J. COUNTER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, biological, and chemical—along with their associated delivery systems, pose a major threat to our security and that of our allies and other friendly states. Thus a key part of our strategy is to seek to stem the proliferation of such weapons and to develop an effective capability to deal with these threats (Reference 15).
In line with this guidance from the President and related congressional direction, a national program to counter the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has been established. The status of the national counter-WMD effort is provided in the annual Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation, prepared by the congressionally mandated Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC).
In Proliferation: Threat and Response (April 1996), Secretary of Defense William Perry described DoD's contributions to national counterproliferation efforts that have been integrated into the defense planning process. In concert with CPRC's planning, warfighters have identified and prioritized the qualifying factors for accomplishing assigned counter-WMD missions. These requirements involve improved intelligence concerning WMD threats, and enhancements in capabilities for passive defense, active defense, and counterforce against NBC hazards.
The technology development and demonstration activities reported in this section focus on improving military capabilities for the counterforce portion of the counter-WMD mission. Section I, Chemical/Biological Warfare Defense and Protection, includes science and technology (S&T) programs reported in this section in the previous (May 1996) JWSTP.
Counterproliferation S&T in this section is defined to include the capability to detect and evaluate the existence of WMD R&D and manufacturing capability; and identify and assess the weapon capability of alert and launched WMDs on the battlefield to permit the proper level of counterforce to be exerted promptly. This includes counterforce against targets covering entire spectrum of WMD storage and production facilities and agent defeat capability (Reference 16).
These counterforce capabilities respond to 6 of 15 areas designated by the CPRC as development priorities (Reference 17):
Joint Vision 2010 presents the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's vision for future military capabilities. This vision calls for the application of four operational concepts—dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection, and focused logistics—by robust, high-quality forces to provide the United States with the capability to dominate an opponent across the range of military operations.
The enhanced counterforce capabilities being developed through the S&T programs described in this section are preconditions for the realization of Joint Vision 2010. Improved counterforce capabilities can be used to deter or prevent proliferant use of WMD during a contingency, allowing U.S. forces to accomplish full spectrum dominance.
One of the core objectives in proliferation protection policy is to convince potential and actual proliferants that NBC weapons will be of no value because the United States and its coalition partners will have the capability to deny or limit the political or military utility of NBC weapons, and because the damage inflicted by U.S. and coalition forces in response will far outweigh any potential benefits of use (Reference 18).
2. Operational Capability Elements
Figure IV.J-1 shows how counterforce operates within a spectrum of counter-WMD capabilities and contingencies. In addition to the specific functions ascribed, it is appropriate to regard counterforce capabilities as having relevance to aspects of the proliferation threat. Effective counterforce capabilities are critical for convincing potential adversaries that no benefits result from threats to use WMD.
Four sets of operational capabilities are needed to accomplish counterforce missions:
Table IV.J-1 shows relationships between these operational capabilities and a range of functional capabilities associated with the counterforce mission. Additional capabilities (e.g., survivable C4I) are also required to accomplish these missions.
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 Strong Support |  Moderate Support | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
4. Current Capabilities, Deficiencies, and Barriers
Table IV.J-2 shows interrelationships between the operational and functional capabilities and goals, limitations (shortfalls in capability), and technology requirements.
| Goal | Functional Capabilities | Limitations | Key Technologies |
|---|---|---|---|
| Operational Capability Element: Timely Target Identification and Characterization | |||
| Find and characterize WMD production, storage, or related facilities that are on or below the ground (at shallow or moderate depth). Find mobile missile launchers either hidden or in transport. Find and characterize very hard or deeply buried underground WMD facilities to include tunnels. |
ID and characterization sensors WMD target planning tools Sensor data fusion WMD proliferation path analysis |
Few sensor capabilities for finding either mobile missile launchers or buried WMD targets Little exploitation of all source information to identify and describe WMD targets Minimal real-time intelligence and targeting information for warfighters |
Advanced SAR/radar imaging Unattended ground sensors (UGSs) with seismic, acoustic, electromagnetic, and NBC capabilities Multisensor imaging Remote BW/CW sensors Low-cost and man-portable sensors Microsensors Real-time data fusion/integration ATR and automated handling of massive data streams Automated proliferation path analysis for critical node identification |
| Operational Capability Element: Prompt Attack and Planning | |||
| Develop operationally suitable, integrated, computerized force application recommendations with confidence bounds and collateral effects/predictions/minimization for WMD targets. | ID and characterization sensors WMD target planning tools Sensor data fusion WMD proliferation path analysis Real-time weather data and forecast Collateral effects prediction |
No decision aid to determine where in WMD development, production, and employment process counterforce attacks have highest probability of success and minimum collateral effects | Targeting calculation capabilities that include (1) soft, bermed, cut-and-cover, and deeply buried targets; (2) structural response and functional kills of internal equipment; (3) restrike decision based on BDA; (4) tunnel portal and adit disruption; (5) advanced conventional/enhanced weapon payloads; (6) optimization to minimize collateral effects; and (7)real-time weather data input |
| Operational Capability Element: Reliable Defeat/Battle Damage Assessment | |||
| Acquire means to defeat WMD targets at times and under circumstances chosen by the U.S. | Enhanced penetrating munitions Enhanced lethality warheads Agent Defeat (Validated Methods/Warheads) Hard target smart fuzing All-weather guidance BDA sensors |
No available earth penetrator that can destroy deeply buried or very hard WMD targets No earth penetrator with payloads for BW/CW agent defeat or neutralization Limited, highly accurate all-weather delivery capability No subsurface BDA No real-time, all-source data fusion |
Advanced penetrating weapons Void-sensing, depth-sensing fuze Highly accurate, all-weather guidance/delivery Weapon-borne sensor to provide penetration/detonation history High temperature incendiary and BW/CW agent defeat payloads Real-time, all-source sensor data fusion |
| Operational Capability Element: Minimal Collateral Effects | |||
| Develop an operationally suitable, integrated all-weather WMD source/transport/effects prediction capability for effects on military forces and civilian populations resulting from (1) accidental release from WMD facility, (2) enemy use of WMD, or (3) U.S. attack on WMD or related facility. Develop means to minimize collateral effects resulting from U.S. attack on WMD or related facility. | WMD target planning tools Sensor data fusion WMD proliferation path analysis Real-time weather data and forecast Collateral effects prediction Agent Defeat (Validated Methods/Warheads) Hard target smart fuzing All-weather guidance BDA sensors |
No integrated, automated and validate NBC hazard prediction tools for wide ranging WMD targets and U.S. weapons No sensors and tools able to provide detailed equipment, enemy WMD, and WMD facility characterization No special weapons that achieve functional kill while minimizing NBC release |
Accurate models for expulsion of NBC materials High-resolution, in-theater, real-time weather data and forecasts Accurate models for terrain effects on transport of NBC models Lethality assessment of dispersed NBC materials Targeting methods and advanced weapons to minimize expulsion of NBC materials Sensors and tools for WMD facility, equipment, and enemy WMD weapon characterization Real-time, all-source sensor data fusion |
The development strategy employed for counterforce emphasizes near-term technology demonstrations and field trials. These activities are based, in part, on concurrent technical activities that develop enabling technologies for these counterforce counter-WMD applications. They also require survivable C4I. Some of these interrelationships are depicted in Figure IV.J-2. Table IV.J-3 presents the DTOs that contribute to improvements in counter-WMD counterforce capabilities, and Table IV.J-4 identifies applicable technology demonstrations. Figure IV.J-3 presents the timelines and relationships associated with these activities.
The following presentations emphasize those portions of the DoD Science and Technology program that have been defined as Defense Technology Objectives (DTOs). Additional activities make important contributions to DoD counterforce counterproliferation capabilities. The Armed Forces Radiobiological Research Institute has work in progress to develop and validate options for defeat of threat chemical and biological agents and to establish interactions in which multiple threat agents are present. Concurrently, important programs are being accomplished in the DoD Counterproliferation Advanced Technology Development program to develop and evaluate the special equipment needed by Special Operations Forces (SOF) for accomplishment of counterforce counterproliferation missions.
Table IV.J-3. Defense Technology Objectives— Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction
| DTO No. | Title |
|---|---|
| J.03 | Counterproliferation I ACTD |
| J.04 | Counterproliferation II/Counterforce ACTD (Proposed) |
| J.05 | Wide Area Tracking System ACTD (Proposed) |
| CB.10.07 | Nuclear Hardness and Survivability Testing Technologies |
| CB.12.01 | Electronic System Radiation Hardening |
| CB.13.07 | Hard Target Defeat |
| CB.14.07 | Prediction and Mitigation of Collateral Hazards |
| CB.15.01 | Balanced Electromagnetic Hardening Technology |
Table IV.J-4. Demonstration Support—Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction
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| Strong Support | Moderate Support | (P) Proposed | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Table IV.J-5 depicts the enhancements in capabilities for defeat of WMD targets that are the objectives in this JWCO area.
| Stages in CWMD ACTD Activities | I | II | III | IV | V |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WMD Targeting Priorities | Above ground Biological storage |
Buried (but not at great depth) Cut-and-cover Chemical weapon production |
Tunnel portal closure Additional surface targets |
Special nuclear targets C3I for WMD More classes of above-ground targets |
Hard/deeply buried WMD Functional kill |
| DTO | J.03 | J.03 | J.04 | J.04 | J.04 |
| FY | 1996 | 1998 | 2000 | 2002 | 2004 |
