I. CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WARFARE DEFENSE AND PROTECTION
The Chemical/Biological (CB) Warfare Defense and Protection area focuses on technologies to counter the threat of chemical and biological weapons, and to ensure the safety and mission effectiveness of U.S. forces operating in a contaminated environment with minimal impact on logistics. Contamination avoidance—to include the ability to detect, identify, characterize, and warn—is the highest priority of the DoD CB defense program. In addition to contamination avoidance, the program includes force protection (individual, collective, and medical) and decontamination.
2. Operational Capability Elements
The key operational capabilities in CB Warfare Defense and Protection are (1) contamination avoidance to include the ability to detect, identify, and warn of CB attacks, (2) force protection that encompasses individual, collective and medical protection, and (3) decontamination. Figure IV.I-1 illustrates how CB warfare defense and protection impacts all aspects of the battlefield, particularly in supporting the national 2 MRC global power projection strategy.
Operational capabilities for CB Warfare Defense and Protection are driven by the Defense Technology Objectives (DTOs) included in the Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan and Defense Technology Area Plan. Technologies supporting these objectives will be refined through ACTDs, ATDs, other technology demonstrations, and various technology thrusts.
Contamination Avoidance. Technologies for the detection, identification, characterization, and warning of an attack are the cornerstone of defense against CB warfare. The key operational capabilities, as listed across the top of Figure IV.I-2, are:
Early Warning. Early warning of CB agents is key to the effective avoidance and protection against contamination. Early warning of a CB attack is a high JCS/CINC/JROC counterproliferation priority. Early warning, which complements local point detection, is intended primarily as a means of detecting and tracking chemical and biological agent clouds and providing information to commanders downwind that an attack has begun that involves agent released from a CB weapon. Intelligence capabilities provide information of an enemy's chemical or biological warfare capabilities (e.g., the size and nature of an enemy's stockpile). In contrast, early warning provides information as early during an attack as possible (from tens of seconds to tens of minutes before units are exposed to CB agent) so that commanders have increased options for operational responses, including which protective posture to assume. Early warning may be implemented through standoff detection using a variety of laser and passive optical detector technologies at ranges up to 100 km from the contamination, through point detectors deployed on remotely controlled platforms (e.g., unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)), or through the forward placement of point detectors (e.g., airdrops, Special Operations Forces (SOF) emplacement). Technology is being developed to accomplished this under DTSE.09.02, Multifunction Laser. While a single technology (or technology suite) with combined multiagent chemical and biological detection is a goal of these efforts, such a solution is not planned for transition out of tech base during the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). Current technology thrusts for early warning focus on separate systems for chemical and biological detection.
The most likely near-term approach will continue to rely on complementary detection technologies. For biological agents, current and near-term technologies seek to identify the presence of higher than normal concentrations of aerosols or particulate matter in the atmosphere. If these substances are present, data are examined to determine whether the aerosol/particulate formation is natural or man-made. Simultaneously, other sensors will seek to detect whether the aerosol or particulate contains biological material. If the material is biological, other sensors (e.g., a biological point identification system mounted on a UAV) may be deployed into the aerosol cloud to determine whether the material is a biological warfare agent. As technologies mature, new systems will be able to detect, identify, and characterize an increasing number of toxic agents, more reliably, and from greater distances. Technical barriers associated with developing these technologies include overcoming attenuation of laser energy by atmospheric absorbents and providing algorithms to discriminate between natural atmospheric species and biological agents.
One of the key early warning defense technology objectives—standoff and remote biological warfare agent detection—recently has been transferred out of tech base and is being funded jointly by the Joint Program Office for Biological Defense (JPO-BD) and the Counterproliferation Support Program. This program seeks to provide maneuver forces, other forces at airbases and seaports, and (possibly) civilians in population centers with timely warnings of biological agents. Technologies being evaluated in an ACTD include standoff detectors and sensors mounted on UAVs.
Point Detection. The overall goal of point detection (also referred to as local warning) is to develop point sensor technologies that can rapidly detect the presence of biological warfare agents, accurately identify biological warfare agents, and enhance the sensitivity, selectivity, reliability, and reduced size of warfare agent detectors. The program is divided into two parts—biological and chemical. Technologies under consideration in the near- and mid-term future cannot address both of these threats using the same technology. However, there are efforts to develop a single suite of sensors to detect all potential CB threats. Chemical and biological detectors will be incorporated as separate modules and could be upgraded as newer technologies emerge. Understanding atmospheric propagation effects is important to this function. These technologies are include under DTOs SE.52.01, Weather/Atmospheric Impacts on Sensor Systems and SE.53.01, On-Scene Weather Sensing and Prediction Capability.
Point detection improves visualization of CB hazards in a local environment through the exploitation of emerging technologies such as immunoassays, deoxyribonucleic acid/gene probes, various forms of spectroscopy, and other physical/chemical characterization technologies. The problems associated with this effort include (1) the development of sensor technology with sufficient sensitivity and discrimination that can detect, identify, and quantify the presence of biological and chemical hazards without false alarm and (2) the integration/development of C3I technology to permit rapid, automatic collection, collation, dissemination, and display of CB hazard information to various command levels. Heretofore, the primary S&T focus has been in sensor development. However, it is becoming increasingly evident that new technologies are required to integrate sensor information with other battlefield situation awareness information (geographical, meteorological) in order to properly design the software and hardware for the digital battlefield of the future.
The strategy for the biological detection technology effort is to develop a suite of complementary technologies to ensure that a capability in biological detection is achieved. Several technologies are currently being pursued in the Integrated Biodetection Advanced Technology Demonstration initiated in FY96. In addition, the JPO-BD sponsors a yearly field trial and evaluation of emerging technologies. The evaluation will provide recommendations to advance the development of relevant technologies, return immature technologies to the laboratory for additional development, or terminate the development of inadequate technologies.
The strategy for chemical detection is similar to that for biological detection. Currently there are two technologies being considered for a small system capable of individual warrior issue: ion mobility spectroscopy (IMS) and surface acoustic wave (SAW) devices. These are in a more mature state of development than biological detection technologies. In addition, mass spectrometry is being examined for its applicability to both the chemical and biological detection problem. An evaluation of the state of development of IMS and SAW technologies will conclude in early FY97 and will lead to selection of the most promising technology to pursue for the Joint Chemical Agent Detector (JCAD) to start demonstration/validation in late FY97 and engineering and manufacturing development in FY99.
Warning and Reporting. Warning and reporting is the critical link between CB detection and CB protection. The goal of this effort is to provide sufficient, timely information to commanders at all levels through early and direct warning capabilities so they may develop options on how to conduct their mission and decide the appropriate protective posture to assume. Warning and reporting is a critical issue in contamination avoidance. The services have agreed to expedite development of this issue by integrating ongoing hardware and software into a Joint Warning and Reporting Network (JWARN) to be fielded in FY99. Technologies will be developed to provide increased management and control functions, as well as to integrate features of the emerging Global Command Control System (GCCS). The long-term goal of JWARN is to increase warning time by eliminating manual and voice transmission of data and replacing it with digital transmission, and providing significantly improved modeling and simulation capabilities to identify and predict the location and nature of CB hazards on the battlefield and to serve as a commander's decision aide.
Force Protection. The key operational capabilities, as listed across the top of Figure IV.I-2, are Individual Protection, Collective Protection, and Medical Protection.
Individual Protection. The goals of individual protection technology efforts are to (1) improve protection against current threats and add protection against future threats, (2) minimize mission degradation by reducing the impact of the use of individual protection on the soldiers performance, and (3) reduce logistics burden. The key components of individual protection are ocular/respiratory protection and percutaneous protection. Both components support general warfighter requirements such as the Army's Land Warrior Program, as well as specialized applications for the Navy and Air Force. Advanced filtration technologies to reduce breathing resistance and selectively agent-impermeable membranes to increase uniform comfort will reduce individual performance degradation. Because of the high interest in providing protection against biological agents for both U.S. forces and their supporting civilian infrastructure in global force projection, initiatives will examine the feasibility of using lightweight, disposable biological masks against such hazards.
Collective Protection. The collective protection technology base efforts seek to maintain protection against current threats and add protection against future threats. At the same time, collective protection technology efforts seek to reduce logistical burdens through the development of improved filter materials with longer useable lifetimes. Collective protection efforts focus on (1) improvements to current reactive-adsorptive materials, (2) advanced nonreactive filtration processes, (3) advanced reactive filtration, (4) regenerable filtration processes for NBC protection of military vehicles, aircraft, ships, shelters, and buildings, and (5) reduced logistics burden.
Medical Protection. Medical protection consists of three primary functions: (1) pre-exposure preventative measures, (2) post-exposure treatment, and (3) diagnostic capabilities. These functions are applied to defense against chemical and biological threats. Technology efforts will provide a number of medical products for preventing illness or personnel degradation when percutaneous or aerosol CB agents are used on the battlefield. For personnel exposed to these agents, a number of initiatives will seek to ameliorate or preclude the effects of inhaled or percutaneous chemical agents or provide relief from the symptoms of biological agents. Current technologies only provide partial protection against a number of percutaneous or inhaled chemical agents, and only a limited number of vaccines are available against biological agents. Some specific treatments are available for exposure to a limited number of biological agents. Before effective treatment can be applied, the causative chemical or biological agent must be identified, at least by type.
Decontamination. Decontamination is defined as the process of removing or neutralizing a surface hazard resulting from a chemical or biological agent attack. The objective of decontamination technology efforts is to develop methods that are effective, are environmentally safe, react with chemical agents or disinfect biological agents, and do not impact the operational effectiveness of the surface or equipment being decontaminated. Current decontamination materials are caustic and rely heavily on water. Moreover, current methods for decontamination cannot be used to decontaminate large, critical areas, such as seaports or airports, the interiors of sea or air transport vehicles, or sensitive equipment, such as electronics and avionics. Critical studies are needed to define the decontamination technology issues that must be addressed as part of the national global force projection and our ability to simultaneously deploy in two potentially contaminated MRCs.
Table IV.I-1 shows the functional capabilities required to produce the operational capabilities composing chemical/biological defense and protection. Specific technology programs are listed under each functional capability.
4. Current Capabilities, Deficiencies, and Barriers
Table IV.I-2 presents the key technologies being pursued to overcome current operational limitations in the functional capabilities that compose CB Defense.
For early warning, the technological issues are (1) discrimination of biological warfare agents from each other and from naturally occurring biological materials in the atmosphere; (2) size, weight, and power requirements of chemical and biological detection systems (meeting these constraints may require tradeoffs in range and sensitivity); (3) aerosol background (naturally occurring biological materials such as pollen may cause high false alarm rates for biodetection systems); (4) man/machine interface; (5) sensor integration on various platforms (e.g., UAVs); (6) on-the-move standoff detection of chemical and biological agents; and (7) sensitivity of standoff detection systems.
For point detection, the technological issues are (1) development of real-time detection of biological materials (current capabilities require 15 or more minutes to detect biological agents and longer to identify agents); (2) unique identification of biological materials (current efforts are focused on generic detection of aerosols and particulates and identification of a limited number of agents); (3) improved sampling and collection technologies for warfare agents; (4) small, lightweight chemical detector (current capabilities provide detection for units but are not useful for use by an individual); (5) decrease in false alarm rate; and (6) sampling and collection of suspect aerosols.
For warning and reporting, the technological issues are (1) digitization of battlefield sensor information; (2) automation of detection and warning processes; (3) collation and display of relevant information at various command levels; (4) integration of other sensor information such as geolocation, meteorology, etc.; and (5) integration of data into appropriate models for analysis and presentation.
For individual protection, the technological issues are (1) development of materials that reduce heat and other stress burdens on the soldier and are more selective in precluding transport of agents across the ensemble barrier but pass heat and perspiration; (2) provision of clear criteria for dexterity, tactility and mobility requirements; and (3) provision of masks that can be adapted to a number of specialized aircrew applications.
For collective protection, the technological issues are (1) development of longer lifetime filters/filter materials for collective protection shelters and (2) develop regenerative filter processes and materials.
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 Strong Support |  Moderate Support | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Table IV.I-2. Goals, Limitations, and Technologies— Chemical/Biological Warfare Defense and Protection
| Goal | Functional Capabilities | Limitations | Key Technologies |
|---|---|---|---|
| Operational Capability Element: Chemical/Biological Detection | |||
|
Chemical and Biological Detection Systems Chemical point detection |
Detectors are not sufficiently miniaturized |
IMS, SAW, and other technologies with agent concentrator |
| Rapid, all biological agent detection and characterization | Biological point detection | No portable systems Limited number of agents No rapid detection Inadequate sampling and collection system |
Size, weight, power, reduction technology Near-real-time detection technology Nonagent specific toxic hazard identification (neuronal sensor) |
| Lightweight on-the-move detection (field-of-view 360° wide x 60° high). High-value site defense. | Chemical early warning | Vapor detection only No miniaturized system No unattended sensor |
FTIR with moving background algorithm DISC/DIAL Coherent frequency agile laser technology Remotely employable technologies |
| Early warning of bio attack. Tracking of threat agent clouds. | Biological early warning | No eye-safe laser Aerosol could detection only No miniaturized systems No unattended sensors |
Eye-safe laser technology Wideband tunable laser technology Remotely employable technologies |
| Fully integrated, interoperable, joint service, real-time warning, reporting, and mapping of all CB hazards | Warning and reporting | Manual Voice, radio, and paper reports Detection systems not integrated into GCCS |
Radio relay automation NBC report preparation automation Computation mapping |
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Modeling CB modeling |
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Gaussian puff model Computational fluid dynamics Rapid calculation of high fidelity model |
| Operational Capability Element: Individual Protection | |||
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Nonmedical Protection Advanced filtration technology Advanced materials for percutaneous protection Systems integration Protection assessment technologies Advanced protection for unique operations |
Ability to satisfy final performance goals may require multiple systems and/or power as in case of thermal degradation Full definition of the land warrior program is needed to satisfy future compatibility requirements Attempting to use one mask for all joint service missions may result in performance reductions for some missions Mission requirements for weight, protection, and launderability force tradeoffs; no single material fulfills all requirements currently Requirements for protection and tactility for gloves for tradeoffs Promising materials for percutaneous protection do not meet affordability requirements; unsuitable for mass production Inadequate capabilities for the unique operational aspects of the marine environment, such as firefighting/damage control, flight deck operations, and high-intensity SPECWARS operations |
Protective system integration and analysis, quantify mission performance, performance testing, performance models for predicting current and future equipment Protective material and test technologies: improve test methodology for protection assessment; improve aerosol stability; investigate effects of different aerosol sizes on protection New/improved filtration systems: develop engineered adsorbent—superactivated adsorbents and polymeric adsorbents; new catalytic systems will be developed; improved particulate filtration technologies Selectively permeable materials for percutaneous protection Various reactive and nonreactive lightweight materials and membranes for protection against all identified C and B hazards |
| Operational Capability Element: Collective Protection | |||
| Ensure ability to sustain operations and accomplish mission in a CB contaminated environment | Advanced filtration technology Systems integration Advanced protection for unique operations |
Limited basic research funding to understand link between physical and adsorptive properties of various materials in order to predict and optimize filtration performance No adequate means to measure filter life in the field No clearly defined requirements for collective protection |
Reactive-adsorptive materials Advanced nonreactive filtration processes Advanced reactive filtration processes for NBC protection of military vehicles, aircraft, ships, shelters, and buildings Regenerative filtration processes (pressure- and temperature-swing adsorption, PSA/TSA) Embedded monitors Plasma technologies Catalytic oxidation (CATOX) |
| Operational Capability Element: Medical Protection | |||
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Medical Chemical Defense Vesicant and respiratory agent therapy Advanced anticonvulsant Multichamber autoinjector Topical skin protectant Catalytic scavenger/nerve agent pretreatment Rapid field diagnostics |
Advanced product development and FDA approval process for fielding of chemical products Current downsizing and monetary restrictions Integration of DoD/tri-service needs (better joint coordination and representation) |
Advanced anticonvulsant Multichamber autoinjector Reactive topical skin protectant Catalytic scavenger treatment for chemical agents Rapid field diagnostics |
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Medical Biological Defense Aerosol immunization against threat agents Multivalent vaccines Passive vaccines (monoclonal antibodies) Rapid field diagnostics |
Current downsizing and monetary restrictions Integration of DoD/tri-service needs (better joint coordination and representation) Length of time for FDA approval of existing bio agent vaccines Rapid stockpiling of vaccines identified by threat priority |
Multivalent vaccine against biological threat agents Pretreatment against biological threat agents Rapid diagnosis kits |
| Operational Capability Element: Decontamination | |||
| Ensure ability to sustain operations and accomplish mission in a CB contaminated environment | Enzymatic decontamination Sensitive equipment decontamination Aircraft interior decontamination |
Current decontaminant (DS2) is effective in chemical decontamination, yet has a surface corrosive effect Limited assessments have been made to determine scope of problems associated with large area decontamination (LAD); consequently, there are no formal requirements for LAD Environmental and safety requirements limit choice of decontaminants Assessment of methods and technologies to decontaminate compartment interiors needed |
Noncorrosive, nonaqueous decontaminant for field/equipment Environmentally safe decontamination of electronic and sensitive equipment Sorbent decontaminant Large area decontaminant dissemination techniques and technologies Surface Raman spectrometer to monitor decontaminant Quaternary ammonium complexes Enzymatic decontaminants |
For medical protection, the technological issues are (1) development of vaccines against remaining threat list biological agents; (2) development of FDA-acceptable testing protocols for vaccines to determine vaccine efficacy; (3) development of improved topical skin decontamination material; and (4) development of prophylaxes against nerve agents and vesicants.
For decontamination, the technological issues are (1) development of a less corrosive, non-aqueous-based decontamination material; (2) development of technologies for dissemination of decontaminants over large surface areas such as seaports and airports; (3) provision of technologies for decontamination for sensitive closed areas (such as cargo holds or ship compartments) and sensitive equipment (such as electronics and avionics); and (4) development of reactive materials for self-decontamination.
Technology demonstrations and joint field trials provide a means for the rapid field testing of technical options to solve operational needs. These demonstrations support the CB Warfare Defense and Protection Joint Warfighting Objectives (JWCO). Table IV.I-3 lists the Defense Technology Objectives (DTOs) that, when attained, will enable the operational capabilities to meet the objective of the JWCO. Table IV.I-4 illustrates how these demonstrations and supporting technologies are structured to support the JWCO. The demonstrations are cross referenced with the operational capabilities in Figure IV.I-3. Each DTO is described in the Defense Technology Objectives of the Joint Warfighting Science and Technology and Defense Technology Area Plan. Relationships among DTOs are plotted in the technology roadmap, Figure IV.I-3. Figure IV.I-4 provides a notional path for the contribution of each DTO toward the overall CB Warfare Defense and Protection goals of the JWCO.
| DTO No. | Title |
|---|---|
| I.02 | Biological Early Warning ACTD (Proposed) |
| I.03 | Airbase/Port Biological Detection ACTD |
| I.04 | Integrated Biodetection ATD |
| I.05 | Chemical Add-On for the Airbase/Port Biological Detection ACTD (Proposed) |
| CB.02.10 | Joint Warning and Reporting Network |
| CB.06.12 | Advanced Lightweight Chemical Protection |
| CB.07.10 | Laser Standoff Chemical Detection Technology |
| CB.08.12 | Advanced Adsorbents for Protection Applications |
| CB.09.12 | Enzymatic Decontamination |
| CB.16.12 | Enhanced Respirator Filtration Technology |
| J.05 | Wide Area Tracking System ACTD (Proposed) |
| MD.04.J00 | Medical Countermeasures for Botulinum Toxin |
| MD.05.J00 | Chemical Agent Prophylaxes |
| MD.07.J00 | Medical Countermeasures for Vesicant Agents |
| MD.13.J00 | Medical Countermeasures for Staphylococcal Enterotoxin B |
| MD.14.J00 | Medical Countermeasures for Yersinia pestis |
| MD.15.J00 | Medical Countermeasures for Encephalomyelitis Viruses |
Table IV.I-4. Demonstration Support—Chemical/Biological Warfare Defense and Protection
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| Strong Support | Moderate Support | D DoD/Joint Service | (P) Proposed | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Figure IV.I-4. Progress—Chemical/Biological Warfare Defense and Protection
Science and technology efforts in CB warfare defense provide the basis for significant future advances in protecting U.S. forces from the CB threat and address the number 1 priority of the CINC/JROC Counterproliferation JWCO. Warning and reporting is key to detection efforts because it integrates detection systems into the digital battlefield and provides commanders with information to accurately visualize the battlefield and assess warfighting options. Achieving these objectives will ensure that the warfighter is equipped with state-of-the-art capabilities and will not face the same deficiencies encountered during Operation Desert Storm.
