H. ELECTRONIC COMBAT

1. Definition

Electronic Combat (EC) encompasses the capability to disrupt or degrade an enemy's defenses throughout the areas and times—and across the entire electronic, infrared (IR), and visual spectrums—required to permit the deployment and employment of U.S. and allied combat systems. EC (also known as electronic warfare, or EW) includes capabilities for deceiving, disrupting, or destroying enemy surveillance, command and control (C²), and weapon systems/sensors (e.g., early warning, acquisition, and targeting functions) associated with the enemy's integrated air/area defense network. EC also includes the critical capabilities of recognizing attempts by hostile systems to track or engage U.S. or friendly forces, automatically initiating the appropriate countermeasures or defensive response, and protecting friendly systems through redundancy and hardening.

2. Operational Capability Elements

The strategic goal of EC is to control and exploit the electromagnetic spectrum for maximum effectiveness of U.S. military operations—that is, to deny, disrupt, degrade, deceive, or exploit enemy use of the full electromagnetic spectrum while ensuring its use by friendly or joint forces. Successful attainment of this goal necessarily confers a superior capability on U.S. military and friendly forces to survive in their execution of all required combat/conflict operations/missions. EC has three principal and integral operational capability elements: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic support. Each element provides a range of benefits to participants in joint organizations and operations. Figure IV.H-1 depicts these principal elements as they contribute to joint operations.

Electronic attack (EA) involves the defensive or offensive protection of U.S. forces and platforms against hostile weapon, sensor, and C³ systems. In its traditional form ("self-protection"), EA consists of a warning receiver to warn of impending weapon attack ("attack warning"), expendable countermeasures, and a jamming system working in concert to prevent sensor-guided weapons from hitting their target. More recent technology further expands the boundaries of electronic attack by engaging sophisticated, long-range target acquisition sensors—such as airborne and space-based surveillance/synthetic aperture radars, and the increasingly modern communications supporting all phases of the enemy attack or defense—thereby becoming a key, integral element of battlespace dominance. Therefore, EC/EW and its EA element plays a prominent, vital role in the new, "leveraged" concept of Full Dimensional Protection, as described in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Joint Vision 2010.

One critical aspect of electronic attack is the ability to deny an opponent the reliable use of their own command, control, communications, and computer/intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C⁴ISR) systems—thereby permitting U.S. platforms and forces to operate freely throughout the battlespace with minimal loss to hostile weapons. Such freedom is gained due to confusion, analysis, and decision delays induced and propagated within the enemy's C⁴ISR infrastructure regarding the location(s), structure, and intent of joint forces. This EA strategy is an enabling capability for operations requiring penetration of hostile territory (e.g., suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), close air support (CAS), counter-C³, and precision attack on any fixed or mobile target). Thus, again, electronic attack plays a prominent role in the Joint Vision 2010 concept of Dominant Maneuver by virtue of aiding the control of operational tempo, and EA is synergistic with the Joint Warfighting Capability Objective (JWCO) of Information Superiority.

Electronic protection (EP) supports the development of design features and employment techniques that allow U.S. forces to enjoy the benefits of accurate electronic sensors and systems, both offense and defensive—despite an environment that includes hostile jamming, deception activity, and enemy weapon targeting that, itself, depends on detecting, recognizing, and determining the location of U.S. emitters. EP allows operational users to initiate and prosecute a mission without degradation from opposing EW or from conventional or directed-energy weapons cued or targeted by hostile sensors. Successes in EP techniques translate into effective targeting by joint combatants and reliable communications, surveillance, and electronic support sensors—corresponding to the JWCOs of Precision Force and Information Superiority.

Electronic support (ES) is the EC element that gathers, consolidates, and employs information from hostile or potentially hostile electronic sensors and C³ systems. ES is critical to developing a comprehensive picture of the battlespace and a reliable indication of hostile force movement and intentions. ES allows force avoidance, efficient engagement, and electronic deception—EA—of enemy sensors, weapons, and communications systems. The classic definition of electronic support recognizes its functionality from the joint operational commander level down to the "single-seat" cockpit combatant. With increasingly sophisticated, worldwide, modern weapon systems, the pressures for ever-increasing ES fidelity are blurring the older distinctions between the classic radar warning receiver (attack warning) and the longer range electronic support measures (ESM) systems. Therefore, in the future, all joint combatants/platforms can be integrated into the battlespace picture via the contributions of their ES systems. ES enables a wide range of operational options that contribute to virtually every combat and peacekeeping mission. Hence, ES is strongly synergistic with the JWCOs of Precision Force, Combat Identification, and Information Superiority and the associated Joint Vision 2010 concept of Precision Engagement.

3. Functional Capabilities

Table IV.H-1 depicts the relationships between operational capability elements and functional capabilities for the EA and ES components of EC. Because electronic protection capabilities are generally specific to a sensor or C³ system, the EP component is not addressed further in this section.¹ From a basic technology perspective, refer to the Defense Technology Area Plan (DTAP), Chapter VII, Sensors, Electronics, and Battlespace Environment; and Chapter X, Weapons (EW Mission Support).

4. Current Capabilities, Deficiencies, and Barriers

Current EC/EW capabilities are generally the result of extensive, detailed concentration on the capabilities of the former Soviet Union; a coherent "successor" threat has not yet been established. However, it is clear that generic trends exist in global military technology that allow identification of the most prominent deficiencies and barriers to joint EW operations. Table IV.H-2 provides a top-level summary of capabilities, limitations, and key technologies to overcome current limitations and to provide those capabilities.

The threat of passively guided weapons has increased dramatically over the past decade. Today, infrared-guided weapons pose a serious and growing threat to U.S. forces and platforms in the air, on land, and at sea. Inexpensive, portable missiles can be launched with ease and effectiveness against all airborne combatants. The threat of longer range infrared guided antiship missiles is equally great, and formidable in both at-sea and littoral scenarios. Land combat vehicles are similarly threatened by frontal and top-attack munitions guided by infrared and multispectral seekers. Protection against infrared guided weapons is the highest priority need in electronic attack and is an important deficiency that constrains the efficient execution of joint operations.

The technology barriers to resolutions of these EA deficiencies include inadequate detection range and angular resolution on attack warning systems to eject decoys or initiate jamming; insufficient power, low efficiency, and unacceptable size, weight, and cost of laser devices that could be used in countermeasure systems; and insufficient output power and excessive size, weight, and cost of high-power microwave systems for self-protection of platforms. Of particular concern in the high-power microwave arena is the integration of this weapons-level EC effect into operational concepts of Joint Forces—so as to avoid/mitigate the possible, self-inflicted, mission-degrading effects of electronics fratricide and platform "suicide." Each of these barriers is being addressed with ongoing technology demonstration programs.

As a second area of high EA priority, the rapid development and adoption of new communications technology has created deficiencies in the ability of U.S. forces to exploit and selectively disrupt modern signals. Cellular and personal communications systems used by civilians and hostile forces, and high-capacity digital, multichannel networks associated with distributed information systems, pose particularly difficult technical challenges. The ability to detect, analyze, exploit, and disrupt these signals is fundamental to the conduct of joint operations against an opponent with modern communications equipment and sensors. In the context of EA, jamming transmitters and antennas used against C³ signals require improvements in precise modulation selection and modulator control, linearity, efficiency, output power, and directivity.

Electronic protection measures are generally specific to a sensor or C³ system. EP measures entail the tailoring of generic protection technology and techniques (again, as treated in the respective DTAP sections) to satisfy the electronic protection requirements of a specific system in order to ameliorate the effects of hostile jamming, deception, targeting, or directed-energy attack. Although included as an element of EC, these efforts are an integral part of the sensor or C³ development program (e.g., GPS). As stated previously and noted at the end of Table IV.H-2, further EP details are omitted from this section.

Electronic support is the activity that gathers timely information on hostile force composition, status, and intentions by intercepting and analyzing the signals from hostile electronic systems and integrating this information with that from our own forces and electronic systems—whether at the joint command, at-sea battlegroup, or single-seat cockpit/battlefield soldier level. The composition and characteristics of C³ systems are changing rapidly as low-cost, high-performance digital technology becomes universally available. The proliferation of this technology has also encouraged the widespread availability of cellular and personal communications devices that are highly mobile and resistant to conventional electronic attacks. Optical fiber networks, coupled with increasingly more powerful computers, constitute the basis for powerful information systems that support sophisticated military C³ functions as easily as civilian applications. These advances in processing and communications technology facilitate and encourage the acquisition of customized, unique C³ systems in the military forces of many small countries. This diversity and unpredictability constitutes a formidable challenge to ES organizations that must support operational users with services and products in any conceivable location and situation.

As advanced knowledge of threat system parameters—necessary for attack warning and countermeasure waveform development—becomes more difficult to obtain, EW receivers on tactical aircraft, ships, and land combatants will have to assume some of the burden formerly assigned to dedicated special signal collection receivers (i.e., the "blurring" regarding ES as discussed in Subsection 2, above). This will be necessary to accumulate detailed information on classes of emitters, as well as individual emitters, and to support the development of generic system recognition algorithms.

The ability to fuse different forms of information from multiple sources is an important capability in an environment of mixed-media signals. Algorithms that can analyze and consolidate information from different sensors and databases can produce a product that is more complete and informative than the sequential examination of the individual contributions. Algorithms using expert system techniques and artificial intelligence principles can represent and manipulate knowledge faster and more exhaustively than is possible with human analysts in time-critical situations.

The technology deficiencies in electronic combat include incomplete development of technologies suitable for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for signal collection/ES missions (and linkages/extrapolations of this technology to broadband RF support EA countermeasures from UAV platforms); inadequate processing subsystems and algorithms for detection, identification, and analysis of new communications waveforms; unacceptable performance in signal collection against mixed-media networks containing fiber optic and other transmission media; and inadequate performance and excessive cost to acquire and maintain warning and signal collection capabilities in tactical EW receivers. Finally, current capabilities in the representation of data, automated sensor product analyses, and machine reasoning capabilities are insufficient to perform timely and complete sensor product and data fusion.

Figure IV.H-2 illustrates how technology developments support technical demonstrations that contribute to operational capability elements in Electronic Combat. Table IV.H-3 lists planned DTOs for EC, the details of which can be found in the DTO volume for the JWSTP and the DTAP. Table IV.H-4 correlates the technical demonstrations with the operational capability elements they support.

5. Technology Plan

As emphasized above, a critical, coordinated tri-service plan to address vulnerability to IR missiles and weapons has been developed under Defense Reliance and is being executed. The program includes near to mid term measures to reduce vulnerabilities by using improved missile warning capabilities and advanced flares. Coupled with laser source work under the DTAP (DARPA and WE.43.08), conventional laser-based infrared countermeasures (IRCM) solutions are in progress—notably the current work under DTOs H.02 (for rotary-wing aircraft) and H.05 (for large aircraft). Additionally, an ATD is scheduled to conclude this fiscal year that will establish baseline data on future open-loop, laser-based IRCM architectures for planned Reliance collaboration in the tactical aircraft arena (TACAIR DIRCM). With regard to surface ship combatants, 1996 plans to pursue a laser-based IRCM ACTD for the large-ship class have been superseded by the inclusion of the technology (from its successful 1994-95 ATD) into 6.4 development work in conjunction with the Advanced Integrated EW System (AIEWS).

Capabilities to attack hostile command and control (C²) networks will vastly improve with the development of transmitters with more efficient power amplification; modern, digital, EA modulation formats; and greater angular precision. These enhancements will effectively increase jamming power on victim systems and reduce interference with U.S. and allied systems in the vicinity. A coordinated tri-service effort will develop signal separation, recognition, analysis, and countermeasure techniques against specific waveforms used in C² applications. These ES capabilities will be consolidated with the jamming improvements developed as an electronic attack measure to produce an improved ability to selectively disrupt hostile communications and weapon control networks.

Similarly, a coordinated development is under way to design and integrate critical digital receiver/processor technologies to yield next-generation EW receivers and receiver upgrades. These receivers will be capable of performing warning, signal parameter collection, and situation assessment; and assisting the functions of threat geolocation and combat ID. Associated architectures will integrate the advantages of broadband, channelized monolithic receivers "on a chip" with commercial, real-time, parallel digital signal processors to yield an affordable, adaptable, software-reconfigurable capability. A concurrent affordability thrust is planned by the Navy in FY97-98 to "productize" the 6.2-developed monolithic microwave integrated circuit (MMIC) receiver-channelizer, with firm expectations to achieve hundredfold reductions in cost, size, weight, and increased reliability. In conjunction with DARPA/AF work on advanced digital receiver components/interconnects, these capabilities will serve to fill a number of future operational deficiencies that are now represented by more than a dozen individual systems.

The major push in the Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) area is the Miniature Air-Launched Decoy (MALD) ACTD Program (H.04). To augment the EW "triad" of the future (standoff communications jamming, SEAD, and standoff radar jamming), a joint development effort is being planned to design and develop the next-generation support jammer. Key to the program is the adoption of a reconfigurable pod/UAV concept that will not depend on a dedicated airframe in the future. Synergies of the technologies involved will also have joint applications to affordable upgrades to jamming systems of all three services and their respective platforms (DTAP DTO WE.46.08, Coherent RF Countermeasures Technology, and H.06/ H.08).

Figure IV.H-3 is a roadmap for developing and demonstrating the technologies required to support the operational advances in Electronic Combat. This roadmap concentrates on the themes of IRCM (air, land, and sea platforms); offensive C² Warfare/Information Warfare; precision emitter location and battlespace SA; upgrades to our aging joint combatant platforms; and the valuable "force multiplier" aspects of support jamming.

6. Summary

Figure IV.H-4 shows how this investment strategy will provide incremental improvements to Electronic Combat. This section on the Electronic Combat JWCO describes a well-balanced approach to achieve platform protection and electronic support to all joint combatants. The plan emphasizes solutions to the formidable, worldwide IR missile threats; multispectral situation awareness; countering the C² hierarchies of the hostile force while preserving real-time knowledge of the enemy; and countering the enemy early in the engagement process via the EC triad of C² Warfare, SEAD, and RF support jamming.

EC demonstrates vital support to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and his Joint Vision 2010 concepts of Full-Dimensional Protection, Dominant Maneuver, and Precision Engagement. As an "enabler," EC demonstrates several, critical important synergies with the Information Superiority, Combat Identification, and Precision Force JWCOs, with an overall focus on assuring survivability to the joint warfighter.

¹ For example, protecting operational usage of GPS is dealt with, in part, by the Navigation Warfare ACTD.