focused pressure shock waves

Enhanced explosive materials

Increased standoff explosive neutralization techniques

Hypervelocity projectiles

Kinetic energy neutralization

RF signal neutralization

Chemical neutralization

Operational Capability Element: Countermine Battlespace Management
Provide synchronized countermine command and control in support of joint operations. Common C4I environment Information from various national, theater, and tactical sensors is not fully compatible

Limited access to intelligence databases at the tactical level

Common countermine operational picture is not available

Models and data do not support optimum mission planning and equipment design

C4I systems and computer models supporting countermine are not fully compatible

Limited ability for automated marking of mines/minefield data to situation displays

Interactive distributed simulation models
High data rate communications Communication data rates limit the capabilities of autonomous/remotely operated systems Data compression, bandwidth optimization, and high data rate acoustic modems
Signature reduction

Vulnerability reduction

Magnetic signatures of naval vessels/ground vehicles make them vulnerable to influence mines Closed loop degaussing and active magnetic field suppression

Current surf zone, beach zone, and land mine clearance is limited to M-58 and M-59 line charges deployed from autonomous armored vehicles (AAVs) or trailers accompanied by the Track Width Mine Plow (TWMP) for proofing. Explosive line charges generate overpressure onto a minefield. Current mechanical neutralization and breaching techniques simply push mines into the plowed spoil. In both cases, there is no standoff capability. The overall effectiveness of these systems is further hampered by technological enhancements to mine fuses and the environmental limitations imposed on each of the neutralization techniques.

Reliable neutralization of mines presents several unique challenges. Improved targeting systems and in-depth ballistic/hydroballistic analysis and testing are needed to make directed fire an effective neutralization tool against subsurface or buried mines. A technology breakthrough is required to solve the naval pressure minesweeping problem. To reduce human vulnerability, neutralization techniques like signature duplication must be light enough to be deployed from small remotely controlled vessels and ground systems and be highly durable to operate in the high shock/vibration conditions of the surf and land battlefield environments. The problem with any breaching operation is that it is usually complicated by the fact that mines and obstacles are often deployed together. Effectiveness of explosive line charges and Track Width Mine Plows/Track Width Mine Rollers (TWMP/TWMR) are significantly degraded when obstacles are factored into the countermine task.

To provide a true in-stride breaching capability, improved fire control systems must be developed to permit the firing of breaching charges from amphibious landing craft operations in breaking surf and from vehicles on the run. Improved breaching charges must be developed to provide a high kill probability against all types of fuzed mines including those buried by surf and tidal action on the beach. Additionally, for a holistic breaching capability, efforts are needed in the area of obstacle removal.

Another new challenge to land warfare is off-route mines. This emerging threat can lay in wait at standoffs up to 100 meters, and it is capable of targeting and killing mechanized forces without being detected. Systems must be developed for in-stride clearance of these mines from the shoulders of the intended route as well as from barrier minefields.

Area clearance in support of a military mission is a challenge that has been overlooked. This task requires the clearing of large areas infested with mines or unexploded ordnance (UXO). Such an action is paramount to the conduct of logistics over the shore and the establishment of rear-area Combat Service Support (CSS) functions. CSS elements must be capable of operating in a mined environment. Currently these units rely on many of the same personnel and equipment resources that support the maneuver force. Clearance resources available to the CSS as well as to the general forces are limited and labor intense. Efforts are needed to provide mechanical, electronic, robotics, and low-order neutralization technologies that will allow for the systematic removal of mines and UXO by organic resources. Dissemination of intelligence relative to the locations of previous combat and fire support operations is required. This intelligence will allow CSS units operating in post-combat areas to be aware of the risk, and it will support planning for required clearance missions.

Battlespace management for countermine warfare must be improved. To be effective, the operational commander requires fused mine warfare intelligence in a timely manner within his overall maneuver battle plan. Currently, for both land and amphibious operations, the electronic dissemination of information regarding suspected minefields, actual mine locations, and cleared routes or areas is often inaccurate and unreliable. In shallow water, in surf zones, and on beaches, no capability exists to rapidly mark these areas cleared for follow-on maneuver. Mine warfare environmental sampling, databases, and modeling efforts must be improved if they are to contribute to the development of sensors and systems as well as real-time support for field commanders in the form of tactical decision aids (TDAs). Data collection tools for mine/minefield reports are needed to provide accurate, consistent mine data inputs. Software tools are needed to collect, store, format, display, and disseminate countermine data. The goal of this effort is to provide a comprehensive countermine picture to all required operational units. Reduction in the vulnerability of watercraft, land vehicles, and personnel to mines is a critical technical challenge involving blast deflection/absorption, signature duplication and projection, acoustic and magnetic signature reduction, and other techniques.

5. Technology Plan

Figure IV.G-2 presents the technologies needed to breach the limitations to functional capabilities required to achieve the joint countermine objective. These technologies offer the potential for a significant increase in today's capability. Their need is underscored by experience in the Persian Gulf War, Somalia, and Bosnia.

Table IV.G-3 identifies the Joint Countermine DTOs. Table IV.G-4 presents the DTOs that, when attained, will enable the operational capability elements. Each DTO is plotted in the technology roadmap, Figure IV.G-3.

The roadmap for developing and demonstrating the technologies required to support the JCM JWCO is shown in Figure IV.G-3. This diagram shows the demonstrations that result from three serial processes: phenomenology, technology, and integration. Phenomenology addresses the understanding of the physical effects that influence mine detection, detonation, and negation. These effects include a better understanding of hydrographic phenomena in shallow and littoral waters and the surf zone, acoustic and electromagnetic mine and minefield signatures, and the reaction of explosives to chemical and energetic perturbation (pressure, directed energy, etc.). Technology enables the design of various sensoring and neutralization systems, including algorithms for the detection and identification of minefields and for the exploitation of all available data (tactical sensors, intelligence sensors, and threat databases). This effort is supported by DTAP DTO SE.19.03, Affordable ATR via Rapid Design, Evaluation, and Simulation. Integration represents the effort required to put technologies on a militarily significant platform for demonstration. Integration also addresses the critical need to provide a comprehensive C4I capability, which includes near-real-time, high-confidence situational awareness of the mine threat, the location and availability of friendly forces and their countermine capabilities, and coordination among service and coalition forces to optimize countermine effectiveness.

Figure IV.G-2

Table IV.G-3. Defense Technology Objectives—Joint Countermine

DTO No. Title
G.01 Land Mine Neutralization
G.02 Land Mine Detection
G.04 Joint Countermine ACTD
G.05 Rapid Battlefield Mine Reconnaissance
G.06 Rapid Sea Mine Neutralization
G.07 Autonomous Shallow Water Influence Sweeping
G.08 In-Stride Amphibious Breaching
G.09 Advanced Mine Reconnaissance/Minehunting Sensors
G.11 Advanced Mine Detection Sensors
G.12 Lightweight Airborne Multispectral Countermine Detection System
GV.12.01 Mission Reconfigurable Unmanned Undersea Vehicle
IS.01.01 Consistent Battlespace Understanding
SE.19.03 Affordable ATR via Rapid Design, Evaluation, and Simulation
SE.28.01 Low-Power Radio Frequency Electronics
SE.29.01 Design Technology for RF Front Ends
SE.33.01 Advanced Focal Plane Array Technology
SE.43.01 Energy Conversion/Power Generation
SE.45.01 Forecast of Littoral Currents and Waves
SE.47.01 Autonomous Ocean Sampling Network: Mapping of Ocean Fields

The technology efforts include several projects in the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps S&T programs. Following is a list by DTOs:

Table IV.G-4. Demonstration Support—Joint Countermine

Demonstration Operational Capability Elements Service/
Agency
Type of Demonstration
Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Detection Breaching and Neutralization Battlespace Management DTO ACTD ATD
Land Mine Neutralization









Army G.01 X X
Land Mine Detection





Army G.02


X
Joint Countermine ACTD Army, Navy G.04 X


Rapid Battlefield Mine Reconnaissance





Marine Corps G.05 X X
Rapid Sea Mine Neutralization








Navy G.06


X
Autonomous Shallow Water Influence Sweeping









Navy G.07 X X
In-Stride Amphibious Breaching










Navy G.08 X X
Advanced Mine Reconnaissance/Minehunting Sensors








Navy G.09 X


Advanced Mine Detection Sensors










Army G.11


X
Lightweight Airborne Multispectral Countermine Detection System





Army G.12 X (C)
Mission Reconfigurable Unmanned Undersea Vehicle







Navy GV.12.01



Consistent Battlespace Understanding








Air Force, Navy, DARPA IS.01.01



Affordable ATR via Rapid Design, Evaluation, and Simulation








Army, Air Force SE.19.01



Low-Power Radio Frequency Electronics




Air Force, DARPA SE.28.01



Design Technology for RF Front Ends




Air Force, DARPA SE.29.01



Advanced Focal Plane Array Technology




Air Force, Navy, DARPA SE.33.01



Energy Conversion/Power Generation






Navy, Air Force, DARPA SE.43.01



Forecast of Littoral Currents and Waves






Navy, Army SE.45.01



Autonomous Ocean Sampling Network




Navy, Army SE.47.01



Strong Support Moderate Support(C) 6.3 Core Demo

Figure IV.G-3 The primary mechanism for consolidating these projects into an integrated system-of-systems is the joint countermine Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) (DTO G.04), sponsored and executed by USACOM and developed and managed by a Navy/Marine Corps/Army Joint Program Office. The two key integration activities in this ACTD are the C4I effort and the Joint Countermine Operational Simulation (JCOS) project. Under the C4I effort, the Joint Task Force Commander will be provided a complete, up-to-date situation awareness of the countermine intelligence and status along with direct connectivity to all maneuver units via existing or planned communications links. Global Command and Control System (GCCS)-compatible countermine warfighting evaluation tools and tactical decision aids (TDAs) will support all aspects of the littoral countermine effort, including minefield and obstacle surveillance and reconnaissance, mine and obstacle detection and avoidance, mine classification, and mine and obstacle clearance. The JCOS links existing modeling and simulation tools along with representatives of all countermine platforms and units in a distributed interactive simulation (DIS) framework consistent with the JCM/C4I net to provide a comprehensive planning, training, rehearsal, and operational evaluation tool for joint countermine operations.

Additionally, individual service 6.2 and 6.3 core programs in various areas—including environment, sensors, explosives, and countermine—contribute significantly to the joint countermine effort. Several other related efforts also have the potential to help countermine efforts. The Army Environmental Center recently completed a range clean-up technology program at the Jefferson Proving Ground. DOE and EPA requirements for test range and dump site redemption have led to the joint DoD/DOE Mobile Underwater Debris Survey System (MUDSS) project. Sandia National Laboratory is exploring foam bridges for minefield breaching and chemical sensing devices for mine reconnaissance. DARPA has an ongoing mine hunting UUV program and is developing a synthetic aperture sonar for underwater mine reconnaissance. DARPA is also investing in low-cost robotic technology for use in very shallow water, surf zone, and beach zone mine and obstacle clearance. Under DTO GV.14.07, Advanced Ship Degaussing, efforts are underway to significantly reduce steel-hulled ships' magnetic and induced field strengths.

6. Summary

FY96 highlighted the accomplishment of a number of key milestones. During FY96, the Close-in Man-Portable Mine Detector (CIMMD) and the Off-Route Smart Mine Countermeasure (ORSMC) completed their ATDs. The Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis (COBRA), Joint Amphibious Mine Countermeasure (JAMC), and the fire control of the Explosive EN-TD successfully underwent technology demonstrations. Components of the JAMC, LRS/Radiant Clear, and Advanced Underwater Sensor programs participated in USACOM Purple Star exercise (May 1996). CIMMD and ORSMC participated in the TRADOC-sponsored Lightfighter Countermine Experiment (September 1996). These live exercises serve as preparation for the Joint Countermine ACTD Demonstration I in August 1997. Numerous virtual experiments were also conducted during this year. These experiments provided insight to the impact that emerging technologies have on countermine tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Between 1997 and 2005, DoD will continue to enhance the warfighting capability of the services. The collective capabilities demonstrated for each DTO scheduled between 1997 and 2005 shows a stepped improvement over the previous demonstration. The capabilities and their schedule of availability are depicted in Figure IV.G-4. Through combined joint countermine capabilities and user awareness of the growing mine threat, the overall joint countermine objective of providing seamless mine and minefield detection and neutralization in a force projection from sea to inland targets will be realized.

Figure IV.G-4